基于两种公平的农民工集体行动双路径分析
|
摘要
文章运用公平理论,从人们对不满的反应入手,探讨了公平及其两个分类即程序公平、分配公平和人们的集体行动之间的关系,并结合集体行动分析的愤怒路径和效能路径提出了相关假设。利用2010年湖北省流动人口动态监测数据,讨论反映分配公平感的工资评价以及或与程序公平感有关的合同、关系对农民工集体行动的多重影响,总结农民工的维权行动策略,建议更多依靠相关制度的完善,促使这一社会问题自然走向终结。
Since the 1980 s,in the process of China's large-scale rural-urban population transfer that lasted more than 30 years,there are still hundreds of millions of peasant workers who have not yet fully become urban citizens.As marginalized migrants wandering between urban and rural areas,faced with right infringements in the daily life and work,when becoming more and more aware of their rights as citizens and workers,peasant workers are taking an increasing number of protests in various forms,in which the one known as "peasant workers mass incident"attracting public attentions especially,and it brings impacts to China's social management and social stability.However,the Government's"stability maintenance"system,while increasing the financial burden for a long period,seems to be of not much effect on solving this problem ultimately,as far as it goes.This gives rise to the necessity of the study on peasant worker's"non-participation"in collective actions,considering that the collective action "non-participation"will directly lead to the end of the social problem.In this sense,as far as people's collective action is concerned,the study of"non-participation"is more important than the study of "participation".That is the reason why the paper attempts to focus on peasant workers' "nonparticipation"perspective to explain their collective actions.Nevertheless,as compared with people's participation in collective action,people's non-participation in collective action does not receive enough attention from researchers in related fields.It is usually considered that non-participation is the other side of participation,but this is not the whole story,and,as participation,people's non-participation in collective action is also a complex dynamic process.In order to simplify analysis,the paper set collective action into a black box.Next,based on justice theory,starting with people's responses to grievances,the paper investigated the actions of people in the three nodes,including"inaction/action","individual action/collective action",and "exit/continue",and especially in the first two nodes,"inaction/action"and"individual action/collective action",and then explored the relationship between people's collective action and justice,as well as the classification of justice,that is,procedure justice and distributive justice.Finally,combined with anger path and efficacy path for collective action analysis,the paper adopted people's conditions including sighing contract with enterprise,relationship with enterprise,and their wage evaluation,as three corefactors influencing their collective action,and so put forward six related hypotheses.Hypothesis 1.1:person who signs a contract with the enterprise may be more likely not to participate in collective action(contract anger path/contract efficacy path);Hypothesis 1.2:person who signs a contract with the enterprise may be less likely not to take part in collective action(contract efficacy path);Hypothesis 2.1:person who has a good relationship with the enterprise may be more likely not to participate in collective action(relationship anger path/relationship efficacy path);Hypothesis 2.2:person who has a bad relationship with the enterprise may be more likely not to take part in collective action.(relationship efficacy path);Hypothesis 3.1:the wage evaluation,which is used to reflect people's sense of distributive justice,regulates the relationship between people's procedural justice perception and their non-participation in collective action;Hypothesis 3.2:people's procedural justice perception regulates the relationship between their wage evaluation that are used to reflect their sense of distributive justice,and their non-participation in collective action.Using 2010 Hubei migrant population dynamic monitoring data,with multivariate logistic regression and moderating effect analysis,the paper tested these six assumptions.It shows:Hypothesis 1.1has not been confirmed;Hypothesis 1.2is verified;Hypothesis 2.1is verified;Hypothesis 2.2has not been confirmed;Hypothesis 3.1is partially verified;Hypothesis 3.2has not been confirmed.According to these results,the paper found that:(1)In some cases,signing contract with the enterprise does not relate to peasant worker's procedure justice perception,which on the contrary decreases their non-participation inclination in collective action through efficacy path;(2)peasant worker's relationship with the enterprise relates to their procedure justice perception,which influences their non-participation inclination in collective action through anger path,but meanwhile its two-way impacts through efficacy path may also exist;(3)reflecting distributive justice perception,peasant worker's wage evaluation has both a significant direct impact on their nonparticipation inclination in collective action,and a significant indirect impact by moderating the impact of relationship with the enterprise on their non-participation inclination in collective action.Based on these conclusions,the paper summarized the dual influencing paths of procedure injustice and distributive injustice on peasant worker's collective action,and so analyzed the tactics of their actions.With further discussions,especially on the lack of efficiency of China's current"stability maintenance"system,the paper suggested more relying on the improvement of relevant systems,such as,to strengthen the implementation of Labor Contract Law and its supporting regulatory measures,to create better institutional environment for enterprises survival,and to provide peasant workers with more cultural and legal education.These will induce peasant workers to return to normal channels to protect their rights and interests,and to be more dependent on institutionalized solutions,for instance,contracts,and therefore reduce the occurrence of peasant workers mass incidents,and improve China's social management and social stability.
