规避制造商产品质量风险的保险策略及价格决策
|
摘要
产品质量作为影响企业品牌形象、顾客忠诚度及核心竞争力的关键要素,已被越来越多的制造企业所重视。然而,生产工艺的复杂化,外包策略及供应链管理模式的应用加剧了产品质量的不确定性。为了缓解产品质量风险引发的财务危机,制造商可利用金融工具实现避险。文章以单周期制造商的产品价格决策模型为基础,借助CVaR风险测度方法,研究了制造商购买商业保险规避产品质量风险的边界条件及最优保险策略,并分析了保险策略对制造商产品价格决策的影响。最后,给出商业保险规避产品质量风险的价值分析。研究结果表明:(1)制造商保险购买意愿由安全因子,贴现率和风险承受能力决定,与其它因素无关;(2)当制造商风险承受能力较高而保险安全因子较低时,购买保险可以帮助制造商进入市场;(3)当制造商风险承受能力和保险安全因子均比较低时,购买保险可提高制造商的CVaR值;(4)制造商的投保额度随单位外部故障成本或缺陷率分布上界的上升先增加后降低,随缺陷率分布下界的上升而降低;(5)购买保险可降低产品价格提高消费者剩余;(6)当安全因子和贴现率足够低时,购买保险不仅提高了CVaR值还为制造商带来更高的期望利润;(7)当保险提高制造商的期望利润时,期望利润的增长比率随单位外部故障成本的上升而上升,随产品质量的降低(即缺陷率分布边界的上升)而降低。
The product quality as a key factor affects the manufacturer's brand image, customer loyalty, and core competitiveness. A lack of quality assurance in the design process, R&D, production process or management would aggravate the uncertainty of product quality. The risk of product's quality can cause huge business loss or even the financial crisis. That is why modern manufacturing enterprises attach great importance to product quality, hence taking various strategies to avoid product quality risk.To mitigate the adverse impact of a financial crisis caused by product quality risk, many manufacturers choose to buy business insurance such as warranty insurance, product quality liability insurance or product recall insurance. In this way, business losses can be, partly or all, moved to the third party—financial institution. This practice is an implementation of a risk hedge in the sense of financial management, to alleviate the adverse impact of the risk of product quality.However, such method hedges the risk at the expense of current profit. If there were no defective products during the period covered by business insurance, the high premium of insurance would become the sunk cost. Thus, the manufacturer should choose the optimal insurance policy according to the trade-off between benefit and risk. At this point, a single-period pricing decision model is built in the article, and five key aspects of problems concerned are figured out and analyzed accordingly. The first problem is about the conditions on which manufacturers buy business insurance to avoid the product quality risk.The second problem is related to the optimal insurance strategy when they decide to buy insurance. The third problem is relevant to the impact of business insurance on the manufacturer's pricing decision. The fourth problem is about the effect of market parameters on the manufacturer's optimal insurance policy and the optimal pricing decision. The fifth problem is related to the effect of market parameters on risk hedging value of the certain insurance.Based on a single-period pricing decision model and CVaR measure, this article firstly deals with the boundary conditions and the optimal insurance policy for a manufacturer to buy insurance to avoid the risk of product quality. Furthermore, it presents an analysis of the effects of the insurance strategy by manufacturers for their decisions of the product price. Finally, in the article, value analysis of insurance for hedging the product quality risk is provided.The research findings show that a manufacturer's purchase intention for insurance only depends on the safety factor, discount rate and the degree of risk aversion. In the case of a higher degree of risk aversion with the manufacturer and a lower safety factor of insurance, purchasing insurance can help the manufacturer to enter the market. In the case of both a lower degree of risk aversion with the manufacturer and a lower safety factor of insurance, insurance purchase can improve the manufacturer's CVaR value. The coverage limit increases the upper bound of defect rate distribution and the unit external failure cost and then decreases. However, the coverage limit always decreases the lower bound of defect rate distribution. Purchasing insurance can reduce the product's price and increase the consumer's surplus. When both of the safety factor and discount rate are low enough, purchasing insurance not only improves the manufacturer's CVa R value but also brings a higher expected profit. When the insurance improves the manufacturer's expected profit, the expected profit's growth rate increases concerning the unit external failure cost and decreases concerning the quality of the product(i.e., increases concerning the boundaries of defect rate distribution).The values of business insurance in product quality risk management, which is significant in practice management, include three dimensions. First,business insurance can help small and medium-sized components manufacturers respond effectively to the financial crisis. Second, business insurance can promote manufacturers to develop new products. Third, business insurance can improve consumer surplus and social welfare.This study is limited in a theme of single cycle price and insurance purchase decision model. Follow-up studies are intended to deal with multi-cycle product pricing and insurance purchase decisions in favor of product quality improvement. Also, the product defect rate only serves uniform distribution but leaves another sort of distributions subordinated to choosing the insurance strategy by enterprises.
