高管薪酬与资本结构动态调整
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摘要
在考察了高管薪酬对资本结构调整行为产生的影响后,我们发现,高管薪酬会通过降低管理者代理成本提高公司资本结构调整速度。随着高管薪酬的增加,公司的资本结构调整速度显著地提高,这说明高管薪酬有效地发挥了激励作用,抑制了代理成本。而当高管持股时,公司向目标资本结构调整的速度更快。进一步分组检验发现,相比于高管不持股的公司,在高管持股的公司中,高管薪酬提高资本结构调整速度的作用明显更强。并且,在研究了不同性质企业中高管薪酬的激励作用后发现,高管薪酬仅在国有企业中才能产生显著的正向激励作用。
This paper investigates the relationship between the executive pay of Chinese listed companies and their capital structure adjustments in recent decade.The results show that executive pay can affect the adjustment speed to their target capital structures through affecting the management agency cost. With the increasing of executive pay,the capital structure adjustment speed of these companies would be significantly improved,which demonstrates that executive pay can play a role of incentive and control agency costs.Companies with managerial ownership would adjust capital structures towards their target capital structures at the higher speed.After examination with separating groups,we find that compared with companies without managerial ownership,the effect of executive pay improving the capital structure adjustment speed is significantly stronger in companies with managerial ownership. Moreover,compared with private enterprises,the effect of executive pay improving the capital structure adjustment speed is stronger in state-owned companies.
This paper investigates the relationship between the executive pay of Chinese listed companies and their capital structure adjustments in recent decade.The results show that executive pay can affect the adjustment speed to their target capital structures through affecting the management agency cost. With the increasing of executive pay,the capital structure adjustment speed of these companies would be significantly improved,which demonstrates that executive pay can play a role of incentive and control agency costs.Companies with managerial ownership would adjust capital structures towards their target capital structures at the higher speed.After examination with separating groups,we find that compared with companies without managerial ownership,the effect of executive pay improving the capital structure adjustment speed is significantly stronger in companies with managerial ownership. Moreover,compared with private enterprises,the effect of executive pay improving the capital structure adjustment speed is stronger in state-owned companies.
引文
1.胡国柳、黄景贵,2006:《资本结构选择的影响因素---来自中国上市公司的新证据》,《经济评论》第1期。
2.黄福广、李广、李西文,2011:《高管薪酬、行政级别与代理成本》,《科学学与科学技术管理》第2期。
3.黄继承、阚铄、朱冰、郑志刚,2016:《经理薪酬激励与资本结构动态调整》,《管理世界》第11期。
4.连玉君、钟经樊,2007:《中国上市公司资本结构动态调整机制研究》,《南方经济》第1期。
5.刘绍娓、万大艳,2013:《高管薪酬与公司绩效:国有与非国有上市公司的实证比较研究》,《中国软科学》第2期。
6.曲亮、任国良,2010:《高管薪酬激励、股权激励与企业价值相关性的实证检验》,《当代经济科学》第5期。
7.盛明泉、戚昊辰,2014:《高管薪酬差距与资本结构动态调整研究》,《商业经济与管理》第12期。
8.陶萍、张睿、朱佳,2016:《高管薪酬、企业绩效激励效应与政府限薪令的影响---133家A股国有控股公司的实证研究》,《现代财经(天津财经大学学报)》第6期。
9.吴育辉、吴世农,2010:《高管薪酬:激励还是自利?---来自中国上市公司的证据》,《会计研究》第11期。
10.徐向艺、王俊韡、巩震,2007:《高管人员报酬激励与公司治理绩效研究---一项基于深、沪A股上市公司的实证分析》,《中国工业经济》第2期。
11.周建、袁德利,2013:《公司治理机制与公司绩效:代理成本的中介效应》,《预测》第2期。
12.朱德胜、张伟,2017:《高管薪酬激励对股权代理成本影响的实证研究》,《经济与管理评论》第3期。
13.Bebchuk,L.A.,and J.M.Fried.2003.“Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem.”Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(3):71-92.
14.Belghitar,Y.,and E.Clark.2015.“Managerial Risk Incentives and Investment Related Agency Costs.”International Review of Financial Analysis 38(3):191-197.
15.Benmelech,E.,E.Kandel,and P.Veronesi.2010.“Stock-based Compensation and CEO(Dis)Incentives.”The Quarterly Journal of Economics 125(4):1769-1820.
16.Conyon,M.J.,and L.He.2011.“Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in China.”Journal of Corporate Finance 17(4):1158-1175.
17.Drobetz,W.,and G.Wanzenried.2006.“What Determines the Speed of Adjustment to the Target Capital Structure?”Applied Financial Economics 16(13):941-958.
18.Fischer,E.O.,Heinkel,R.,and Zechner,J.1989.“Dynamic Capital Structure Choice:Theory and Tests.”The Journal of Finance 44(1):19-40.
19.Flannery,M.J.,and K.P.Rangan.2006.“Partial Adjustment toward Target Capital Structures.”Journal of Financial Economics 79(3):469-506.
20.Frydman,C.,and R.E.Saks.2010.“Executive Compensation:A New View from a Long-term Perspective,1936-2005.”The Review of Financial Studies 23(5):2099-2138.
21.Huang,H.,Q.Wang,and X.Zhang.2009.“The Effect of CEO Ownership and Shareholder Rights on Cost of Equity Capital.”Corporate Governance 9(3):225-270.
22.Jensen,M.C.,and W.H.Meckling.1976.“Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.”Journal of Financial Economics 3(4):305-360.
23.Jensen,M.C.,and K.J.Murphy.1990.“Performance Pay and Top-management Incentives.”Journal of Political Economy 98(2):225-264.
