中国经济成就的政治经济学原因
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摘要
中国改革开放四十年来的经济增长堪称奇迹。已有研究大多停留在讨论哪些经济政策和制度变革促成了这个奇迹,较少涉及为什么中国政府能够采取正确的政策和制度变革这样的政治经济学问题。本文认为,三个因素决定了中国在政治经济学方面的成功,即中性的中央政府、地方分权和选贤任能的官员选拔体制。中性政府保证国家层面的决策不受利益集团的干扰,采取能够促进经济增长的政策和制度变革;地方分权给予地方官员强烈的发展动力;选贤任能的官员选拔体制保证地方官员执行中央的政策,抵消分权可能带来的负面作用。这三个因素对于其他发展中国家具有借鉴意义。
China's economic growth in the past 40 years has been a miracle. Most of the existing studies have tried to find out what China has done right in terms of economic policy and institutional reform; few have attempted to study why and how China has done right. The question of "why"and "how"begs a political economy answer.This paper argues that there are three political economy causes for China's extraordinary economic success,namely,a disinterested central government,economic decentralization,and a meritocratic promotion system for government officials. A disinterested central government is free of the interference of interest groups,so it is able to adopt growth-enhancing economic policies and institutional reforms. Economic decentralization gives local officials strong incentives to develop the local economy. And a meritocratic promotion system makes sure that local officials implement central government policies,so it minimizes the negative consequences of economic decentralization that have plagued many developing countries. China's experience offers useful lessons for other developing countries.
China's economic growth in the past 40 years has been a miracle. Most of the existing studies have tried to find out what China has done right in terms of economic policy and institutional reform; few have attempted to study why and how China has done right. The question of "why"and "how"begs a political economy answer.This paper argues that there are three political economy causes for China's extraordinary economic success,namely,a disinterested central government,economic decentralization,and a meritocratic promotion system for government officials. A disinterested central government is free of the interference of interest groups,so it is able to adopt growth-enhancing economic policies and institutional reforms. Economic decentralization gives local officials strong incentives to develop the local economy. And a meritocratic promotion system makes sure that local officials implement central government policies,so it minimizes the negative consequences of economic decentralization that have plagued many developing countries. China's experience offers useful lessons for other developing countries.
引文
[1]YAO Y.The Chinese growth miracle[M]∥AGHION P,DURLAUF S.Handbook of economic growth.North Hollland,2014:943-1032.
[2]林毅夫,蔡昉,李周.中国的奇迹:发展战略与经济改革[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1994.
[3]林毅夫.解读中国经济[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2014.
[4]胡素珊.中国的内战[M].北京:当代中国出版社,2014.
[5]姚洋,郑东雅.重工业和经济发展:计划经济时代再考察[J].经济研究,2008(4):26-40.
[6]WILLIAMSON J.The strange history of Washington Consensus[J].Journal of Post Keynesian Economics,2004,27(2):195-206.
[7]黄平,崔之元.中国与全球化:华盛顿共识还是北京共识[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2005.
[8]MAO R,YAO Y,ZOU J.Productivity growth,fixed exchange rates,and export-led growth[Z].Manuscript,2017.
[9]朱天.中国增长之谜[M].北京:中信出版社,2016.
[10]姚洋.中性政府:对转型期中国经济成功的一个解释[J].经济评论,2009(3):5-13.
[11]姚洋.威权政府还是中性政府[J].二十一世纪,2010(10):97-100.
[12]弗朗西斯·福山.政治秩序与政治衰败:从工业革命到民主全球化[M].南宁:广西师范大学出版社,2015.
[13]贺大兴,姚洋.社会平等、中性政府与中国经济增长[J].经济研究,2011(1):4-17.
[14]HE D,YAO Y.Equality,coalition formation and the disinterested government[Z].Manuscript,2017.
[15]曼瑟·奥尔森.国家的兴衰——经济增长、滞涨和社会僵化[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2007.
[16]弗朗西斯·福山.政治秩序的起源[M].南宁:广西师范大学出版社,2014.
[17]QIAN Y,WEINGAST B R.China's transition to markets:market-preserving federalism,Chinese style[J].Journal of Policy Reform,1996,1(2):149-185.
[18]BLANCHARD O,SHLEIFER A.Federalism with and without political centralization:China versus Russia[J].IMF Staff Pappers,2001,48(1):171-179.
[19]邓小南.西汉官吏考课制度初探[J].北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版),1987(2):22-27,33.
[20]LI H,ZHOU L.Political turnover and economic performance:the incentive role of personnel control in China[J].Journal of Public Economics,2005,89(9-10):1743-1762.
[21]YAO Y,ZHANG M.Subnational leaders and economic growth:evidence from Chinese cities[J].Journal of Economic Growth,2015,20(4):405-436.
[22]SHIH V,ADOLPH C,LIU M.Getting ahead in the Communist Party:explaining the advancement of Central Committee members in China[J].American Political Science Review,2012,106(1):166-187.
