应计操纵与年报文本信息语气操纵研究
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摘要
本文研究应计操纵对年报文本信息语气操纵的影响。研究发现,应计操纵为正向时,年报文本信息可操纵语气显著为正;应计操纵为负向时,年报文本信息可操纵语气显著为负;且上述关系在应计操纵约束较大、分析师跟踪较多、机构持股比例较高的公司以及2007年实行新会计准则后更显著。研究表明,年报文本信息语气操纵方向与应计操纵方向相同,即管理者会通过操纵文本信息语气辅助其盈余管理行为,且盈余管理约束会加强该策略选择。本文揭示了文本信息操纵对数字信息操纵的补充效应,相关研究结论对于识别管理者信息披露策略组合,提高年报文本信息披露质量具有重要借鉴意义。
This paper studies the influence of accrual management on tone management of annual reports. Results show that when the discretionary accrual is positive, the abnormal tone is significantly positive. When the discretionary accrual is negative, the abnormal tone is significantly negative. And the relationship is more significant for firms with larger accrual manipulation constraints, more analysts following, and higher institutional shareholding and after the implementation of new accounting standards in 2007. The findings indicate that managers will manipulate tone to complement their earnings management strategies, and eanings management constraints will strengthen this opportunistic behavior. This paper reveals the complementary effect of narrative information manipulation on number information manipulation. The conclusions have important reference for identifying managers' opportunistic information disclosure strategy and improving the quality of annual report disclosure in Chinese market.
This paper studies the influence of accrual management on tone management of annual reports. Results show that when the discretionary accrual is positive, the abnormal tone is significantly positive. When the discretionary accrual is negative, the abnormal tone is significantly negative. And the relationship is more significant for firms with larger accrual manipulation constraints, more analysts following, and higher institutional shareholding and after the implementation of new accounting standards in 2007. The findings indicate that managers will manipulate tone to complement their earnings management strategies, and eanings management constraints will strengthen this opportunistic behavior. This paper reveals the complementary effect of narrative information manipulation on number information manipulation. The conclusions have important reference for identifying managers' opportunistic information disclosure strategy and improving the quality of annual report disclosure in Chinese market.
引文
程书强.2006.机构投资者持股与上市公司会计盈余信息关系实证研究.管理世界,9:129~136
林乐,谢德仁.2016.投资者会听话听音吗?--基于管理层语调视角的实证研究.财经研究,7:28~39
谢德仁,林乐.2015.管理层语调能预示公司未来业绩吗?--基于我国上市公司年度业绩说明会的文本分析.会计研究,2:20~27
薛爽,肖泽忠,潘妙丽.2010.管理层讨论与分析是否提供了有用信息?--基于亏损上市公司的实证探索.管理世界,5:130-140
于李胜.2007.盈余管理动机、信息质量与政府监管.会计研究,9:42~49
Barton,J.,P.J.Simko.2002.The Balance Sheet as an Earnings Management Constraint.The Accounting Review,77(Supplement):1?27
Cohen,D.A.,P.Zarowin.2010.Accrual-Based and Real Earnings Management Activities around Seasoned Equity Offer?ings.Journal of Accounting and Economics,50(1):2~19
Davis,A.K.,J.M.Piger,L.M.Sedor.2012.Beyond the Numbers:Measuring the Information Content of Earnings Press Release Language.Contemporary Accounting Research,29(3):845-868
