企业社会责任与政府监管进化博弈模型研究
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摘要
随着全球化的不断深化、地球生态、社会问题,逐渐成为人们关注的焦点,以人为本越来越成为人类共识,不论企业还是社会都面临可持续发展问题,全球都在倡导低碳经济,倡导企业社会责任。近年以来,我国企业社会责任问题层出不穷,从几年前的三鹿奶粉事件,到最近大范围的空气污染,反应出我国企业社会责任的缺失和政府监督的不力,因此有必要尝试一种新的方法,即进化博弈论的方法,来分析和研究企业社会责任和政府监管,构建企业与政府监管部门的进化博弈模型,通过对企业和政府监管部门的复制动态方程及其进化稳定策略的分析,求出复制动态方程及进化稳定策略,并进行了稳定性分析,提出提升企业社会责任的建议。
With the deepening of globalization,global ecological,social issues,has become the focus of attention,people-oriented increasingly become the consensus of mankind,the world are promoting a low-carbon economy,promote corporate social responsibility.In recent years,corporate social responsibility issues emerging from the sanlu milk powder incident a few years ago to the recent large-scale air pollution,reflecting the lack of government oversight and ineffective of corporate social responsibility,it is necessary to try a new approach,namely,evolutionary game theory to analyze and study the corporate social responsibility and government regulation,construct evolutionary game model of corporate and government regulators and analyzes replicator dynamics and its evolutionary stable strategy and solves the function of replicator dynamics and evolutionary stable strategy,and does some stability analysis.Propose recommendations to improve corporate social responsibility.
With the deepening of globalization,global ecological,social issues,has become the focus of attention,people-oriented increasingly become the consensus of mankind,the world are promoting a low-carbon economy,promote corporate social responsibility.In recent years,corporate social responsibility issues emerging from the sanlu milk powder incident a few years ago to the recent large-scale air pollution,reflecting the lack of government oversight and ineffective of corporate social responsibility,it is necessary to try a new approach,namely,evolutionary game theory to analyze and study the corporate social responsibility and government regulation,construct evolutionary game model of corporate and government regulators and analyzes replicator dynamics and its evolutionary stable strategy and solves the function of replicator dynamics and evolutionary stable strategy,and does some stability analysis.Propose recommendations to improve corporate social responsibility.
引文
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[13]周涵琛.证券市场上与上市公司财务信息非对称进化博弈[J].统计与决策,2011(13):637-666.
[2]高展,金润圭.企业社会责任的理论研究与拓展[J].企业经济,2012(9).
[3]刘振彪.企业家创新投资决策的进化博弈分析[J].管理工程学报,2005(1):56-59.
[4]Friedman D.On Economic Applications of Evolutionary Game Theory[J].Journal of Evolutionary Economics,1998(8):15-43.
[5]小约瑟夫·哈林顿.哈林顿博弈论[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2012:306-309.
[6]Friedman.Evolutionary.Games in Economics[J].Econometric,1991,59(3):637-666.
[7]Weibull JW.Evolutionary Game Theory[M].Boston MIT Press,1998.
[8]张泽麟等.标准设定动因下企业RD联盟的进化博弈分析[J].软科学,2011(1):20-25.
[9]Mayanard S J.Evolutionary and the Theory of Games[M].London:Cambri-dge University Press,1982.
[10]Erwin A,Alex P.On the stability of evolutionary dynamics in games with incomplete informatio[J].Mathematical Social Sciences,2009,58.
[11]Clark Robinson.动力系统导论[M].韩茂安,邢业明,毕平译.北京:机械工业出版社,2007.
[12]许岩等.基于随机演化博弈的战略联盟稳定性分析和仿真[J].系统工程理论与实践,2011(5):920-926.
[13]周涵琛.证券市场上与上市公司财务信息非对称进化博弈[J].统计与决策,2011(13):637-666.