产品差异与技术差距影响研发溢出的理论探讨——基于企业竞争合作策略视角
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摘要
在传统研发溢出效应假设基础上,通过技术差距将溢出效应与产品差异有机联系起来,并通过构建双寡头企业两阶段博弈模型对研发卡特尔、生产卡特尔、完全合作等不同形式合作联盟的均衡水平和福利变化进行分析比较。研究证实:当企业间技术差距较小时,完全合作或研发卡特尔能有效提高企业利润和社会福利;而当技术差距较大时,研发阶段的合作不仅无法激励企业进行研发投入,还会抑制企业创新的积极性。此外,与完全合作相比,局部合作具有更强的稳定性和可持续性,尤其是在产品差异程度较大的情况下,研发卡特尔最为稳定。
On the basis of the traditional R&D spillover effect hypothesis,this paper uses technology gap to organically associate product differentiation with spillover effect.By building a two-stage duopoly game,this paper analyzes and compares the equilibrium levels in different forms of cooperative alliance,such as R&D cartel,production cartel and complete cooperation.It is shown that full cooperation or R&D cartel can effectively increase the profits and enhance the social welfare when the technology gap is small;however,when the technology gap is large,cooperation in the R&D stage not only hinders firms to invest in R&D,but also restrains innovation enthusiasm of firms.In addition,this paper also confirms that semi-cooperation is more stable and more sustainable than full cooperation,especially when the product differentiation is large,R&D cartel is the most stable.
On the basis of the traditional R&D spillover effect hypothesis,this paper uses technology gap to organically associate product differentiation with spillover effect.By building a two-stage duopoly game,this paper analyzes and compares the equilibrium levels in different forms of cooperative alliance,such as R&D cartel,production cartel and complete cooperation.It is shown that full cooperation or R&D cartel can effectively increase the profits and enhance the social welfare when the technology gap is small;however,when the technology gap is large,cooperation in the R&D stage not only hinders firms to invest in R&D,but also restrains innovation enthusiasm of firms.In addition,this paper also confirms that semi-cooperation is more stable and more sustainable than full cooperation,especially when the product differentiation is large,R&D cartel is the most stable.
引文
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[25]茆训诚.基于技术溢出效应和产品差异化视角的企业研发组织模式动态选择研究[J].上海经济研究,2009(1):3-12.
[26]石光.技术互补性、产品可替代性与企业研发合作[J].管理科学,2012,25(5):22-29.
[27]侯光明,艾凤义.基于混合一处的双寡头横向R&D合作[J].管理科学学报,2006,20(4):94-97.
[28]苏素,肖阿妮.基于混合溢出效应的产业共性技术研发组织模式研究[J].科技进步与对策,2012,29(5):23-28.
[29]张春辉,陈继祥.考虑内生溢出与R&D投入的创新模式选择[J].中国管理科学,2011,19(3):26-32.
[30]刘金平,黄波,李宇雨.基于投资溢出的并行研发联盟成员的投资策略实验研究[J].科技进步与对策,2011,28(2):9-12.
[31]BROD A,SHIVAKUMAR R.Advantageous semi-collusion[J].Journal of Industrial Economics,1999,47(2):221-230.
[32]何慧爽.产品差异化、竞争强度与企业R&D策略分析[J].科学学研究,2010,28(9):1361-1367.
[2]KATS M L.An analysis of cooperative research and development[J].The Rand Journal of Economics,1986,17:527-543.
[3]D'ASPREMONT C,JACQUEMIN A.Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers[J].American Economic Review,1988,78:1133-1137.
[4]SUZUMURA K.Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in an oligopoly with spillovers[J].American Economic Review,1992,82:1307-1320.
[5]KAMIEN M,MULLER E,ZANG I.Research joint ventures and R&D cartels[J].American Economic Review,1992,82:1293-1306.
[6]ZISS S.Strategic R&D with spillovers,collusion and welfare[J].Journal of Industrial Economics,1994,42:375-393.
