粮豆轮作补贴:规模导向与瞄准偏差——基于生态补偿瞄准性视角的分析
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摘要
本文基于生态补偿机制中的瞄准性视角,利用粮豆轮作补贴试点地区833户农户调查数据,从效益瞄准和成本瞄准两个角度综合评估了规模标准能否实现粮豆轮作补贴政策的瞄准性。本文研究结果表明:首先,耕地质量和家庭经营规模之间不存在负相关,规模标准不能起到激励耕地质量较差的农户采纳粮豆轮作技术的政策效应,从效益瞄准的角度而言,粮豆轮作补贴政策没有实现补贴对象的瞄准;其次,小农户自发轮作的概率较低,且对粮豆轮作补贴存在较强的政策需求,规模标准降低了粮豆轮作补贴政策的边际效应,因此,从成本瞄准的角度来看,该政策也没有实现补贴对象的瞄准。因而,针对规模农户的粮豆轮作补贴政策没有实现补贴对象的瞄准,政策目标和补贴对象的失配不仅影响政策的预期效果,也影响补贴资金的使用效率。
Based on the targeting perspective of ecological compensation mechanism, this article uses survey data collected from 833 households in the grain-soybean rotation subside pilot area to comprehensively assess whether the scale standard can help the targeting policy of the grain-soybean rotation subsidy achieve its objectives. The analysis shows that, firstly, there is no negative correlation between the quality of cultivated land and the scale of family business. So the scale standard cannot make the policy play a role in stimulating farmers having poor quality of cultivated land to adopt grain-soybean rotation technology.Therefore, the objective of subsidy policy targeting from the perspective of efficiency targeting has not been achieved. Secondly,there is a small probability that small-scale farmers, who have a strong demand for subsidy policy, will engage in spontaneous rotation. Therefore, the scale standard reduces the marginal effect of the policy. Therefore, from the perspective of cost targeting,the objective of subsidy policy targeting has not been achieved. The subsidy policy for large-scale households has not achieved its targeting objectives, and the mismatch between policy objectives and subsidy targets not only affects the expected effect of the policy, but also affects the efficiency of subsidy use.
Based on the targeting perspective of ecological compensation mechanism, this article uses survey data collected from 833 households in the grain-soybean rotation subside pilot area to comprehensively assess whether the scale standard can help the targeting policy of the grain-soybean rotation subsidy achieve its objectives. The analysis shows that, firstly, there is no negative correlation between the quality of cultivated land and the scale of family business. So the scale standard cannot make the policy play a role in stimulating farmers having poor quality of cultivated land to adopt grain-soybean rotation technology.Therefore, the objective of subsidy policy targeting from the perspective of efficiency targeting has not been achieved. Secondly,there is a small probability that small-scale farmers, who have a strong demand for subsidy policy, will engage in spontaneous rotation. Therefore, the scale standard reduces the marginal effect of the policy. Therefore, from the perspective of cost targeting,the objective of subsidy policy targeting has not been achieved. The subsidy policy for large-scale households has not achieved its targeting objectives, and the mismatch between policy objectives and subsidy targets not only affects the expected effect of the policy, but also affects the efficiency of subsidy use.
引文
1.程臻宇、刘春宏,2015:《国外生态补偿效率研究综述》,《经济与管理评论》第6期。
2.付兆刚、郭翔宇,2017:《农地经营权抵押贷款农户需求行为影响因素分析——基于黑龙江省6个县1328个农户的问卷调查》,《中国土地科学》第3期。
3.Ganesh、Thapa,2010:《亚洲和拉美地区经济转型过程中小规模农业面临的挑战和机遇》,《中国农村经济》第12期。
4.高鸣,2017:《脱钩收入补贴对小麦生产率有影响吗?——基于农户的微观证据》,《中国农村经济》第11期。
5.高瑛、王娜、李向菲、王咏红,2017:《农户生态友好型农田土壤管理技术采纳决策分析——以山东省为例》,《农业经济问题》第1期。
