质量兴农下考虑投资补贴的农产品供应链协调
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摘要
【目的】针对农产品供应链质量管理中的双重边际化、质量投资不足问题,探讨了公司作为供应链主导方、农户决定农产品质量水平情况下,农户、公司构成的二级农产品供应链的质量协调问题。【方法】运用动态博弈理论分析了集中决策下的供应链均衡结果,以及传统批发价契约下的供应链决策,在此基础上应用博弈理论、最优化理论设计了质量投资补贴契约。【结果】批发价契约下供应链的最优质量水平、供应链总利润均低于集中决策下的情形;投资补贴契约下,农产品最优质量水平等于集中决策下的质量水平,最优价格与批发价正相关,最优质量、最优价格、公司利润均大于传统批发价契约下的均衡结果,农户利润则不变。研究也发现,质量需求弹性越大、质量投资系数越小的农产品,采用投资补贴契约后、公司的利润提升越大。【结论】投资补贴契约下的农产品供应链,相比批发价契约能够得到帕累托改进,同时农产品质量投资也将得到更好的激励。
【Objective】Aiming at double marginalization and insufficient quality investment in the quality management of agricultural product supply chain, this paper probed into the quality coordination of the secondary agricultural product supply chain formed by the companies as the leading party of the supply chain and farmers households as the party that decides the quality level of agricultural products.【Method】 The equilibrium results of supply chain under the centralized decision and the supply chain decision under the traditional wholesale price contract were analyzed by dynamic game theory. On this basis, the quality investment subsidy contract was designed by using game theory and optimization theory. 【Result】It was found that both the optimal quality level and the total profit of the supply chain under the wholesale price contract were lower than those under the centralized decision. Under the investment subsidy contract,the optimal quality of agricultural products was equal to the quality under the centralized decision, the optimal price was positively correlated to wholesale price, and the optimal quality, optimal price, and the companys' profits were greater than the equilibrium results under wholesale price contract while the farmers' profits remained the same. It was also observed that, for the agricultural products with higher quality demand elasticity and lower quality investment coefficient, the higher profits could be gained by the company after adopting the investment subsidy contract.【Conclusion】 The supply chain of agricultural products under the investment subsidy contract can gain Pareto improvement compared with the wholesale price contract, and the investment in the quality of agricultural products will be better encouraged.
【Objective】Aiming at double marginalization and insufficient quality investment in the quality management of agricultural product supply chain, this paper probed into the quality coordination of the secondary agricultural product supply chain formed by the companies as the leading party of the supply chain and farmers households as the party that decides the quality level of agricultural products.【Method】 The equilibrium results of supply chain under the centralized decision and the supply chain decision under the traditional wholesale price contract were analyzed by dynamic game theory. On this basis, the quality investment subsidy contract was designed by using game theory and optimization theory. 【Result】It was found that both the optimal quality level and the total profit of the supply chain under the wholesale price contract were lower than those under the centralized decision. Under the investment subsidy contract,the optimal quality of agricultural products was equal to the quality under the centralized decision, the optimal price was positively correlated to wholesale price, and the optimal quality, optimal price, and the companys' profits were greater than the equilibrium results under wholesale price contract while the farmers' profits remained the same. It was also observed that, for the agricultural products with higher quality demand elasticity and lower quality investment coefficient, the higher profits could be gained by the company after adopting the investment subsidy contract.【Conclusion】 The supply chain of agricultural products under the investment subsidy contract can gain Pareto improvement compared with the wholesale price contract, and the investment in the quality of agricultural products will be better encouraged.
引文
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[13]许民利,王俏,欧阳林寒.食品供应链中质量投入的演化博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2012(5):131-141.doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207X.2012.05.004.XU M L,WANG Q,OUYANG L H.Investment decision of food supply chain quality based on the evolutionary game[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2012(5):131-141.doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207X.2012.05.004.
[14]闻卉,陶建平,曹晓刚,黎继子.基于双边质量控制的生鲜农产品供应链决策[J].控制工程,2017,24(12):2478-2484.doi:10.14107/j.cnki.kzgc.160691.WEN H,TAO J P,CAO X G,LI J Z.Fresh Agricultural Supply Chain Decision Based on Bilateral Quality Control[J].Control Engineering of China,2017,24(12):2478-2484.doi:10.14107/j.cnki.kzgc.160691.