Feldman,R.,S.Govindaraj,J.Livnat,B.Segal.2010.Management’s Tone Change,Post Earnings Announcement Drift and Accruals.Review of Accounting Studies,15(4):915-953
Huang,X.,S.H.Teoh,Y.Zhang.2014.Tone Management.The Accounting Review,89(3):1083?1113
Lo,K.,F.Ramos,R.Rogo.2017.Earnings Management and Annual Report Readability.Journal of Accounting and Economics,63(1):1?25
Roychowdhury,S.2006.Earnings Management through Real Activities Manipulation.Journal of Accounting and Economics,42(3):335?370
Xie,H.2001.The Mispricing of Abnormal Accruals.The Accounting Review,76(3):357?373
Yu,F.F.2008.Analyst Coverage and Earnings Management.Journal of Financial Economics,88(2):245~271
Zang,A.Y.2012.Evidence on the Trade-Off between Real Activities Manipulation and Accrual-Based Earnings Man?agement.The Accounting Review,87(2):675-703
(1)考虑到我国上市公司分部门数据难以获取,本文未包含Huang等(2014)模型中对应的变量。
(2)在稳健性检验中,本文在可操纵语气估计模型中增加了分析师相关变量。
(3)2007年之前,“短期金融投资”取值为资产负债表中的“短期投资净额”,2007年及之后取值为资产负债表中的“交易性金融资产”、“可供出售金融资产净额”与“持有至到期投资净额”三者之和。
(4)为阅读方便,本文将ABTONE_t和ABTONE_FE_t在原始值的基础上乘以100进行呈现,因此,此处ABTONE_t均值和中位数的原始值为0.00015和0.00056,ABTONE-FE_t均值和中位数的原始值为0.00016和0.00075。
(5)限于篇幅,本文未报告相关结果。
林乐,谢德仁.2016.投资者会听话听音吗?--基于管理层语调视角的实证研究.财经研究,7:28~39
谢德仁,林乐.2015.管理层语调能预示公司未来业绩吗?--基于我国上市公司年度业绩说明会的文本分析.会计研究,2:20~27
薛爽,肖泽忠,潘妙丽.2010.管理层讨论与分析是否提供了有用信息?--基于亏损上市公司的实证探索.管理世界,5:130-140
于李胜.2007.盈余管理动机、信息质量与政府监管.会计研究,9:42~49
Barton,J.,P.J.Simko.2002.The Balance Sheet as an Earnings Management Constraint.The Accounting Review,77(Supplement):1?27
Cohen,D.A.,P.Zarowin.2010.Accrual-Based and Real Earnings Management Activities around Seasoned Equity Offer?ings.Journal of Accounting and Economics,50(1):2~19
Davis,A.K.,J.M.Piger,L.M.Sedor.2012.Beyond the Numbers:Measuring the Information Content of Earnings Press Release Language.Contemporary Accounting Research,29(3):845-868
Feldman,R.,S.Govindaraj,J.Livnat,B.Segal.2010.Management’s Tone Change,Post Earnings Announcement Drift and Accruals.Review of Accounting Studies,15(4):915-953
Huang,X.,S.H.Teoh,Y.Zhang.2014.Tone Management.The Accounting Review,89(3):1083?1113
Lo,K.,F.Ramos,R.Rogo.2017.Earnings Management and Annual Report Readability.Journal of Accounting and Economics,63(1):1?25
Roychowdhury,S.2006.Earnings Management through Real Activities Manipulation.Journal of Accounting and Economics,42(3):335?370
Xie,H.2001.The Mispricing of Abnormal Accruals.The Accounting Review,76(3):357?373
Yu,F.F.2008.Analyst Coverage and Earnings Management.Journal of Financial Economics,88(2):245~271
Zang,A.Y.2012.Evidence on the Trade-Off between Real Activities Manipulation and Accrual-Based Earnings Man?agement.The Accounting Review,87(2):675-703
(1)考虑到我国上市公司分部门数据难以获取,本文未包含Huang等(2014)模型中对应的变量。
(2)在稳健性检验中,本文在可操纵语气估计模型中增加了分析师相关变量。
(3)2007年之前,“短期金融投资”取值为资产负债表中的“短期投资净额”,2007年及之后取值为资产负债表中的“交易性金融资产”、“可供出售金融资产净额”与“持有至到期投资净额”三者之和。
(4)为阅读方便,本文将ABTONE_t和ABTONE_FE_t在原始值的基础上乘以100进行呈现,因此,此处ABTONE_t均值和中位数的原始值为0.00015和0.00056,ABTONE-FE_t均值和中位数的原始值为0.00016和0.00075。
(5)限于篇幅,本文未报告相关结果。