[23]JIA R,KUDAMATSU M,SEIM D.Political selection in China:the complementary roles of connections and performance[J].Journal of the European Economic Association,2015,13(4):631-668.
[24]LANDRY P,LYU X,DUAN H.Does performance matter?Evaluating political selection along the Chinese administrative ladder[J].Forthcoming at Comparative Political Studies,2017.
[25]王赫.创卫与升迁[Z].草稿,2017.
(1)实行进口替代政策,发展本国重工业,是当时世界银行给发展中国家提出的主要政策建议,也是当时多数中国学人的共识。1948年对中国留美学生的一份问卷发现,51.5%的回答者认为,应该通过国有化推动中国重工业的发展[4]。
(2)姚洋和郑东雅(2008)构建了一个动态一般均衡模型,对计划经济时代的重工业优先发展战略进行了一个全面的评价。他们的模拟研究发现,通过释放正的外部性,重工业优先发展战略对中国的经济发展起到了推动作用,但是,这个战略持续的时间过长(最优应该是12年),而且重工业获得的补贴更高[5]。
(1)全文请见http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2014-01/15/content_2567800.htm。
[2]林毅夫,蔡昉,李周.中国的奇迹:发展战略与经济改革[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1994.
[3]林毅夫.解读中国经济[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2014.
[4]胡素珊.中国的内战[M].北京:当代中国出版社,2014.
[5]姚洋,郑东雅.重工业和经济发展:计划经济时代再考察[J].经济研究,2008(4):26-40.
[6]WILLIAMSON J.The strange history of Washington Consensus[J].Journal of Post Keynesian Economics,2004,27(2):195-206.
[7]黄平,崔之元.中国与全球化:华盛顿共识还是北京共识[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2005.
[8]MAO R,YAO Y,ZOU J.Productivity growth,fixed exchange rates,and export-led growth[Z].Manuscript,2017.
[9]朱天.中国增长之谜[M].北京:中信出版社,2016.
[10]姚洋.中性政府:对转型期中国经济成功的一个解释[J].经济评论,2009(3):5-13.
[11]姚洋.威权政府还是中性政府[J].二十一世纪,2010(10):97-100.
[12]弗朗西斯·福山.政治秩序与政治衰败:从工业革命到民主全球化[M].南宁:广西师范大学出版社,2015.
[13]贺大兴,姚洋.社会平等、中性政府与中国经济增长[J].经济研究,2011(1):4-17.
[14]HE D,YAO Y.Equality,coalition formation and the disinterested government[Z].Manuscript,2017.
[15]曼瑟·奥尔森.国家的兴衰——经济增长、滞涨和社会僵化[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2007.
[16]弗朗西斯·福山.政治秩序的起源[M].南宁:广西师范大学出版社,2014.
[17]QIAN Y,WEINGAST B R.China's transition to markets:market-preserving federalism,Chinese style[J].Journal of Policy Reform,1996,1(2):149-185.
[18]BLANCHARD O,SHLEIFER A.Federalism with and without political centralization:China versus Russia[J].IMF Staff Pappers,2001,48(1):171-179.
[19]邓小南.西汉官吏考课制度初探[J].北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版),1987(2):22-27,33.
[20]LI H,ZHOU L.Political turnover and economic performance:the incentive role of personnel control in China[J].Journal of Public Economics,2005,89(9-10):1743-1762.
[21]YAO Y,ZHANG M.Subnational leaders and economic growth:evidence from Chinese cities[J].Journal of Economic Growth,2015,20(4):405-436.
[22]SHIH V,ADOLPH C,LIU M.Getting ahead in the Communist Party:explaining the advancement of Central Committee members in China[J].American Political Science Review,2012,106(1):166-187.
[23]JIA R,KUDAMATSU M,SEIM D.Political selection in China:the complementary roles of connections and performance[J].Journal of the European Economic Association,2015,13(4):631-668.
[24]LANDRY P,LYU X,DUAN H.Does performance matter?Evaluating political selection along the Chinese administrative ladder[J].Forthcoming at Comparative Political Studies,2017.
[25]王赫.创卫与升迁[Z].草稿,2017.
(1)实行进口替代政策,发展本国重工业,是当时世界银行给发展中国家提出的主要政策建议,也是当时多数中国学人的共识。1948年对中国留美学生的一份问卷发现,51.5%的回答者认为,应该通过国有化推动中国重工业的发展[4]。
(2)姚洋和郑东雅(2008)构建了一个动态一般均衡模型,对计划经济时代的重工业优先发展战略进行了一个全面的评价。他们的模拟研究发现,通过释放正的外部性,重工业优先发展战略对中国的经济发展起到了推动作用,但是,这个战略持续的时间过长(最优应该是12年),而且重工业获得的补贴更高[5]。
(1)全文请见http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2014-01/15/content_2567800.htm。