腐败控制、私人部门参与基础设施提供与反贫困效应——来自发展中国家的经验证据(1996-2014)
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摘要
惩治腐败和消除贫困始终是广大发展中国家面临的重要任务。文章基于1996年到2014年138个发展中国家的数据,探索了腐败控制降低一国贫困率的新机制,即促进私人部门参与基础设施提供。我们发现:第一,腐败控制显著促进了私人部门参与基础设施提供;第二,私人部门参与基础设施提供显著降低了发展中国家的贫困率;第三,"中介效应"分析显示,腐败控制是通过促进私人部门参与基础设施提供进而降低一国贫困率的。文章的发现是对发展中国家腐败与贫困关系研究的一个有益补充,不但有助于理解私人部门参与基础设施提供的制度基础,也有助于发展中国家设计反贫困的公共政策。
International experience shows that, relative to developed countries, the developing countries have a more severe problem of government corruption and also face a higher degree of poverty. As a result,control of corruption and poverty alleviation have always been essential tasks for developing countries. The traditional wisdom proposes several theories to explain the positive relationship between corruption and poverty rate in developing countries,for instance,corruption can impede economic growth and poverty deduction by reducing the return of investment,distorting the structure of public expenditure,or suppressing the incentive of innovation and entrepreneurship.However,this paper proposes a new mechanism,that is,corruption can lower the incentives of pirvite entities to cooperate with government and to take part in infrastructure provision,and thus deteriorates the poverty issue in developing countries. In other words,the improvement in control of corruption helps to alleviate poverty by facilitating private participation in infrastructure provision. Based on the transnational data of 138 developing countries from 1996 to 2014 and a set of econometric models with mediating effect,our paper finds that,firstly,control of corruption significantly promotes private participation in infrastructure provision,which is consistent with Hypothesis A. Specifically,ceteris paribus,one unit standard deviation increase of control of corruption promotes 0.29 percentage of investment in infrastructure provision with private participation. Secondly,infrastructure provision with private participation results in a significant reduction in the poverty rate of developing countries,which lends support for Hypothesis B. M ore precisely,ceteris paribus,one percentage increase of investment in infrastructure provision with private participation reduces 2.14 percentage of poverty headcount ratio at $3.10 a day,or reduces 1.55 percentage of poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day. Thirdly,the analysis of "mediating effect" shows that control of corruption reduces the poverty rate of developing countries through promoting private participation in infrastructure provision,which provides evidence in favor of Hypothesis C. Therefore,this paper makes a beneficial contribution to the related studies investigating the relationship between corruption and poverty of developing countries. It not only gives us a better understanding of the institutional fundamentals of private participation in infrastructure provision in developing world,but also sheds light on the design of anti-poverty policies for China and other developing countries. This paper concludes with the following policy implications,firstly,we should attach more importance to the role of infrastructure construction in poverty alleviation,in order to realize and strengthen its pro-poor and redistributive property. Secondly,we should treat the behaviors of private participation in infrastructure provision rationally, and further develop the comparative advantage of private entities in infrastructure provision. Lastly,we should further enhance the positive social and economic effects of anti-corruption campaign. In summary,this paper is beneficial for China's sustainable development and building a well-off society in an all-round way.
