博弈模型视角下的跨界水污染研究及政策含义
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摘要
跨界水污染问题一般涉及多个行政主体利益,在缺乏成熟制度设计的现状下通常难以顺利解决。博弈模型在精确刻画行政主体策略和研判决策收益方面具有显著优势,可以为跨界水污染问题提供理论上的解决思路和方案。文章首先讨论了跨界水污染博弈模型的一般形态;然后简要回顾了跨界水污染博弈文献在转移支付制度、约束机制和环境政策三方面的研究文献;最后针对现实中跨行政区划的流域水污染问题,提出跨界水污染博弈在设计水质、水量双重环境政策和评估不同补偿原则效果两方面的研究方向及相关政策含义。
Transboundary water pollution is usually difficult to deal with in the absence of mature mechanisms as it is related to the interests of multiple administrative subjects.The game models have a significant advantage in accurately characterizing the administrative subjects' strategies and judging the benefits of decisions so that they can provide a theoretical solution for the transboundary water pollution problem.On the basis of introducing the general form of the game models taking transboundary water pollution into consideration,this paper briefly discusses the literature on transboundary water pollution game in the aspects of transfer payment system,restraint mechanism and environmental policy.In view of the research status,this paper suggests that the research on transboundary water pollution game needs to be extended in the design of dual environmental policy of water quality and quantity and in the evaluation of different compensation principles.
Transboundary water pollution is usually difficult to deal with in the absence of mature mechanisms as it is related to the interests of multiple administrative subjects.The game models have a significant advantage in accurately characterizing the administrative subjects' strategies and judging the benefits of decisions so that they can provide a theoretical solution for the transboundary water pollution problem.On the basis of introducing the general form of the game models taking transboundary water pollution into consideration,this paper briefly discusses the literature on transboundary water pollution game in the aspects of transfer payment system,restraint mechanism and environmental policy.In view of the research status,this paper suggests that the research on transboundary water pollution game needs to be extended in the design of dual environmental policy of water quality and quantity and in the evaluation of different compensation principles.
引文
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[15]姜翔程,张青.基于演化博弈的地方政府水污染规制策略分析[J].国土资源科技管理,2016(5):80-85.
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[21]李昌峰,张娈英,赵广川,等.基于演化博弈理论的流域生态补偿研究——以太湖流域为例[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2014(1):171-176.
[22]高文军,郭根龙,石晓帅.基于演化博弈的流域生态补偿与监管决策研究[J].环境科学与技术,2015(1):183-187.
[23]李胜.跨行政区流域水污染治理:基于政策博弈的分析[J].生态经济,2016(9):173-176.
[24]Haurie A,Krawczyk J B.Optimal charges on river effluent from lumped and distributed sources[J].Environmental Modeling&Assessment,1997,2(3):177-189.
[25]赵来军.湖泊流域跨界水污染转移税协调模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2011(2):364-370.
[26]陈祖海,彭灵敏.跨界流域水污染利益主体博弈分析[J].中南民族大学学报(自然科学版),2013(3):108-112.
[27]刘钢,王慧敏,仇蕾,等.湖域工业初始排污权纳什议价模型研究——以江苏省太湖流域纺织行业为例[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2012(10):78-85.
[28]Nikoo M R,Kerachian R,Niksokhan M H,et al.A game theoretic model for trading pollution discharge permits in river systems[J].International Journal of Environmental Science&Development2011,2(2):162-166.
[29]Niksokhan M H,Kerachian R,Karamouz M.A game theoretic approach for trading discharge permits in rivers[J].Water Science&Technology,2009,60(3):793-804.
[30]Poorsepahy-Samian H,Kerachian R,Nikoo M R.Water and pollution discharge permit allocation to agricultural zones:Application of game theory and min-max regret analysis[J].Water Resources Management,2012,26(14):4241-4257.
[31]Frisvold G B,Caswell M F.Transboundary water management:Game-theoretic lessons for projects on the US-Mexico border[J].Agricultural Economics,2000,24(1):101-111.
