前反思自我觉知的自然化现象学面廓
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摘要
时间意识的双重意向性决定了前反思自我觉知在现象学研究上的重要地位。在现象学心理学中,前反思自我觉知以诸多具有"家族相似性"的概念形态存在。它在生活世界中具有奠基性,并作为意识的自身给予性构成了任何意识经验所具有的基本的自我感,帮助现象学摆脱意识研究的无穷倒退陷阱。伴随虚拟现实技术与认知神经科学的蓬勃发展,前反思自我觉知的上述特征在自然化现象学运动中得到重新检视与系统推进。橡胶手错觉实验揭示的拥有感可以被视为前反思自我觉知的核心构成,而自我参照系的脑电特征佐证了前反思自我觉知的奠基性。这将启发现象学家与神经科学家开展更多值得期待的联姻工作。
The double intentionality of time-consciousness determines that pre-reflective self-awareness plays a core role in phenomenology.In phenomenological psychology,many researchers classify the pre-reflective self-awareness into different concepts according to its family resemblance.Argumentations which come from phenomenology affirm the founded status of pre-reflective self-awareness in life-world,and it is characterized by a first-personal givenness that immediately reveals them as one's own,which can make the experiences to capture a sense of self.Furthermore,it can help phenomenology to avoid an infinite regress in study of consciousness.With the rise of virtual reality and cognitive neuroscience,the features of pre-reflective self-awareness are revisited and systematically tested in the perspective of naturalizing phenomenology.The experiments of rubber hand illusion showed how the sense of ownership constituted the experience of minimal self,and EEG feature of self-reference provided an experimental evidence for the founding position of pre-reflective self-awareness.These works will make a matter of anticipated fact that phenomenology and cognitive neuroscience can learn from each other in a process of mutual enlightenment.
The double intentionality of time-consciousness determines that pre-reflective self-awareness plays a core role in phenomenology.In phenomenological psychology,many researchers classify the pre-reflective self-awareness into different concepts according to its family resemblance.Argumentations which come from phenomenology affirm the founded status of pre-reflective self-awareness in life-world,and it is characterized by a first-personal givenness that immediately reveals them as one's own,which can make the experiences to capture a sense of self.Furthermore,it can help phenomenology to avoid an infinite regress in study of consciousness.With the rise of virtual reality and cognitive neuroscience,the features of pre-reflective self-awareness are revisited and systematically tested in the perspective of naturalizing phenomenology.The experiments of rubber hand illusion showed how the sense of ownership constituted the experience of minimal self,and EEG feature of self-reference provided an experimental evidence for the founding position of pre-reflective self-awareness.These works will make a matter of anticipated fact that phenomenology and cognitive neuroscience can learn from each other in a process of mutual enlightenment.
引文
[1]胡塞尔.内时间意识现象学[M].倪梁康,译.北京:商务印书馆,2009:154.
[2]THOMPSON E.Mind in life:biology,phenomenology,and the sciences of mind[M].Cambridge,MA:The MIT Press,2007.
[3]扎哈维.主体性和自身性:对第一人称视角的探究[M].蔡文菁,译.上海:上海译文出版社,2008:12.
[4]LEGRAND D.Pre-reflective self-consciousness:on being bodily in the world[J].Janus head,2007,9(2):493-519.
[5]COLOMBETTI G.Varieties of pre-reflective self-awareness:foreground and background bodily feelings in emotion experience[J].Inquiry,2011,54(3):293-313.
[6]张祥龙.现象学导论七讲:从原著阐发原意[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2011:42.
[7]萨特.存在与虚无[M].陈宣良,等译.北京:三联书店,2007:11.
[8]MERLEAU-PONTY M.The phenomenology of perception[M].London:Routledge,1962.
[9]GALLAGHER S.Philosophical conceptions of the self:implications for cognitive science[J].Trends in cognitive sciences,2000,4(1):14-21.
[10]DUVAL T S,WICKLUND R A.A theory of objective selfawareness[M].New York:Academic,1972.
[11]LEGRAN D.Pre-reflective self-as-subject from experiential and empirical perspectives[J].Consciousness and cognition,2007,16(3):583-599.
[12]DAMASIO A R.The feeling of what happens:body and emotion in the making of consciousness[M].New York:Harcourt Brace and Co,1999.
[13]GILLIHAN S J,FARAH M J.Is self special?A critical review of evidence from experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience[J].Psychological bulletin,2005,131(1):76-97.
[14]萨特.自我的超越性:一种现象学的描述初探[M].杜小真,译.北京:商务印书馆,2010:11.
[15]ZAHAVI D.Inner time-consciousness and pre-reflective self-awareness[C]∥WELTON D.The new Husserl:a critical reader.Bloomington:Indiana University Press,2003:169.
[16]GALLAGHER S.On the possibility of naturalizing phenomenology[C]∥ZAHAVI D.Oxford handbook of contemporary phenomenology.Oxford:Oxford University Press,2012:70-93.