Since the 1980 s,in the process of China's large-scale rural-urban population transfer that lasted more than 30 years,there are still hundreds of millions of peasant workers who have not yet fully become urban citizens.As marginalized migrants wandering between urban and rural areas,faced with right infringements in the daily life and work,when becoming more and more aware of their rights as citizens and workers,peasant workers are taking an increasing number of protests in various forms,in which the one known as "peasant workers mass incident"attracting public attentions especially,and it brings impacts to China's social management and social stability.However,the Government's"stability maintenance"system,while increasing the financial burden for a long period,seems to be of not much effect on solving this problem ultimately,as far as it goes.This gives rise to the necessity of the study on peasant worker's"non-participation"in collective actions,considering that the collective action "non-participation"will directly lead to the end of the social problem.In this sense,as far as people's collective action is concerned,the study of"non-participation"is more important than the study of "participation".That is the reason why the paper attempts to focus on peasant workers' "nonparticipation"perspective to explain their collective actions.Nevertheless,as compared with people's participation in collective action,people's non-participation in collective action does not receive enough attention from researchers in related fields.It is usually considered that non-participation is the other side of participation,but this is not the whole story,and,as participation,people's non-participation in collective action is also a complex dynamic process.In order to simplify analysis,the paper set collective action into a black box.Next,based on justice theory,starting with people's responses to grievances,the paper investigated the actions of people in the three nodes,including"inaction/action","individual action/collective action",and "exit/continue",and especially in the first two nodes,"inaction/action"and"individual action/collective action",and then explored the relationship between people's collective action and justice,as well as the classification of justice,that is,procedure justice and distributive justice.Finally,combined with anger path and efficacy path for collective action analysis,the paper adopted people's conditions including sighing contract with enterprise,relationship with enterprise,and their wage evaluation,as three corefactors influencing their collective action,and so put forward six related hypotheses.Hypothesis 1.1:person who signs a contract with the enterprise may be more likely not to participate in collective action(contract anger path/contract efficacy path);Hypothesis 1.2:person who signs a contract with the enterprise may be less likely not to take part in collective action(contract efficacy path);Hypothesis 2.1:person who has a good relationship with the enterprise may be more likely not to participate in collective action(relationship anger path/relationship efficacy path);Hypothesis 2.2:person who has a bad relationship with the enterprise may be more likely not to take part in collective action.(relationship efficacy path);Hypothesis 3.1:the wage evaluation,which is used to reflect people's sense of distributive justice,regulates the relationship between people's procedural justice perception and their non-participation in collective action;Hypothesis 3.2:people's procedural justice perception regulates the relationship between their wage evaluation that are used to reflect their sense of distributive justice,and their non-participation in collective action.Using 2010 Hubei migrant population dynamic monitoring data,with multivariate logistic regression and moderating effect analysis,the paper tested these six assumptions.It shows:Hypothesis 1.1has not been confirmed;Hypothesis 1.2is verified;Hypothesis 2.1is verified;Hypothesis 2.2has not been confirmed;Hypothesis 3.1is partially verified;Hypothesis 3.2has not been confirmed.According to these results,the paper found that:(1)In some cases,signing contract with the enterprise does not relate to peasant worker's procedure justice perception,which on the contrary decreases their non-participation inclination in collective action through efficacy path;(2)peasant worker's relationship with the enterprise relates to their procedure justice perception,which influences their non-participation inclination in collective action through anger path,but meanwhile its two-way impacts through efficacy path may also exist;(3)reflecting distributive justice perception,peasant worker's wage evaluation has both a significant direct impact on their nonparticipation inclination in collective action,and a significant indirect impact by moderating the impact of relationship with the enterprise on their non-participation inclination in collective action.Based on these conclusions,the paper summarized the dual influencing paths of procedure injustice and distributive injustice on peasant worker's collective action,and so analyzed the tactics of their actions.With further discussions,especially on the lack of efficiency of China's current"stability maintenance"system,the paper suggested more relying on the improvement of relevant systems,such as,to strengthen the implementation of Labor Contract Law and its supporting regulatory measures,to create better institutional environment for enterprises survival,and to provide peasant workers with more cultural and legal education.These will induce peasant workers to return to normal channels to protect their rights and interests,and to be more dependent on institutionalized solutions,for instance,contracts,and therefore reduce the occurrence of peasant workers mass incidents,and improve China's social management and social stability.