[32]List J A,Mason C F.Optimal institutional arrangements for transboundary pollutants:Evidence from a differential game with asymmetric players[J].Journal of Environmental Economics&Management,2001,42(3):277-296.
[33]Bayramoglu B.Transboundary pollution in the Black Sea:Comparison of institutional arrangements[J].Environmental&Resource Economics,2006,35(4):289-325.
[34]Fernandez L.Transboundary water institutions in action[J].Water Resources&Economics,2013,1:20-35.
[35]J?rgensen S,Martín-Herrán G,Zaccour G.Dynamic games in the economics and management of pollution[J].Environmental Modeling&Assessment,2010,15(6):433-467.
[36]刘晓星,陈乐.“河长制”:破解中国水污染治理困局[J].环境保护,2009(9):18-20.
[37]王书明,蔡萌萌.基于新制度经济学视角的“河长制”评析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2011(9):8-13.
[38]王亚华.中国水管理改革进展评估报告[M]//国情报告:第十卷,2007年(上).北京:社会科学文献出版社,2012.
[39]Weber M L.Markets for water rights under environmental constraints[J].Journal of Environmental Economics&Management,2001,42(1):53-64.
[40]Manshadi H D,Niksokhan M H,Ardestani M.A quantity-quality model for inter-basin water transfer system using game theoretic and virtual water approaches[J].Water Resources Management,2015,29(13):4573-4588.
[41]曾文慧.越界水污染规制[D].上海:复旦大学,2005:106-107.
[2]石广明,王金南,董战峰,等.跨界流域污染防治:基于合作博弈的视角[J].自然资源学报,2015(4):549-559.
[3]孙开,孙琳.流域生态补偿机制的标准设计与转移支付安排——基于资金供给视角的分析[J].财贸经济,2015(12):118-128.
[4]杨娟.生态补偿法律制度研究[D].武汉:武汉大学,2005:8,41-43.
[5]Gren I M.International versus national actions against nitrogen pollution of the Baltic Sea[J].Environmental and Resource Economics,2001,20(1):41-59.
[6]Gren I M,Folmer H.Cooperation with respect to cleaning of an international water body with stochastic environmental damage:The case of the Baltic Sea[J].Ecological Economics,2003,47(1):33-42.
[7]Mc Kinney D C,Teasley R L.Cooperative game theory for transboundary river basins:The Syr Darya Basin[R].USA:World Environmental and Water Resources Congress,2007.
[8]赖苹,曹国华,朱勇.基于合作博弈的流域水污染治理成本分摊研究[J].生态与农村环境学报,2011(6):26-31.
[9]J?rgensen S,Zaccour G.Time consistent side payments in a dynamic game of downstream pollution[J].Journal of Economic Dynamics&Control,2001,25(12):1973-1987.
[10]Fernandez L,Sumaila U R,Dinar A,et al.Wastewater pollution abatement across an international border[J].Environment and Development Economics,2009,14(1):67-88.
[11]Bahn O,Breton M,Sbragia L,et al.Stability of international environmental agreements:An illustration with asymmetrical countries[J].International Transactions in Operational Research,2009,16(3):307-324.
[12]Missfeldt F.Game-theoretic modelling of transboundary pollution[J].Journal of Economic Surveys,1999,13(3):287-321.
[13]接玉梅,葛颜祥,徐光丽.基于进化博弈视角的水源地与下游生态补偿合作演化分析[J].运筹与管理,2012(3):137-143.
[14]易志斌.地方政府竞争的博弈行为与流域水环境保护[J].经济问题,2011(1):60-64.
[15]姜翔程,张青.基于演化博弈的地方政府水污染规制策略分析[J].国土资源科技管理,2016(5):80-85.
[16]徐大伟,涂少云,常亮,等.基于演化博弈的流域生态补偿利益冲突分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2012(2):8-14.