The product quality as a key factor affects the manufacturer's brand image, customer loyalty, and core competitiveness. A lack of quality assurance in the design process, R&D, production process or management would aggravate the uncertainty of product quality. The risk of product's quality can cause huge business loss or even the financial crisis. That is why modern manufacturing enterprises attach great importance to product quality, hence taking various strategies to avoid product quality risk.To mitigate the adverse impact of a financial crisis caused by product quality risk, many manufacturers choose to buy business insurance such as warranty insurance, product quality liability insurance or product recall insurance. In this way, business losses can be, partly or all, moved to the third party—financial institution. This practice is an implementation of a risk hedge in the sense of financial management, to alleviate the adverse impact of the risk of product quality.However, such method hedges the risk at the expense of current profit. If there were no defective products during the period covered by business insurance, the high premium of insurance would become the sunk cost. Thus, the manufacturer should choose the optimal insurance policy according to the trade-off between benefit and risk. At this point, a single-period pricing decision model is built in the article, and five key aspects of problems concerned are figured out and analyzed accordingly. The first problem is about the conditions on which manufacturers buy business insurance to avoid the product quality risk.The second problem is related to the optimal insurance strategy when they decide to buy insurance. The third problem is relevant to the impact of business insurance on the manufacturer's pricing decision. The fourth problem is about the effect of market parameters on the manufacturer's optimal insurance policy and the optimal pricing decision. The fifth problem is related to the effect of market parameters on risk hedging value of the certain insurance.Based on a single-period pricing decision model and CVaR measure, this article firstly deals with the boundary conditions and the optimal insurance policy for a manufacturer to buy insurance to avoid the risk of product quality. Furthermore, it presents an analysis of the effects of the insurance strategy by manufacturers for their decisions of the product price. Finally, in the article, value analysis of insurance for hedging the product quality risk is provided.The research findings show that a manufacturer's purchase intention for insurance only depends on the safety factor, discount rate and the degree of risk aversion. In the case of a higher degree of risk aversion with the manufacturer and a lower safety factor of insurance, purchasing insurance can help the manufacturer to enter the market. In the case of both a lower degree of risk aversion with the manufacturer and a lower safety factor of insurance, insurance purchase can improve the manufacturer's CVaR value. The coverage limit increases the upper bound of defect rate distribution and the unit external failure cost and then decreases. However, the coverage limit always decreases the lower bound of defect rate distribution. Purchasing insurance can reduce the product's price and increase the consumer's surplus. When both of the safety factor and discount rate are low enough, purchasing insurance not only improves the manufacturer's CVa R value but also brings a higher expected profit. When the insurance improves the manufacturer's expected profit, the expected profit's growth rate increases concerning the unit external failure cost and decreases concerning the quality of the product(i.e., increases concerning the boundaries of defect rate distribution).The values of business insurance in product quality risk management, which is significant in practice management, include three dimensions. First,business insurance can help small and medium-sized components manufacturers respond effectively to the financial crisis. Second, business insurance can promote manufacturers to develop new products. Third, business insurance can improve consumer surplus and social welfare.This study is limited in a theme of single cycle price and insurance purchase decision model. Follow-up studies are intended to deal with multi-cycle product pricing and insurance purchase decisions in favor of product quality improvement. Also, the product defect rate only serves uniform distribution but leaves another sort of distributions subordinated to choosing the insurance strategy by enterprises.
