家庭农场退出诱发的利益冲突与化解策略研究
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摘要
研究目的:借助埃奇沃斯盒状图阐述家庭农场退出的"帕累托改进"过程,深入分析家庭农场退出可能诱发不同主体间的利益冲突以及应对策略,为家庭农场的合理有序退出提供理论支撑。研究方法:经济学交换的一般均衡分析法、理论分析法、文献梳理法、综合分析法。研究结果:在家庭农场退出时,会在家庭农场主、农户、债权人、集体经济组织、家庭农场的其他成员等主体之间围绕土地合同违约、债务清偿次序、债务承担比例、资产处置等问题诱发激烈的矛盾冲突,这些问题的妥善解决对于构建家庭农场的合理有序退出机制、盘活退出家庭农场的整体资产、维护退出家庭农场主和债权人的合法权益都具有重要意义。研究结论:家庭农场退出所诱发的不同主体间的利益冲突应当依据法律政策、土地流转合同等科学合理地加以解决。对于家庭农场退出的资产采取整体转让、转租、托管经营等方式处理;明确家庭农场退出需要承担的法律责任,参照相关法律政策,明确家庭农场退出的债务偿还规则;明确集体经济组织在家庭农场退出时的职能定位;通过制定内部规章制度明晰家庭农场成员间的"权责利"关系格局。
The purpose of the study is to illustrate the "Pareto Improvement" process of family farm exit by using the Aiqiwosi-box diagram and to analyse the interest conflict and countermeasures of family farm exit, to provide a theoretical basis for the rational and orderly exit of family farms. The research methods include general equilibrium analysis,theoretical analysis, literature review and comprehensive analysis. The research results show that family farm exit induces severe conflict between the farm owner and the farmers, creditors, collective economic organizations, and other family members related to land contract breach, debt settlement order, debt commitment ratio and disposal of the assets. The proper solutions to these problems are of great importance for constructing a reasonable and orderly exit mechanism for family farms, revitalizing the overall assets of family farms and maintaining the legal rights and interests of family farmers and creditors. In conclusion, the interest conflict between different subjects induced by the family farm exit should be resolved scientifically and reasonably according to laws, policies and contracts. For assets of family farm exit, it can be solved by means of overall transfer of family farms, sub-leasing, and trusteeship management of new agricultural business entities. The legal responsibilities and the debt repayment rules for the family farm exit should be clarified with reference to relevant laws and policies. The functional position of collective economic organizations should also be clarified during family farm exit. The pattern of "rights, responsibilities and interests" among family farm members should be clarified through the formulation of internal rules and regulations.
The purpose of the study is to illustrate the "Pareto Improvement" process of family farm exit by using the Aiqiwosi-box diagram and to analyse the interest conflict and countermeasures of family farm exit, to provide a theoretical basis for the rational and orderly exit of family farms. The research methods include general equilibrium analysis,theoretical analysis, literature review and comprehensive analysis. The research results show that family farm exit induces severe conflict between the farm owner and the farmers, creditors, collective economic organizations, and other family members related to land contract breach, debt settlement order, debt commitment ratio and disposal of the assets. The proper solutions to these problems are of great importance for constructing a reasonable and orderly exit mechanism for family farms, revitalizing the overall assets of family farms and maintaining the legal rights and interests of family farmers and creditors. In conclusion, the interest conflict between different subjects induced by the family farm exit should be resolved scientifically and reasonably according to laws, policies and contracts. For assets of family farm exit, it can be solved by means of overall transfer of family farms, sub-leasing, and trusteeship management of new agricultural business entities. The legal responsibilities and the debt repayment rules for the family farm exit should be clarified with reference to relevant laws and policies. The functional position of collective economic organizations should also be clarified during family farm exit. The pattern of "rights, responsibilities and interests" among family farm members should be clarified through the formulation of internal rules and regulations.
引文
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[3]郑宇洁.家庭农场:探路土地适度规模经营[J].国土资源导刊,2013(7):21-23.
[4]刘新卫.家庭农场,呼唤土地政策创新[J].中国土地,2013(7):28-30.
[5]张学艳.基于结构化理论的家庭农场主目标的实现路径探析[J].广东农业科学,2015(23):213-219.
[6]孔令成,郑少锋.家庭农场的经营效率及适度规模--基于松江模式的DEA模型分析[J].西北农林科技大学学报(社会科学版),2016,16(5):107-118.
[7]方志权,张晨,楼建丽,等.松江家庭农场十年历程与展望[J].农村经营管理,2018(2):40-42.
[8]邵桦毅.我国家庭农场法律制度研究[D].成都:西南政法大学,2014:48-49.
[9]刘连成.我国家庭农场法律问题研究[D].蚌埠:安徽财经大学,2016:34-36.
[10]G KUEHNE.My decision to sell the family farm[J].Agriculture&Human Values,2013,30(2):203-213.
[11]杜玉品.完善我国家庭农场市场规制法律制度的思考[D].济南:山东大学,2014:33.
[12]齐蘅,吴玲.中国农村土地制度变迁的历史溯源与现实观照[J].吉首大学学报(社会科学版),2017,38(3):72-77.
[13]庄慧娴.我国家庭农场法律问题研究[D].蚌埠:安徽财经大学,2015:21.
[14]梁庆宾,冯艳玲.完善农业生产经营体系视野下家庭农场相关法律问题研究[J].人民论坛,2015(11):115-117.
[15]花宇.家庭农场等待更清晰的法律界定[N].农村大众,2015-12-21(1).
[16]胡桂芳.发展家庭农场的思考和建议[N].中国经济时报,2013-08-21(A11).
[17]丁关良.家庭承包之土地承包经营权抵押乱象剖析和法律规制研究[J].中国党政干部论坛,2014(6):28-33.
[18]柴振国,郭慧敏.农业公司破产中农民股东与债权人利益的冲突与协调[J].山东警察学院学报,2009(2):45-48.
[19]王国静.土地承包经营权在破产清算中的法律问题研究[D].扬州:扬州大学,2014:17.
[20]刘莉莉.土地承包经营权入股法律问题研究[D].武汉:华中师范大学,2013:31.
[21]荣振华.家庭农场注册登记中的问题及其治理[J].湖南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2018,19(1):73-78.
[22]M MORAIS,JAR BORGES,E BINOTTO.Using the reasoned action approach to understand Brazilian successors’intention to take over the farm[J].Land Use Policy,2018,71:445-452.