国有股权参股对家族企业创新投入的影响
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摘要
创新是企业发展的动力,但家族企业面临着严重的创新投入不足问题。国有股权参股非国有企业的混合所有制改革,能否助力包括家族企业在内的非国有企业健康持续发展,是近年来被广为关注和讨论的问题。本文以2009—2016年家族企业上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了国有股权参股对家族企业创新投入的影响及其作用机制。研究发现,国有股权参股能够显著地促进家族企业的创新投入,这一作用在家族企业属于高新技术企业、所处环境的政策不确定性更高时更为显著。同时也发现,当参股国有股权在家族企业中参与程度更高、参股国有股权来源于本地时,促进作用更为显著。在排除各种可能存在的内生性问题后,本文结论依然成立。进一步分析其作用机制发现,国有股权参股提高了家族企业投入创新活动的意愿,增加了家族企业可投入创新活动的资源,最终促进了家族企业的创新投入。本文的结论不仅验证了国有股权参股对家族企业创新投入的促进作用,还发现了国有股权参股促进家族企业创新投入的不同情形及其作用机理,为进一步推进混合所有制改革、提升包括家族企业在内的非国有企业的持续发展能力提供了新的理论支持和经验证据。
Innovation is the driving force of enterprise development,but family firms are facing serious problems of insufficient investment in innovation.Whether the mixed-ownership reform of state-owned equity participate in non-state-owned firms will help the healthy and sustainable development of family firms,has been widely concerned and discussed recently.Based on the sample of listed family firms in 2009—2016,this paper investigates whether and how state-owned equity promote family firms' innovation investment.This study finds that state-owned equity can significantly promote innovation investment in family firms.When the family firm belongs to high-tech industry and when the family firm face to higher policy uncertainty,the promotion effect is more significant.This study also finds that when the state-owned equity has higher degree of participation and belongs to local government,the promotion effect is more significant.Further study shows that state-owned equity enhances the willingness and increase the resources for family firms to invest in innovations,and finally promotes the innovation investment of family firms.The results not only verifiy the effect of state-owned equity participation in family firms,but also find the distinct effect in different situation.This paper provides new empirical evidence and theoretical support for further mixed-ownership reform and how to enhance the sustainable development ability of non-state-owned firms.
Innovation is the driving force of enterprise development,but family firms are facing serious problems of insufficient investment in innovation.Whether the mixed-ownership reform of state-owned equity participate in non-state-owned firms will help the healthy and sustainable development of family firms,has been widely concerned and discussed recently.Based on the sample of listed family firms in 2009—2016,this paper investigates whether and how state-owned equity promote family firms' innovation investment.This study finds that state-owned equity can significantly promote innovation investment in family firms.When the family firm belongs to high-tech industry and when the family firm face to higher policy uncertainty,the promotion effect is more significant.This study also finds that when the state-owned equity has higher degree of participation and belongs to local government,the promotion effect is more significant.Further study shows that state-owned equity enhances the willingness and increase the resources for family firms to invest in innovations,and finally promotes the innovation investment of family firms.The results not only verifiy the effect of state-owned equity participation in family firms,but also find the distinct effect in different situation.This paper provides new empirical evidence and theoretical support for further mixed-ownership reform and how to enhance the sustainable development ability of non-state-owned firms.
引文
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(1)2015年9月24日,国务院下发《国务院关于国有企业发展混合所有制经济的意见》,其中第十三条提出“鼓励国有资本以多种方式入股非国有企业。在公共服务、高新技术、生态环境保护和战略性产业等重点领域,以市场选择为前提,以资本为纽带,充分发挥国有资本投资、运营公司的资本运作平台作用,对发展潜力大、成长性强的非国有企业进行股权投资。鼓励国有企业通过投资入股、联合投资、并购重组等多种方式,与非国有企业进行股权融合、战略合作、资源整合,发展混合所有制经济。”
(1)本文从股东性质的角度讨论国有资本入股非国有企业,文中“国有股权”与“国有资本”内涵相同,后文统一称“国有股权”。
(2)数据来自Wind数据库,经笔者手工整理计算而得。
(1)参照皮永华和宝贡敏(2005)的研究,并根据证监会2012年发布的《上市公司行业分类指引》,本文将属于医药制造业(C27),铁路、船舶、航空航天和其他运输设备制造业(C37),计算机、通信和其他电子设备制造业(C39)、信息传输、软件和信息技术服务业(I)的企业定义为高新技术企业。
(1)相关性检验结果请参见《中国工业经济》网站(http://www.ciejournal.org)公开附件。
(1)国有股权参股(State1)的回归系数0.3682与家族企业创新投入均值3.7025之间的比值为0.0994。
(1)稳健性检验结果请参见《中国工业经济》网站(http://www.ciejournal.org)公开附件。
(1)此处继承人指创始人的儿子儿媳或女儿女婿。参照胡旭阳和吴一平(2017),本文控制了家族持股、家族董事比例、企业年龄、企业规模、负债水平、盈利水平、增长水平、成长机会、两职合一情况、董事会人数、独立董事比例、机构持股等控制变量。
[2]曹春方.政治权力转移与公司投资:中国的逻辑[J].管理世界,2013,(1):143-157.
[3]陈德球,钟昀珈.制度效率、家族化途径与家族投资偏好[J].财经研究,2011,(12):107-117.
[4]陈建林.家族所有权与非控股国有股权对企业绩效的交互效应研究---互补效应还是替代效应[J].中国工业经济,2015,(12):99-114.
