行政处罚如何影响银行业风险:理论机制与实证分析
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摘要
行政处罚可以从警示指导、声誉减损和利益剥夺等三个方面防控银行业风险。本文基于2005年至2017年的银行业行政处罚数据和省级宏观数据,实证研究了行政处罚对银行业风险的影响,并基于银行级微观数据做了稳健性检验。研究结果表明,行政处罚能从不良贷款率、不良贷款增长率和银行破产概率等方面显著降低银行业风险。该结果具有一致性和稳健性。此外,因果识别分析的结果显示,行政处罚与银行业风险之间存在因果关系。在实证结果的基础上,结合当前金融发展形势,本文从健全法规和执法规则、针对个人的问责、加强声誉监管、强化公司治理以及增加违规识别能力和处罚力度等五个方面,就强化银行业风险管控提出了政策建议。
Administrative penalty can prevent and control banking risk taking through three mechanisms: warning guidance, reputation impairment and interest deprivation. With banking administrative penalty data and provincial macro data from 2005 to 2017, this paper empirically studies the impact of administrative penalty on banking risk taking. A robustness test is run with bank-level micro data. The results show that, administrative penalty can significantly demotivate banking risks taking by depressing non-performing loan ratio, non-performing loan growth rate and bank failure probability. The conclusions are consistent and robust. In addition, the results of causal identification analysis show that there is a causal relationship between administrative penalty and banking risk taking. Based on the empirical results, some policy recommendations are proposed to help strengthen risk management of the banking industry in current financial development situation. These proposals include sounding regulations and enforcement rules, accounting personally, strengthening reputation supervision and corporate governance, and increasing violation identification abilities and punishment dynamics.
Administrative penalty can prevent and control banking risk taking through three mechanisms: warning guidance, reputation impairment and interest deprivation. With banking administrative penalty data and provincial macro data from 2005 to 2017, this paper empirically studies the impact of administrative penalty on banking risk taking. A robustness test is run with bank-level micro data. The results show that, administrative penalty can significantly demotivate banking risks taking by depressing non-performing loan ratio, non-performing loan growth rate and bank failure probability. The conclusions are consistent and robust. In addition, the results of causal identification analysis show that there is a causal relationship between administrative penalty and banking risk taking. Based on the empirical results, some policy recommendations are proposed to help strengthen risk management of the banking industry in current financial development situation. These proposals include sounding regulations and enforcement rules, accounting personally, strengthening reputation supervision and corporate governance, and increasing violation identification abilities and punishment dynamics.
引文
1.陈鹏,界定行政处罚行为的功能性考量路径,法学研究,2015年第2期,99-114。
2.陈其安和黄悦悦,政府监管、市场约束对商业银行风险承担行为的影响,金融论坛,2011年第10期,56-61。
3.陈太清和徐泽萍,行政处罚功能定位之检讨,中南大学学报(社会科学版),2015年第4期,61-65、75。
4.成洁,资本监管约束下银行资本与风险调整,统计研究,2014年第2期,68-74。
5.蒋海和杨利,监管压力、市场竞争力与银行稳健性--基于中国48家商业银行的实证分析,广东财经大学学报,2017年第3期,45-56。
6.李延喜、吴笛和肖峰雷等,声誉理论研究述评,管理评论,2010年第10期,3-11。
7.潘敏和魏海瑞,提升监管强度具有风险抑制效应吗?--来自中国银行业的经验证据,金融研究,2015第12期,64-80。
8.邵汉华,审慎监管有效性的实证研究--基于银行效率和风险的视角,财经论丛,2017年第6期,60-68。
9.杨新兰,资本监管下银行资本与风险调整的实证研究,国际金融研究,2015年第7期,67-74。
10.周茂玉和张春和,行贿利益剥夺机制初探,人民检察,2008年第4期,22-26。
11.Adams,R.,and D.Ferreira,Regulatory Pressure and Bank Directors’Incentives to Attend Board Meetings,International Review of Finance,2012,Vol.12,227-248.
12.Bodvarsson,B.,and J.Hou,and K.Shen,Aging and Migration:Micro and Macro Evidence from China,Frontiers of Economics in China,2016,Vol.11,548-580.
13.Fu,Y.,and S.Lee,and L.Xu,et al.The Effectiveness of Capital Regulation on Bank Behavior in China,International Review of Finance,2015,Vol.15,321-345.
14.Laeven,L.,and R.Levine,Bank Governance,Regulation and Risk Taking,Journal of Financial Economics,2009,Vol.93,259-275.
15.Lo,A.,Regulatory Reform in the Wake of the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008,Journal of Financial Economic Policy,2009,Vol.1,4-43.
(1)限于篇幅,不就控制变量的选取理由作表述。
(1)限于篇幅,未对控制变量的结果和各模型之间的差异所反映出来的信息进行解读和分析。
2.陈其安和黄悦悦,政府监管、市场约束对商业银行风险承担行为的影响,金融论坛,2011年第10期,56-61。
3.陈太清和徐泽萍,行政处罚功能定位之检讨,中南大学学报(社会科学版),2015年第4期,61-65、75。
4.成洁,资本监管约束下银行资本与风险调整,统计研究,2014年第2期,68-74。
5.蒋海和杨利,监管压力、市场竞争力与银行稳健性--基于中国48家商业银行的实证分析,广东财经大学学报,2017年第3期,45-56。
6.李延喜、吴笛和肖峰雷等,声誉理论研究述评,管理评论,2010年第10期,3-11。
7.潘敏和魏海瑞,提升监管强度具有风险抑制效应吗?--来自中国银行业的经验证据,金融研究,2015第12期,64-80。
8.邵汉华,审慎监管有效性的实证研究--基于银行效率和风险的视角,财经论丛,2017年第6期,60-68。
9.杨新兰,资本监管下银行资本与风险调整的实证研究,国际金融研究,2015年第7期,67-74。
10.周茂玉和张春和,行贿利益剥夺机制初探,人民检察,2008年第4期,22-26。
11.Adams,R.,and D.Ferreira,Regulatory Pressure and Bank Directors’Incentives to Attend Board Meetings,International Review of Finance,2012,Vol.12,227-248.
12.Bodvarsson,B.,and J.Hou,and K.Shen,Aging and Migration:Micro and Macro Evidence from China,Frontiers of Economics in China,2016,Vol.11,548-580.
13.Fu,Y.,and S.Lee,and L.Xu,et al.The Effectiveness of Capital Regulation on Bank Behavior in China,International Review of Finance,2015,Vol.15,321-345.
14.Laeven,L.,and R.Levine,Bank Governance,Regulation and Risk Taking,Journal of Financial Economics,2009,Vol.93,259-275.
15.Lo,A.,Regulatory Reform in the Wake of the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008,Journal of Financial Economic Policy,2009,Vol.1,4-43.
(1)限于篇幅,不就控制变量的选取理由作表述。
(1)限于篇幅,未对控制变量的结果和各模型之间的差异所反映出来的信息进行解读和分析。