税收竞争、企业生产效率与出口行为
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摘要
文章构建了一个辖区间税收竞争通过技术进步及生产率影响企业出口行为的理论框架,运用1998～2006年的中国工业企业数据,通过空间计量模型测算中国地方政府间营业税、企业所得税及增值税的税收竞争系数。在此基础上,采用Heckman两阶段选择模型考察了营业税、企业所得税及增值税税收竞争对中国企业出口行为的影响,并使用联立方程模型对税收竞争通过新产品、全要素生产率影响企业出口行为的机制进行实证验证。结果表明:样本期间中国地方政府就营业税、企业所得税、增值税税收政策的策略互补和策略替代行为同时存在,出口企业所在地的"逐底竞争"更明显;税收竞争促进了企业出口选择和出口规模;相比全要素生产率,税收竞争通过新产品渠道促进企业出口行为的机制更明显。财政自主权抑制了企业出口行为,而基础设施资本存量及地区税基流动性条件促进了企业出口行为;财政自主权对税收竞争影响企业出口行为具有正向调节作用,而基础设施资本存量则具有负向调节作用。此外,税收竞争对内资、内陆地区企业出口行为的促进作用比外资、沿海地区企业更显著;对劳动密集型企业出口行为的促进作用也比资本及技术密集型企业更强烈。
This paper builds a theoretical framework of inter-jurisdictional tax competition,technical progress,productivity and firm export behavior,and estimates the intergovernmental tax competition of business tax,corporation income tax and value-added tax through a spatial econometric model using China Industrial Enterprise Data from the year 1998 to 2006. Then this paper conductsa research about the effect of intergovernmental tax competition on firm's export behavior using the Heckman two-stage model and a research about the role of new products and TFP in this effect using Simultaneous Equation Model. The results show that strategic substitution and strategic complementarity in tax rates exist simultaneously,and race to the bottom is more obvious in the region where exporters agglomerate; tax competition promotes firm' s export probability and scale; compared with TFP,it is more obvious the mechanism of tax competition promotes firm's export probability and scale through new products. Fiscal autonomy restrains firm's export behavior,but infrastructure capital stock and regional mobility condition of tax base promote firm's export behavior; while the cross term of fiscal autonomy and tax competition promotes firm's export behavior,the cross term of infrastructure capital stock and tax competition restrains firm's export behavior. Furthermore,the tax competition has more significant effect on domestic-funded enterprises,coastal enterprises and labor-intensive enterprises than foreign-funded enterprises,inland enterprise and capital and technology-intensive enterprises
This paper builds a theoretical framework of inter-jurisdictional tax competition,technical progress,productivity and firm export behavior,and estimates the intergovernmental tax competition of business tax,corporation income tax and value-added tax through a spatial econometric model using China Industrial Enterprise Data from the year 1998 to 2006. Then this paper conductsa research about the effect of intergovernmental tax competition on firm's export behavior using the Heckman two-stage model and a research about the role of new products and TFP in this effect using Simultaneous Equation Model. The results show that strategic substitution and strategic complementarity in tax rates exist simultaneously,and race to the bottom is more obvious in the region where exporters agglomerate; tax competition promotes firm' s export probability and scale; compared with TFP,it is more obvious the mechanism of tax competition promotes firm's export probability and scale through new products. Fiscal autonomy restrains firm's export behavior,but infrastructure capital stock and regional mobility condition of tax base promote firm's export behavior; while the cross term of fiscal autonomy and tax competition promotes firm's export behavior,the cross term of infrastructure capital stock and tax competition restrains firm's export behavior. Furthermore,the tax competition has more significant effect on domestic-funded enterprises,coastal enterprises and labor-intensive enterprises than foreign-funded enterprises,inland enterprise and capital and technology-intensive enterprises
引文
[1] Bucovetsky S.,H. Andreas. Tax Competition when Firms Choose Their Organizational Form:Should Tax Loopholes for Multinationals be Closed. Journal of International Economics,2008,74(7):188-201.
[2] Carlsen,F.,Langset,B.,Rattso,J.. The Relationship between Firm Mobility and Tax Level:Empirical Evidence of Fiscal Competition between Local Governments. Journal of Urban Economics,2005,58(2):273-288.
[3] Chirinkoa,R. S.,D. J. Wilson. Tax Competition among U. S. States:Racing to the Bottom or Riding on a Seesaw? Journal of Public Economics,2017,155(8):147-163.
[4] Eugster,B.,R. Parchet. Culture and Taxes:Towards Identifying Tax Competition. Management Science,2011,17(11):774-777.
[5] Heckman,J. J.. Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error. Econometrica,1979,47(1):153-161.
[6] Helpman,E.,M. Melitz,Y.. Rubinstein. Estimating Trade Flows:Trading Partners and Trading Volumes. Quarterly Journal of Economics,2008,5(2):441-487.