[15]熊峰,袁俊,王猛,陈方宇.公平偏好下生鲜农产品质量投入与定价研究[J].软科学,2017,31(4):122-127.doi:10.13956/j.ss.1001-8409.2017.04.27.XIONG F,YUAN J,WANG M,CHEN F Y.Study on the Quality Investment and Pricing of Fresh Agricultural Products under the Fairness Preference[J].Soft Science,2017,31(4):122-127.doi:10.13956/j.ss.1001-8409.2017.04.27.
[16]姚冠新,浦凌波.基于“农超对接”模式的质量改进与公平偏好研究[J].商业研究,2014(5):172-176.doi:10.13902/j.cnki.syyj.2014.05.025.YAO G X,PU L B.Research on quality improvement and fairness preference based on the mode of"agriculture-supermarket jointing"[J].Commercial Research,2014(5):172-176.doi:10.13902/j.cnki.syyj.2014.05.025.
[17]崔丽,胡洪林.农产品质量安全控制下“农超对接”主体间成本分担机制[J].系统工程,2017(3):131-136.CUI L,HU H L.The cost sharing mechanism between participants of the alliance of farmers and supermarkets under quality control[J].System Engineering,2017(3):131-136.
[18]郑琪,范体军.考虑风险偏好的生鲜农产品供应链激励契约设计[J].管理工程学报,2018,32(2):171-178.doi:10.13587/j.cnki.jieem.2018.02.019.ZHENG Q,FAN T J.Design of incentive contract for fresh agricultural products supply chain considering risk preference[J].Journal of Industrial Engineering Engineering Management,2018,32(2):171-178.doi:10.13587/j.cnki.jieem.2018.02.019.
[19]胡军,张镓,芮明杰.线性需求条件下考虑质量控制的供应链协调契约模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013(3):601-609.HU J,ZHANG J,RUI M J.Supply chain coordination model contract considering quality control under the condition of linear demand[J].Systems Engineering Theory&Practice,2013(3):601-609.
[20]GURNANI H,ERKOC M.Supply Contracts in Manufacturer-retailer interactions with manufacturer-quality and retailer effort-induced demand[J].Naval Research Logistics,2008,55(3):200-217.
[21]XIE G,YUE W,WANG S,LAI K K.Quality investment and price decision in a risk-averse supply chain[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2011,214(2):403-410.
[22]YANG F,SHAN F,JIN M.Capacity investment under cost sharing contracts[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2017.191:278-285.
[23]戴佩慧,项朝阳.蔬菜供应链利益分配应用研究--基于改进的shapley值法[J].广东农业科学,2014,41(14):208-213.doi:10.16768/j.issn.1004-874X.2014.14.047.DAI P H,XIANG C Y.Application research on profit distribution of vegetable supply chain-Based on the improved shapley value method[J].Guangdong Agricultural Sciences,2014,41(14):208-213.doi:10.16768/j.issn.1004-874X.2014.14.047.
[24]吴绒.政府补贴策略下农产品绿色供应链管理决策研究[J].广东农业科学,2014,41(15):215-219.doi:10.16768/j.issn.1004-874X.2014.15.044.WU R.Decisions on green supply chain management of agricultural products under government subsidies strategies[J].Guangdong Agricultural Sciences,2014,41(15):215-219.doi:10.16768/j.issn.1004-874X.2014.15.044.
[25]陈爽,朱丽芳,王薇薇.“互联网+”背景下农业产业链主体利益分配模型研究-基于合作博弈理论[J].广东农业科学,2018,45(1):160-164.doi:10.16768/j.issn.1004-874X.2018.01.025.CHEN S,ZHU L F,WANG W W.Research on the distribution pattern of the main interests of agricultural industry chains under the background of“Internet+”-Based on cooperative game theory[J].Guangdong Agricultural Sciences,2018,45(1):160-164.doi:10.16768/j.issn.1004-874X.2018.01.025.