International experience shows that, relative to developed countries, the developing countries have a more severe problem of government corruption and also face a higher degree of poverty. As a result,control of corruption and poverty alleviation have always been essential tasks for developing countries. The traditional wisdom proposes several theories to explain the positive relationship between corruption and poverty rate in developing countries,for instance,corruption can impede economic growth and poverty deduction by reducing the return of investment,distorting the structure of public expenditure,or suppressing the incentive of innovation and entrepreneurship.However,this paper proposes a new mechanism,that is,corruption can lower the incentives of pirvite entities to cooperate with government and to take part in infrastructure provision,and thus deteriorates the poverty issue in developing countries. In other words,the improvement in control of corruption helps to alleviate poverty by facilitating private participation in infrastructure provision. Based on the transnational data of 138 developing countries from 1996 to 2014 and a set of econometric models with mediating effect,our paper finds that,firstly,control of corruption significantly promotes private participation in infrastructure provision,which is consistent with Hypothesis A. Specifically,ceteris paribus,one unit standard deviation increase of control of corruption promotes 0.29 percentage of investment in infrastructure provision with private participation. Secondly,infrastructure provision with private participation results in a significant reduction in the poverty rate of developing countries,which lends support for Hypothesis B. M ore precisely,ceteris paribus,one percentage increase of investment in infrastructure provision with private participation reduces 2.14 percentage of poverty headcount ratio at $3.10 a day,or reduces 1.55 percentage of poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day. Thirdly,the analysis of "mediating effect" shows that control of corruption reduces the poverty rate of developing countries through promoting private participation in infrastructure provision,which provides evidence in favor of Hypothesis C. Therefore,this paper makes a beneficial contribution to the related studies investigating the relationship between corruption and poverty of developing countries. It not only gives us a better understanding of the institutional fundamentals of private participation in infrastructure provision in developing world,but also sheds light on the design of anti-poverty policies for China and other developing countries. This paper concludes with the following policy implications,firstly,we should attach more importance to the role of infrastructure construction in poverty alleviation,in order to realize and strengthen its pro-poor and redistributive property. Secondly,we should treat the behaviors of private participation in infrastructure provision rationally, and further develop the comparative advantage of private entities in infrastructure provision. Lastly,we should further enhance the positive social and economic effects of anti-corruption campaign. In summary,this paper is beneficial for China's sustainable development and building a well-off society in an all-round way.
引文
陈屹立、邵同尧,2012,“地方政府腐败会影响私人投资积极性吗?---基于动态面板模型的系统GMM分析”,《南方经济》,第2期,第39-49页。
国家统计局,2017,《中华人民共和国2016年国民经济和社会发展统计公报》。
康继军、郭蒙、傅蕴英,2014,“要想富,先修路?---交通基础设施建设,交通运输业发展与贫困减少的实证研究”,《经济问题探索》,第9期,第41-46页。
刘晓光、张勋、方文全,2015,“基础设施的城乡收入分配效应:基于劳动力转移的视角”,《世界经济》,第3期,第145-170页。
刘晓昀、辛贤、毛学峰,2003,“贫困地区农村基础设施投资对农户收入和支出的影响”,《中国农村观察》,第1期,第31-36页。
王贤彬、王露瑶,2016,“反腐败与经济增长”,《经济社会体制比较》,第2期,第61-74页。
王小鲁、余静文、樊纲,2013,《中国分省企业经营环境指数2013年报告》,北京:中信出版股份有限公司。
吴一平、芮萌,2010,“地区腐败,市场化与中国经济增长”,《管理世界》,第11期,第10-17页。
杨灿明、赵福军,2004,“行政腐败的宏观经济学分析”,《经济研究》,第9期,第101-109页。
张勋、万广华,2016,“中国的农村基础设施促进了包容性增长吗?”,《经济研究》,第10期,第82-96页。
Alesina A.and R.Wacziarg,1998,“Openness,Country Size and Government”,Journal of Public Economics,69:305-321.
Ali,I.and E.M.Pernia,2003,“Infrastructure and Poverty Reduction:What is the Connection?”,Asian Development Bank Policy Brief Series No.13.
Aschauer,D.A.,1989,“Is Public Expenditure Productive?”,Journal of Monetary Economics,23(2):177-200.
Azariadis,Costas and John Stachurski,2005,“Poverty Traps”,In:Handbook of Economic Growth,Volume 1A.Edited by Philippe Aghion and Steven N.Durlauf,Elsevier.
Bardhan,P.,1997,“Corruption and Development:A Review of Issues”,Journal of Economic Literature,35(3):1320-1346.
Baron,R.M.and D.A.Kenny,1986,“The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological Research:Conceptual,Strategic,and Statistical Considerations”,Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,51:1173-1182.
Besley,T.and M.Ghatak,2004,“Public Goods and Economic Development”,in Policies for Poverty Alleviation,edited by Abhijit Banerjee,Roland Benabou,and Dilip Mookherjee.
Brunetti,A.and B.Weder,2003,“A free press is bad news for corruption”,Journal of Public Economics,87:1801-1824.
Davis,J.,2003,“Corruption in Public Service Delivery:Experience from South Asia's Water and Sanitation Sector”,World Development,32:53-71.
Demir,F.,2015,“Effects of FDI Flow son Institutional Development:Does It Matter Where the Investors are from”,World Development,78:341-359.
Démurger,S.,2001,“Infrastructure Development and Economic Growth:An Explanation for Regional Disparities in China”,Journal of Comparative Economics,29(1):95-117.
