央企控股上市公司内部控制质量与企业价值关系研究
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摘要
本文以2012年沪深两市223家央企控股上市公司为研究对象,探讨内部控制质量对企业价值的影响。首先,分析了我国央企控股上市公司的分布情况以及影响地位,表明央企控股上市公司的内部控制问题的重要性,并总结了央企控股上市公司内部控制的特征;其次,结合央企规章制度,本文构建了央企控股上市公司内部控制质量评价指数ICI,评价内容涵盖了COS0内部控制框架中的内部环境、风险评估、控制活动、信息与沟通以及监督五要素,并具体划分了24个子指标;最后,根据央企经营业绩考核办法,本文选取经济增加值(EVA)作为企业价值的评价指标,通过回归分析,发现我国央企控股上市公司的内部控制质量对企业价值具有高度显著的正向促进作用。
The core objective of corporate governance is to achieve the maximization of corporate value,while the internal control has played an irreplaceable role in enterprise management.Internal control ensures business objectives achieved and operating efficiency improved,it also contributes to reduce agency costs,reduce fraud and such other behaviors like misconduct or waste of resources.In the aftermath of the post-boom financial scandals in the U.S.,Congress revised significantly federal securities laws and ratified the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002(SOX).After the bankrupt of Enron,the importance of internal control has been around,as well as China.The Ministry of Finance with the other four ministries and commissions issued the "basic norms of internal control" and "internal control guidelines" which are imposed at the main board of listed corporations of Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange since January 1st,2012.The development of internal control practices also contributes to the development of theoretical research.In recent years,the research on internal control quality assessment and its economic consequences has become a hot topic.Compared with the overseas study,domestic study started relatively late,in addition,a great deal of researchers mainly followed their research models.However,China owns a very different characteristic from those developed countries,as a consequence,the micro-environment of enterprises know from foreign countries by reason of economic structure and historical changes.The central enterprises is a typical example on account of its tremendous size and enormous economic contribution.Moreover,the convention supervision organization and ultimate controller of central enterprises have a significant difference with other listed companies,since most of the operating acts controlled by SASAC(State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council).Therefore,there are a mass of policies and requires to supervise the central enterprises.For this reason,the internal control problem is particularly prominently and notably.That leads us to make a question about the exactly internal control quality of the central enterprises? Does the increase of internal control quality can improve the central enterprises value? These problems are the main point of this essay.This essay takes 223 listed companies held by central enterprises as the research object.We are trying to discover the effect of internal control quality towards corporate value.Firstly,we will analyze the distribution and status of these companies,and stresses the importance of internal control.Combined with the rules and regulations of central enterprises,we will create a new index——ICI(Internal Control Index),to evaluate the quality of internal control.It includes the five basic elements of COSO Internal Control Framework,that is,internal environment,risk assessment,control activities,information and communication,supervision.Furthermore,we will divide the five elements into 24 sub-indexes.Finally,based on the performance evaluation methods of central enterprises,we will choose EVA(Economic Value Added) as the index for evaluating the corporate value.By using the method of regression analysis,we discovered the existence of significant positive correlation between listed companies held by central enterprises and corporate value.In addition,this essay argues that central enterprises hold more economic and political resources than common listed company,they also have more social responsibility which makes the internal control of central enterprises important than common ones.However,there are still many shortcomings in this essay,such as the index system of internal control cannot contain all of the indexes,and the lack of a relatively fair quantitative method of weight which need further study and exploration.
The core objective of corporate governance is to achieve the maximization of corporate value,while the internal control has played an irreplaceable role in enterprise management.Internal control ensures business objectives achieved and operating efficiency improved,it also contributes to reduce agency costs,reduce fraud and such other behaviors like misconduct or waste of resources.In the aftermath of the post-boom financial scandals in the U.S.,Congress revised significantly federal securities laws and ratified the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002(SOX).After the bankrupt of Enron,the importance of internal control has been around,as well as China.The Ministry of Finance with the other four ministries and commissions issued the "basic norms of internal control" and "internal control guidelines" which are imposed at the main board of listed corporations of Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange since January 1st,2012.The development of internal control practices also contributes to the development of theoretical research.In recent years,the research on internal control quality assessment and its economic consequences has become a hot topic.Compared with the overseas study,domestic study started relatively late,in addition,a great deal of researchers mainly followed their research models.However,China owns a very different characteristic from those developed countries,as a consequence,the micro-environment of enterprises know from foreign countries by reason of economic structure and historical changes.The central enterprises is a typical example on account of its tremendous size and enormous economic contribution.Moreover,the convention supervision organization and ultimate controller of central enterprises have a significant difference with other listed companies,since most of the operating acts controlled by SASAC(State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council).Therefore,there are a mass of policies and requires to supervise the central enterprises.For this reason,the internal control problem is particularly prominently and notably.That leads us to make a question about the exactly internal control quality of the central enterprises? Does the increase of internal control quality can improve the central enterprises value? These problems are the main point of this essay.This essay takes 223 listed companies held by central enterprises as the research object.We are trying to discover the effect of internal control quality towards corporate value.Firstly,we will analyze the distribution and status of these companies,and stresses the importance of internal control.Combined with the rules and regulations of central enterprises,we will create a new index——ICI(Internal Control Index),to evaluate the quality of internal control.It includes the five basic elements of COSO Internal Control Framework,that is,internal environment,risk assessment,control activities,information and communication,supervision.Furthermore,we will divide the five elements into 24 sub-indexes.Finally,based on the performance evaluation methods of central enterprises,we will choose EVA(Economic Value Added) as the index for evaluating the corporate value.By using the method of regression analysis,we discovered the existence of significant positive correlation between listed companies held by central enterprises and corporate value.In addition,this essay argues that central enterprises hold more economic and political resources than common listed company,they also have more social responsibility which makes the internal control of central enterprises important than common ones.However,there are still many shortcomings in this essay,such as the index system of internal control cannot contain all of the indexes,and the lack of a relatively fair quantitative method of weight which need further study and exploration.
