法制环境、两权分离与资本结构动态调整
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摘要
本文实证检验了法制环境以及控股股东控制权和所有权分离对资本结构动态调整的影响。研究发现:上市公司控股股东控制权和所有权分离程度越高,实际资本结构偏离最优资本结构的幅度越大,资本结构调整速度越慢;上市公司所处的法制环境越好,实际资本结构偏离最优资本结构的幅度越小,资本结构调整速度越快;法制环境的改善能够显著的缓解两权分离对资本结构动态调整的负面影响;结合中国的制度背景,基于公司产权性质的分析发现,相比国有上市公司,非国有上市公司受法制环境和两权分离的影响更加显著。
Based on the data of China's A share listed firms,this paper studies the effect imposed by the separation of control right and ownership and legal environment on the dynamic adjustment of capital structure. The results are as follows:the lower the level of separation of control right and ownership,the slower the speed of dynamic adjustment of capital structure and the higher the level of capital structure deviation; the better the legal environment,the faster the speed of dynamic adjustment of capital structure and the lower the level of capital structure deviation; the improvement of the legal environment can significantly alleviate the negative effect imposed by the separation of control right and ownership on the dynamic adjustment of capital structure. Finally,based on China's institution background,the research finds that compared with state-owned firms,non-state-owned firms are more significantly affected by the separation of control right and ownership and legal environment.
Based on the data of China's A share listed firms,this paper studies the effect imposed by the separation of control right and ownership and legal environment on the dynamic adjustment of capital structure. The results are as follows:the lower the level of separation of control right and ownership,the slower the speed of dynamic adjustment of capital structure and the higher the level of capital structure deviation; the better the legal environment,the faster the speed of dynamic adjustment of capital structure and the lower the level of capital structure deviation; the improvement of the legal environment can significantly alleviate the negative effect imposed by the separation of control right and ownership on the dynamic adjustment of capital structure. Finally,based on China's institution background,the research finds that compared with state-owned firms,non-state-owned firms are more significantly affected by the separation of control right and ownership and legal environment.
引文
[1]La Porta,R.,Lopez de Silanes,F.,Shleifer,A.and Vishny,R.W.Law and finance[J].Journal of Political Economy,1998,106(6):1113-1155.
[2]La Porta,R.,Lopez de Silanes,F.,Shleifer,A.and Vishny,R,W.Corporate ownership around the world[J].Journal of Finance,1999,(54):471-517.
[3]Claessens,S.,S.Djankov,J.P.H.Fan,and L.H.P.Lang.Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings[J].Journal of Finance,2002,(57):2741-2771.
[4]Faccio,Mara and Larry H.P.Lang.The ultimate ownership of western european corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2002,65(3):365-395.
[5]Dyck,A.,and Zingales L.Private benefits of control:An international comparison[J].Journal of Finance,2004,59(2):537-600.
[6]Baek,Jae-Seung,Jun-Koo Kang,Kyung Suh Park.Corporate governance and firm value:Evidence from the Korean financial crisis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2004,71(2):265-313.
[7]叶勇,胡培,黄登仕.中国上市公司终极控制权及其与东亚、西欧上市公司的比较分析[J].南开管理评论,2005,(8):25-31.
[8]肖作平,廖理.终极控制股东、法律环境与融资结构选择[J].管理科学学报,2012,(9):84-96.
[9]Leary,M.,Roberts S.,M.R.Do firms rebalance their capital structures[J].Journal of Finance,2005,60(6):2575-2619.
[10]La Porta,R.,Lopez de Silanes,F.,Shleifer,A.and Vishny,R,W.Investor protection and corporate governance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,(58):3-27.
[11]樊纲,王小鲁,朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数:各地区市场化相对进程2011年报告[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2010.
[12]姜付秀,黄继承.市场化进程与资本结构动态调整[J].管理世界,2011,(3):124-134.
[13]Flannery,M.,K.Rangan.Partial adjustment toward target capital structures[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,79(3):469-506.
[14]Cook,D.T.Tang.Macroeconomic conditions and capital structure adjustment speed[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2010,(16):73-87.
