私募股权投资与企业并购——基于创业板市场的证据
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摘要
本文以创业板公司2009年至2014年间发生的并购事件为样本,考察私募股权投资对企业并购行为和并购绩效的影响。研究发现:私募股权投资参与的企业并购在支付方式上存在明显的偏好,具体为混合支付﹥现金支付﹥股票支付;虽然私募股权投资积极介入企业并购,但并没有使收购方企业在并购后显著提高经营绩效,而且,有私募参与的并购在公告日期间的股东财富显著低于无私募介入的并购,反映出市场对有私募股权投资参与的并购事件反应消极。上述结果表明,在创业板市场上,私募股权投资能影响企业并购支付方式的选择,但未发现私募股权投资提高公司并购绩效的直接证据。
This paper investigates the impact of Private Equity( PE) on M&A performance in China GEM from 2009 to 2014. It is found that there are obvious preferences in the payment methods of M&A in which the PEs participate,which shows mixed payment > cash payment > stock payment. Although PEs are actively involved in M&A,they fail to improve the operating performance of acquirer after M&A. In addition,the wealth of shareholders during the announcement is significantly lower when the PEs participate in the M&A which reflects that the market reacts negatively to the events. These findings indicate that in China GEM,PEs have certain influence on M&A payment choices,but we do not find direct evidence that PEs can improve corporate performance.
This paper investigates the impact of Private Equity( PE) on M&A performance in China GEM from 2009 to 2014. It is found that there are obvious preferences in the payment methods of M&A in which the PEs participate,which shows mixed payment > cash payment > stock payment. Although PEs are actively involved in M&A,they fail to improve the operating performance of acquirer after M&A. In addition,the wealth of shareholders during the announcement is significantly lower when the PEs participate in the M&A which reflects that the market reacts negatively to the events. These findings indicate that in China GEM,PEs have certain influence on M&A payment choices,but we do not find direct evidence that PEs can improve corporate performance.
引文
[1]Kaplan S.N.,Str9mberg P.Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,2009,23(1):121-146
[2]Gompers P.,Kaplan S.N.,Mukharlyamov V.What Do Private Equity Firms Say They Do?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2016,121(1):449-476
[3]Harris R.S.,Jenkinson T.,Kaplan S.N.Private Equity Performance:What Do We Know?[J].The Journal of Finance,2014,69(5):1851-1882
[4]Ewens M.,Rhodes-Kropf M.Is a VC Partnership Greater Than the Sum of Its Partners?[J].The Journal of Finance,2015,70(3):1081-1113
[5]Bernstein S.,Giroud X.,Townsend R.R.The Impact of Venture Capital Monitoring[J].The Journal of Finance,2015,71:1591-1622
[6]Amess K.,Stiebale J.,Wright M.The Impact of Private Equity on Firms’Patenting Activity[J].European Economic Review,2016,86:147-160
[7]陈工孟,俞欣,寇祥河.风险投资参与对中资企业首次公开发行折价的影响---不同证券市场的比较[J].经济研究,2011,(5):74-85
[8]余琰,罗炜,李怡宗,等.国有风险投资的投资行为和投资成效[J].经济研究,2014,(2):32-46
[9]黄福广,李西文,张开军.风险资本持股对中小板上市公司IPO盈余管理的影响[J].管理评论,2012,24(8):29-39
[10]Huang P.,Officer M.S.,Powell R.Method of Payment and Risk Mitigation in Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2016,40:216-234