Fan S.and X.Zhang,2004,“Infrastructure and Regional Economic Development in Rural China”,China Economic Review,15(2):203-214.
Guasch,J.L.,2004,Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions:Doing it Right,Washington DC:World Bank.
Gulati,M.and M.Rao,2006,“Checking Corruption in the Electricity Sector”,mimeo,World Bank.
Hodge,G.A.and C.Greve,2007,“Public-Private Partnerships:An International Performance Review”,Public Administration Review,67(3):545-558.
Hodge,G.A.and C.Greve,2009,“PPPs:The Passage of Time Permits a Sober Reflection”,Economic Affairs,M arch 2009,33-39.
Iossa,E.and D.M artimort,2015,“The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private Partnerships”,Journal of Public Economic Theory,17(1):4-48.
Kaufmann,D.,A.Kraay and M.Mastruzzi,2010,“The Worldwide Governance Indicators:Methodology and Analytical Issues”,World Bank Policy Research Working Paper,No.5430.
Kenny,C.,2006,“Measuring and Reducing the Impact of Corruption in Infrastructure”,World Bank Working Paper,No.4099.
Kenny,C.,2007,“Construction,Corruption,and Developing Countries”,World Bank Working Paper,No.4271.
Kw ok,C.and S.Tadesse,2006,“The MNC as an Agent of Change for Host-Country Institutions:FDI and Corruption”,Journal of International Business Studies,37:767-785.
Larsen,T.I.,H.L.Pham and M.Rama,2004,“The Impact of Infrastructure Development on Rural Poverty Reduction in Vietnam”,World Bank Working Paper No.30790.
Lipscomb,M.,M.A.M obarak and T.Barham,2013,“Development Effects of Electrification:Evidence from the Topographic Placement of Hydropow er Plants in Brazil”,American Economic Journal:Applied Economics,5(2):200-231.
M auro,P.,1995,“Corruption and Growth”,The Quarterly Journal of Economics,110(3):681-712.
M unnell,A.H.,1992,“Policy Watch:Infrastructure Investment and Economic Growth”,Journal of Economic Perspectives,6(4):189-198.
Ogun,T.P.,2010,“Infrastructure and Poverty Reduction:Implications for Urban Development in Nigeria”,UNU-WIDER Working Paper,No.43.
Olken,B.,2004,“Monitoring Corruption:Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia”,NBER Working Paper No.11753.
Olken,Benjamin A.and Rohini Pande,2011,“Corruption in Developing Countries”,NBER Working Paper,No.17398.
Rodrik,D.,1998,“Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?”,Journal of Political Economy,106(5):997-1032.
Shleifer,A.and R.W.Vishny,1993,“Corruption”,The Quarterly Journal of Economics,108(3):599-617.
Stock,J.H.and M.Watson,2012,Introduction to Econometrics(3rd Edition),Pearson Education,2012.
Svensson,Jakob,2005,“Eight Questions about Corruption”,Journal of Economic Perspectives,19(3):19-42.
Tanzi,V.and H.Davoodi,1997,“Corruption,Public Investment,and Growth”,International Monetary Fund Working Paper,No.97139.
van de Walle,D.,1996,“Infrastructure and Poverty in Viet Nam”,World Bank Living Standards Measurement Study Working Paper,No.121.
World Bank,2017,Global Economic Prospects:Weak Investment in Uncertain Times.Washington,DC:World Bank.