引文
[1]蔡禾、李超海、冯建华(2009).利益受损农民工的利益抗争行为研究.社会学研究,1.
[2]陈浩、薛婷、乐国安(2009).工具理性、社会认同与群体愤怒——集体行动的社会心理学研究.心理科学进展,1.
[3]梁宏(2013).生存还是发展,利益还是权利?——新生代农民工集体行动意愿的影响因素分析.中国农村观察,1.
[4]刘传江、赵颖智、董延芳(2012).不一致的意愿与行动:农民工群体性事件参与探悉.中国人口科学,2.
[5]卢晖临、潘毅(2014).当代中国第二代农民工的身份认同、情感与集体行动.社会,4.
[6]汪建华(2013).实用主义团结——基于珠三角新工人集体行动案例的分析.社会学研究,1.
[7]王晴锋(2010).农民工集体行动因素分析.中国农业大学学报(社会科学版),2.
[8]徐永祥、胡兵(2013).以“可行能力”剥夺看待农民工抗争行动——以上海为例的一项研究.复旦政治学评论,1.
[9]翟学伟(2009).是“关系”,还是社会资本.社会,1.
[10]Becker J.C(2012).Virtual Special Issue on Theory and Research on Collective Action in the European Journal of Social Psychology.European Journal of Social Psychology,42(1).
[11]Berkowitz L(1972).Frustrations,Comparisons,and Other Sources of Emotion Arousal as Contributors to Social Unrest.Journal of Social Issues,28(1).
[12]Blader S.L(2007).What Leads Organizational Members to Collectivize?Injustice and Identification as Precursors of Union Certification.Organization Science,18(1).
[13]De Weerd M&Klandermans B(1999).Group Identification and Political Protest:Farmers’Protest in the Netherlands.European Journal of Social Psychology,29(8).
[14]Goodwin J,Jasper J.M,&Polletta F(2000).Return of the Repressed:The Fall and Rise of Emotions in Social Movement Theory.Mobilization:An International Journal,5(1).
[15]Klandermans B&Van Stekelenburg J(2014).Why People Don’t Participate in Collective Action.Journal of Civil Society,10(4).
[16]Klandermans B(1984).Mobilization and Participation:Social Psychological Expansions of Resource Mobilization Theory.American Sociological Review,49(5).
[17]Tyler T.R&Smith H.J(1998).Social Justice and Social Movements.In Gilbert D,Fiske S T,&Lindzey G(eds.).Handbook of Social Psychology.New York:Mc Graw-Hill.
[18]Van Stekelenburg J&Klandermans B(2007).Individuals in Movements:A Social Psychology of Contention.In Klandermans B&Roggeband C M(eds.).The Handbook of Social Movements across Disciplines.New York:Springer.
[19]Van Zomeren M,Postmes T,&Spears R(2008).Toward an integrative Social Identity Model of Collective Action:A Quantitative Research Synthesis of Three Socio-Psychological Perspectives.Psychological Bulletin,134(4).
[20]Wright S.C,Taylor D M,&Moghaddam,F M(1990).The Relationship of Perceptions and Emotions to Behavior in the Face of Collective Inequality.Social Justice Research,4(3).