[7] Hindrinks,J.,Peralta,S.,Weber,S.. Competing in Taxes and Investment under Fiscal Equalization. Journal of Public Economics,2008,92(12):2392-2402.
[8] Janeba,E.,S. Osterloh. Tax and the City:A Theory of Local Tax Competition. Journal of Public Economics,2013,106(8):89-100.
[9] Lawless,M. Firm Export Dynamics and the Geography of Trade. Journal of International Economics,2009,77(2):245-254.
[10] Lejour,A. M.,A. A. H. Verbon. Tax Competition and Redistribution in a Two-Country Endogenous-Growth Model. International Tax and Public Finance,1997,4(4):485-497.
[11] Levinsohn,J.,A. Petrin. Estimating Production Functions Using Inputs to Control for Unobservables. Review of Economic Studies,2003,70(7):317-341.
[12] Melitz,J. Mare. The Impact of Trade on Intra-industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity. Econometrica,2003,71(6):1695-1725.
[13] Oates,W. E. Fiscal Federalism. New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,1972.
[14] Olley,S.,Pakes,A. The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications Equipment Industry. Econometrica,1996,64(6):1263-1297.
[15] Rork,J. C. Coveting Thy Neighbors's Taxation. National Tax Journal,2003,66(4):775-787.
[16] Tiebout,C. M. A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure. Journal of Political Economy,1956,64(5):416-424.
[17] Wilson D. J. Trade,Capital Mobility and Tax Competition. Journal of Political Economy,1987,95(4):835-856.
[18]陈硕.分税制改革、地方财政自主权与公共品供给.经济学(季刊),2010(9):1427-1446.
[19]郭杰,李涛.中国地方政府间税收竞争研究:基于我国省级面板数据的经验证据.管理世界,2009(11):54-64.
[20]贾俊雪.税收激励、企业有效平均税率与企业进入.经济研究,2014(7):94-109.
[21]李建军.税收征管效率评估分析:1997~2007.中国经济问题,2011(3):90-99.
[22]李世刚,尹恒.县级基础教育财政支出的外部性分析:兼论以县为主体制的有效性.中国社会科学,2012(11):81-97.
[23]龙小宁,朱艳丽,蔡伟贤,李少民.基于空间计量模型的中国县级政府间税收竞争的实证分析.经济研究,2014(8):41-53.
[24]彭馨.税收竞争与企业生产率:从营业税到增值税.中南财经政法大学学报(社会科学版),2018(4):61-70.
[25]任志成,巫强,崔欣.财政分权、地方政府竞争与省级出口增长.财贸经济,2015(7):59-69.
[26]任志成,张二震,吕凯波.贸易开放、财政分权与国内市场分割.经济学动态,2014(12):44-52.
[27]沈鸿,顾乃华.地方财政分权、产业集聚与企业出口行为.国际贸易问题. 2017(9):25-36.
[28]唐飞鹏.省际财政竞争、政府治理能力与企业迁移.世界经济,2016(10):53-77.
[29]唐飞鹏.地方税收竞争、企业利润与门槛效应.中国工业经济,2017(7):99-117.
[30]巫强,崔欣欣,马野青.财政分权和地方政府竞争视角下我国出口增长的制度解释:理论与实证研究.国际贸易问题,2015(10):142-151.
[31]杨龙见,尹恒.中国县级政府税收竞争研究.统计研究,2014(6):42-49.
[32]张伦俊,李淑萍.规模以上工业企业的行业税负研究.统计研究,2012(2):66-72.
(1)为了提高对FDI的吸引力,各地方政府争相突破国家政策底线,将“两免三减半”的税收优惠政策变为“五免五减”,甚至“十免十减”。
(2)相比其他税种,营业税、企业所得税、增值税是研究地方政府税收竞争影响企业出口问题最合适的对象。首先,相比其他税基,如劳动所得和消费等,营业税、企业所得税、增值税的税基源自流动性资本,使得地方政府为了争夺税源进行典型的税收竞争;其次,地方税营业税、共享税企业所得税及增值税的地方分成是地方政府税收收入的主要来源,因此地方政府制定税收政策时对其关注更多;最后,由于本文实质探讨的是地方政府税收竞争与工业企业出口的政企关系问题,因此只考虑工业企业负担的上述三个主要税种。
[2] Carlsen,F.,Langset,B.,Rattso,J.. The Relationship between Firm Mobility and Tax Level:Empirical Evidence of Fiscal Competition between Local Governments. Journal of Urban Economics,2005,58(2):273-288.
[3] Chirinkoa,R. S.,D. J. Wilson. Tax Competition among U. S. States:Racing to the Bottom or Riding on a Seesaw? Journal of Public Economics,2017,155(8):147-163.