[2]刘凤芹.不完全合约与履约障碍--以订单农业为例[J].经济研究,2003(4):22-30,92.LIU F Q.Incomplete contract and the barrier to performance:a case research on the farm produce for order[J].Economic Research,2003(4):22-30,92.
[3]熊峰,彭健,金鹏,张向阳,邱妘.生鲜农产品供应链关系契约稳定性影响研究--以冷链设施补贴模式为视角[J].中国管理科学,2015(8):102-111.doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207X.2015.08.012.XIONG F,PENG J,JIN P,ZHANG X Y,QIU Y.The impact of relational contracts stability about fresh agricultural product supply chain study:from the perspective of cold chain facilities subsidy mode[J].Chinese journal of management science,2015(8):102-111.doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207X.2015.08.012.
[4]黄祖辉,王祖锁.从不完全合约看农业产业化经营的组织方式[J].农业经济问题,2002(3):28-31.doi:10.13246/j.cnki.iae.2002.03.006.HUANG Z H,WANG Z S.The organization way of agricultural ind ustrialization management-an incomplete contracting perspective[J].Issues in Agricultural Economy,2002(3):28-31.doi:10.13246/j.cnki.iae.2002.03.006.
[5]王庚,李子文.期权合约在订单农业中的应用[J].运筹与管理,2016,25(1):238-245.WANG G,LI Z W.The Application of Option Contract in Contract Farming[J].Operations research and management science,2016,25(1):238-245.
[6]WANG C,CHEN X.Option pricing and coordination in the fresh produce supply chain with portfolio contracts[J].Annals of Operations Research,2017,248(1-2):471-491.
[7]YU Y,XIAO T.Pricing and cold-chain service level decisions in a fresh agri-products supply chain with logistics outsourcing[J].Computers&Industrial Engineering,2017,111(9):56-66.
[8]冯颖,余云龙,张炎治,吴茜.随机产出与随机需求下TPL介入的农产品供应链协调[J].管理工程学报,2017(4):156-163.doi:10.13587/j.cnki.jieem.2017.04.020.FENG Y,YU Y L,ZHANG Y Z,WU X.Coordination of agriproducts supply chain with TPL’s participation under random yield and random demand[J].Journal of Industrial Engineering Engineering Management,2017(4):156-163.doi:10.13587/j.cnki.jieem.2017.04.020.
[9]陈小霖.供应链环境下的农产品质量安全保障研究[D].南京:南京理工大学,2008.CHEN X L.Research on agri-food quality safety guarantee based on supply chain management[D].Nanjing:Nanjing University of science,2008.
[10]但斌,伏红勇,徐广业,陈伟.考虑天气与努力水平共同影响产量及质量的农产品供应链协调[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013(9):2229-2238.DAN B,FU H Y,XU G Y,CHEN W.Agri-food supply chain coordination considering the impact of weather and effort level on output and quality[J].Systems Engineering Theory&Practice,2013(9):2229-2238.
[11]杨浩雄,魏彬.供应链视角下的鲜活农产品质量安全研究[J].广东农业科学,2015,42(22):150-155.doi:10.16768/j.issn.1004-874X.2015.22.026.YANG H X,WEI B.Study on fresh agricultural products quality and safety under the perspective of supply chain[J].Guangdong Agricultural Sciences,2015,42(22):150-155.doi:10.16768/j.issn.1004-874X.2015.22.026.
[12]SONG C,ZHUANG J.Modeling a Government-Manufacturer-Farmer game for food supply chain risk management[J].Food Control,2017,78:443-455.
[13]许民利,王俏,欧阳林寒.食品供应链中质量投入的演化博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2012(5):131-141.doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207X.2012.05.004.XU M L,WANG Q,OUYANG L H.Investment decision of food supply chain quality based on the evolutionary game[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2012(5):131-141.doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207X.2012.05.004.
[14]闻卉,陶建平,曹晓刚,黎继子.基于双边质量控制的生鲜农产品供应链决策[J].控制工程,2017,24(12):2478-2484.doi:10.14107/j.cnki.kzgc.160691.WEN H,TAO J P,CAO X G,LI J Z.Fresh Agricultural Supply Chain Decision Based on Bilateral Quality Control[J].Control Engineering of China,2017,24(12):2478-2484.doi:10.14107/j.cnki.kzgc.160691.