[11]Boone A.L.,Lie E.,Liu Y.Time Trends and Determinants of the Method of Payment in M&As[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2014,27:296-304
[12]Martin K.J.The Method of Payment in Corporate Acquisitions,Investment Opportunities and Management Ownership[J].The Journal of Finance,1996,51(4):1227-1246
[13]Faccio M.,Masulis R.W.The Choice of Payment Method in European Mergers and Acquisitions[J].The Journal of Finance,2005,60(3):1345-1388
[14]Andriosopoulos D.,Yang S.The Impact of Institutional Investors on Mergers and Acquisitions in the United Kingdom[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2015,50:547-561
[15]周伶.联合投资网络位置对投资绩效的影响---来自风险投资的实证研究[J].管理评论,2014,26(12):160-169
[16]胡志颖,吴先聪,果建竹.私募股权声誉、产权性质和IPO前持有期[J].管理评论,2015,27(12):113-124
[17]李九斤,王福胜,徐畅.私募股权投资特征对被投资企业价值的影响---基于2008-2012年IPO企业经验数据的研究dium-sized Businesses[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2014,47:177-197[J].南开管理评论,2015,18(5):151-160
[18]Paglia J.K.,Harjoto M.A.The Effects of Private Equity and Venture Capital on Sales and Employment Growth in Small and Me-
[19]Fang L.,Ivashina V.,Lerner J.The Disintermediation of Financial Markets:Direct Investing in Private Equity[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2015,116(1):160-178
[20]蔡宁.风险投资“逐名”动机与上市公司盈余管理[J].会计研究,2015,(5):20-27
[21]杨其静,程商政,朱玉.VC真在努力甄选和培育优质创业型企业吗[J].金融研究,2015,(4):192-206
[22]王会娟,张然,胡诗阳.私募股权投资与现金股利政策[J].会计研究,2014,(10):51-58
[23]Heckman J.J.Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error[J].Econometrica,1979,47(1):153-161
[24]杜放,吴黎华.疯狂的逃亡:大股东吃饱,小股民割肉[N].经济参考报,2014年3月18日(第5版)
[25]冯慧群.私募股权投资对控股股东“掏空”的抑制效应[J].经济管理,2016,(6):41-58
[26]李明,叶勇.媒体负面报道对控股股东掏空行为影响的实证研究[J].管理评论,2016,28(1):73-82
[27]赵息,陈佳琦.创业板上市公司股权结构对并购绩效的影响[J].东北大学学报(社会科学版),2016,18(3):255-261
[28]朱红军,汪辉.“股权制衡”可以改善公司治理吗?---宏智科技股份有限公司控制权之争的案例研究[J].管理世界,2004,(10):114-123
(1)在495个并购事件中,并购完成日期信息完整的样本有232个。
(2)若PE的实际控制人为公司实际经营者或与公司控制人存在亲属关系,这类PE缺少独立性,会产生很大噪音,本文所研究的PE不包括这一类。
(3)现有研究在考察PE对公司绩效影响时基本上采用线性模型,本文也遵循此惯例;我们也尝试了非线性模型,如在有PE持股的并购样本中,以PE持股比例及其平方项为自变量,以并购完成前后公司ROE为因变量,结果显示,无论是持股比例变量还是其平方项,系数均不显著,反映出模型解释效果并不理想。
(4)本文涉及日期指标时,以d=0表示盈余公告当日,d<0(d>0)表示盈余公告前(后)第d个交易日。首先,股票i的市场模型为Rit=α+βmt+εt,其中Rit和Rmt分别是股票i和市场组合在t交易日的收益;接着,根据事件研究法,以公告日为分界点,利用公告前[-150,-31]区间上的数据,估计出参数值α和β,由此可以计算出股票在t交易日的预期收益为E(Rit)=α+βRmt,因d此,股票i的超常收益为ARit=Rit-E(Rit)=Rit-(α+βRmt),股票在并购公告期间[-d,d]累计超常收益为CAR[-d,d]i=d∑t=-dARit。
(5)在表4未公布的Probit回归结果中,Netpro,Income和Cash等变量的系数均显著为负,说明营业利润率、主营业务收入、现金流较低的公司更愿意引入PE,反映出PE在选择目标企业时存在逆向选择问题。
(6)我们尝试控制内生性,但发现Lambda的系数不显著,意味着内生性问题并不严重,因此,本部分的回归结果未考虑内生性问题。
(7)表7也做了类似处理。
[2]Gompers P.,Kaplan S.N.,Mukharlyamov V.What Do Private Equity Firms Say They Do?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2016,121(1):449-476
[3]Harris R.S.,Jenkinson T.,Kaplan S.N.Private Equity Performance:What Do We Know?[J].The Journal of Finance,2014,69(5):1851-1882
[4]Ewens M.,Rhodes-Kropf M.Is a VC Partnership Greater Than the Sum of Its Partners?[J].The Journal of Finance,2015,70(3):1081-1113
[5]Bernstein S.,Giroud X.,Townsend R.R.The Impact of Venture Capital Monitoring[J].The Journal of Finance,2015,71:1591-1622