24.John,T.A.,and K.John.1993.“Top-management Compensation and Capital Structure.”The Journal of Finance48(3):949-974.
25.Lambrecht,B.M.,and S.C.Myers.2008.“Debt and Managerial Rents in a Real-options Model of the Firm.”Journal of Financial Economics 89(2):209-231.
26.Lambrinoudakis,C.2016.“Adjustment Cost Determinants and Target Capital Structure.”SSRN Working Paper Series No.2746378.
27.Morellec,E.,B.Nikolov,and N.Schurhoff.2012.“Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Dynamics.”The Journal of Finance 67(3):803-848.
28.Myers,S.C.1984.“The Capital Structure Puzzle.”The Journal of Finance 39(3):575-592.
29.Ozkan,A.2001.“Determinants of Capital Structure and Adjustment to Long Run Target:Evidence from UKCompany Panel Data.”Journal of Business Finance&Accounting 28(1-2):175-198.
(1)为测度最优资本结构需要使用滞后变量,本文还使用了上市公司2004年的数据。
(1)针对不同级别国有企业的分组检验结果,详见表8。
2.黄福广、李广、李西文,2011:《高管薪酬、行政级别与代理成本》,《科学学与科学技术管理》第2期。
3.黄继承、阚铄、朱冰、郑志刚,2016:《经理薪酬激励与资本结构动态调整》,《管理世界》第11期。
4.连玉君、钟经樊,2007:《中国上市公司资本结构动态调整机制研究》,《南方经济》第1期。
5.刘绍娓、万大艳,2013:《高管薪酬与公司绩效:国有与非国有上市公司的实证比较研究》,《中国软科学》第2期。
6.曲亮、任国良,2010:《高管薪酬激励、股权激励与企业价值相关性的实证检验》,《当代经济科学》第5期。
7.盛明泉、戚昊辰,2014:《高管薪酬差距与资本结构动态调整研究》,《商业经济与管理》第12期。
8.陶萍、张睿、朱佳,2016:《高管薪酬、企业绩效激励效应与政府限薪令的影响---133家A股国有控股公司的实证研究》,《现代财经(天津财经大学学报)》第6期。
9.吴育辉、吴世农,2010:《高管薪酬:激励还是自利?---来自中国上市公司的证据》,《会计研究》第11期。
10.徐向艺、王俊韡、巩震,2007:《高管人员报酬激励与公司治理绩效研究---一项基于深、沪A股上市公司的实证分析》,《中国工业经济》第2期。
11.周建、袁德利,2013:《公司治理机制与公司绩效:代理成本的中介效应》,《预测》第2期。
12.朱德胜、张伟,2017:《高管薪酬激励对股权代理成本影响的实证研究》,《经济与管理评论》第3期。
13.Bebchuk,L.A.,and J.M.Fried.2003.“Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem.”Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(3):71-92.
14.Belghitar,Y.,and E.Clark.2015.“Managerial Risk Incentives and Investment Related Agency Costs.”International Review of Financial Analysis 38(3):191-197.
15.Benmelech,E.,E.Kandel,and P.Veronesi.2010.“Stock-based Compensation and CEO(Dis)Incentives.”The Quarterly Journal of Economics 125(4):1769-1820.
16.Conyon,M.J.,and L.He.2011.“Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in China.”Journal of Corporate Finance 17(4):1158-1175.
17.Drobetz,W.,and G.Wanzenried.2006.“What Determines the Speed of Adjustment to the Target Capital Structure?”Applied Financial Economics 16(13):941-958.
18.Fischer,E.O.,Heinkel,R.,and Zechner,J.1989.“Dynamic Capital Structure Choice:Theory and Tests.”The Journal of Finance 44(1):19-40.
19.Flannery,M.J.,and K.P.Rangan.2006.“Partial Adjustment toward Target Capital Structures.”Journal of Financial Economics 79(3):469-506.
20.Frydman,C.,and R.E.Saks.2010.“Executive Compensation:A New View from a Long-term Perspective,1936-2005.”The Review of Financial Studies 23(5):2099-2138.
21.Huang,H.,Q.Wang,and X.Zhang.2009.“The Effect of CEO Ownership and Shareholder Rights on Cost of Equity Capital.”Corporate Governance 9(3):225-270.
22.Jensen,M.C.,and W.H.Meckling.1976.“Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.”Journal of Financial Economics 3(4):305-360.
23.Jensen,M.C.,and K.J.Murphy.1990.“Performance Pay and Top-management Incentives.”Journal of Political Economy 98(2):225-264.
24.John,T.A.,and K.John.1993.“Top-management Compensation and Capital Structure.”The Journal of Finance48(3):949-974.
25.Lambrecht,B.M.,and S.C.Myers.2008.“Debt and Managerial Rents in a Real-options Model of the Firm.”Journal of Financial Economics 89(2):209-231.
26.Lambrinoudakis,C.2016.“Adjustment Cost Determinants and Target Capital Structure.”SSRN Working Paper Series No.2746378.
27.Morellec,E.,B.Nikolov,and N.Schurhoff.2012.“Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Dynamics.”The Journal of Finance 67(3):803-848.
28.Myers,S.C.1984.“The Capital Structure Puzzle.”The Journal of Finance 39(3):575-592.
29.Ozkan,A.2001.“Determinants of Capital Structure and Adjustment to Long Run Target:Evidence from UKCompany Panel Data.”Journal of Business Finance&Accounting 28(1-2):175-198.
(1)为测度最优资本结构需要使用滞后变量,本文还使用了上市公司2004年的数据。
(1)针对不同级别国有企业的分组检验结果,详见表8。