(1)本文涉及的138个发展中国家是世界银行“私人参与基础设施”研究项目按照一国的人均国民收入以及基础设施发展情况选取的。根据世界银行的标准(按2015年人均国民收入),除了智利、乌拉圭、立陶宛、塞舌尔、安提瓜和巴布达、圣基茨和尼维斯这6个国家进入“高收入国家(12476美元以上)”行列之外,其他国家符合“中等收入国家(1026到12475美元)”和“低收入国家(1025美元以下)”的标准,因而这138个国家较好地代表了发展中国家。国家名称列表见附表1。
(1)腐败即“以权谋私”,主要是指政府工作人员利用公共权力谋取私利的行为。腐败控制是指一国政府遏制用公权谋取私利的程度和能力,是一国制度质量的重要维度(Shleifer and Vishny,1993; Bardhan,1997; Kaufmann et al.,2010)。
(1)对IPP取对数实际上排除了极少数IPP为0值的样本。这些0值样本可能是由于当年没有相关基础设施投资所导致,也可能是由于国家禁止私人部门参与而形成,但无论是否将这些0值样本纳入模型,基本结论都没有变化。限于篇幅,结果留存备索。
(2)关于半对数模型的系数解释可以参考Stock and Watson(2012)第八章“非线性回归函数”。
(1)值得注意的是,WGI的腐败控制是从人们主观感知(perception)的角度对一个国家的腐败程度进行衡量,这主要是因为客观的政府腐败官员数量及行为是难以观测的,这也是学术上衡量腐败程度的主流方法,例如“透明国际”的腐败感知指数(Corruption Perception Index,CPI)和王小鲁等(2013)设计的中国各地区政府廉洁指数。
(1)进一步的Sobel检验显示这一系数乘积显著非零。
国家统计局,2017,《中华人民共和国2016年国民经济和社会发展统计公报》。
康继军、郭蒙、傅蕴英,2014,“要想富,先修路?---交通基础设施建设,交通运输业发展与贫困减少的实证研究”,《经济问题探索》,第9期,第41-46页。
刘晓光、张勋、方文全,2015,“基础设施的城乡收入分配效应:基于劳动力转移的视角”,《世界经济》,第3期,第145-170页。
刘晓昀、辛贤、毛学峰,2003,“贫困地区农村基础设施投资对农户收入和支出的影响”,《中国农村观察》,第1期,第31-36页。
王贤彬、王露瑶,2016,“反腐败与经济增长”,《经济社会体制比较》,第2期,第61-74页。
王小鲁、余静文、樊纲,2013,《中国分省企业经营环境指数2013年报告》,北京:中信出版股份有限公司。
吴一平、芮萌,2010,“地区腐败,市场化与中国经济增长”,《管理世界》,第11期,第10-17页。
杨灿明、赵福军,2004,“行政腐败的宏观经济学分析”,《经济研究》,第9期,第101-109页。
张勋、万广华,2016,“中国的农村基础设施促进了包容性增长吗?”,《经济研究》,第10期,第82-96页。
Alesina A.and R.Wacziarg,1998,“Openness,Country Size and Government”,Journal of Public Economics,69:305-321.
Ali,I.and E.M.Pernia,2003,“Infrastructure and Poverty Reduction:What is the Connection?”,Asian Development Bank Policy Brief Series No.13.
Aschauer,D.A.,1989,“Is Public Expenditure Productive?”,Journal of Monetary Economics,23(2):177-200.
Azariadis,Costas and John Stachurski,2005,“Poverty Traps”,In:Handbook of Economic Growth,Volume 1A.Edited by Philippe Aghion and Steven N.Durlauf,Elsevier.
Bardhan,P.,1997,“Corruption and Development:A Review of Issues”,Journal of Economic Literature,35(3):1320-1346.
Baron,R.M.and D.A.Kenny,1986,“The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological Research:Conceptual,Strategic,and Statistical Considerations”,Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,51:1173-1182.
Besley,T.and M.Ghatak,2004,“Public Goods and Economic Development”,in Policies for Poverty Alleviation,edited by Abhijit Banerjee,Roland Benabou,and Dilip Mookherjee.
Brunetti,A.and B.Weder,2003,“A free press is bad news for corruption”,Journal of Public Economics,87:1801-1824.
Davis,J.,2003,“Corruption in Public Service Delivery:Experience from South Asia's Water and Sanitation Sector”,World Development,32:53-71.
Demir,F.,2015,“Effects of FDI Flow son Institutional Development:Does It Matter Where the Investors are from”,World Development,78:341-359.
Démurger,S.,2001,“Infrastructure Development and Economic Growth:An Explanation for Regional Disparities in China”,Journal of Comparative Economics,29(1):95-117.
Fan S.and X.Zhang,2004,“Infrastructure and Regional Economic Development in Rural China”,China Economic Review,15(2):203-214.
Guasch,J.L.,2004,Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions:Doing it Right,Washington DC:World Bank.
Gulati,M.and M.Rao,2006,“Checking Corruption in the Electricity Sector”,mimeo,World Bank.
Hodge,G.A.and C.Greve,2007,“Public-Private Partnerships:An International Performance Review”,Public Administration Review,67(3):545-558.
Hodge,G.A.and C.Greve,2009,“PPPs:The Passage of Time Permits a Sober Reflection”,Economic Affairs,M arch 2009,33-39.
Iossa,E.and D.M artimort,2015,“The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private Partnerships”,Journal of Public Economic Theory,17(1):4-48.
