创业板上市公司控制权特征对实际控制人减持行为的影响研究
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摘要
控制权特征影响公司实际控制人决策动机,进而影响其首发股份减持幅度。以2009-2014年上市的创业板上市公司为样本,探究实际控制人在首发股份解禁后减持比例与其控制权特征之间的关系,实证研究结果表明:实际控制人进行内部交易和减持实现权力变现的行为普遍存在,对中小股东及市场公平性造成一定影响,权力难以得到约束是这一现象形成的重要原因,因此,需要考虑在治理结构上适当降低两权分离度、股权集中度和终极控制权,外部加强企业信息披露监管。进一步的研究还表明,控制权较高的情况下,实际控制人减持行为、力度与企业业绩并无显著影响,对此类减持行为需要持更理性的态度,客观分析其减持动机;由此也需要认识到,控制权变动是市场调节作用之一,新进入的资本有可能为企业经营带来正面作用,这在控制权过高的企业中尤为明显。
The control power characteristics affect the decision-making motivations of companies' actual controllers. In turn,it will affect the reduction of its initial shareholding. The paper explores the relationship between reducing ratio and control power characteristics with the samples of GEM listed companies in 2009-2014,finding that the fact that actual controllers conduct internal transactions and reduce the holdings to realize the realization of power is widespread,which has a impact on the minority shareholders and market fairness. And one of the important reasons for this phenomenon is that the control power is hard to be restrained effectively. Therefore,it is necessary to consider reducing two-weight separation,equity concentration and ultimate control rights,and strengthening the supervision of enterprise information disclosure. Further research also shows that the actual controllers' holding reduction has no significant effect on the performance of the enterprise under the condition of high control right. It is necessary to take a more rational attitude towards such reduction and objectively analyze its motivation; it is also necessary to recognize that the change of control rights is one of the market regulation functions,and that the new capital may bring positive effects to the operation of enterprises,especially in enterprises with excessive control rights.
The control power characteristics affect the decision-making motivations of companies' actual controllers. In turn,it will affect the reduction of its initial shareholding. The paper explores the relationship between reducing ratio and control power characteristics with the samples of GEM listed companies in 2009-2014,finding that the fact that actual controllers conduct internal transactions and reduce the holdings to realize the realization of power is widespread,which has a impact on the minority shareholders and market fairness. And one of the important reasons for this phenomenon is that the control power is hard to be restrained effectively. Therefore,it is necessary to consider reducing two-weight separation,equity concentration and ultimate control rights,and strengthening the supervision of enterprise information disclosure. Further research also shows that the actual controllers' holding reduction has no significant effect on the performance of the enterprise under the condition of high control right. It is necessary to take a more rational attitude towards such reduction and objectively analyze its motivation; it is also necessary to recognize that the change of control rights is one of the market regulation functions,and that the new capital may bring positive effects to the operation of enterprises,especially in enterprises with excessive control rights.
引文
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[2]La Porta,Lopez-de-Silanes,Shleifer.Corporate Ownership Around the World[J].Journal of Finance,1999,5(2):471-517.
[3]Barclay,Holderness.Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporation[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1989(25):371-395.
[4]Gilson R J,Gordon J N.Controlling Shareholders[J].University of Pennsylvania Law Review,2003,152(2):785-843.
[5]Attig N,Gadhoum Y,Lang L.Bid-Ask Spread,Asymmetric Information and Ultimate Ownership[D].Chinese University of Hong Kong,2003:G32.
[6]Masulis R W,Wang C,Xie F.Agency Problems at Dual-class Companies[J].The Journal of Finance,2009,64(4):1697-1727.
[7]黄蕾.股权结构与公司价值间关系的实证分析[J].江西社会科学,2008(3):91-94.
[8]徐莉萍,辛宇,陈工孟.股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响[J].经济研究,2006(1):90-100.
[9]朱武祥,宋勇.股权结构与企业价值---对家电行业上市公司实证分析[J].经济研究,2001(12):66-72,92.
[10]陈仕华,李维安.中国上市公司股票期权:大股东的一个合法性“赎买”工具[J].经济管理,2012,34(3):50-59.
[11]吕景胜,赵玉梅.董事会特征对内部控制失效的影响研究---基于中国上市公司的数据分析[J].中国软科学,2016(5):93-106.
[12]朱滔.董事薪酬、CEO薪酬与公司未来业绩:监督还是合谋?[J].会计研究,2015(8):49-56,97.
[13]叶青,赵良玉,刘思辰.独立董事“政商旋转门”之考察:一项基于自然实验的研究[J].经济研究,2016,51(6):98-113.
[14]Lorie,Niederhoffer.Predictive and Statistical Properties of Insider Trading[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1968,11:35-51.
[15]Noe.Voluntary Disclosures and Insider Transactions[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,1999,27:305-326.
[16]刘亚莉,王微.大股东减持的市场反应与影响因素---基于市场氛围的研究[J].北京科技大学学报(社会科学版),2010,26(2):40-46.
[17]吴育辉,吴世农.股票减持过程中的大股东掏空行为研究[J].中国工业经济,2010(5):121-130.
[18]俞红海,徐龙炳.终极控股股东控制权与全流通背景下的大股东减持[J].财经研究,2010,36(1):123-133.