摘要
资产结构究竟能否反映资产专用性,本文提出了一个研究视角和检验方法,即通过检验企业资产结构与绩效、融资结构的关系是否具备专用性经济后果特征来判断企业资产是否具有专用性以及资产结构反映多大程度的专用性信息。沿循此视角和方法,我们选取了2001—2013年中国A股上市公司共21,703个观测值进行实证分析。研究发现中国企业资产结构与绩效、负债水平均呈现显著负相关,表明整体上中国企业长期非金融性资产专用性不足。研究同时发现中国企业产权性质对其资产结构包含的专用性及其经济后果具有重要影响。具体而言,民营控股公司资产结构与绩效、融资结构的关系符合资产专用性经济后果特征,显示出较强的专用性程度。在国有控股公司以及中央政府控股的国有公司、地方政府控股的国有公司的样本组中均未能发现资产结构体现专用性经济后果特征的证据。进一步研究发现投资增量的效率是导致产权性质不同的企业专用性存在差异的主要原因。
This paper supplies a perspective and method to examine whether asset structure(AS)reflect asset specificity. By investigating the relations between AS and financial performance, AS and capital structure, and recognizing whether the relations agree with economic consequences of assets specificity, we examine whether and how much AS discloses assets specificity. Using 21703 observations from Chinese listed companies issuing A shares for the 2001—2013 period, we find the relations between AS and financial performance, AS and capital structure are all negative, which suggests the specificity of long-term non-financial assets of Chinese firms is insufficient. In addition, the different nature of ownership of Chinese firms influences assets specificity and its economic consequences. The study shows the relation between AS and financial performance, as well as the relation between AS and capital structure in private enterprises agrees with assets specificity, which suggests private enterprises' assets specificity is sufficient. However, we find assets structure's economic consequences of stated-enterprises, including the enterprises controlled by the central government and the local authorities, don't agree with assets specificity. In further investigation, we also find the efficiency of investment increment is the main reason for the difference of assets specificity in the different nature of ownership of enterprises.
引文
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