水库群系统发电调度的合作博弈研究
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摘要
水资源的竞争性和非排他性导致水库管理者基于个体利益进行发电调度,使得水库在满足个体利益的同时往往忽略了系统的整体效益。为了在保证个体利益的基础上实现系统总效益的最大化,建立了梯级水库群发电调度合作博弈模型;采用改进后的水循环算法对模型进行分层求解。以金沙江两库与三峡梯级构成的梯级水库群为研究对象,选取典型年进行实例计算。计算结果表明:梯级水库群发电调度的合作博弈模型在获得系统最大效益的同时使得个体利益达到Pareto最优状态,实现水库群总效益和单库个体效益的双赢,既优于联合优化调度模型又优于单库优化调度模型。该合作博弈模型及其新解法可为水库群调度决策分析开创一种新思路。
Due to the characteristic of competition and non-excludability of water resources, reservoir operators usually make decisions based on their individual interests, which often ignores the system's overall benefits. In order to maximize the system's overall benefits on the basis of ensuring their individual interests, the paper built a hydropower model for the multi-reservoir system based on the cooperative game theory and solved the proposed model by the improved water cycle algorithm. A multi-reservoir system, consisting of two reservoirs on Jinsha River and the Three Gorges cascade, is used as a case. Results from the proposed model under typical years showed that the multi-reservoir system can obtain a maximized overall benefits and the reservoir individual benefits can achieve a Pareto-optimality, resulting in a win-win situation of the individual and system's benefits. This model is better than the joint optimal operation model for the multi-reservoir system and the optimal operation model for the single reservoir that can provide a new idea for decision analyses of the multi-reservoir operation.
Due to the characteristic of competition and non-excludability of water resources, reservoir operators usually make decisions based on their individual interests, which often ignores the system's overall benefits. In order to maximize the system's overall benefits on the basis of ensuring their individual interests, the paper built a hydropower model for the multi-reservoir system based on the cooperative game theory and solved the proposed model by the improved water cycle algorithm. A multi-reservoir system, consisting of two reservoirs on Jinsha River and the Three Gorges cascade, is used as a case. Results from the proposed model under typical years showed that the multi-reservoir system can obtain a maximized overall benefits and the reservoir individual benefits can achieve a Pareto-optimality, resulting in a win-win situation of the individual and system's benefits. This model is better than the joint optimal operation model for the multi-reservoir system and the optimal operation model for the single reservoir that can provide a new idea for decision analyses of the multi-reservoir operation.
引文
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[12] 周彬彬,申建建,程春田.基于联盟博弈的多控制性水库梯级电站补偿效益分摊方法[J].水电能源科学,2016(11):58-62.
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[14] 谭忠富,于超,李莉,等.发电侧与供电侧联合节能及SO2减排利益分配优化模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2011,31(6):1182-1190.
[15] 周珍,邢瑶瑶,孙红霞,等.政府补贴对京津冀雾霾防控策略的区间博弈分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2017,37(10):2640-2648.
[16] Nash J.Two person cooperative games[J].Econometrica,1953,21(1):128-140.
[17] Harsanyi J C.A bargaining model for cooperative n-person games[J].Contributions to the theory of games,1959,40(5):325-355.
[18] Eskandar H,Sadollah A,Bahreininejad A,et al.Water cycle algorithm-a novel metaheuristic optimization method for solving constrained engineering optimization problems.Comput Struct,2012,110(10):151-166.
[2] 张俊,程春田,廖胜利,等.改进粒子群优化算法在水电站群优化调度中的应用研究[J].水利学报,2009,40(4):435-441.
[3] 欧阳硕,周建中,张睿,等.金沙江下游梯级与三峡梯级多目标联合防洪优化调度研究[J].水力发电学报,2013,32(6):43-49.
[4] 刘攀,郭生练,张文选,等.梯级水库群联合优化调度函数研究[J].水科学进展,2007,18(6):816-822.
[5] 覃晖,周建中,肖舸,等.梯级水电站多目标发电优化调度[J].水科学进展,2010,21(3):377-384.
[6] Giuliani M,Castelletti A,Amigoni F,et al.Multiagent systems and distributed constraint reasoning for regulatory mechanism design in water management[J].Journal of Water Resources Planning & Management,2014,141(4):04014068.
[7] Chew I M L,Tan R R,Foo D C Y,et al.Game theory approach to the analysis of inter-plant water integration in an eco-industrial park[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2009,17(18):1611-1619.
[8] Madani K.Hydropower licensing and climate change:Insights from cooperative game theory[J].Advances in Water Resources,2011,34(2):174-183.
[9] 付湘,陆帆,胡铁松.利益相关者的水资源配置博弈[J].水利学报,2016,47(1):38-43.
[10] Girard C,Rinaudo J,Pulido‐Velazquez M.Sharing the cost of a river basin adaptation portfolios to climate change:Insights from social justice and cooperative game theory[J].Water Resources Research,2016,52(10):7945-7962.
[11] 李志洁,程春田,黄飞雪.基于合作博弈的网格资源分配[J].大连理工大学学报,2007,47(6):909-913.
[12] 周彬彬,申建建,程春田.基于联盟博弈的多控制性水库梯级电站补偿效益分摊方法[J].水电能源科学,2016(11):58-62.
[13] Madani K,Hooshyar M.A game theory–reinforcement learning (GT–RL) method to develop optimal operation policies for multi-operator reservoir systems[J].Journal of Hydrology,2014,519(Part A):732-742.
[14] 谭忠富,于超,李莉,等.发电侧与供电侧联合节能及SO2减排利益分配优化模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2011,31(6):1182-1190.
[15] 周珍,邢瑶瑶,孙红霞,等.政府补贴对京津冀雾霾防控策略的区间博弈分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2017,37(10):2640-2648.
[16] Nash J.Two person cooperative games[J].Econometrica,1953,21(1):128-140.
[17] Harsanyi J C.A bargaining model for cooperative n-person games[J].Contributions to the theory of games,1959,40(5):325-355.
[18] Eskandar H,Sadollah A,Bahreininejad A,et al.Water cycle algorithm-a novel metaheuristic optimization method for solving constrained engineering optimization problems.Comput Struct,2012,110(10):151-166.