论“动物权利”中伤害与裨益的不可通约性
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摘要
作为一种新的伦理学,汤姆·里根(Tom Regan)的"动物权利"不单单是"革命的",也是"精粹的"。在实践上,这种特征突出地表现在里根关于"轻伤害原则"与"副作用"的阐述中。本文在考察两者内涵的基础上,确定了权利论的一个关键预设,即"伤害"与"裨益"的不可通约性,后者构成权利论与功利论的一种根本区别。分析指出,里根的这个预设不但是合乎逻辑的,也是合乎理性的。进而,伤害与裨益的不可通约性具有重要的实践意义:它为"放任自然"的实践策略提供了稳固的根据,并对环境管理方式的潜在危险具有强大的矫枉力,但同时也暴露了其应对某些生态问题的局限性。环境伦理学的进一步的完善应该以此为出发点。
As a new ethic, Tom Regan's "animal rights" is not only "revolutionary" but also "quintessential". In practice, this feature is highlighted in Regan's arguments about the "worse-off principle" and "side effects". In this paper, I investigate the connotations of the "worse-off principle" and "side effects", and identify an underlying presupposition, namely, the incommensurability of "harms" and "benefits", which acts as a fundamental difference between the rights view and utilitarianism. Further analysis shows that this presupposition is not only logical but also reasonable. Meanwhile, the incommensurability of "harm" and "benefit" has important implications for practice: it provides a solid basis for the policy that "lets nature be", and bears preventative power against potential risks associated with environmental management; however, it helps little to deal with some of the ecological crises. This presupposition should be a starting point towards further improvement of environmental ethics.
As a new ethic, Tom Regan's "animal rights" is not only "revolutionary" but also "quintessential". In practice, this feature is highlighted in Regan's arguments about the "worse-off principle" and "side effects". In this paper, I investigate the connotations of the "worse-off principle" and "side effects", and identify an underlying presupposition, namely, the incommensurability of "harms" and "benefits", which acts as a fundamental difference between the rights view and utilitarianism. Further analysis shows that this presupposition is not only logical but also reasonable. Meanwhile, the incommensurability of "harm" and "benefit" has important implications for practice: it provides a solid basis for the policy that "lets nature be", and bears preventative power against potential risks associated with environmental management; however, it helps little to deal with some of the ecological crises. This presupposition should be a starting point towards further improvement of environmental ethics.
引文
[1]Callicott,J.B.Beyond the Land Ethic:More Essays in Environmental Philosophy[M].Albany,N.Y.:State University of New York Press,1999,73.
[2]Taylor,P.W.Respect for Nature:A Theory of Environmental Ethics[M].Princeton,N.J.:Princeton University Press,2011,280.
[3]Regan,T.The Case for Animal Rights[M].Berkeley and Los Angeles,California:University of California Press,2004,116-117.
[4]Singer,P.Animal Liberation:The Definitive Classic of the Animal Movement[M].New York:HarperCollins Publishers,2009.
[5]Kuhn,T.S.The Structure of Scientific Revolutions(With An Introductory Essay by Ian Hacking)[M].Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,2012,4.
[6]Feinberg,J.,Narveson,J.'The Nature and Value of Rights'[J].Journal of Value Inquiry,1970,4(4):243-260.
[7]Leopold,A.Round River:From the Journals of Aldo Leopold[M].New York:Oxford University Press,1953,146-147.
[8]Callicott,J.B.In Defense of the Land Ethic:Essays in Environmental Philosophy[M].Albany,N.Y.:State University of New York Press,1989.
[9]孙亚君.论生态中心主义的实践局限[J].云南师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2016,48(5):129-137.