[21]Wright S.C(2009).The Next Generation of Collective Action Research.Journal of Social Issues,65(4).
(1)在Van Zomeren等(2008:504-535)提出的工具理性和群体愤怒的双路径模型中,工具理性路径包括群体效能和行动支持,群体愤怒路径包括不公平感和社会观点支持。由于本文实证部分对因变量的界定,行动支持不在我们的考虑范围,又由于数据缺乏,本文对社会观点支持也不进行分析。此外,由于本文着重研究集体行动的不参与,不参与本身即表现为一种个人行动而非集体的,故而群体效能被我们改为效能,群体愤怒被我们改为愤怒,相应的路径也去掉“群体”而称为效能路径和愤怒路径。这里的效能更多地指个人化的成本-收益,愤怒也更多地指个人的不公平感。事实上,在集体行动研究领域,个人化的成本-收益从来没有淡出研究者们的视野,如集体性动机中的奖赏动机;而个体剥夺感和个人行动相关,群体剥夺感则不必然引发集体行动(陈浩等,2012:127-136)。更多地从个体而非群体角度进行本文的分析是合理的。
(2)关于“关系诞生关系资本”,举例说明---“如果某商店有许多购物者抢购某种商品的话,那么为了让每个人都能满足利益,只有通过公平公正的方式来解决,这就是排队购物;但中国人要考虑的是他如何能用最短最有效的方式得到此货物。结果便是疏通关系。假如他认识售货员,那么售货员就会为他把货备好,他不用排队就可以得到;如果他认识排队的人,那他就会插队,而不需要从头排起。”(翟学伟,2009:109-121)另外,关系资本不同于社会资本。关系资本的运用经常是绕过正式制度解决问题,而社会资本的运用则不强调这一点。关系资本和社会资本的更多区别请见上述翟学伟的相关研究。
(1)尽管表2没有显示关系(R)和无固定期限合同(C_2)的显著相关性,但这可能只表明,无固定期限合同的特殊性没有被和企业签订该类合同的样本作为评价自身和企业关系的指标之一。
(1)Blader对程序公平和分配公平的重要性在其论文中给出比较的逻辑是:程序公平对“联合资格的支持”(support for union certification)和“选举投票”(vote cast in election)两个因变量都影响显著,而与分配公平相关的资源评价只对“联合资格的支持”一个因变量影响显著。但这其实并不能得到程序公平一定比分配公平更重要的结论---谁能肯定这里另一个因变量的价值?Blader在此的结论也仅仅是:“这给出了应当关注程序公平的强劲证明。”而这的确是解读Tyler和Smith观点的角度之一。
[2]陈浩、薛婷、乐国安(2009).工具理性、社会认同与群体愤怒——集体行动的社会心理学研究.心理科学进展,1.
[3]梁宏(2013).生存还是发展,利益还是权利?——新生代农民工集体行动意愿的影响因素分析.中国农村观察,1.
[4]刘传江、赵颖智、董延芳(2012).不一致的意愿与行动:农民工群体性事件参与探悉.中国人口科学,2.
[5]卢晖临、潘毅(2014).当代中国第二代农民工的身份认同、情感与集体行动.社会,4.
[6]汪建华(2013).实用主义团结——基于珠三角新工人集体行动案例的分析.社会学研究,1.
[7]王晴锋(2010).农民工集体行动因素分析.中国农业大学学报(社会科学版),2.
[8]徐永祥、胡兵(2013).以“可行能力”剥夺看待农民工抗争行动——以上海为例的一项研究.复旦政治学评论,1.
[9]翟学伟(2009).是“关系”,还是社会资本.社会,1.
[10]Becker J.C(2012).Virtual Special Issue on Theory and Research on Collective Action in the European Journal of Social Psychology.European Journal of Social Psychology,42(1).
[11]Berkowitz L(1972).Frustrations,Comparisons,and Other Sources of Emotion Arousal as Contributors to Social Unrest.Journal of Social Issues,28(1).
[12]Blader S.L(2007).What Leads Organizational Members to Collectivize?Injustice and Identification as Precursors of Union Certification.Organization Science,18(1).