6.胡振通、孔德帅、靳乐山,2015:《草原生态补偿:草畜平衡奖励标准的差别化和依据》,《中国人口·资源与环境》第11期。
7.刘乐、张娇、张崇尚、仇焕广,2017:《经营规模的扩大有助于农户采取环境友好型生产行为吗——以秸秆还田为例》,《农业技术经济》第5期。
8.刘同山、李竣,2017:《论中国小农户的前景与出路》,《中州学刊》第11期。
9.陆继霞,2017:《农村土地流转研究评述》,《中国农业大学学报(社会科学版)》第1期。
10.尼尔·J·萨尔金德,2011:《爱上统计学》,史玲玲译,重庆:重庆大学出版社。
11.仇焕广、刘乐、李登旺、张崇尚,2017:《经营规模、地权稳定性与土地生产率——基于全国4省地块层面调查数据的实证分析》,《中国农村经济》第6期。
12.王建英、陈志钢、黄祖辉、Thomas Reardon,2015:《转型时期土地生产率与农户经营规模关系再考察》,《管理世界》第9期。
13.王亚楠、纪月清、徐志刚、钟甫宁,2015:《有偿VS无偿:产权风险下农地附加价值与农户转包方式选择》,《管理世界》第11期。
14.徐晋涛、陶然、徐志刚,2004:《退耕还林:成本有效性、结构调整效应与经济可持续性——基于西部三省农户调查的实证分析》,《经济学(季刊)》第4期。
15.徐志刚、张骏逸、吕开宇,2018:《经营规模、地权期限与跨期农业技术采用——以秸秆直接还田为例》,《中国农村经济》第3期。
16.姚柳杨、赵敏娟、徐涛,2016:《经济理性还是生态理性?农户耕地保护的行为逻辑研究》,《南京农业大学学报(社会科学版)》第5期。
17.余威震、罗小锋、李容容、薛龙飞、黄磊,2017:《绿色认知视角下农户绿色技术采纳意愿与行为悖离研究》,《资源科学》第8期。
18.赵连阁、蔡书凯,2012:《农户IPM技术采纳行为影响因素分析——基于安徽省芜湖市的实证》,《农业经济问题》第3期。
19.张复宏、胡继连,2013:《基于计划行为理论的果农无公害种植行为的作用机理分析——来自山东省16个地市(区)苹果种植户的调查》,《农业经济问题》第7期。
20.张瑞娟、高鸣,2018:《新技术采纳行为与技术效率差异——基于小农户与种粮大户的比较》,《中国农村经济》第5期。
21.Barrett,C.B.,M.F.Bellemare,and J.Y.Hou,2010,“Reconsidering Conventional Explanations of the Inverse Productivity-size Relationship”,World Development,38(1):88-97.
22.Benjamin,D.,1995,“Can Unobserved Land Quality Explain the Inverse Productivity Relationship?”,Journal of Development Economics,46(1):51-84.
23.Babcock,B.A.,P.G.Lakshiminarayan,J.J.Wu,and D.Zilberman,1997,“Targeting Tools for the Purchase of Environmental Amenities”,Land Economics,73(3):325-339.
24.B?rner,J.,K.Baylis,E.Corbera,and C.Esteve,2017,“The Effectiveness of Payments for Environmental Services”,World Development,96(8):359-374.
25.Bullock,D.G.,1992,“Crop Rotation”,Critical Reviews in Plant Sciences,11(4):309-326.
26.Byerlee,D.,1993,“The Adoption of Agricultural Technology:A Guide for Survey Design”,Economic Program,International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center,https://repository.cimmyt.org/xmlui/handle/10883/895?show=full.
27.Chen,Z.,W.E.Huffman,and Scott Rozelle,2011,“Inverse Relationship between Productivity and Farm Size:The Case of China”,Contemporary Economic Policy,29(4):580-592.
28.Claassen,R.,A.Cattaneo,and R.Johansson,2008,“Cost-effective Design of Agri-environmental Payment Programs:U.S.Experience in Theory and Practice”,Ecological Economics,65(4):737-752.
29.Engel,S.,S.Pagiola,and S.Wunder,2008,“Designing Payments for Environmental Services in Theory and Practice:An Overview of the Issues”,Ecological Economics,65(4):663-674.
30.Foster,A.D.,and M.R.Rosenzweig,2010,“Microeconomics of Technology Adoption”,Annual Review of Economics,2(1):395-424
31.Gollwitzer,P.M.,1999,“Implementation Intentions:Strong Effects of Simple Plans”,American Psychologist,54(7):493-503.
32.Pannell,D.J.,R.S.Llewellyn,and M.Corbeels,2014,“The Farm-level Economics of Conservation Agriculture for Resource-poor Farmers”,Agriculture Ecosystems&Environment,187(1):52-64.
33.Schomers,S.,C.Sattler,and B.Matzdorf,2015,“An Analytical Framework for Assessing the Potential of Intermediaries to Improve the Performance of Payments for Ecosystem Services”,Land Use Policy,42(7):58-70.
34.Wu,J.J.,R.M.Adams,C.L.Kling,and K.Tanaka,2011,“From Microlevel Decisions to Landscape Changes:An Assessment of Agricultural Conservation Policies”,American Journal of Agricultural Economics,86(1):26-41.
35.Wunder,S.,2005,“Payments for Environmental Services:Some Nuts and Bolts”,CIFOR Occasional Paper,42(1):4-31.