[17]吴瑞明,胡代平,沈惠璋.流域污染治理中的演化博弈稳定性分析[J].系统管理学报,2013(6):797-801.
[18]屈宇飞,王慧敏.南水北调供水区水污染治理策略选择的演化博弈分析[J].统计与决策,2012(5):58-62.
[19]孙冬营,王慧敏,牛文娟.基于图模型的流域跨界水污染冲突研究[J].长江流域资源与环境,2013(4):455-461.
[20]徐志伟,刘欢.河流污染协同治理行为及相关福利分析——基于不同经济空间结构的视角[J].河北经贸大学学报,2015(4):108-113.
[21]李昌峰,张娈英,赵广川,等.基于演化博弈理论的流域生态补偿研究——以太湖流域为例[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2014(1):171-176.
[22]高文军,郭根龙,石晓帅.基于演化博弈的流域生态补偿与监管决策研究[J].环境科学与技术,2015(1):183-187.
[23]李胜.跨行政区流域水污染治理:基于政策博弈的分析[J].生态经济,2016(9):173-176.
[24]Haurie A,Krawczyk J B.Optimal charges on river effluent from lumped and distributed sources[J].Environmental Modeling&Assessment,1997,2(3):177-189.
[25]赵来军.湖泊流域跨界水污染转移税协调模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2011(2):364-370.
[26]陈祖海,彭灵敏.跨界流域水污染利益主体博弈分析[J].中南民族大学学报(自然科学版),2013(3):108-112.
[27]刘钢,王慧敏,仇蕾,等.湖域工业初始排污权纳什议价模型研究——以江苏省太湖流域纺织行业为例[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2012(10):78-85.
[28]Nikoo M R,Kerachian R,Niksokhan M H,et al.A game theoretic model for trading pollution discharge permits in river systems[J].International Journal of Environmental Science&Development2011,2(2):162-166.
[29]Niksokhan M H,Kerachian R,Karamouz M.A game theoretic approach for trading discharge permits in rivers[J].Water Science&Technology,2009,60(3):793-804.
[30]Poorsepahy-Samian H,Kerachian R,Nikoo M R.Water and pollution discharge permit allocation to agricultural zones:Application of game theory and min-max regret analysis[J].Water Resources Management,2012,26(14):4241-4257.
[31]Frisvold G B,Caswell M F.Transboundary water management:Game-theoretic lessons for projects on the US-Mexico border[J].Agricultural Economics,2000,24(1):101-111.
[32]List J A,Mason C F.Optimal institutional arrangements for transboundary pollutants:Evidence from a differential game with asymmetric players[J].Journal of Environmental Economics&Management,2001,42(3):277-296.
[33]Bayramoglu B.Transboundary pollution in the Black Sea:Comparison of institutional arrangements[J].Environmental&Resource Economics,2006,35(4):289-325.
[34]Fernandez L.Transboundary water institutions in action[J].Water Resources&Economics,2013,1:20-35.
[35]J?rgensen S,Martín-Herrán G,Zaccour G.Dynamic games in the economics and management of pollution[J].Environmental Modeling&Assessment,2010,15(6):433-467.
[36]刘晓星,陈乐.“河长制”:破解中国水污染治理困局[J].环境保护,2009(9):18-20.
[37]王书明,蔡萌萌.基于新制度经济学视角的“河长制”评析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2011(9):8-13.
[38]王亚华.中国水管理改革进展评估报告[M]//国情报告:第十卷,2007年(上).北京:社会科学文献出版社,2012.
[39]Weber M L.Markets for water rights under environmental constraints[J].Journal of Environmental Economics&Management,2001,42(1):53-64.
[40]Manshadi H D,Niksokhan M H,Ardestani M.A quantity-quality model for inter-basin water transfer system using game theoretic and virtual water approaches[J].Water Resources Management,2015,29(13):4573-4588.
[41]曾文慧.越界水污染规制[D].上海:复旦大学,2005:106-107.