“推理”的双重语义与逻辑学层级——哈曼与菲尔德之争辨析
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摘要
随着"逻辑的认知转向"兴起,实际推理过程研究被越来越多的学者视为逻辑学的一部分。这似乎违背了弗雷格的"反心理主义",因而引起学界的争议。哈曼从"推理"的双重语义出发,否定逻辑与实际推理过程之间存在无例外的关联原则,论证实际推理过程研究应排除在逻辑学之外;菲尔德则肯定这种原则的存在,论证逻辑是规范性学科。引入层级分明的"大逻辑观"视角可知,这种关联原则存在与否,应属于"应用逻辑"层面的问题,因而无法决定逻辑本身的学科范围。在一定意义上,实际推理过程可作为逻辑研究对象。
With the rise of the "cognitive turn of logic",the study of practical reasoning has been regarded as a part of logic by more and more scholars. This seems to go against the anti-psychologism of G. Frege,thus causing academic controversies. From the double meanings of "reasoning",G. Harman argues that there is no unexceptionable principle of connection between logic and practical reasoning,and that the study of practical reasoning shall be excluded from logic. On the contrary,H. Field affirms the existence of such principle and argues that logic is a normative subject. From the perspective of a clearly hierarchal "view of logic in a broad sense",it can be seen that the existence or absence of such principle of connection shall belong to the level of applied logic,so that the scope of logic itself cannot be determined. In a certain sense,the practical reasoning can be one of the objects of logic study.
With the rise of the "cognitive turn of logic",the study of practical reasoning has been regarded as a part of logic by more and more scholars. This seems to go against the anti-psychologism of G. Frege,thus causing academic controversies. From the double meanings of "reasoning",G. Harman argues that there is no unexceptionable principle of connection between logic and practical reasoning,and that the study of practical reasoning shall be excluded from logic. On the contrary,H. Field affirms the existence of such principle and argues that logic is a normative subject. From the perspective of a clearly hierarchal "view of logic in a broad sense",it can be seen that the existence or absence of such principle of connection shall belong to the level of applied logic,so that the scope of logic itself cannot be determined. In a certain sense,the practical reasoning can be one of the objects of logic study.
引文
(1)H. Field."What Is the Normative Role of Logic?"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society,Supplementary Volunes,2009(83):251-268.
(2)G. Harman. Changein View:Principles of Reasoning Cambrdge:The MIT Press,1986,p.3.
(1)请注意,哈曼对术语的使用与国际通行惯例有所不同。一般情况下,带有-ing后缀的“reasoning”和“arguing”指的是推理者的推理过程或论证过程,因而许多学者用“inference”与“reasoning”相区别,用前者指称弗雷格意义上的纯粹的真值关联,就如同Gabby和Woods用“arguing”与“argument”相对照那样。(参见Dov M. Gabby and John Woods"The Practical Turn in Logic", in Handbook of Philosophical Logic,Second Edition,vol. 13,Springer,2005,pp. 15-123.)不过,因为“reasoning”与“inference”在英语中是近义词,学者自有选择术语加以区分的自由,我们需要澄清的是其中实质性的分辨。
(2)G. Harman. Change in View:Principles of Reasoning. Cambridge:The MIT Press, 1986,p.5.
(3)G. Harman. Change in View:Principles of Reasoning.Cambridge:The MITPrss,1986,p.6.
(4)G. Harman. Change in View:Principles of Reasoning. Cambridge:The MIT Press, 1986,p. 15.
(1)G.Harman.Change in View:Principles of Reasoning.Cambridge:The MIT Press,1986,p.16.
(2)G.Harman.Change in View:Principles of Reasoning.Cambridge:The MIT Press,1986,p.16.
(3)G.Harman.Change in View:Principles of Reasioning.Cambridge:The MIT Press,1986,p.19.
(4)H. Field."What Is the Normative Role of Logic?"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society,Supplementary Volumes,2009(83):251-268.以下该文的引文不再加注。
(1)G. Harman.“Field on the Normative Role of Logic".Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,2009(109):333-335.
(2)张建军:《走向一种层级分明的“大逻辑观”》,《学术月刊》2011年第11期,第38-47页。以下该文引文不再加注。
(3)张建军教授区分了“形式”的三种含义,限于本文宗旨,这里只提及其中两种。
(4)参见张建军:《逻辑行动主义方法论发凡》,载张建军等著:《当代逻辑哲学前沿问题研究》,人民出版社2014年版,第593-615页。
(5)张建军:《论当代“应用逻辑”学科群的崛起》,载张建军著:《在逻辑与哲学之间》,中国社会科学出版社2013年版,第245-253页。
(2)G. Harman. Changein View:Principles of Reasoning Cambrdge:The MIT Press,1986,p.3.
(1)请注意,哈曼对术语的使用与国际通行惯例有所不同。一般情况下,带有-ing后缀的“reasoning”和“arguing”指的是推理者的推理过程或论证过程,因而许多学者用“inference”与“reasoning”相区别,用前者指称弗雷格意义上的纯粹的真值关联,就如同Gabby和Woods用“arguing”与“argument”相对照那样。(参见Dov M. Gabby and John Woods"The Practical Turn in Logic", in Handbook of Philosophical Logic,Second Edition,vol. 13,Springer,2005,pp. 15-123.)不过,因为“reasoning”与“inference”在英语中是近义词,学者自有选择术语加以区分的自由,我们需要澄清的是其中实质性的分辨。
(2)G. Harman. Change in View:Principles of Reasoning. Cambridge:The MIT Press, 1986,p.5.
(3)G. Harman. Change in View:Principles of Reasoning.Cambridge:The MITPrss,1986,p.6.
(4)G. Harman. Change in View:Principles of Reasoning. Cambridge:The MIT Press, 1986,p. 15.
(1)G.Harman.Change in View:Principles of Reasoning.Cambridge:The MIT Press,1986,p.16.
(2)G.Harman.Change in View:Principles of Reasoning.Cambridge:The MIT Press,1986,p.16.
(3)G.Harman.Change in View:Principles of Reasioning.Cambridge:The MIT Press,1986,p.19.
(4)H. Field."What Is the Normative Role of Logic?"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society,Supplementary Volumes,2009(83):251-268.以下该文的引文不再加注。
(1)G. Harman.“Field on the Normative Role of Logic".Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,2009(109):333-335.
(2)张建军:《走向一种层级分明的“大逻辑观”》,《学术月刊》2011年第11期,第38-47页。以下该文引文不再加注。
(3)张建军教授区分了“形式”的三种含义,限于本文宗旨,这里只提及其中两种。
(4)参见张建军:《逻辑行动主义方法论发凡》,载张建军等著:《当代逻辑哲学前沿问题研究》,人民出版社2014年版,第593-615页。
(5)张建军:《论当代“应用逻辑”学科群的崛起》,载张建军著:《在逻辑与哲学之间》,中国社会科学出版社2013年版,第245-253页。