引文
[1]Zhu K.,Zhang RQ,Tsung F.Pushing quality improvement along supply chains[J].Management Science,2007,53(3):421-436.
[2]Dunk AS.Product quality,environmental accounting and quality performance[J].Accounting,Auditing&Accountability Journal,2002,15(5):719-732.
[3]桂寿平,栗叔林,张智勇等.允许缺货且具有随机缺陷率的EOQ模型研究[J].管理工程学报,2011,25(1):140-147.
[4]Baiman S,Fischer PE,Rajan MV.Information,contracting,and quality costs[J].Management Science,2000,46(6):776-789.
[5]Myers SC,Majluf NS.Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have[J].Journal of financial economics,1984,13(2):187-221.
[6]张娓.促进产品质量保险发展的几点思考[J].生产力研究,2010(4):85-86.
[7]吴祥佑.论产品召回保险的性质[J].保险研究,2011(3):70-78.
[8]阮宇.国内飞机制造企业保险需求分析[J].保险职业学院学报,2013,27(6):37-39.
[9]Billington C,Johnson B,Triantis A.A real options perspective on supply chain management in high technology[J].Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,2002,15(2):32-43.
[10]李婕.金融工程在供应链风险管理中的应用分析[J].生产力研究,2008(4):32-33.
[11]Froot KA,Scharfstein DS,Stein J.Risk Management:Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing Policies[J].Finance,1993,48(5):1629-1658.
[12]Reyniers DJ,Tapiero CS.The delivery and control of quality in supplier-producer contracts[J].Management Science,1995,41(10):1581-1589.
[13]Lim WS.Producer-supplier contracts with incomplete information[J].Management Science,2001,47(5):709-715.
[14]Balachandran KR,Radhakrishnan S.Quality implications of warranties in a supply chain[J].Management Science,2005,51(8):1266-1277.
[15]李丽君,黄小原,庄新田.双边道德风险条件下供应链的质量控制策略[J].管理科学学报,2005,8(1):42-47.
[16]朱立龙,尤建新.非对称信息供应链质量信号传递博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2011,19(1):109-118.
[17]洪江涛,黄沛.两级供应链上质量控制的动态协调机制研究[J].管理工程学报,2011,25(2):62-65.
[18]Chao GH,Iravani SM,Savaskan RC.Quality improvement incentives and product recall cost sharing contracts[J].Management Science,2009,55(7):1122-1138.
[19]刘学勇,熊中楷,熊榆.线性需求下的产品召回成本分担和质量激励[J].系统工程理论与实践,2012,32(7):1400-1407.
[20]Hayek PA,Salameh MK.Production lot sizing with the reworking of imperfect quality items produced[J].Production Planning and Control,2001,12(6):584-590.
[21]Chan W.M,Ibrahim R.N.,Lochert P.B.A new EPQ model:Integrating lower pricing rework and reject situations[J].Production Planning Control,2003,14:588-595.
[22]Sarkar B,C′ardenas-Barr′on LE,Sarkar M.,Singgih ML.An economic production quantity model with random defective rate,rework process and backorders for a single stage production system[J].Manufacturing Systems,2014,33(3):423-435.
[23]Chen Y,Xu M,Zhang G.A risk-averse newsvendor model under the CVaR decision criterion[J].Operation Research(forthcoming),2006.
[24]Rockafellar RT,Uryasev S.Conditional value-at-risk for general loss distributions[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2002.26(7):1443-1471.
[25]孙华,胡金焱.风险偏好下的供应链协同契约机制研究[J].云南大学学报:社会科学版,2011,10(3):85-91.
[26]Dong L,Tomlin B.Managing disruption risk:the interplay between operations and insurance[J].Management Science,2012,58(10):1898-1915.
[27]Bowers NL.Actuarial mathematics[M].Itasca,Ill.:Society of Actuaries,1986.
[28]Cummins JD.Statistical and financial models of insurance pricing and the insurance firm[J].Journal of Risk and Insurance,1991,58(2):261-302.