[17]BOTVINICK M,COHEN J.Rubber hands‘feel’touch that eyes see[J].Nature,1998,391(6669):756.
[18]EHRSSON H H.The experimental induction of out-ofbody experiences[J].Science,2007,317(5841):1048.
[19]张静,陈巍.身体意象可塑吗?同步性和距离参照系对身体拥有感的影响[J].心理学报,2016,48(8):933-945.
[20]TSAKIRIS M,CARPENTER L,JAMES D,et al.Hands only illusion:multisensory integration elicits sense of ownership for body parts but not for non-corporeal objects[J].Experimental brain research,2010,204(3):343-352.
[21]GUTERSTAM A,ZEBERG H,OZCIFTCI V M,et al.The magnetic touch illusion:a perceptual correlate of visuotactile integration in peripersonal space[J].Cognition,2016,155:44-56.
[22]OCHSNER K N,BEER J S,ROBERTSON E R,et al.The neural correlates of direct and reflected self-knowledge[J].Neuro Image,2005,28:797-814.
[23]ESSLEN M,METYLER S,PASCUAL-MARQUI R,et al.Pre-reflective and reflective self-reference:a spatiotemporal EEG analysis[J].Neuro Image,2008,42:437-449.
[24]ZAHAVI D.Naturalized phenomenology[C]∥Schmicking D,Gallagher S.Handbook of phenomenology and cognitive science.Dordrecht:Springer,2010:8.
(1)也有学者使用“前反思的自我意识”。我们认为使用觉知(awareness)比意识(consciousness)更能体现前反思的原初地位。
(1)胡塞尔认为绝对之流是“自我构成的”(self-constituting)。由于绝对之流具有纵向与横向意向性,因此它以保存并且延续自身(包括保存它自身的延续以及延续它自身的保存)的方式形成自身的统一。然而,这个论证因缺少经验依据而略显独断。
(2)当然,我们对旋律的聆听也可以以前反思的、不及物的方式出现。这涉及与环境即时耦合或动态协调。比如在全神贯注的沉浸地聆听一个熟悉的和钟爱的旋律时,这种聆听也完全可以是前反思的。
(3)即无穷倒退。
(1)在神经科学上,本体感觉被视为一种来自身体内部的纯粹个人的、无意识状态下的感知觉功能,是中央神经系统对身体四肢位置的无意识的记录。当前认知科学哲学中则把其看作是意识的一种特殊形式。比如,我们能在前反思地觉知到当自己在环境中运动的时候四肢的空间位置、运动的速度等。还包括皮肤对作用其上的物体距离、纹理等的感觉。
(1)这种设计能够确保研究者在毫秒尺度内计算脑电活动的皮层间来源。
(2)为确保形容词具有广阔的覆盖面,研究者将其分为如下维度:与执行相关的活动(例如饥渴);不活跃,外向或内向性(例如社交的);幸福(例如快乐);情绪性的坏脾气和恐惧(例如紧张)。每个维度包含50个形容词,积极与消极效价的形容词各25个。句子呈现的方式是:从人称代词“我”,或者“他”或“她”为开始,随后接一个对应的系动词“am”或“is”,并以50个可能的形容词结尾。三者的组合可以产生150个不同的句子(例如我是害羞的,她是智慧的)。
(3)这两个朋友或亲属在实验开始前要求被试预先选定,为确保两者与被试的在亲密感上的一致性,要求被试不能选择配偶或恋人。在整个实验过程中,被试在OR条件下做出的评价必须针对同一个男性与女性。
(4)包括内侧前额皮层、前扣带皮层、背内侧前额皮层、楔前叶和后扣带皮层等区。该结构也是大脑静息态网络的组成部分。这些脑区的显著特征之一是静息状态时基线较高,在执行目标指向行为时活动反而降低。
[2]THOMPSON E.Mind in life:biology,phenomenology,and the sciences of mind[M].Cambridge,MA:The MIT Press,2007.
[3]扎哈维.主体性和自身性:对第一人称视角的探究[M].蔡文菁,译.上海:上海译文出版社,2008:12.
[4]LEGRAND D.Pre-reflective self-consciousness:on being bodily in the world[J].Janus head,2007,9(2):493-519.
[5]COLOMBETTI G.Varieties of pre-reflective self-awareness:foreground and background bodily feelings in emotion experience[J].Inquiry,2011,54(3):293-313.
[6]张祥龙.现象学导论七讲:从原著阐发原意[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2011:42.
[7]萨特.存在与虚无[M].陈宣良,等译.北京:三联书店,2007:11.
[8]MERLEAU-PONTY M.The phenomenology of perception[M].London:Routledge,1962.
[9]GALLAGHER S.Philosophical conceptions of the self:implications for cognitive science[J].Trends in cognitive sciences,2000,4(1):14-21.
