当代德性知识论视域中的理智美德——以理智谦逊为例
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摘要
当代德性知识论关注认知主体的优秀品格,而理智谦逊就是一种值得追求的品格。理智谦逊的无知观、承认局限观和非自我中心观三种观点皆面临各自的困难。鉴于上述困难,理智谦逊被刻画为理智生活领域的一种美德,它是一种在自然和社会的广阔视角中准确把握自我的认知表现,并进而以此为基础与人交往的倾向。通过理智谦逊的培养,认知者一方面可以准确地认识自我和接受自我,另一方面也获得对世界的更多的知识以及更深入的理解。理智谦逊带来了具有更高价值的认知成就,因此促使了认知者在认知领域的上升。
Contemporary virtue epistemology concerns the virtuous character of cognitive agents. Intellectual humility is one of the virtues that we admire. After reviewing the ignorance,the owning one's limitations and the non-egotist's accounts of intellectual humility,it is argued that intellectual humility is an intellectual virtue. Specifically,it consists of a disposition to view one's epistemic performance accurately in a social and environmental setting and a characteristic way of social interaction on the basis. In the process of cultivating intellectual humility,a cognitive agent,on the one hand,begins to understand and accept oneself; on the other hand,he also achieves a deep understanding of the world. Intellectual humility brings about more valuable cognitive achievements,and hence epistemic ascending.
Contemporary virtue epistemology concerns the virtuous character of cognitive agents. Intellectual humility is one of the virtues that we admire. After reviewing the ignorance,the owning one's limitations and the non-egotist's accounts of intellectual humility,it is argued that intellectual humility is an intellectual virtue. Specifically,it consists of a disposition to view one's epistemic performance accurately in a social and environmental setting and a characteristic way of social interaction on the basis. In the process of cultivating intellectual humility,a cognitive agent,on the one hand,begins to understand and accept oneself; on the other hand,he also achieves a deep understanding of the world. Intellectual humility brings about more valuable cognitive achievements,and hence epistemic ascending.
引文
(1)值得注意的是,德莱芙并没有直接谈论谦逊(humility),而是谈论谦虚(modesty)。她区分说,谦逊的人可以对自己有一个准确的评价,但谦虚的人需要低估自己。因此,严格来说,她并不支持谦逊的无知观。但是如果取消谦逊与谦虚的差别,我们仍然可以发展出一种谦逊的无知观。
(1)这里我们可以考虑射箭案例。一个有能力的射箭者,即使他的一次射箭展现了自己的技能,但由于在箭矢的飞行过程中,产生了方向相反的两阵风,使得箭矢先偏离轨道后又回归轨道从而射中箭靶。此时由于环境因素的干扰,我们会倾向于不把这个成功归于射箭者。
(1)特别值得注意的是,这里对无知的弥补并不是杂乱无章的。虽然广泛地学习新知识是无可厚非的,但这种无规律的学习方式也可能受到诟病。在我的案例中,理智谦逊的人首先是对自己已经知道的命题P发出为何P的疑问,进而由于自己对P的原因的无知开始新的探究。
(1)普理查德称之为强认知成就,是旨在与弱认知成就区分开。弱认知成就是不需要克服太多困难或者也不依赖高超技能的由于能力的成功。布拉德弗德则在成就这个概念中,直接指明了行动过程中需要克服困难的这一根本要求,因此她所谈论的成就都不是轻易获得的成功。
[1]Julia Driver,“The Virtues of Ignorance”,The Journal of Philosophy,86(7),1989,p. 376.
[2][3]Dennis Whitcomb,Heather Battaly,Jason Baehr,and Daniel Howard-Synder,“Intellectual Humility:Owning our Limitations”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,94(3),2017,p. 520,517-518.
[4][5]Robert Roberts and Jay Wood,Intellectual Virtues:An Essay in Regulative Epistemology. New York:Oxford University Press. 2007,p. 259,265.
[6]Joseph Kupfer,“The Moral Perspective of Humility”,Pacific Philosophical Quarterly,84(3),2003,p. 252.