[4] Eugster,B.,R. Parchet. Culture and Taxes:Towards Identifying Tax Competition. Management Science,2011,17(11):774-777.
[5] Heckman,J. J.. Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error. Econometrica,1979,47(1):153-161.
[6] Helpman,E.,M. Melitz,Y.. Rubinstein. Estimating Trade Flows:Trading Partners and Trading Volumes. Quarterly Journal of Economics,2008,5(2):441-487.
[7] Hindrinks,J.,Peralta,S.,Weber,S.. Competing in Taxes and Investment under Fiscal Equalization. Journal of Public Economics,2008,92(12):2392-2402.
[8] Janeba,E.,S. Osterloh. Tax and the City:A Theory of Local Tax Competition. Journal of Public Economics,2013,106(8):89-100.
[9] Lawless,M. Firm Export Dynamics and the Geography of Trade. Journal of International Economics,2009,77(2):245-254.
[10] Lejour,A. M.,A. A. H. Verbon. Tax Competition and Redistribution in a Two-Country Endogenous-Growth Model. International Tax and Public Finance,1997,4(4):485-497.
[11] Levinsohn,J.,A. Petrin. Estimating Production Functions Using Inputs to Control for Unobservables. Review of Economic Studies,2003,70(7):317-341.
[12] Melitz,J. Mare. The Impact of Trade on Intra-industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity. Econometrica,2003,71(6):1695-1725.
[13] Oates,W. E. Fiscal Federalism. New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,1972.
[14] Olley,S.,Pakes,A. The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications Equipment Industry. Econometrica,1996,64(6):1263-1297.
[15] Rork,J. C. Coveting Thy Neighbors's Taxation. National Tax Journal,2003,66(4):775-787.
[16] Tiebout,C. M. A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure. Journal of Political Economy,1956,64(5):416-424.
[17] Wilson D. J. Trade,Capital Mobility and Tax Competition. Journal of Political Economy,1987,95(4):835-856.
[18]陈硕.分税制改革、地方财政自主权与公共品供给.经济学(季刊),2010(9):1427-1446.
[19]郭杰,李涛.中国地方政府间税收竞争研究:基于我国省级面板数据的经验证据.管理世界,2009(11):54-64.
[20]贾俊雪.税收激励、企业有效平均税率与企业进入.经济研究,2014(7):94-109.
[21]李建军.税收征管效率评估分析:1997~2007.中国经济问题,2011(3):90-99.
[22]李世刚,尹恒.县级基础教育财政支出的外部性分析:兼论以县为主体制的有效性.中国社会科学,2012(11):81-97.
[23]龙小宁,朱艳丽,蔡伟贤,李少民.基于空间计量模型的中国县级政府间税收竞争的实证分析.经济研究,2014(8):41-53.
[24]彭馨.税收竞争与企业生产率:从营业税到增值税.中南财经政法大学学报(社会科学版),2018(4):61-70.
[25]任志成,巫强,崔欣.财政分权、地方政府竞争与省级出口增长.财贸经济,2015(7):59-69.
[26]任志成,张二震,吕凯波.贸易开放、财政分权与国内市场分割.经济学动态,2014(12):44-52.
[27]沈鸿,顾乃华.地方财政分权、产业集聚与企业出口行为.国际贸易问题. 2017(9):25-36.
[28]唐飞鹏.省际财政竞争、政府治理能力与企业迁移.世界经济,2016(10):53-77.
[29]唐飞鹏.地方税收竞争、企业利润与门槛效应.中国工业经济,2017(7):99-117.
[30]巫强,崔欣欣,马野青.财政分权和地方政府竞争视角下我国出口增长的制度解释:理论与实证研究.国际贸易问题,2015(10):142-151.
[31]杨龙见,尹恒.中国县级政府税收竞争研究.统计研究,2014(6):42-49.
[32]张伦俊,李淑萍.规模以上工业企业的行业税负研究.统计研究,2012(2):66-72.
(1)为了提高对FDI的吸引力,各地方政府争相突破国家政策底线,将“两免三减半”的税收优惠政策变为“五免五减”,甚至“十免十减”。
(2)相比其他税种,营业税、企业所得税、增值税是研究地方政府税收竞争影响企业出口问题最合适的对象。首先,相比其他税基,如劳动所得和消费等,营业税、企业所得税、增值税的税基源自流动性资本,使得地方政府为了争夺税源进行典型的税收竞争;其次,地方税营业税、共享税企业所得税及增值税的地方分成是地方政府税收收入的主要来源,因此地方政府制定税收政策时对其关注更多;最后,由于本文实质探讨的是地方政府税收竞争与工业企业出口的政企关系问题,因此只考虑工业企业负担的上述三个主要税种。