[10]DUVAL T S,WICKLUND R A.A theory of objective selfawareness[M].New York:Academic,1972.
[11]LEGRAN D.Pre-reflective self-as-subject from experiential and empirical perspectives[J].Consciousness and cognition,2007,16(3):583-599.
[12]DAMASIO A R.The feeling of what happens:body and emotion in the making of consciousness[M].New York:Harcourt Brace and Co,1999.
[13]GILLIHAN S J,FARAH M J.Is self special?A critical review of evidence from experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience[J].Psychological bulletin,2005,131(1):76-97.
[14]萨特.自我的超越性:一种现象学的描述初探[M].杜小真,译.北京:商务印书馆,2010:11.
[15]ZAHAVI D.Inner time-consciousness and pre-reflective self-awareness[C]∥WELTON D.The new Husserl:a critical reader.Bloomington:Indiana University Press,2003:169.
[16]GALLAGHER S.On the possibility of naturalizing phenomenology[C]∥ZAHAVI D.Oxford handbook of contemporary phenomenology.Oxford:Oxford University Press,2012:70-93.
[17]BOTVINICK M,COHEN J.Rubber hands‘feel’touch that eyes see[J].Nature,1998,391(6669):756.
[18]EHRSSON H H.The experimental induction of out-ofbody experiences[J].Science,2007,317(5841):1048.
[19]张静,陈巍.身体意象可塑吗?同步性和距离参照系对身体拥有感的影响[J].心理学报,2016,48(8):933-945.
[20]TSAKIRIS M,CARPENTER L,JAMES D,et al.Hands only illusion:multisensory integration elicits sense of ownership for body parts but not for non-corporeal objects[J].Experimental brain research,2010,204(3):343-352.
[21]GUTERSTAM A,ZEBERG H,OZCIFTCI V M,et al.The magnetic touch illusion:a perceptual correlate of visuotactile integration in peripersonal space[J].Cognition,2016,155:44-56.
[22]OCHSNER K N,BEER J S,ROBERTSON E R,et al.The neural correlates of direct and reflected self-knowledge[J].Neuro Image,2005,28:797-814.
[23]ESSLEN M,METYLER S,PASCUAL-MARQUI R,et al.Pre-reflective and reflective self-reference:a spatiotemporal EEG analysis[J].Neuro Image,2008,42:437-449.
[24]ZAHAVI D.Naturalized phenomenology[C]∥Schmicking D,Gallagher S.Handbook of phenomenology and cognitive science.Dordrecht:Springer,2010:8.
(1)也有学者使用“前反思的自我意识”。我们认为使用觉知(awareness)比意识(consciousness)更能体现前反思的原初地位。
(1)胡塞尔认为绝对之流是“自我构成的”(self-constituting)。由于绝对之流具有纵向与横向意向性,因此它以保存并且延续自身(包括保存它自身的延续以及延续它自身的保存)的方式形成自身的统一。然而,这个论证因缺少经验依据而略显独断。
(2)当然,我们对旋律的聆听也可以以前反思的、不及物的方式出现。这涉及与环境即时耦合或动态协调。比如在全神贯注的沉浸地聆听一个熟悉的和钟爱的旋律时,这种聆听也完全可以是前反思的。
(3)即无穷倒退。
(1)在神经科学上,本体感觉被视为一种来自身体内部的纯粹个人的、无意识状态下的感知觉功能,是中央神经系统对身体四肢位置的无意识的记录。当前认知科学哲学中则把其看作是意识的一种特殊形式。比如,我们能在前反思地觉知到当自己在环境中运动的时候四肢的空间位置、运动的速度等。还包括皮肤对作用其上的物体距离、纹理等的感觉。
(1)这种设计能够确保研究者在毫秒尺度内计算脑电活动的皮层间来源。
(2)为确保形容词具有广阔的覆盖面,研究者将其分为如下维度:与执行相关的活动(例如饥渴);不活跃,外向或内向性(例如社交的);幸福(例如快乐);情绪性的坏脾气和恐惧(例如紧张)。每个维度包含50个形容词,积极与消极效价的形容词各25个。句子呈现的方式是:从人称代词“我”,或者“他”或“她”为开始,随后接一个对应的系动词“am”或“is”,并以50个可能的形容词结尾。三者的组合可以产生150个不同的句子(例如我是害羞的,她是智慧的)。
(3)这两个朋友或亲属在实验开始前要求被试预先选定,为确保两者与被试的在亲密感上的一致性,要求被试不能选择配偶或恋人。在整个实验过程中,被试在OR条件下做出的评价必须针对同一个男性与女性。
(4)包括内侧前额皮层、前扣带皮层、背内侧前额皮层、楔前叶和后扣带皮层等区。该结构也是大脑静息态网络的组成部分。这些脑区的显著特征之一是静息状态时基线较高,在执行目标指向行为时活动反而降低。