(1)数据来源:http://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=C01。
(1)资料来源:《财政部、农业部大力推进建立以绿色生态为导向的农业补贴制度改革》,http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-12/19/content_5149900.htm。
(2)在一些生态补偿项目中除了提供特定的生态服务之外有时会附加其他社会目标,例如扶贫常常作为一些发展中国家生态补偿项目的重要社会目标,但这些目标往往和效率原则冲突,因此,许多附加其他社会目标的生态补偿项目不适合单纯以效率作为评价标准(Engel et al.,2008)。
(3)粮豆轮作补贴政策对补贴对象的要求是:(1)在合法耕地上前茬种植玉米,后茬种植大豆;(2)规模达到500亩(部分地区300亩)以上,且连片种植;(3)第三年种植杂粮杂豆。
(4)按照黑龙江省农委《2016年黑龙江省玉米改种大豆轮作补贴试点工作实施方案》,补贴主要面向种植大户、家庭农场、合作社等新型经营主体;从笔者的调查来看,各县自主确定补贴农户的最低经营规模为300亩。结合以上两点可以判断,粮豆轮作补贴主要面向规模经营主体。
(1)资料来源:《农业部副部长就〈探索实行耕地轮作休耕制度试点方案〉答记者问》,http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-07/01/content_5087269.htm。
(1)本部分研究的对象是农户对补贴政策的需求,参照付兆刚、郭翔宇(2017)的研究,本文将没有轮作意愿的样本农户剔除。
(1)划分家庭经营规模的一个可行方法是采取因地制宜的方式,例如徐志刚等(2018)采用所在县户均耕地规模的3～5倍和5～10倍两个标准来确定规模农户。
2.付兆刚、郭翔宇,2017:《农地经营权抵押贷款农户需求行为影响因素分析——基于黑龙江省6个县1328个农户的问卷调查》,《中国土地科学》第3期。
3.Ganesh、Thapa,2010:《亚洲和拉美地区经济转型过程中小规模农业面临的挑战和机遇》,《中国农村经济》第12期。
4.高鸣,2017:《脱钩收入补贴对小麦生产率有影响吗?——基于农户的微观证据》,《中国农村经济》第11期。
5.高瑛、王娜、李向菲、王咏红,2017:《农户生态友好型农田土壤管理技术采纳决策分析——以山东省为例》,《农业经济问题》第1期。
6.胡振通、孔德帅、靳乐山,2015:《草原生态补偿:草畜平衡奖励标准的差别化和依据》,《中国人口·资源与环境》第11期。
7.刘乐、张娇、张崇尚、仇焕广,2017:《经营规模的扩大有助于农户采取环境友好型生产行为吗——以秸秆还田为例》,《农业技术经济》第5期。
8.刘同山、李竣,2017:《论中国小农户的前景与出路》,《中州学刊》第11期。
9.陆继霞,2017:《农村土地流转研究评述》,《中国农业大学学报(社会科学版)》第1期。
10.尼尔·J·萨尔金德,2011:《爱上统计学》,史玲玲译,重庆:重庆大学出版社。
11.仇焕广、刘乐、李登旺、张崇尚,2017:《经营规模、地权稳定性与土地生产率——基于全国4省地块层面调查数据的实证分析》,《中国农村经济》第6期。
12.王建英、陈志钢、黄祖辉、Thomas Reardon,2015:《转型时期土地生产率与农户经营规模关系再考察》,《管理世界》第9期。
13.王亚楠、纪月清、徐志刚、钟甫宁,2015:《有偿VS无偿:产权风险下农地附加价值与农户转包方式选择》,《管理世界》第11期。
14.徐晋涛、陶然、徐志刚,2004:《退耕还林:成本有效性、结构调整效应与经济可持续性——基于西部三省农户调查的实证分析》,《经济学(季刊)》第4期。
15.徐志刚、张骏逸、吕开宇,2018:《经营规模、地权期限与跨期农业技术采用——以秸秆直接还田为例》,《中国农村经济》第3期。
16.姚柳杨、赵敏娟、徐涛,2016:《经济理性还是生态理性?农户耕地保护的行为逻辑研究》,《南京农业大学学报(社会科学版)》第5期。
17.余威震、罗小锋、李容容、薛龙飞、黄磊,2017:《绿色认知视角下农户绿色技术采纳意愿与行为悖离研究》,《资源科学》第8期。
18.赵连阁、蔡书凯,2012:《农户IPM技术采纳行为影响因素分析——基于安徽省芜湖市的实证》,《农业经济问题》第3期。
19.张复宏、胡继连,2013:《基于计划行为理论的果农无公害种植行为的作用机理分析——来自山东省16个地市(区)苹果种植户的调查》,《农业经济问题》第7期。
20.张瑞娟、高鸣,2018:《新技术采纳行为与技术效率差异——基于小农户与种粮大户的比较》,《中国农村经济》第5期。
21.Barrett,C.B.,M.F.Bellemare,and J.Y.Hou,2010,“Reconsidering Conventional Explanations of the Inverse Productivity-size Relationship”,World Development,38(1):88-97.