引文
[1]Antti,J.K&Hannu,J.S.A Multidimensional Model for the Disclosure Policy of a Firm[J].Management,1997,(3):229-249.
[2]Chow,C.W.&Wong-Boren.A Voluntary Financial Disclosure by Mexican Corporations[J].The Accounting Review,1987,(3):533-541.
[3]Cooke,T.E.Voluntary Corporate Disclosure by Swedish Companies[J].Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting,1989,(1):171-195.
[4]Fama,Eugene F.&Michael C.Jensen.Agency Problems and Residual Claims[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1983,(2):327-349.
[5]Firth M.The Impact of Size,Stock Market Listing and Auditors on Voluntary Disclosure in Corporate Annual Reportsf J].Accounting and Business Research,1979,(9);273-280.
[6]Iris Saliterer.Sanja Korac.Performance Information Use by Politicians and Public Managers for Internal Control and External Accountability Purposes[J].Critical Perspectives on Accounting,2013,(24):502-517.
[7]Jeffrey Doyle,Weili Ge,Sarah McVay.Determinants of Weaknesses in Internal Control over Financial Reporting[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2007,(44);193-223.
[8]Kareen E.Brown,Jee-Hae Lim.The Effect of Internal Control Deficiencies on the Usefulness of Earnings in Executive Compensation[J].Advances in Accounting,incorporating Advances in International Accounting,2012,(28):75-87.
[9]Klaus Altendorfer,Herbert Jodlbauer.Which Utilization and Service Level Lead to the Maximum EVA?[J].Int.J.Production Economics,2011,130,(1):16-26.
[10]Lawrence Kryzanowski,Sana Mohsni.Capital Returns,Costs and EVA for Canadian Firms[J].North American Journal of Economics and Finance,2010,(21);256-273.
[11]Naomi R.Rothenbery.The Interaction among Disclosures,Competition,and an Internal Control Problem[J].Management Accounting Research,2009,(20):225-238.
[12]Thomas D.Dowdell Jr.,David N.Herda,Matthew A.Notbohm.Do Management Reports on Internal Control over Financial Reporting Improve Financial Reporting?[Z].Research in Accounting Regulation,2014.
[13]Thomas J.Lopez,Scott D.Vandervelde,Yi-Jing Wu.Investor Perceptions of an Auditor's Adverse Internal Control Opinion[J].J.Account.Public Policy,2009,(28):231-250.
[14]Yongtae Kim,Myung Seok Park.Market Uncertainty and Disclosure of Internal Control Deficiencies under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Control Opinion[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2009,(5);419-445.
[15]池国华,关建朋,乔跃峰.企业内部控制评价系统的构建[J].大连:财经问题研究,2011,(5).
[16]董望,陈汉文.内部控制、应计质量与盈余反应——基于中国2009年A股上市公司的经验证据[J].北京:审计研究,2011,(4).
[17]范纪珍.EVA与企业现行业绩评价指标的比较分析[J].太原:经济问题,2006,(5).
[18]李洪,张德明,曹秀英,张学岷.EVA绩效评价指标有效性的实证研究—基于454家沪市上市公司2004年度的数据[J].北京:中国软科学,2006,(10).
[19]李连华.公司治理结构与内部控制的链接与互动[J].北京:会计研究,2005,(2).
[20]李心合.内部控制:从财务报告导向到价值创造导向[J].北京:会计研究,2007,(4).
[21]李万福,林斌,宋璐.内部控制在公司投资中的角色:效率促进还是抑制?[J].北京:管理世界,2011,(2).