[7]Ernest Sosa,Epistemology,Princeton:Princeton University Press. 2017,p. 191.
[8]Ernest Sosa,A virtue epistemology:Apt belief and reflective knowledge(Vol. 1),Oxford:Oxford University Press.2007,p. 79.
[9]陈嘉明:《“理解”的知识论》,《哲学动态》2016年第11期。
[10]陈嘉明:《理解与合理性》,《哲学研究》2017年第9期。
[11]Jonathan Kvanvig,The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding,New York:Cambridge University Press.2003,p. 192.
[12]Thomas Hill,Autonomy and Self-Respect,New York:Cambridge University Press. 1991,p. 104-118.
[13]Stephen Grimm,“Is Understanding a Species of Knowledge?”,The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,57(3),2010,p. 532.
[14]Duncan Pritchard,“Seeing it for oneself:perceptual knowledge,understanding and intellectual autonomy”. Episteme,13(1),2016,p. 37; Gwen Bradford,Achievement,Oxford:Oxford University Press. 2015,p. 27.
[15]王聚:《无限主义与阿格里帕三难问题》,《自然辩证法研究》2018年第2期;王聚:《无限主义与强推论创造主义的相容性研究》,《厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2018年第1期。
(1)这里我们可以考虑射箭案例。一个有能力的射箭者,即使他的一次射箭展现了自己的技能,但由于在箭矢的飞行过程中,产生了方向相反的两阵风,使得箭矢先偏离轨道后又回归轨道从而射中箭靶。此时由于环境因素的干扰,我们会倾向于不把这个成功归于射箭者。
(1)特别值得注意的是,这里对无知的弥补并不是杂乱无章的。虽然广泛地学习新知识是无可厚非的,但这种无规律的学习方式也可能受到诟病。在我的案例中,理智谦逊的人首先是对自己已经知道的命题P发出为何P的疑问,进而由于自己对P的原因的无知开始新的探究。
(1)普理查德称之为强认知成就,是旨在与弱认知成就区分开。弱认知成就是不需要克服太多困难或者也不依赖高超技能的由于能力的成功。布拉德弗德则在成就这个概念中,直接指明了行动过程中需要克服困难的这一根本要求,因此她所谈论的成就都不是轻易获得的成功。
[1]Julia Driver,“The Virtues of Ignorance”,The Journal of Philosophy,86(7),1989,p. 376.
[2][3]Dennis Whitcomb,Heather Battaly,Jason Baehr,and Daniel Howard-Synder,“Intellectual Humility:Owning our Limitations”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,94(3),2017,p. 520,517-518.
[4][5]Robert Roberts and Jay Wood,Intellectual Virtues:An Essay in Regulative Epistemology. New York:Oxford University Press. 2007,p. 259,265.
[6]Joseph Kupfer,“The Moral Perspective of Humility”,Pacific Philosophical Quarterly,84(3),2003,p. 252.
[7]Ernest Sosa,Epistemology,Princeton:Princeton University Press. 2017,p. 191.
[8]Ernest Sosa,A virtue epistemology:Apt belief and reflective knowledge(Vol. 1),Oxford:Oxford University Press.2007,p. 79.
[9]陈嘉明:《“理解”的知识论》,《哲学动态》2016年第11期。
[10]陈嘉明:《理解与合理性》,《哲学研究》2017年第9期。
[11]Jonathan Kvanvig,The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding,New York:Cambridge University Press.2003,p. 192.
[12]Thomas Hill,Autonomy and Self-Respect,New York:Cambridge University Press. 1991,p. 104-118.
[13]Stephen Grimm,“Is Understanding a Species of Knowledge?”,The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,57(3),2010,p. 532.
[14]Duncan Pritchard,“Seeing it for oneself:perceptual knowledge,understanding and intellectual autonomy”. Episteme,13(1),2016,p. 37; Gwen Bradford,Achievement,Oxford:Oxford University Press. 2015,p. 27.
[15]王聚:《无限主义与阿格里帕三难问题》,《自然辩证法研究》2018年第2期;王聚:《无限主义与强推论创造主义的相容性研究》,《厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2018年第1期。