区域合作减排策略选择及提升对策研究
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摘要
跨区域合作的碳减排是实现减排目标较为有效的机制。通过构建政府间减排演化博弈模型,模拟了区域内地方政府独立减排、合作减排情形的策略选择演化过程。研究发现,(1)当区域内本地政府和外部政府经济发展水平都比较低时,无论是独立减排还是合作减排,{减排,减排}都是地方政府的稳定选择策略,但减排效果不显著;(2)独立减排情形下,经济先发地区减排意愿薄弱,后发地区有减排意愿,但减排效果并不显著;(3)合作减排时,当协同收益小于交易成本时,随着地方政府经济发展,减排系统博弈最终会向地方政府一方减排一方不减排的方向演进;当协同收益大于交易成本时,通过合作减排,实现了资源的优势互补,降低了碳排放的负外部效应,提高了减排意愿。最后提出通过搭建起区域合作交流平台,激发地方政府减排活力及推进低碳经济发展等建议,来提高协同收益或降低交易成本,有效促进区域合作减排。
The regional cooperation is an effective way to achieve emission reduction targets. Thus, through the construction of intergovernmental mitigation evolutionary game model, this paper simulates the strategic selection evolution of local governments' independent emission reduction and cooperative emission reduction. The study finds that:(1)when the level of economic development of local government and external government is relatively low, whether it is independent emission reduction or cooperative reduction, reduction is the local government stability strategy, but the effect of mitigation is not significant;(2)In the case of independent emission reduction, when the economic level of one or both are raised to a certain degree, both emission and reduction, non-emission reduction or both non-emission reduction and emission reduction are stability strategy of the system;(3)In the case of cooperative emission reduction, when the synergistic income is less than the transaction costs, with the local government economic development, local government's emission reduction game will eventually evolve into the situation that one side reduces emission and the other does not. If the synergistic income is greater than the transaction cost, the optimization of resources is achieved, reducing the negative effects of carbon emissions, and improving the willingness of reduce emissions. At last, we suggest that through building up platforms for regional cooperation, stimulating local governments to reduce emissions and promoting low-carbon economy, synergies benefits can be improved or transaction costs can be reduced, and regional cooperation in emission reduction can be effectively reached, which are of great significance to achieving emission reduction targets.
The regional cooperation is an effective way to achieve emission reduction targets. Thus, through the construction of intergovernmental mitigation evolutionary game model, this paper simulates the strategic selection evolution of local governments' independent emission reduction and cooperative emission reduction. The study finds that:(1)when the level of economic development of local government and external government is relatively low, whether it is independent emission reduction or cooperative reduction, reduction is the local government stability strategy, but the effect of mitigation is not significant;(2)In the case of independent emission reduction, when the economic level of one or both are raised to a certain degree, both emission and reduction, non-emission reduction or both non-emission reduction and emission reduction are stability strategy of the system;(3)In the case of cooperative emission reduction, when the synergistic income is less than the transaction costs, with the local government economic development, local government's emission reduction game will eventually evolve into the situation that one side reduces emission and the other does not. If the synergistic income is greater than the transaction cost, the optimization of resources is achieved, reducing the negative effects of carbon emissions, and improving the willingness of reduce emissions. At last, we suggest that through building up platforms for regional cooperation, stimulating local governments to reduce emissions and promoting low-carbon economy, synergies benefits can be improved or transaction costs can be reduced, and regional cooperation in emission reduction can be effectively reached, which are of great significance to achieving emission reduction targets.
引文
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[27] 荆克迪,安虎森,田柳.国际碳减排合作的博弈论分析[J].西南民族大学学报(人文社会科学版),2014,(06):128-134.
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[33] Friedman D.Evolution game in economics[J].Econometrica,1991,59(3):637- 666.
[34] 韩小花,薛声家.竞争的闭环供应链回收渠道的演化博弈决策[J].计算机集成制造系统,2010(7):1487-1493.
[2] Edenmore Ottoman,et al.“IPCC special report on renewable energy sources and climate change mitigation.” prepared by working group III of the intergovernmental panel on climate change[M].Cambridge University Press,Cambridge,UK,2011.
[3] Quire C L,Moriarty R,Andrew R M,et al.Global carbon budget 2014[J].Earth System Science Data Discussions,2015,7(2):521- 610.
[4] Li J,Yang X,et al.The independent contribution is the strength,the attitude,is also the responsibility——to the Chinese national independent contribution Comment[J].Environmental economy,2015(16):17-17.
[5] Zhang Y J,Peng Y L,Ma C Q,et al.Can environmental innovation facilitate carbon emissions reduction?evidence from china[J].Energy Policy,2017,100:18-28.