[22]林钟高,郑军,王书珍.内部控制与企业价值研究——来自沪深两市A股的经验分析[J].上海:财经研究,2007,(4).
[23]刘圻.经济增加值与企业价值管理创新流程模式研究——基于国资委第22号令中EVA考核指标的应用视角[J].北京:宏观经济研究,2011,(8).
[24]卢闯,杜菲,佟岩,汤谷良导入EVA考核中央企业的公平性及其改进[J].北京:中国工业经济,2010,(6).
[25]南京大学会计与财务研究院课题组.论中国企业内部控制评价制度的现实模式——基于112个企业案例的研究[J].北京:会计研究,2010,(6).
[26]覃蕾蕾.公司治理对内部控制有效性影响的实证研究[D].成都:西南财经大学,2011.
[27]王华,黄之骏.经营者股权激励、董事会组成与企业价值——基于内生性视角的经验分析[J].北京:管理世界,2006,(9).
[28]王国顺,彭宏.EVA方法有效性的实证研究[J].长沙:系统工程,2004,(1).
[29]王雅,刘希成.经济增加值对企业价值相关性的实证分析[J].北京理工大学学报,2011,(3).
[30]叶梓.内部控制与企业绩效的实证研究——基于内部审计视角[D].北京交通大学,201 1.
[31]查剑秋,张秋生,庄健.战略管理下的企业内控与企业价值关系实证研究[J].北京:审计研究,2009,(1).
[32]张纯.论新经济时代EVA的效用性[J].北京:会计研究,2003,(4).
[33]张士强,张暖暖.我国上市公司内部控制现状与存在问题分析[J].南京:审计与经济研究,2009,(3).
[34]张晓岚,沈豪杰,杨默.内部控制信息披露质量与公司经营状况——基于面板数据的实证研究[J].南京:审计与经济研究,2012,(2).
[35]张先冶,戴文涛.中国企业内部控制评价系统研究[J].北京:审计研究,2011,(1).
[36]张兆国,张旺峰,杨清香.目标导向下的内部控制评价体系构建及实证检验[J].天津:南开管理评论,2011,(1).
[37]赵息,张西栓.高管权力及其对内部控制的影响——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].天津:科学学与科学技术管理,2013,(1).
[38]周扬.基于EVA的国有企业绩效评价研究——以中国神华能源股份有限公司为例[D].北京:财政部财政科学研究所,2013.
[39]中国上市公司内部控制指数研究课题组.中国上市公司内部控制指数研究[J].北京:会计研究,2011,(12).
[40]钟伟强,张天西.公司治理状况对自愿披露水平的影响[J].武汉:中南财经政法大学学报,2006,(1).
①本文赋予相同权重是由于Firth(1979)认为,不同的权重是特定信息使用者为了反映对特定评价指标的需求,而Cooke(1989)认为,未经加权处理的评价指标,是面对所有的信息使用者时更为合适的选择。Chow,Wong-Boren(1987)和Antti,Hannu(1997)通过对比分析加权与不加权两种方法的结果,发现二者结论几乎一致。
[2]Chow,C.W.&Wong-Boren.A Voluntary Financial Disclosure by Mexican Corporations[J].The Accounting Review,1987,(3):533-541.
[3]Cooke,T.E.Voluntary Corporate Disclosure by Swedish Companies[J].Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting,1989,(1):171-195.
[4]Fama,Eugene F.&Michael C.Jensen.Agency Problems and Residual Claims[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1983,(2):327-349.
[5]Firth M.The Impact of Size,Stock Market Listing and Auditors on Voluntary Disclosure in Corporate Annual Reportsf J].Accounting and Business Research,1979,(9);273-280.
[6]Iris Saliterer.Sanja Korac.Performance Information Use by Politicians and Public Managers for Internal Control and External Accountability Purposes[J].Critical Perspectives on Accounting,2013,(24):502-517.
[7]Jeffrey Doyle,Weili Ge,Sarah McVay.Determinants of Weaknesses in Internal Control over Financial Reporting[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2007,(44);193-223.
[8]Kareen E.Brown,Jee-Hae Lim.The Effect of Internal Control Deficiencies on the Usefulness of Earnings in Executive Compensation[J].Advances in Accounting,incorporating Advances in International Accounting,2012,(28):75-87.
[9]Klaus Altendorfer,Herbert Jodlbauer.Which Utilization and Service Level Lead to the Maximum EVA?[J].Int.J.Production Economics,2011,130,(1):16-26.
[10]Lawrence Kryzanowski,Sana Mohsni.Capital Returns,Costs and EVA for Canadian Firms[J].North American Journal of Economics and Finance,2010,(21);256-273.
