新创企业的质量创新及市场竞争均衡
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摘要
随着互联网技术的快速发展,新兴市场中新创企业井喷式增长。不同于成熟企业以利润为导向,大多数新创企业面临先生存再快速发展的使命。文章基于需求不确定情形下的纵向产品差异模型,引入生存诉求目标函数,论证了垄断情形下新创企业与成熟企业的质量创新策略差异以及双寡头竞争情形下的市场均衡。研究结果显示,垄断市场中新创企业创新策略主要受其债务影响,较高的债务将推动新创企业加大创新力度,而成熟企业只有在市场需求不确定性较高时才会加大创新投入。在目标诉求相同的双寡头市场中,新创企业会比成熟企业表现出更强的投资意愿,但新创企业与成熟企业竞争时,市场中会存在两种均衡状态:当负债较高且消费者对产品质量偏好较低时,新创企业会加大质量创新的力度;当负债较低且消费者对产品质量偏好较低时,新创企业会采取保守的创新策略。
With the rapid development of internet,start-ups are skyrocketing in new markets.Different from established firms which are profit-seeking,the majority of start-ups need to ensure their survival firstly for long-term development.Based on the vertical product differentiation model with demand uncertainty,this paper introduces the survival-seeking objective function and demonstrates the differences of quality innovation strategies between start-ups and established firms in the context of monopoly and the market equilibrium under the background of duopoly competition.The study results show that the innovation strategy of start-ups in monopoly market is mainly affected by their debt and higher debt pushes start-ups to invest more,while established firms care more about demand uncertainty and they invest more if demand uncertainty is higher.When two symmetric firms compete,it could be found that start-ups are much more willing to position high.However,when one start-up competes against one established firm,two Nash equilibria exist in their quality competition:The start-up positions high quality and the established firm positions low when the debt is large and consumers'preference for quality is low;The established firm positions high quality and the start-up positions low when the debt is low and consumers'preference is low.
With the rapid development of internet,start-ups are skyrocketing in new markets.Different from established firms which are profit-seeking,the majority of start-ups need to ensure their survival firstly for long-term development.Based on the vertical product differentiation model with demand uncertainty,this paper introduces the survival-seeking objective function and demonstrates the differences of quality innovation strategies between start-ups and established firms in the context of monopoly and the market equilibrium under the background of duopoly competition.The study results show that the innovation strategy of start-ups in monopoly market is mainly affected by their debt and higher debt pushes start-ups to invest more,while established firms care more about demand uncertainty and they invest more if demand uncertainty is higher.When two symmetric firms compete,it could be found that start-ups are much more willing to position high.However,when one start-up competes against one established firm,two Nash equilibria exist in their quality competition:The start-up positions high quality and the established firm positions low when the debt is large and consumers'preference for quality is low;The established firm positions high quality and the start-up positions low when the debt is low and consumers'preference is low.
引文
[1]阿里研究院.“移动互联网+”中国双创生态研究报告[DB/OL].(2015-07-16)[2018-03-23]. http://www. 199it. com/ar-chives/366129.html.
[2]MONTGOMERY C A,HARIHARAN S. Diversified expan-sion by large established firms[J]. Journal of Economic Be-havior&Organization,2003,15(1):71-89.
[3]ACS Z,ARMINGTON C. Endogenous growth and entrepre-neurial activity in cities[M]. Washington DC:Center forEconomic Studies,Bureau of the Census,2003.
[4]REID G C. Complex actions and simple outcomes:How newentrepreneurs stay in business[J]. Small Business Econom-ics,1999,13(4):303-315.
[5]MCCARTHY N. The top 20 reasons startup fail[DB/OL].(2017-11-06)[2018-03-23].https://www. statista. com/chart/11690/the-top-reasons-startups-fail/blog/startup-failure-reasons-top/.
[6]TANRISEVER F,ERZURUMLU S S,JOGLEKAR N. Pro-duction,process investment,and the survival of debt-financed start-up firms[J]. Production and Operations Man-agement,2012,21(4):637-652.