[6] Jian-Kun H E.An analysis of China’s CO2 emission peaking target and pathways[J].Advances in Climate Change Research(气候变化研究进展(英文版)),2014,5(4):155-161.
[7] Liu L C,Liang Q M,Wang Q.Accounting for China’s regional carbon emissions in 2002 and 2007:production-based versus consumption-based principles[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2015,103:384-392.
[8] Jiang J,Ye B,Xie D,et al.Provincial-level carbon emission drivers and emission reduction strategies in china:combining multi-layer LMDI decomposition with hierarchical clustering[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2017.
[9] Yu V K,Kolosovsky A M,Tikhonova A.The assessment of research and technical potential in the framework of the innovative model of development of regional economy[J].Baltic Region,2012,1(1):89-96.
[10] 孙慧,刘媛媛.中国区际碳排放差异与损益偏离现象分析[J].管理评论,2016,28(10):89-96.
[11] 林伯强,黄光晓.梯度发展模式下中国区域碳排放的演化趋势——基于空间分析的视角[J].金融研究,2011(12):35- 46.
[12] 邢华.我国区域合作的纵向嵌入式治理机制研究:基于交易成本的视角[J].中国行政管理,2015,(10):80- 84.
[13] Uddin N,Taplin R.Regional cooperation in widening energy access and mitigating climate change:current programs and future potential[J].Global Environmental Change,2015,35:497-504.
[14] 王金南,宁淼,孙亚梅.区域大气污染联防联控的理论与方法分析[J].环境与可持续发展,2012,37(5):5-10.
[15] 苑清敏,李想.基于产业梯度的京津冀合作减排分析[J].科技管理研究,2015,(16):225-229.
[16] 李炫榆,宋海清.区域减排合作路径探寻——基于结构效应与二氧化碳排放的空间面板数据实证分析[J].福建师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2015,(01):29-35.
[17] álvaro López-Pe■ I,Linares P.Renewables vs.energy efficiency:the cost of carbon emissions reduction in spain[J].Energy Policy,2012,50(11):659- 668.
[18] Chang Y F,Lewis C,Lin S J.Comprehensive evaluation of industrial CO2,emission(1989～2004)in Taiwan by input-output structural decomposition[J].Energy Policy,2008,36(7):2471-2480.
[19] Tian X,Chang M,Tanikawa H,et al.Structural decomposition analysis of the carbonization process in beijing:a regional explanation of rapid increasing carbon dioxide emission in China[J].Energy Policy,2013,53(1):279-286.
[20] Zhang Y J,Peng Y L,Ma C Q,et al.Can environmental innovation facilitate carbon emissions reduction?evidence from china[J].Energy Policy,2017,100:18-28.
[21] Yang L,Wang J,Shi J.Can China meet its 2020 economic growth and carbon emissions reduction targets?[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2017.993-1001.
[22] 黄清煌,高明.中国环境规制工具的节能减排效果研究[J].科研管理,2016,37(6):19-27.
[23] 徐盈之,杨英超,郭进.环境规制对碳减排的作用路径及效应——基于中国省级数据的实证分析[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2015,36(10):135-146.
[24] Wang Y.A game pattern analysis of the cooperation and competition of global carbon emission reduction[J].Advanced Materials Research,2012,524-527:2352-2355.
[25] Zhang B,Wang Z,Yin J,et al.CO2,emission reduction within Chinese iron & steel industry:practices,determinants and performance[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2012,33:167-178.
[26] Pan X Y,Zhao D,Wu C X.Enterprises’ emission reduction cooperation in carbon supply chain[J].Open Cybernetics & Systemics Journal,2014,8(1):931-937.
[27] 荆克迪,安虎森,田柳.国际碳减排合作的博弈论分析[J].西南民族大学学报(人文社会科学版),2014,(06):128-134.
[28] Levinea D K,Pesendorferb W.The evolution of cooperation through imitation[J].Games & Economic Behavior,2007,58(2):293-315.
[29] Alós-Ferrer C,Ania A B.The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior[J].Economic Theory,2005,26(3):497-516.
[30] Weibull W.Evolution Game theory[M].Princeton:The MIT Press,1997.
[31] 薄燕.合作意愿与合作能力——一种分析中国参与全球气候变化治理的新框架[J].世界经济与政治,2013,(01):135-155.
[32] 陈文颖,高鹏飞,何建坤.二氧化碳减排对中国未来GDP增长的影响[J].清华大学学报(自然科学版),2004,(06):744-747.
[33] Friedman D.Evolution game in economics[J].Econometrica,1991,59(3):637- 666.
[34] 韩小花,薛声家.竞争的闭环供应链回收渠道的演化博弈决策[J].计算机集成制造系统,2010(7):1487-1493.