[13]De Weerd M&Klandermans B(1999).Group Identification and Political Protest:Farmers’Protest in the Netherlands.European Journal of Social Psychology,29(8).
[14]Goodwin J,Jasper J.M,&Polletta F(2000).Return of the Repressed:The Fall and Rise of Emotions in Social Movement Theory.Mobilization:An International Journal,5(1).
[15]Klandermans B&Van Stekelenburg J(2014).Why People Don’t Participate in Collective Action.Journal of Civil Society,10(4).
[16]Klandermans B(1984).Mobilization and Participation:Social Psychological Expansions of Resource Mobilization Theory.American Sociological Review,49(5).
[17]Tyler T.R&Smith H.J(1998).Social Justice and Social Movements.In Gilbert D,Fiske S T,&Lindzey G(eds.).Handbook of Social Psychology.New York:Mc Graw-Hill.
[18]Van Stekelenburg J&Klandermans B(2007).Individuals in Movements:A Social Psychology of Contention.In Klandermans B&Roggeband C M(eds.).The Handbook of Social Movements across Disciplines.New York:Springer.
[19]Van Zomeren M,Postmes T,&Spears R(2008).Toward an integrative Social Identity Model of Collective Action:A Quantitative Research Synthesis of Three Socio-Psychological Perspectives.Psychological Bulletin,134(4).
[20]Wright S.C,Taylor D M,&Moghaddam,F M(1990).The Relationship of Perceptions and Emotions to Behavior in the Face of Collective Inequality.Social Justice Research,4(3).
[21]Wright S.C(2009).The Next Generation of Collective Action Research.Journal of Social Issues,65(4).
(1)在Van Zomeren等(2008:504-535)提出的工具理性和群体愤怒的双路径模型中,工具理性路径包括群体效能和行动支持,群体愤怒路径包括不公平感和社会观点支持。由于本文实证部分对因变量的界定,行动支持不在我们的考虑范围,又由于数据缺乏,本文对社会观点支持也不进行分析。此外,由于本文着重研究集体行动的不参与,不参与本身即表现为一种个人行动而非集体的,故而群体效能被我们改为效能,群体愤怒被我们改为愤怒,相应的路径也去掉“群体”而称为效能路径和愤怒路径。这里的效能更多地指个人化的成本-收益,愤怒也更多地指个人的不公平感。事实上,在集体行动研究领域,个人化的成本-收益从来没有淡出研究者们的视野,如集体性动机中的奖赏动机;而个体剥夺感和个人行动相关,群体剥夺感则不必然引发集体行动(陈浩等,2012:127-136)。更多地从个体而非群体角度进行本文的分析是合理的。
(2)关于“关系诞生关系资本”,举例说明---“如果某商店有许多购物者抢购某种商品的话,那么为了让每个人都能满足利益,只有通过公平公正的方式来解决,这就是排队购物;但中国人要考虑的是他如何能用最短最有效的方式得到此货物。结果便是疏通关系。假如他认识售货员,那么售货员就会为他把货备好,他不用排队就可以得到;如果他认识排队的人,那他就会插队,而不需要从头排起。”(翟学伟,2009:109-121)另外,关系资本不同于社会资本。关系资本的运用经常是绕过正式制度解决问题,而社会资本的运用则不强调这一点。关系资本和社会资本的更多区别请见上述翟学伟的相关研究。
(1)尽管表2没有显示关系(R)和无固定期限合同(C_2)的显著相关性,但这可能只表明,无固定期限合同的特殊性没有被和企业签订该类合同的样本作为评价自身和企业关系的指标之一。
(1)Blader对程序公平和分配公平的重要性在其论文中给出比较的逻辑是:程序公平对“联合资格的支持”(support for union certification)和“选举投票”(vote cast in election)两个因变量都影响显著,而与分配公平相关的资源评价只对“联合资格的支持”一个因变量影响显著。但这其实并不能得到程序公平一定比分配公平更重要的结论---谁能肯定这里另一个因变量的价值?Blader在此的结论也仅仅是:“这给出了应当关注程序公平的强劲证明。”而这的确是解读Tyler和Smith观点的角度之一。