[7]CRISCUOLO P,NICOLSOU N,SALTER A. The elixir(orburden)of youth? Exploring differences in innovation be-tween start-ups and established firms[J]. Research Policy,2012,41(2):319-333.
[8]陈有华,聂普焱,彭璧玉.债务约束下的企业广告与R&D投资研究[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(12):142-149.
[9]BHIDE A. The origin and evolution of new businesses[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2000.
[10]段云龙,张新启,刘永松,等.创新型企业经营过程战略风险决策研究述评[J].华东经济管理,2017,31(7):158-165.
[11]SWINNEY R,CACHON G P,NETESSINE S. Capacity in-vestment timing by start-ups and established firms in newmarkets[J]. Management Science,2011,57(4):763-777.
[12]WEI M M,YAO T,JIANG B,et al. Profit seeking vs.surviv-al seeking:an analytical study of supplier’s behavior andbuyer’s subsidy strategy[J]. Production and OperationsManagement,2013,22(2):269-282.
[13]曹国昭,齐二石.竞争博弈下新创企业混合柔性技术战略决策研究[J].管理学报,2015,12(1):118-125.
[14]ANDERSON S P,DE PALMA A,THISSE J F. Discretechoice theory of product differentiation[M]. Cambridge,MA:MI press,1992.
[15]MEAGHER K J,ZAUNER K G. Product differentiationand location decisions under demand uncertainty[J]. Jour-nal of Economic Theory,2004,117(2):201-216.
[16]CHENG Y L. Vertical product differentiation under demanduncertainty[J]. Economic Modelling,2014,36:51-57.
[17]AUGUST T,SHIN H,TUNCA T I. Licensing and competi-tion for services in open source software[J]. InformationSystems Research,2013,24(4):1068-1086.
[18]KARAER?,ERHUN F. Quality and entry deterrence[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2015,240(1):292-303.
[19]LAHIRI A,DEY D. Effects of piracy on quality of informa-tion goods[J]. Management Science,2013,59(1):245-264.
[20]WEI X D,NAULT B R. Monopoly versioning of informationgoods when consumers have group tastes[J]. Productionand Operations Management,2014,23(6):1067-1081.
[21]JONES R,MENDELSON H. Information goods vs. Industri-al goods:Cost structure and competition[J]. ManagementScience,2011,57(1):164-176.
[22]杨广青,蒋录全,王浣尘,陈明义. Bertrand竞争下融资策略与产品差异化策略的博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2006,114(4):88-94.
[23]RONNEN U. Minimum quality standards,fixed costs,andcompetition[J]. The RAND Journal of Economics,1991,22(4):490-504.
[24]彭秀青,蔡莉,陈娟艺,等.从机会发现到机会创造:创业企业的战略选择[J].管理学报,2016,13(9):1312-1320.
[25]陈彪,单标安.转型环境下创业战略与新创企业竞争优势关系研究[J].科技进步与对策,2018,35(3):8-14.
(1)根据Meagher和Zauner(2004)[15]的证明,将消费者质量偏好分布的不确定性假设为充分小,可以避免对-t所服从分布的讨论。沿用Cheng(2014)[16]在双寡头质量博弈模型中的假设,本文在数值计算部分,设定-t∈[0,1/2]。此时,随机参数-t的方差σ2≤1/16。(2)单位标准化:针对满足公式(10-11)的质量ni做如下变换:ni=n′i(μ+1)2+σ2/k,可发现公式(10-11)中的参数μ、σ和k可完全消去。而所得图2及图中曲线的性质不受影响。为表述简便,文中不再出现新参数n'i,而统一表述为以((μ+1)2+σ2)/k为单位的质量ni。
[2]MONTGOMERY C A,HARIHARAN S. Diversified expan-sion by large established firms[J]. Journal of Economic Be-havior&Organization,2003,15(1):71-89.
[3]ACS Z,ARMINGTON C. Endogenous growth and entrepre-neurial activity in cities[M]. Washington DC:Center forEconomic Studies,Bureau of the Census,2003.
[4]REID G C. Complex actions and simple outcomes:How newentrepreneurs stay in business[J]. Small Business Econom-ics,1999,13(4):303-315.