(1)案例来源:http://www.shfinancialnews.com/xww/2009jrb/node5019/node5051/node5062/userobject1ai98465.html
[2]Dunk AS.Product quality,environmental accounting and quality performance[J].Accounting,Auditing&Accountability Journal,2002,15(5):719-732.
[3]桂寿平,栗叔林,张智勇等.允许缺货且具有随机缺陷率的EOQ模型研究[J].管理工程学报,2011,25(1):140-147.
[4]Baiman S,Fischer PE,Rajan MV.Information,contracting,and quality costs[J].Management Science,2000,46(6):776-789.
[5]Myers SC,Majluf NS.Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have[J].Journal of financial economics,1984,13(2):187-221.
[6]张娓.促进产品质量保险发展的几点思考[J].生产力研究,2010(4):85-86.
[7]吴祥佑.论产品召回保险的性质[J].保险研究,2011(3):70-78.
[8]阮宇.国内飞机制造企业保险需求分析[J].保险职业学院学报,2013,27(6):37-39.
[9]Billington C,Johnson B,Triantis A.A real options perspective on supply chain management in high technology[J].Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,2002,15(2):32-43.
[10]李婕.金融工程在供应链风险管理中的应用分析[J].生产力研究,2008(4):32-33.
[11]Froot KA,Scharfstein DS,Stein J.Risk Management:Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing Policies[J].Finance,1993,48(5):1629-1658.
[12]Reyniers DJ,Tapiero CS.The delivery and control of quality in supplier-producer contracts[J].Management Science,1995,41(10):1581-1589.
[13]Lim WS.Producer-supplier contracts with incomplete information[J].Management Science,2001,47(5):709-715.
[14]Balachandran KR,Radhakrishnan S.Quality implications of warranties in a supply chain[J].Management Science,2005,51(8):1266-1277.
[15]李丽君,黄小原,庄新田.双边道德风险条件下供应链的质量控制策略[J].管理科学学报,2005,8(1):42-47.
[16]朱立龙,尤建新.非对称信息供应链质量信号传递博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2011,19(1):109-118.
[17]洪江涛,黄沛.两级供应链上质量控制的动态协调机制研究[J].管理工程学报,2011,25(2):62-65.
[18]Chao GH,Iravani SM,Savaskan RC.Quality improvement incentives and product recall cost sharing contracts[J].Management Science,2009,55(7):1122-1138.
[19]刘学勇,熊中楷,熊榆.线性需求下的产品召回成本分担和质量激励[J].系统工程理论与实践,2012,32(7):1400-1407.
[20]Hayek PA,Salameh MK.Production lot sizing with the reworking of imperfect quality items produced[J].Production Planning and Control,2001,12(6):584-590.
[21]Chan W.M,Ibrahim R.N.,Lochert P.B.A new EPQ model:Integrating lower pricing rework and reject situations[J].Production Planning Control,2003,14:588-595.
[22]Sarkar B,C′ardenas-Barr′on LE,Sarkar M.,Singgih ML.An economic production quantity model with random defective rate,rework process and backorders for a single stage production system[J].Manufacturing Systems,2014,33(3):423-435.
[23]Chen Y,Xu M,Zhang G.A risk-averse newsvendor model under the CVaR decision criterion[J].Operation Research(forthcoming),2006.
[24]Rockafellar RT,Uryasev S.Conditional value-at-risk for general loss distributions[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2002.26(7):1443-1471.
[25]孙华,胡金焱.风险偏好下的供应链协同契约机制研究[J].云南大学学报:社会科学版,2011,10(3):85-91.
[26]Dong L,Tomlin B.Managing disruption risk:the interplay between operations and insurance[J].Management Science,2012,58(10):1898-1915.
[27]Bowers NL.Actuarial mathematics[M].Itasca,Ill.:Society of Actuaries,1986.
[28]Cummins JD.Statistical and financial models of insurance pricing and the insurance firm[J].Journal of Risk and Insurance,1991,58(2):261-302.
(1)案例来源:http://www.shfinancialnews.com/xww/2009jrb/node5019/node5051/node5062/userobject1ai98465.html