[15]夏立军,方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005,(5):40-51.
[16]孙铮,刘风委,李曾泉.市场化程度、政府干预与企业债务期限结构——来自我国上市公司的实证证据[J].经济研究,2005,(5):52-63.
[17]Fan,J.P.H.,T.J.Wong,Tianyu Zhang.The emergence of corporate pyramids in China[R].Mimeo,Chinese University of Hong Kong,2005.
[18]程仲鸣.我国上市公司终极控制人股权特征的经验研究[J].财政研究,2010,(3):68-70.
[19]南开大学公司治理评价课题组.中国上市公司治理状况评价研究——来自2008年1127家上市公司的数据[J].管理世界,2010,(1):142-151.
(1)LLSV为四位学者姓名的简写,分别是:La porta,Robert W.Vishny,Lopez-de-Silanes,Andrei Shleifer。
(1)由于樊纲等的《中国市场化指数:各地区市场化相对进程2011年报告》中的市场中介组织的发育与法律制度环境得分数据截止到2009年,所以当使用法制环境变量时样本区间为2003-2009,同时观测样本减少到4756个。
[2]La Porta,R.,Lopez de Silanes,F.,Shleifer,A.and Vishny,R,W.Corporate ownership around the world[J].Journal of Finance,1999,(54):471-517.
[3]Claessens,S.,S.Djankov,J.P.H.Fan,and L.H.P.Lang.Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings[J].Journal of Finance,2002,(57):2741-2771.
[4]Faccio,Mara and Larry H.P.Lang.The ultimate ownership of western european corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2002,65(3):365-395.
[5]Dyck,A.,and Zingales L.Private benefits of control:An international comparison[J].Journal of Finance,2004,59(2):537-600.
[6]Baek,Jae-Seung,Jun-Koo Kang,Kyung Suh Park.Corporate governance and firm value:Evidence from the Korean financial crisis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2004,71(2):265-313.
[7]叶勇,胡培,黄登仕.中国上市公司终极控制权及其与东亚、西欧上市公司的比较分析[J].南开管理评论,2005,(8):25-31.
[8]肖作平,廖理.终极控制股东、法律环境与融资结构选择[J].管理科学学报,2012,(9):84-96.
[9]Leary,M.,Roberts S.,M.R.Do firms rebalance their capital structures[J].Journal of Finance,2005,60(6):2575-2619.
[10]La Porta,R.,Lopez de Silanes,F.,Shleifer,A.and Vishny,R,W.Investor protection and corporate governance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,(58):3-27.
[11]樊纲,王小鲁,朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数:各地区市场化相对进程2011年报告[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2010.
[12]姜付秀,黄继承.市场化进程与资本结构动态调整[J].管理世界,2011,(3):124-134.
[13]Flannery,M.,K.Rangan.Partial adjustment toward target capital structures[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,79(3):469-506.
[14]Cook,D.T.Tang.Macroeconomic conditions and capital structure adjustment speed[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2010,(16):73-87.
[15]夏立军,方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005,(5):40-51.
[16]孙铮,刘风委,李曾泉.市场化程度、政府干预与企业债务期限结构——来自我国上市公司的实证证据[J].经济研究,2005,(5):52-63.
[17]Fan,J.P.H.,T.J.Wong,Tianyu Zhang.The emergence of corporate pyramids in China[R].Mimeo,Chinese University of Hong Kong,2005.
[18]程仲鸣.我国上市公司终极控制人股权特征的经验研究[J].财政研究,2010,(3):68-70.
[19]南开大学公司治理评价课题组.中国上市公司治理状况评价研究——来自2008年1127家上市公司的数据[J].管理世界,2010,(1):142-151.
(1)LLSV为四位学者姓名的简写,分别是:La porta,Robert W.Vishny,Lopez-de-Silanes,Andrei Shleifer。
(1)由于樊纲等的《中国市场化指数:各地区市场化相对进程2011年报告》中的市场中介组织的发育与法律制度环境得分数据截止到2009年,所以当使用法制环境变量时样本区间为2003-2009,同时观测样本减少到4756个。