(1)这里,涉及到环境伦理学的边界问题。在狭义的语境中,道德地考量整体性的环境对象(如生态系统)往往被视为环境伦理学的题中之义。但是,如果将环境伦理学宽泛地定义为道德关怀对象不局限于人的伦理学,那么,这种“广义”的环境伦理学既包括辛格(Peter Singer)的“动物解放(animal liberation)”,也包括里根的“动物权利”。本文中所谓的环境伦理学即是广义的环境伦理学。
(1)严格而言,里根所谓的慈善义务与裨益在“效果”上并不完全吻合。裨益往往指的是增加“好”,而里根的“慈善义务”针对的是减少“坏”。妙手回春,救人水火,是一种减少“坏”;福上加福,多多益善,是一种增加“好”。当然,如果减少坏也可以看作是一种增加好的话,慈善义务与裨益在“改善现状”的大方向上是一致的。特别地,这种相对现状的“改善”是两者的共同点,也是两者作为“积极的义务”区别于“消极的义务”之所在。
(1)在里根的伦理学中,一般而言,生命主体(subject-of-a-life)的边界即是道德关怀对象的边界。严格而言,生命主体指向一周岁以上的“心智正常(mentally normal)”的哺乳动物个体。
(2)这里,暂且不谈该实践原则是否能够达到保护生态系统的目的,也暂且不谈该实践原则的可操作性。
(3)虽然克里考特本人并未直接使用“谨慎原则”一词,但是,这种“谨慎性”的考量既为被克里考特所继承的利奥波德(Aldo Leopold)的大地伦理(the land ethic)所强调,也体现在克里考特关于生物多样性与生态系统稳定性之关系的论述中。特别地,克里考特明确地将物种保护作为其道德实践的主张,而孙亚君的分析指出,在生态中心论的框架下,物种保护的理论依据必然在于谨慎性的考量。
(4)这里,所谓的认识论、本体论与价值论都是相应于各自体系而言的。
[2]Taylor,P.W.Respect for Nature:A Theory of Environmental Ethics[M].Princeton,N.J.:Princeton University Press,2011,280.
[3]Regan,T.The Case for Animal Rights[M].Berkeley and Los Angeles,California:University of California Press,2004,116-117.
[4]Singer,P.Animal Liberation:The Definitive Classic of the Animal Movement[M].New York:HarperCollins Publishers,2009.
[5]Kuhn,T.S.The Structure of Scientific Revolutions(With An Introductory Essay by Ian Hacking)[M].Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,2012,4.
[6]Feinberg,J.,Narveson,J.'The Nature and Value of Rights'[J].Journal of Value Inquiry,1970,4(4):243-260.
[7]Leopold,A.Round River:From the Journals of Aldo Leopold[M].New York:Oxford University Press,1953,146-147.
[8]Callicott,J.B.In Defense of the Land Ethic:Essays in Environmental Philosophy[M].Albany,N.Y.:State University of New York Press,1989.
[9]孙亚君.论生态中心主义的实践局限[J].云南师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2016,48(5):129-137.
(1)这里,涉及到环境伦理学的边界问题。在狭义的语境中,道德地考量整体性的环境对象(如生态系统)往往被视为环境伦理学的题中之义。但是,如果将环境伦理学宽泛地定义为道德关怀对象不局限于人的伦理学,那么,这种“广义”的环境伦理学既包括辛格(Peter Singer)的“动物解放(animal liberation)”,也包括里根的“动物权利”。本文中所谓的环境伦理学即是广义的环境伦理学。
(1)严格而言,里根所谓的慈善义务与裨益在“效果”上并不完全吻合。裨益往往指的是增加“好”,而里根的“慈善义务”针对的是减少“坏”。妙手回春,救人水火,是一种减少“坏”;福上加福,多多益善,是一种增加“好”。当然,如果减少坏也可以看作是一种增加好的话,慈善义务与裨益在“改善现状”的大方向上是一致的。特别地,这种相对现状的“改善”是两者的共同点,也是两者作为“积极的义务”区别于“消极的义务”之所在。
(1)在里根的伦理学中,一般而言,生命主体(subject-of-a-life)的边界即是道德关怀对象的边界。严格而言,生命主体指向一周岁以上的“心智正常(mentally normal)”的哺乳动物个体。
(2)这里,暂且不谈该实践原则是否能够达到保护生态系统的目的,也暂且不谈该实践原则的可操作性。
(3)虽然克里考特本人并未直接使用“谨慎原则”一词,但是,这种“谨慎性”的考量既为被克里考特所继承的利奥波德(Aldo Leopold)的大地伦理(the land ethic)所强调,也体现在克里考特关于生物多样性与生态系统稳定性之关系的论述中。特别地,克里考特明确地将物种保护作为其道德实践的主张,而孙亚君的分析指出,在生态中心论的框架下,物种保护的理论依据必然在于谨慎性的考量。
(4)这里,所谓的认识论、本体论与价值论都是相应于各自体系而言的。