[15]熊峰,袁俊,王猛,陈方宇.公平偏好下生鲜农产品质量投入与定价研究[J].软科学,2017,31(4):122-127.doi:10.13956/j.ss.1001-8409.2017.04.27.XIONG F,YUAN J,WANG M,CHEN F Y.Study on the Quality Investment and Pricing of Fresh Agricultural Products under the Fairness Preference[J].Soft Science,2017,31(4):122-127.doi:10.13956/j.ss.1001-8409.2017.04.27.
[16]姚冠新,浦凌波.基于“农超对接”模式的质量改进与公平偏好研究[J].商业研究,2014(5):172-176.doi:10.13902/j.cnki.syyj.2014.05.025.YAO G X,PU L B.Research on quality improvement and fairness preference based on the mode of"agriculture-supermarket jointing"[J].Commercial Research,2014(5):172-176.doi:10.13902/j.cnki.syyj.2014.05.025.
[17]崔丽,胡洪林.农产品质量安全控制下“农超对接”主体间成本分担机制[J].系统工程,2017(3):131-136.CUI L,HU H L.The cost sharing mechanism between participants of the alliance of farmers and supermarkets under quality control[J].System Engineering,2017(3):131-136.
[18]郑琪,范体军.考虑风险偏好的生鲜农产品供应链激励契约设计[J].管理工程学报,2018,32(2):171-178.doi:10.13587/j.cnki.jieem.2018.02.019.ZHENG Q,FAN T J.Design of incentive contract for fresh agricultural products supply chain considering risk preference[J].Journal of Industrial Engineering Engineering Management,2018,32(2):171-178.doi:10.13587/j.cnki.jieem.2018.02.019.
[19]胡军,张镓,芮明杰.线性需求条件下考虑质量控制的供应链协调契约模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013(3):601-609.HU J,ZHANG J,RUI M J.Supply chain coordination model contract considering quality control under the condition of linear demand[J].Systems Engineering Theory&Practice,2013(3):601-609.
[20]GURNANI H,ERKOC M.Supply Contracts in Manufacturer-retailer interactions with manufacturer-quality and retailer effort-induced demand[J].Naval Research Logistics,2008,55(3):200-217.
[21]XIE G,YUE W,WANG S,LAI K K.Quality investment and price decision in a risk-averse supply chain[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2011,214(2):403-410.
[22]YANG F,SHAN F,JIN M.Capacity investment under cost sharing contracts[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2017.191:278-285.
[23]戴佩慧,项朝阳.蔬菜供应链利益分配应用研究--基于改进的shapley值法[J].广东农业科学,2014,41(14):208-213.doi:10.16768/j.issn.1004-874X.2014.14.047.DAI P H,XIANG C Y.Application research on profit distribution of vegetable supply chain-Based on the improved shapley value method[J].Guangdong Agricultural Sciences,2014,41(14):208-213.doi:10.16768/j.issn.1004-874X.2014.14.047.
[24]吴绒.政府补贴策略下农产品绿色供应链管理决策研究[J].广东农业科学,2014,41(15):215-219.doi:10.16768/j.issn.1004-874X.2014.15.044.WU R.Decisions on green supply chain management of agricultural products under government subsidies strategies[J].Guangdong Agricultural Sciences,2014,41(15):215-219.doi:10.16768/j.issn.1004-874X.2014.15.044.
[25]陈爽,朱丽芳,王薇薇.“互联网+”背景下农业产业链主体利益分配模型研究-基于合作博弈理论[J].广东农业科学,2018,45(1):160-164.doi:10.16768/j.issn.1004-874X.2018.01.025.CHEN S,ZHU L F,WANG W W.Research on the distribution pattern of the main interests of agricultural industry chains under the background of“Internet+”-Based on cooperative game theory[J].Guangdong Agricultural Sciences,2018,45(1):160-164.doi:10.16768/j.issn.1004-874X.2018.01.025.