[5]陈凌,吴炳德.市场化水平、教育程度和家族企业研发投资[J].科研管理,2014,(7):44-50.
[6]郝阳,龚六堂.国有、民营混合参股与公司绩效改进[J].经济研究,2017,(3):122-135.
[7]黄海杰,吕长江,朱晓文.二代介入与企业创新---来自中国家族上市公司的证据[J].南开管理评论,2018,(1):6-16.
[8]胡旭阳,吴一平.创始人政治身份与家族企业控制权的代际锁定[J].中国工业经济,2017,(5):152-171.
[9]姜付秀,朱冰,王运通.国有企业的经理激励契约更不看重绩效吗[J].管理世界,2014,(9):143-159.
[10]李凤羽,杨墨竹.经济政策不确定性会抑制企业投资吗?---基于中国经济政策不确定指数的实证研究[J].金融研究,2015,(4):115-129.
[11]李婧,贺小刚.股权集中度与创新绩效:国有企业与家族企业的比较研究[J].商业经济与管理,2012,(10):40-51.
[12]李维安.民营企业传承与治理机制构建[J].南开管理评论,2013,(3):1.
[13]黎文靖,郑曼妮.实质性创新还是策略性创新?---宏观产业政策对微观企业创新的影响[J].经济研究,2016,(4):60-73.
[14]李溪,郑馨,张建琦.制造企业的业绩困境会促进创新吗---基于期望落差维度拓展的分析[J].中国工业经济,2018,(8):174-192.
[15]刘莉亚,何彦林,王照飞,程天笑.融资约束会影响中国企业对外直接投资吗?---基于微观视角的理论和实证分析[J].金融研究,2015,(8):124-140.
[16]刘运国,郑巧,蔡贵龙.非国有股东提高了国有企业的内部控制质量吗?---来自国有上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2016,(11):61-68.
[17]陆铭,陈钊.分割市场的经济增长---为什么经济开放可能加剧地方保护[J].经济研究,2009,(3):42-52.
[18]陆瑶,何平,吴边.非控股国有股权,投资效率与公司业绩[J].清华大学学报(自然科学版),2011,(4):513-520.
[19]潘越,潘健平,戴亦一.公司诉讼风险,司法地方保护主义与企业创新[J].经济研究,2015,(3):131-145.
[20]皮永华,宝贡敏.我国企业多角化战略与研发强度之间关系的实证研究---以浙江省为例[J].科研管理,2005,(2):76-82.
[21]宋增基,冯莉茗,谭兴民.国有股权,民营企业家参政与企业融资便利性---来自中国民营控股上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,2014,(12):133-147.
[22]苏启林,朱文.上市公司家族控制与企业价值[J].经济研究,2003,(8):36-45.
[23]谭劲松,冯飞鹏,徐伟航.产业政策与企业研发投资[J].会计研究,2017,(10):58-64.
[24]唐清泉,黎文飞,蔡贵龙.家族控制,风险投资和企业R&D投资[J].证券市场导报,2015,(1):32-38.
[25]王兰芳,胡悦.创业投资促进了创新绩效吗?---基于中国企业面板数据的实证检验[J].金融研究,2017,(1):177-190.
[26]吴炳德,陈凌.社会情感财富与研发投资组合:家族治理的影响[J].科学学研究,2014,(8):1233-1241.
[27]许静静,吕长江.家族企业高管性质与盈余质量---来自中国上市公司的证据[J].管理世界,2011,(1):112-120.
[28]徐业坤,钱先航,李维安.政治不确定性,政治关联与民营企业投资---来自市委书记更替的证据[J].管理世界,2013,(5):116-130.
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(1)2015年9月24日,国务院下发《国务院关于国有企业发展混合所有制经济的意见》,其中第十三条提出“鼓励国有资本以多种方式入股非国有企业。在公共服务、高新技术、生态环境保护和战略性产业等重点领域,以市场选择为前提,以资本为纽带,充分发挥国有资本投资、运营公司的资本运作平台作用,对发展潜力大、成长性强的非国有企业进行股权投资。鼓励国有企业通过投资入股、联合投资、并购重组等多种方式,与非国有企业进行股权融合、战略合作、资源整合,发展混合所有制经济。”
(1)本文从股东性质的角度讨论国有资本入股非国有企业,文中“国有股权”与“国有资本”内涵相同,后文统一称“国有股权”。
(2)数据来自Wind数据库,经笔者手工整理计算而得。
(1)参照皮永华和宝贡敏(2005)的研究,并根据证监会2012年发布的《上市公司行业分类指引》,本文将属于医药制造业(C27),铁路、船舶、航空航天和其他运输设备制造业(C37),计算机、通信和其他电子设备制造业(C39)、信息传输、软件和信息技术服务业(I)的企业定义为高新技术企业。
(1)相关性检验结果请参见《中国工业经济》网站(http://www.ciejournal.org)公开附件。
(1)国有股权参股(State1)的回归系数0.3682与家族企业创新投入均值3.7025之间的比值为0.0994。
(1)稳健性检验结果请参见《中国工业经济》网站(http://www.ciejournal.org)公开附件。
(1)此处继承人指创始人的儿子儿媳或女儿女婿。参照胡旭阳和吴一平(2017),本文控制了家族持股、家族董事比例、企业年龄、企业规模、负债水平、盈利水平、增长水平、成长机会、两职合一情况、董事会人数、独立董事比例、机构持股等控制变量。