Kaufmann,D.,A.Kraay and M.Mastruzzi,2010,“The Worldwide Governance Indicators:Methodology and Analytical Issues”,World Bank Policy Research Working Paper,No.5430.
Kenny,C.,2006,“Measuring and Reducing the Impact of Corruption in Infrastructure”,World Bank Working Paper,No.4099.
Kenny,C.,2007,“Construction,Corruption,and Developing Countries”,World Bank Working Paper,No.4271.
Kw ok,C.and S.Tadesse,2006,“The MNC as an Agent of Change for Host-Country Institutions:FDI and Corruption”,Journal of International Business Studies,37:767-785.
Larsen,T.I.,H.L.Pham and M.Rama,2004,“The Impact of Infrastructure Development on Rural Poverty Reduction in Vietnam”,World Bank Working Paper No.30790.
Lipscomb,M.,M.A.M obarak and T.Barham,2013,“Development Effects of Electrification:Evidence from the Topographic Placement of Hydropow er Plants in Brazil”,American Economic Journal:Applied Economics,5(2):200-231.
M auro,P.,1995,“Corruption and Growth”,The Quarterly Journal of Economics,110(3):681-712.
M unnell,A.H.,1992,“Policy Watch:Infrastructure Investment and Economic Growth”,Journal of Economic Perspectives,6(4):189-198.
Ogun,T.P.,2010,“Infrastructure and Poverty Reduction:Implications for Urban Development in Nigeria”,UNU-WIDER Working Paper,No.43.
Olken,B.,2004,“Monitoring Corruption:Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia”,NBER Working Paper No.11753.
Olken,Benjamin A.and Rohini Pande,2011,“Corruption in Developing Countries”,NBER Working Paper,No.17398.
Rodrik,D.,1998,“Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?”,Journal of Political Economy,106(5):997-1032.
Shleifer,A.and R.W.Vishny,1993,“Corruption”,The Quarterly Journal of Economics,108(3):599-617.
Stock,J.H.and M.Watson,2012,Introduction to Econometrics(3rd Edition),Pearson Education,2012.
Svensson,Jakob,2005,“Eight Questions about Corruption”,Journal of Economic Perspectives,19(3):19-42.
Tanzi,V.and H.Davoodi,1997,“Corruption,Public Investment,and Growth”,International Monetary Fund Working Paper,No.97139.
van de Walle,D.,1996,“Infrastructure and Poverty in Viet Nam”,World Bank Living Standards Measurement Study Working Paper,No.121.
World Bank,2017,Global Economic Prospects:Weak Investment in Uncertain Times.Washington,DC:World Bank.
(1)本文涉及的138个发展中国家是世界银行“私人参与基础设施”研究项目按照一国的人均国民收入以及基础设施发展情况选取的。根据世界银行的标准(按2015年人均国民收入),除了智利、乌拉圭、立陶宛、塞舌尔、安提瓜和巴布达、圣基茨和尼维斯这6个国家进入“高收入国家(12476美元以上)”行列之外,其他国家符合“中等收入国家(1026到12475美元)”和“低收入国家(1025美元以下)”的标准,因而这138个国家较好地代表了发展中国家。国家名称列表见附表1。
(1)腐败即“以权谋私”,主要是指政府工作人员利用公共权力谋取私利的行为。腐败控制是指一国政府遏制用公权谋取私利的程度和能力,是一国制度质量的重要维度(Shleifer and Vishny,1993; Bardhan,1997; Kaufmann et al.,2010)。
(1)对IPP取对数实际上排除了极少数IPP为0值的样本。这些0值样本可能是由于当年没有相关基础设施投资所导致,也可能是由于国家禁止私人部门参与而形成,但无论是否将这些0值样本纳入模型,基本结论都没有变化。限于篇幅,结果留存备索。
(2)关于半对数模型的系数解释可以参考Stock and Watson(2012)第八章“非线性回归函数”。
(1)值得注意的是,WGI的腐败控制是从人们主观感知(perception)的角度对一个国家的腐败程度进行衡量,这主要是因为客观的政府腐败官员数量及行为是难以观测的,这也是学术上衡量腐败程度的主流方法,例如“透明国际”的腐败感知指数(Corruption Perception Index,CPI)和王小鲁等(2013)设计的中国各地区政府廉洁指数。
(1)进一步的Sobel检验显示这一系数乘积显著非零。