[11]Naomi R.Rothenbery.The Interaction among Disclosures,Competition,and an Internal Control Problem[J].Management Accounting Research,2009,(20):225-238.
[12]Thomas D.Dowdell Jr.,David N.Herda,Matthew A.Notbohm.Do Management Reports on Internal Control over Financial Reporting Improve Financial Reporting?[Z].Research in Accounting Regulation,2014.
[13]Thomas J.Lopez,Scott D.Vandervelde,Yi-Jing Wu.Investor Perceptions of an Auditor's Adverse Internal Control Opinion[J].J.Account.Public Policy,2009,(28):231-250.
[14]Yongtae Kim,Myung Seok Park.Market Uncertainty and Disclosure of Internal Control Deficiencies under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Control Opinion[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2009,(5);419-445.
[15]池国华,关建朋,乔跃峰.企业内部控制评价系统的构建[J].大连:财经问题研究,2011,(5).
[16]董望,陈汉文.内部控制、应计质量与盈余反应——基于中国2009年A股上市公司的经验证据[J].北京:审计研究,2011,(4).
[17]范纪珍.EVA与企业现行业绩评价指标的比较分析[J].太原:经济问题,2006,(5).
[18]李洪,张德明,曹秀英,张学岷.EVA绩效评价指标有效性的实证研究—基于454家沪市上市公司2004年度的数据[J].北京:中国软科学,2006,(10).
[19]李连华.公司治理结构与内部控制的链接与互动[J].北京:会计研究,2005,(2).
[20]李心合.内部控制:从财务报告导向到价值创造导向[J].北京:会计研究,2007,(4).
[21]李万福,林斌,宋璐.内部控制在公司投资中的角色:效率促进还是抑制?[J].北京:管理世界,2011,(2).
[22]林钟高,郑军,王书珍.内部控制与企业价值研究——来自沪深两市A股的经验分析[J].上海:财经研究,2007,(4).
[23]刘圻.经济增加值与企业价值管理创新流程模式研究——基于国资委第22号令中EVA考核指标的应用视角[J].北京:宏观经济研究,2011,(8).
[24]卢闯,杜菲,佟岩,汤谷良导入EVA考核中央企业的公平性及其改进[J].北京:中国工业经济,2010,(6).
[25]南京大学会计与财务研究院课题组.论中国企业内部控制评价制度的现实模式——基于112个企业案例的研究[J].北京:会计研究,2010,(6).
[26]覃蕾蕾.公司治理对内部控制有效性影响的实证研究[D].成都:西南财经大学,2011.
[27]王华,黄之骏.经营者股权激励、董事会组成与企业价值——基于内生性视角的经验分析[J].北京:管理世界,2006,(9).
[28]王国顺,彭宏.EVA方法有效性的实证研究[J].长沙:系统工程,2004,(1).
[29]王雅,刘希成.经济增加值对企业价值相关性的实证分析[J].北京理工大学学报,2011,(3).
[30]叶梓.内部控制与企业绩效的实证研究——基于内部审计视角[D].北京交通大学,201 1.
[31]查剑秋,张秋生,庄健.战略管理下的企业内控与企业价值关系实证研究[J].北京:审计研究,2009,(1).
[32]张纯.论新经济时代EVA的效用性[J].北京:会计研究,2003,(4).
[33]张士强,张暖暖.我国上市公司内部控制现状与存在问题分析[J].南京:审计与经济研究,2009,(3).
[34]张晓岚,沈豪杰,杨默.内部控制信息披露质量与公司经营状况——基于面板数据的实证研究[J].南京:审计与经济研究,2012,(2).
[35]张先冶,戴文涛.中国企业内部控制评价系统研究[J].北京:审计研究,2011,(1).
[36]张兆国,张旺峰,杨清香.目标导向下的内部控制评价体系构建及实证检验[J].天津:南开管理评论,2011,(1).
[37]赵息,张西栓.高管权力及其对内部控制的影响——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].天津:科学学与科学技术管理,2013,(1).
[38]周扬.基于EVA的国有企业绩效评价研究——以中国神华能源股份有限公司为例[D].北京:财政部财政科学研究所,2013.
[39]中国上市公司内部控制指数研究课题组.中国上市公司内部控制指数研究[J].北京:会计研究,2011,(12).
[40]钟伟强,张天西.公司治理状况对自愿披露水平的影响[J].武汉:中南财经政法大学学报,2006,(1).
①本文赋予相同权重是由于Firth(1979)认为,不同的权重是特定信息使用者为了反映对特定评价指标的需求,而Cooke(1989)认为,未经加权处理的评价指标,是面对所有的信息使用者时更为合适的选择。Chow,Wong-Boren(1987)和Antti,Hannu(1997)通过对比分析加权与不加权两种方法的结果,发现二者结论几乎一致。