22.Benjamin,D.,1995,“Can Unobserved Land Quality Explain the Inverse Productivity Relationship?”,Journal of Development Economics,46(1):51-84.
23.Babcock,B.A.,P.G.Lakshiminarayan,J.J.Wu,and D.Zilberman,1997,“Targeting Tools for the Purchase of Environmental Amenities”,Land Economics,73(3):325-339.
24.B?rner,J.,K.Baylis,E.Corbera,and C.Esteve,2017,“The Effectiveness of Payments for Environmental Services”,World Development,96(8):359-374.
25.Bullock,D.G.,1992,“Crop Rotation”,Critical Reviews in Plant Sciences,11(4):309-326.
26.Byerlee,D.,1993,“The Adoption of Agricultural Technology:A Guide for Survey Design”,Economic Program,International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center,https://repository.cimmyt.org/xmlui/handle/10883/895?show=full.
27.Chen,Z.,W.E.Huffman,and Scott Rozelle,2011,“Inverse Relationship between Productivity and Farm Size:The Case of China”,Contemporary Economic Policy,29(4):580-592.
28.Claassen,R.,A.Cattaneo,and R.Johansson,2008,“Cost-effective Design of Agri-environmental Payment Programs:U.S.Experience in Theory and Practice”,Ecological Economics,65(4):737-752.
29.Engel,S.,S.Pagiola,and S.Wunder,2008,“Designing Payments for Environmental Services in Theory and Practice:An Overview of the Issues”,Ecological Economics,65(4):663-674.
30.Foster,A.D.,and M.R.Rosenzweig,2010,“Microeconomics of Technology Adoption”,Annual Review of Economics,2(1):395-424
31.Gollwitzer,P.M.,1999,“Implementation Intentions:Strong Effects of Simple Plans”,American Psychologist,54(7):493-503.
32.Pannell,D.J.,R.S.Llewellyn,and M.Corbeels,2014,“The Farm-level Economics of Conservation Agriculture for Resource-poor Farmers”,Agriculture Ecosystems&Environment,187(1):52-64.
33.Schomers,S.,C.Sattler,and B.Matzdorf,2015,“An Analytical Framework for Assessing the Potential of Intermediaries to Improve the Performance of Payments for Ecosystem Services”,Land Use Policy,42(7):58-70.
34.Wu,J.J.,R.M.Adams,C.L.Kling,and K.Tanaka,2011,“From Microlevel Decisions to Landscape Changes:An Assessment of Agricultural Conservation Policies”,American Journal of Agricultural Economics,86(1):26-41.
35.Wunder,S.,2005,“Payments for Environmental Services:Some Nuts and Bolts”,CIFOR Occasional Paper,42(1):4-31.
(1)数据来源:http://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=C01。
(1)资料来源:《财政部、农业部大力推进建立以绿色生态为导向的农业补贴制度改革》,http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-12/19/content_5149900.htm。
(2)在一些生态补偿项目中除了提供特定的生态服务之外有时会附加其他社会目标,例如扶贫常常作为一些发展中国家生态补偿项目的重要社会目标,但这些目标往往和效率原则冲突,因此,许多附加其他社会目标的生态补偿项目不适合单纯以效率作为评价标准(Engel et al.,2008)。
(3)粮豆轮作补贴政策对补贴对象的要求是:(1)在合法耕地上前茬种植玉米,后茬种植大豆;(2)规模达到500亩(部分地区300亩)以上,且连片种植;(3)第三年种植杂粮杂豆。
(4)按照黑龙江省农委《2016年黑龙江省玉米改种大豆轮作补贴试点工作实施方案》,补贴主要面向种植大户、家庭农场、合作社等新型经营主体;从笔者的调查来看,各县自主确定补贴农户的最低经营规模为300亩。结合以上两点可以判断,粮豆轮作补贴主要面向规模经营主体。
(1)资料来源:《农业部副部长就〈探索实行耕地轮作休耕制度试点方案〉答记者问》,http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-07/01/content_5087269.htm。
(1)本部分研究的对象是农户对补贴政策的需求,参照付兆刚、郭翔宇(2017)的研究,本文将没有轮作意愿的样本农户剔除。
(1)划分家庭经营规模的一个可行方法是采取因地制宜的方式,例如徐志刚等(2018)采用所在县户均耕地规模的3～5倍和5～10倍两个标准来确定规模农户。