[7]KABIRAJ T,MUKHERJEE A.Cooperation in R&D and production:a three-firm analysis[J].Journal of Economics,2000,71:281-304.
[8]ATALLAH G.Vertical R&D spillovers,cooperation,market structure and innovation[J].Economics of Innovation and New Technology,2002,11(3):179-209.
[9]ISHII A.Cooperative R&D between vertically related firms with spillovers[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2004,22(8-9):1213-1235.
[10]STEPANOVA A,TESORIERE A.R&D with spillovers:monopoly versus noncooperative and cooperative duopoly[J].Manchester School,2011,79(1):125-144.
[11]AMIR R,EVSTIGNEEV I,WOODERS J.Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates[J].Games and Economic Behavior,2003,42(2):183-207.
[12]VERSPAGEN B.Measuring intersectoral technology spillovers:estimates from the European and US patent office databases[J].Economic Systems Research,1997,9(1):47-65.
[13]AMIR R,WOODERS J.One-way spillovers,endogenous innovator imitator roles,and research joint ventures[J].Games and Economic Behavior,2000,31(1):1-25.
[14]HUR K L,WATANABE C.Dynamic process of technology spillover:a transfer function approach[J].Technovation,2002,22(7):437-444.
[15]PIGA C,POYAGO-THEOTOKY J.Endogenous R&Dspillovers and locational choice[J].Regional Science and Urban Economics,2005,35:127-139.
[16]DEY S,FU Q.Do firms value knowledge spillover?a model of R&D competition,endogenous R&D appropriability and product differentiation[C].National University of Singapore Working Paper,2009:1-31.
[17]武博,陈萱源,陈颖.纵向溢出效应对企业独立研发与纵向RJV的影响研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2011,32(2):14-19.
[18]赵凯.信息不对称时产业链企业研发投资行为及产业集群效应分析[J].产业经济研究,2015(4):21-31.
[19]丁旭,孟卫东,陈晖.基于技术风险的供应链纵向合作研发利益分配方式研究[J].科技进步与对策,2011,28(20):19-23.
[20]赵麟,石岿然,黄芳.具有溢出效应的纵向R&D合作[J].科技进步与对策,2009,26(7):112-114.
[21]陈宇科,邹艳,杨洋.基于产品生命周期和溢出效应的企业合作研发策略[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(11):570-575.
[22]生延超.创新投入补贴还是创新产品补贴:技术联盟的政府策略选择[J].中国管理科学,2008,16(6):184-192.
[23]游达明,朱桂菊.不同竞合模式下企业生态技术创新最优研发与补贴[J].中国工业经济,2014(8):122-134.
[24]但斌,田丽娜,董绍辉.考虑溢出效应的互补品企业间广告决策模型研究[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(2):66-75.
[25]茆训诚.基于技术溢出效应和产品差异化视角的企业研发组织模式动态选择研究[J].上海经济研究,2009(1):3-12.
[26]石光.技术互补性、产品可替代性与企业研发合作[J].管理科学,2012,25(5):22-29.
[27]侯光明,艾凤义.基于混合一处的双寡头横向R&D合作[J].管理科学学报,2006,20(4):94-97.
[28]苏素,肖阿妮.基于混合溢出效应的产业共性技术研发组织模式研究[J].科技进步与对策,2012,29(5):23-28.
[29]张春辉,陈继祥.考虑内生溢出与R&D投入的创新模式选择[J].中国管理科学,2011,19(3):26-32.
[30]刘金平,黄波,李宇雨.基于投资溢出的并行研发联盟成员的投资策略实验研究[J].科技进步与对策,2011,28(2):9-12.
[31]BROD A,SHIVAKUMAR R.Advantageous semi-collusion[J].Journal of Industrial Economics,1999,47(2):221-230.
[32]何慧爽.产品差异化、竞争强度与企业R&D策略分析[J].科学学研究,2010,28(9):1361-1367.