[5]MCCARTHY N. The top 20 reasons startup fail[DB/OL].(2017-11-06)[2018-03-23].https://www. statista. com/chart/11690/the-top-reasons-startups-fail/blog/startup-failure-reasons-top/.
[6]TANRISEVER F,ERZURUMLU S S,JOGLEKAR N. Pro-duction,process investment,and the survival of debt-financed start-up firms[J]. Production and Operations Man-agement,2012,21(4):637-652.
[7]CRISCUOLO P,NICOLSOU N,SALTER A. The elixir(orburden)of youth? Exploring differences in innovation be-tween start-ups and established firms[J]. Research Policy,2012,41(2):319-333.
[8]陈有华,聂普焱,彭璧玉.债务约束下的企业广告与R&D投资研究[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(12):142-149.
[9]BHIDE A. The origin and evolution of new businesses[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2000.
[10]段云龙,张新启,刘永松,等.创新型企业经营过程战略风险决策研究述评[J].华东经济管理,2017,31(7):158-165.
[11]SWINNEY R,CACHON G P,NETESSINE S. Capacity in-vestment timing by start-ups and established firms in newmarkets[J]. Management Science,2011,57(4):763-777.
[12]WEI M M,YAO T,JIANG B,et al. Profit seeking vs.surviv-al seeking:an analytical study of supplier’s behavior andbuyer’s subsidy strategy[J]. Production and OperationsManagement,2013,22(2):269-282.
[13]曹国昭,齐二石.竞争博弈下新创企业混合柔性技术战略决策研究[J].管理学报,2015,12(1):118-125.
[14]ANDERSON S P,DE PALMA A,THISSE J F. Discretechoice theory of product differentiation[M]. Cambridge,MA:MI press,1992.
[15]MEAGHER K J,ZAUNER K G. Product differentiationand location decisions under demand uncertainty[J]. Jour-nal of Economic Theory,2004,117(2):201-216.
[16]CHENG Y L. Vertical product differentiation under demanduncertainty[J]. Economic Modelling,2014,36:51-57.
[17]AUGUST T,SHIN H,TUNCA T I. Licensing and competi-tion for services in open source software[J]. InformationSystems Research,2013,24(4):1068-1086.
[18]KARAER?,ERHUN F. Quality and entry deterrence[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2015,240(1):292-303.
[19]LAHIRI A,DEY D. Effects of piracy on quality of informa-tion goods[J]. Management Science,2013,59(1):245-264.
[20]WEI X D,NAULT B R. Monopoly versioning of informationgoods when consumers have group tastes[J]. Productionand Operations Management,2014,23(6):1067-1081.
[21]JONES R,MENDELSON H. Information goods vs. Industri-al goods:Cost structure and competition[J]. ManagementScience,2011,57(1):164-176.
[22]杨广青,蒋录全,王浣尘,陈明义. Bertrand竞争下融资策略与产品差异化策略的博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2006,114(4):88-94.
[23]RONNEN U. Minimum quality standards,fixed costs,andcompetition[J]. The RAND Journal of Economics,1991,22(4):490-504.
[24]彭秀青,蔡莉,陈娟艺,等.从机会发现到机会创造:创业企业的战略选择[J].管理学报,2016,13(9):1312-1320.
[25]陈彪,单标安.转型环境下创业战略与新创企业竞争优势关系研究[J].科技进步与对策,2018,35(3):8-14.
(1)根据Meagher和Zauner(2004)[15]的证明,将消费者质量偏好分布的不确定性假设为充分小,可以避免对-t所服从分布的讨论。沿用Cheng(2014)[16]在双寡头质量博弈模型中的假设,本文在数值计算部分,设定-t∈[0,1/2]。此时,随机参数-t的方差σ2≤1/16。(2)单位标准化:针对满足公式(10-11)的质量ni做如下变换:ni=n′i(μ+1)2+σ2/k,可发现公式(10-11)中的参数μ、σ和k可完全消去。而所得图2及图中曲线的性质不受影响。为表述简便,文中不再出现新参数n'i,而统一表述为以((μ+1)2+σ2)/k为单位的质量ni。