农村集体产权变迁的政治逻辑
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摘要
农村集体产权嵌入复杂的地方行政权力结构和村庄权力结构,朝着国有化、私有化和股权化等产权样态演进,形成行政主导型、规则竞争型和利益均沾型三种集体产权变迁模式。与之对应,地方政府给予村干部任职行政化、公共规则治理、制度化分权等制度回应。这表明,集体产权变迁与基层治理结构之间并非线性的因果逻辑,反而呈现出复线的循环关联,并在基层政权治理能力、国家与农民关系两方面产生重要政治后果。实施乡村振兴战略过程中,国家主导的新一轮农村土地集体所有制改革,能否优化相对均衡的土地利益格局,值得进一步的经验考查和理论思考。
Rural collective property rights embedded in the complex local administrative power structure and village power structure which have evolved towards nationalization,privatization,and equity. There are three modes of change in collective property rights: executive-led,regular competition,and benefit sharing.Correspondingly,local government responds to the administration of village cadres,governance of public rules,and institutionalized decentralization. This shows that the non-linear causal logic between the change of collective property rights and the governance structure of the grass-roots level,on the contrary,presents a cyclical correlation between the two lines. It has important political consequences in terms of governance ability at the grass-roots level and relations between the state and farmers. In the process of implementing the rural revitalization strategy,whether the state-led reform of rural collective land ownership reform can optimize the relatively balanced pattern of land interests deserves further empirical examination and theoretical considerations.
Rural collective property rights embedded in the complex local administrative power structure and village power structure which have evolved towards nationalization,privatization,and equity. There are three modes of change in collective property rights: executive-led,regular competition,and benefit sharing.Correspondingly,local government responds to the administration of village cadres,governance of public rules,and institutionalized decentralization. This shows that the non-linear causal logic between the change of collective property rights and the governance structure of the grass-roots level,on the contrary,presents a cyclical correlation between the two lines. It has important political consequences in terms of governance ability at the grass-roots level and relations between the state and farmers. In the process of implementing the rural revitalization strategy,whether the state-led reform of rural collective land ownership reform can optimize the relatively balanced pattern of land interests deserves further empirical examination and theoretical considerations.
引文
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[22]仇叶.富人治村的类型与基层民主实践机制研究[J].中国农村观察,2017(1).
[23]赵树凯.宁海村级小微权力改革是乡村治理的制度创新[J].改革内参,2015(10).
[24]陈明.土地冲突:公共权力失范与农民的权力建构[J].中国农村观察,2016(3).
[2]曹正汉.产权的社会建构逻辑——从博弈论的观点评中国社会学家的产权研究[J].社会学研究,2008(1).
[3]郭亮.资本下乡与山林流转:来自湖北S镇的经验[J].社会,2011(3).
[4]田先红,陈玲.“阶层地权”:农村地权配置的一个分析框架[J].管理世界,2013(9).
[5]邓大才.产权与政治研究:进路与整合——建构产权政治学的新尝试[J].学术月刊,2011(12).
[6]折晓叶,陈婴婴.产权怎样界定——一份集体产权私化的社会文本[J].社会学研究,2005(4).
[7]姬会然,慕良泽.产权过程与现代国家建构:方法与理论阐释——以农村地产改革为例[J].经济体制改革,2012(5).
[8]周诚.土地经济学原理[M].北京:商务印书馆,2003.
[9]郭亮.土地征收中的利益主体及其权利配置——对当前征地冲突的法社会学探析[J].华中科技大学学报(社会科学版),2012(5).
[10]周明生.新苏南模式:若干认识与思考[J].江苏行政学院学报,2008(2).
[11] Jean C. Oi. Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundation of Local State Corporatism in China[J].World Politics,1992(1).
[12]潘维.农民与市场:中国基层政权与乡镇企业[M].北京:商务印书馆,2003.
[13]郭亮.土地征收中的“行政包干制”及其后果[J].政治学研究,2015(1).
[14]蒋省三,刘守英.土地资本化与农村工业化——广东省佛山市南海经济发展调查[J].管理世界,2003(11).
[15] Michael Heller. The Tragedy of the Anticommons:Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets[J].Harvard Law Review,1998(3).
[16]印子.乡村土地执法中的共谋与竞争,法律和社会科学(第16卷·第1辑)[M].北京:法律出版社,2017.
[17][美]罗伯特·A·达尔(Robert A. Dahl),布鲁斯·斯泰恩布里克纳(Bruce Stinebrickner)等著,吴勇译.现代政治分析[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2012.
[18]贺雪峰.农村集体产权制度改革与乌坎事件的教训[M].行政论坛,2017(3).
[19]徐勇.种豆得瓜:农村集体经济的不同产业绩效及动因[J].社会科学家,2016(6).
[20]贺雪峰.治村[J].北京:北京大学出版社,2017.
[21]朱政,徐铜柱.村级治理的“行政化”与村级治理体系的重建[J].社会主义研究,2018(1).
[22]仇叶.富人治村的类型与基层民主实践机制研究[J].中国农村观察,2017(1).
[23]赵树凯.宁海村级小微权力改革是乡村治理的制度创新[J].改革内参,2015(10).
[24]陈明.土地冲突:公共权力失范与农民的权力建构[J].中国农村观察,2016(3).