盈利预测补偿协议与跨区域并购的价值创造
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摘要
以盈利预测补偿协议为切入点,本文对跨地区并购中的市场分割效应和信息不对称效应进行了区分和检验。实证结果显示盈利预测补偿协议的采用显著提高了收购方股东的价值创造。相较于同地区并购而言,跨地区并购为收购方股东创造的价值更低,产权性质差异不影响跨地区并购的价值创造。但盈利补偿协议的采用,可以显著提高跨地区并购的价值创造。进一步研究还发现,并购双方信息不对称程度越严重,盈利预测补偿协议的采用为收购方股东创造的价值越高。实证结果符合信息不对称理论的预测,表明跨地区企业之间的信息交流与共享,是改善跨地区并购价值创造的关键。此外,实证证据也为监管部门在并购重组中引入或有对价安排的积极作用提供了经验证据支持。
Based on the valuation adjustment mechanism(VAM), this paper tests the market segmentation effect and the information asymmetry effect in the cross-regional M&As. The empirical results show that VAM significantly improves the value creation of the acquirer's shareholders. Compared with the same regional M&As, cross-regional M&As create less value for the acquirer's shareholders. The type of ownership does not affect value creation of cross-regional M&As. The use of VAM can significantly improve the value creation of cross-regional M&As. Further, we also find that the more serious degree of information asymmetry between the two sides, higher value that the use of VAM creates for the acquirer's shareholders is. In all, the empirical results are in line with the prediction of information asymmetry, indicating that the exchange and sharing of information between firms in the different regions is the key to improve the value creation of cross-regional M&As. In addition, the research provides empirical evidence to support the introduction of VAM in mergers and acquisitions in China.
Based on the valuation adjustment mechanism(VAM), this paper tests the market segmentation effect and the information asymmetry effect in the cross-regional M&As. The empirical results show that VAM significantly improves the value creation of the acquirer's shareholders. Compared with the same regional M&As, cross-regional M&As create less value for the acquirer's shareholders. The type of ownership does not affect value creation of cross-regional M&As. The use of VAM can significantly improve the value creation of cross-regional M&As. Further, we also find that the more serious degree of information asymmetry between the two sides, higher value that the use of VAM creates for the acquirer's shareholders is. In all, the empirical results are in line with the prediction of information asymmetry, indicating that the exchange and sharing of information between firms in the different regions is the key to improve the value creation of cross-regional M&As. In addition, the research provides empirical evidence to support the introduction of VAM in mergers and acquisitions in China.
引文
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[19]吕长江,韩慧博.盈利预测补偿协议、协同效应与并购收益分配[J].审计与经济研究,2014,(06):3-13.
[20]潘红波,余明桂.支持之手、掠夺之手与异地并购[J].经济研究,2011,(09):108-120.
[21]唐建新,陈冬.地区投资者保护、企业性质与异地并购的协同效应[J].管理世界,2010,(08):102-116.
[22]巫岑,唐清泉.关联并购具有信息传递效应吗?--基于企业社会资本的视角[J].审计与经济研究,2016,(02):81-90.
[23]赵立新,姚又文.对重组盈利预测补偿制度的运行分析及完善建议[J].证券市场导报,2014,(04):4-8\15.
[24]甄红线,王谨乐.机构投资者能够缓解融资约束吗?--基于现金价值的视角[J].会计研究,2016,(12):51-57.
[25]周黎安.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作--兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因[J].经济研究,2004,(06):33-40.
[2]Arbel A.,Strebel P.,The Neglected and Small Firm Effects[J].Financial Review,1982,17(4):201-218.
[3]Barber B.M.,Lyon J.D.,Detecting Abnormal Operating Performance:The Empirical Power and Specification of Test Statistics[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1996,41:359-399.
[4]Barbopoulos L.,Sudarsanam S.,Determinants of Earnout as Acquisition Payment Currency and Bidder’s Value Gains[J],Journal of Banking&Finance,2012,36:678-694.
[5]Bruner R.F.,Dose M&A Pay?A Survey of Evidence for the Decision-Maker[J].Journal of Applied Finance,2002,12(1):48-68.
[6]Cain M.D.,Denis D.J.,Denis D.K.,Earnouts:A Study of Financial Contracting in Acquisition Agreement[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2011,51:151-170.
[7]Chakrabarti A,Mitchell W.,The Role of Geographic Distance in Completing RPT Acquisitions:Evidence from U.S.Chemical Manufacturers[J].Strategic Management Journal,2016,37(4):673-694.
[8]Craig B,Smith A.,The art of Earnouts[J].Strategic Finance,2003,84:44-47.
[9]Elnahas A.M.,Hassan M.K.,Ismail G.M.,Religion and Mergers and Acquisitions Contracting:The Case of Earnout Agreements[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2017,42:221-246.
[10]Erel I.,Liao R.C.,Weisbach M.S.,Determinants of Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions[J].Journal of Finance,2012,67:1045-1082.
[11]Erickson M.,Wang S.W.,Zhang F.,The Change in Information Uncertainty and Acquirer Wealth Losses[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2012,17(4):913-943.
[12]Kuipers D.R.,Miller D.P.,Patel A.,The Legal Environment and Corporate Valuation:Evidence from Cross-Border Takeovers[J].International Review of Economics and Finance,2009,(18):552-567.
[13]Reuer J.J.,Koza M.P.,Asymmetric Information and Joint Venture Performance:Theory and Evidence for Domestic and International Joint Ventures[J].Strategic Management Journal,2000,21(21):81-88.
[14]Rossi S.,Volpin P.F.,Cross-Country Determinants of Mergers and Acquisitions[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2004,74:277-304.
[15]白雪洁,卫婧婧.异地并购、地区间资源流动与产业升级--基于中国数据的实证研究[J].当代财经,2017,(01):100-109.
[16]陈仕华,姜广省,卢昌崇.董事联结、目标公司选择与并购绩效--基于并购双方之间信息不对称的研究视角[J].管理世界,2013,(12):117-132
[17]方军雄.市场分割与资源配置效率的损害--来自企业并购的证据[J].财经研究,2009,(09):36-47.
[18]李维安,陈钢.会计稳健性、信息不对称与并购绩效--来自沪深A股上市公司的经验证据[J].经济管理,2015,(02):96-106
[19]吕长江,韩慧博.盈利预测补偿协议、协同效应与并购收益分配[J].审计与经济研究,2014,(06):3-13.
[20]潘红波,余明桂.支持之手、掠夺之手与异地并购[J].经济研究,2011,(09):108-120.
[21]唐建新,陈冬.地区投资者保护、企业性质与异地并购的协同效应[J].管理世界,2010,(08):102-116.
[22]巫岑,唐清泉.关联并购具有信息传递效应吗?--基于企业社会资本的视角[J].审计与经济研究,2016,(02):81-90.
[23]赵立新,姚又文.对重组盈利预测补偿制度的运行分析及完善建议[J].证券市场导报,2014,(04):4-8\15.
[24]甄红线,王谨乐.机构投资者能够缓解融资约束吗?--基于现金价值的视角[J].会计研究,2016,(12):51-57.
[25]周黎安.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作--兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因[J].经济研究,2004,(06):33-40.