[6]Amess K.,Stiebale J.,Wright M.The Impact of Private Equity on Firms’Patenting Activity[J].European Economic Review,2016,86:147-160
[7]陈工孟,俞欣,寇祥河.风险投资参与对中资企业首次公开发行折价的影响---不同证券市场的比较[J].经济研究,2011,(5):74-85
[8]余琰,罗炜,李怡宗,等.国有风险投资的投资行为和投资成效[J].经济研究,2014,(2):32-46
[9]黄福广,李西文,张开军.风险资本持股对中小板上市公司IPO盈余管理的影响[J].管理评论,2012,24(8):29-39
[10]Huang P.,Officer M.S.,Powell R.Method of Payment and Risk Mitigation in Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2016,40:216-234
[11]Boone A.L.,Lie E.,Liu Y.Time Trends and Determinants of the Method of Payment in M&As[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2014,27:296-304
[12]Martin K.J.The Method of Payment in Corporate Acquisitions,Investment Opportunities and Management Ownership[J].The Journal of Finance,1996,51(4):1227-1246
[13]Faccio M.,Masulis R.W.The Choice of Payment Method in European Mergers and Acquisitions[J].The Journal of Finance,2005,60(3):1345-1388
[14]Andriosopoulos D.,Yang S.The Impact of Institutional Investors on Mergers and Acquisitions in the United Kingdom[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2015,50:547-561
[15]周伶.联合投资网络位置对投资绩效的影响---来自风险投资的实证研究[J].管理评论,2014,26(12):160-169
[16]胡志颖,吴先聪,果建竹.私募股权声誉、产权性质和IPO前持有期[J].管理评论,2015,27(12):113-124
[17]李九斤,王福胜,徐畅.私募股权投资特征对被投资企业价值的影响---基于2008-2012年IPO企业经验数据的研究dium-sized Businesses[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2014,47:177-197[J].南开管理评论,2015,18(5):151-160
[18]Paglia J.K.,Harjoto M.A.The Effects of Private Equity and Venture Capital on Sales and Employment Growth in Small and Me-
[19]Fang L.,Ivashina V.,Lerner J.The Disintermediation of Financial Markets:Direct Investing in Private Equity[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2015,116(1):160-178
[20]蔡宁.风险投资“逐名”动机与上市公司盈余管理[J].会计研究,2015,(5):20-27
[21]杨其静,程商政,朱玉.VC真在努力甄选和培育优质创业型企业吗[J].金融研究,2015,(4):192-206
[22]王会娟,张然,胡诗阳.私募股权投资与现金股利政策[J].会计研究,2014,(10):51-58
[23]Heckman J.J.Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error[J].Econometrica,1979,47(1):153-161
[24]杜放,吴黎华.疯狂的逃亡:大股东吃饱,小股民割肉[N].经济参考报,2014年3月18日(第5版)
[25]冯慧群.私募股权投资对控股股东“掏空”的抑制效应[J].经济管理,2016,(6):41-58
[26]李明,叶勇.媒体负面报道对控股股东掏空行为影响的实证研究[J].管理评论,2016,28(1):73-82
[27]赵息,陈佳琦.创业板上市公司股权结构对并购绩效的影响[J].东北大学学报(社会科学版),2016,18(3):255-261
[28]朱红军,汪辉.“股权制衡”可以改善公司治理吗?---宏智科技股份有限公司控制权之争的案例研究[J].管理世界,2004,(10):114-123
(1)在495个并购事件中,并购完成日期信息完整的样本有232个。
(2)若PE的实际控制人为公司实际经营者或与公司控制人存在亲属关系,这类PE缺少独立性,会产生很大噪音,本文所研究的PE不包括这一类。
(3)现有研究在考察PE对公司绩效影响时基本上采用线性模型,本文也遵循此惯例;我们也尝试了非线性模型,如在有PE持股的并购样本中,以PE持股比例及其平方项为自变量,以并购完成前后公司ROE为因变量,结果显示,无论是持股比例变量还是其平方项,系数均不显著,反映出模型解释效果并不理想。
(4)本文涉及日期指标时,以d=0表示盈余公告当日,d<0(d>0)表示盈余公告前(后)第d个交易日。首先,股票i的市场模型为Rit=α+βmt+εt,其中Rit和Rmt分别是股票i和市场组合在t交易日的收益;接着,根据事件研究法,以公告日为分界点,利用公告前[-150,-31]区间上的数据,估计出参数值α和β,由此可以计算出股票在t交易日的预期收益为E(Rit)=α+βRmt,因d此,股票i的超常收益为ARit=Rit-E(Rit)=Rit-(α+βRmt),股票在并购公告期间[-d,d]累计超常收益为CAR[-d,d]i=d∑t=-dARit。
(5)在表4未公布的Probit回归结果中,Netpro,Income和Cash等变量的系数均显著为负,说明营业利润率、主营业务收入、现金流较低的公司更愿意引入PE,反映出PE在选择目标企业时存在逆向选择问题。
(6)我们尝试控制内生性,但发现Lambda的系数不显著,意味着内生性问题并不严重,因此,本部分的回归结果未考虑内生性问题。
(7)表7也做了类似处理。