“反其本而推之”——朱子对《孟子·梁惠王上》“推恩”问题的理解
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摘要
"推恩"问题出自《孟子·梁惠王上》"以羊易牛"章。所谓"推恩",简单地说,指的是行为者在面对某事物(或境况)时发现自身所具有的特殊的"心"会自然产生某种道德反应,并将此"心"所产生的道德反应推而广之,施加到其他相关事物或境况中去,以使该行为者在面对其他相关的事物或境况时也能作出相同的道德反应。"推恩"理论涉及到许多复杂的道德和心理问题,中外学者尤其是西方学者对此作了相当深入的研究,本文所要处理的只是朱熹对"推恩"问题的解释。本文的基本主张是:西方学者的相关解释固然有其优越之处,但相比之下,朱子的诠释更能显示出理论的整全与一致。本文的主要目的有二:一方面尝试透过朱子的理解以显示朱子理论的主要特色,并以此回应西方学者的解释;另一方面也试图透过朱子的这种解释以呈现朱子在某种意义上对孟子理论的"扭转"。
The notion of tui'en推恩, which literally means "extending gratitude," appears in Mencius孟子. Tui'en refers to the following phenomenon. If a certain thing or situation can give rise to a relevant kind of moral response in an agent's xin心(heart/emotion) naturally and spontaneously, then his or her xin will extend the same moral response to similar things or situations, so that the agent exhibits moral virtues in all circumstances. The phenomenon of tui'en is connected to complex psychological as well as moral problems. While many scholars in Chinese philosophy, especially contemporary Western scholars, have tried to give their own accounts of tui'en, I will focus on Zhu Xi's interpretation in this paper. I try to argue that Zhu Xi's interpretation of tui'en is better than most Western accounts in terms of theoretical coherence and unification, although the latter is not without merits. In the process, I have two aims in my mind. The first aim is, through articulating Zhu Xi's interpretation of Mencius, to reply the mainstream account proposed by Western scholars. The second aim is to reveal the distinguishing features of Zhu Xi's philosophy, in particular, his "twisting" of Mencius.
The notion of tui'en推恩, which literally means "extending gratitude," appears in Mencius孟子. Tui'en refers to the following phenomenon. If a certain thing or situation can give rise to a relevant kind of moral response in an agent's xin心(heart/emotion) naturally and spontaneously, then his or her xin will extend the same moral response to similar things or situations, so that the agent exhibits moral virtues in all circumstances. The phenomenon of tui'en is connected to complex psychological as well as moral problems. While many scholars in Chinese philosophy, especially contemporary Western scholars, have tried to give their own accounts of tui'en, I will focus on Zhu Xi's interpretation in this paper. I try to argue that Zhu Xi's interpretation of tui'en is better than most Western accounts in terms of theoretical coherence and unification, although the latter is not without merits. In the process, I have two aims in my mind. The first aim is, through articulating Zhu Xi's interpretation of Mencius, to reply the mainstream account proposed by Western scholars. The second aim is to reveal the distinguishing features of Zhu Xi's philosophy, in particular, his "twisting" of Mencius.
引文
① 参阅刘清平:《论孟子推恩说的深度悖论》,《齐鲁学刊》2005年第4期;吴先伍:《“见牛未见羊也”——〈孟子〉中“见”的道德本性》,《中国哲学史》2008年第2期;张丰君:《孟子推恩说何以可能》,《管子学刊》2012年第2期;李凯:《论孟子“推恩”说的现实性、困境与出路》,《齐鲁学刊》2012年第5期等。
② 在英语学界,较有代表性的学者如倪德卫(David S.Nivison)、信广来(Kwong-loi Shun)、黄百锐(David B.Wong)、艾文贺(P.J.Ivanhoe)、万百安(Bryan W.Van Norden)、任满说(Manyul Im)、田中孝治(Koji Tanaka)、井原敬(Craig Ihara)等皆对此有专门的论述。笔者在给研究生上课时,曾专门就西方汉学家(指英文世界而言,其余则由于语言能力所限,不能论及)对此的相关论述给予了梳理。由于该部分与本文相涉不是很大,故而我们在稍后只作为背景资料加以必要的说明。
(1)冯友兰先生认为,依孟子,若齐宣王“因己之好货好色,即推而与百姓同之,即‘举斯心加诸彼’也。若实现此心于政事,则其政事即仁政矣。‘善推其所为’即仁也,即忠恕也。孔子讲仁及忠恕,多限于个人之修养方面。孟子则应用之于政治及社会哲学。孔子讲仁及忠恕,只及于‘内圣’;孟子则更及于‘外王’”。参阅氏著:《中国哲学史》(上),上海:华东师范大学出版社,2000年,第95页。
(2)杨伯峻将“恩”理解为“好心好意”或“恩惠”。参阅氏著:《孟子译注》,北京:中华书局,2010年,第18、19页。
(3)倪德卫:《儒家之道——中国哲学之探讨》,南京:江苏人民出版社,2006年,第129页。
(4)倪德卫:《儒家之道——中国哲学之探讨》,第173页。参阅原文David S.Nivison,“Two Roots or One?” The Ways of Confucianism:Investigations in Chinese Philosophy,ed.Bryan Van Norden (Chicago:Open Court,1996) 137.
(5)任满说对此认为,倪氏所理解的“推”在某种意义上是一种“修辞性的说服模式”(a rhetorical mode of persuasion),或者说是一种“理性压力的策略”(rational pressure tactic)。Manyul Im,“Action,Emotion,and Inference in Mencius,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 29.2 (2002):235.
(6)Kwong-loi Shun,“Moral Reasons in Confucian Ethics,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 16.3-4 (1989):322.
(7)Manyul Im,“Action,Emotion,and Inference in Mencius,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 29.2 (2002):221,242.
(8)David B.Wong,“Reasons and Analogical Reasoning in Mengzi,” Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi,eds.Xiusheng Liu,and Philip J.Ivanhoe (Indianapolis:Hackett Publishing Company,Inc.,2002) 190-191.
(9)Philip J.Ivanhoe,“Confucian Self Cultivation and Mengzi's Notion of Extension,” Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi,eds.Xiusheng Liu,and Philip J.Ivanhoe (Indianapolis:Hackett Publishing Company,Inc.,2002) 234.
(10)Ibid.David B.Wong (2002) 198-199.
(11)Ibid.David B.Wong (2002) 191.
(12)David B.Wong,“Is There a Distinction between Reason and Emotion in Mencius?”,Philosophy East & West 41.1 (1991):32.
(13)Cf.Craig K.Ihara,“David Wong on Emotions in Mencius,” Philosophy East and West 41.1 (1991):45-54.
(14)万百安文请参阅“Kwong-loi Shun on Moral Reason in Mencius,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 18.4 (1991):353-370.
(15)主张“情感扩充”的学者虽然在主要方面有其相似的看法,但他们之间在具体观点上也各不相同。
(16)David B.Wong,“Reasons and Analogical Reasoning in Mengzi,” Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi,eds.Xiusheng Liu,and Philip J.Ivanhoe (Indianapolis:Hackett Publishing Company,Inc.,2002)191.
(17)我们举一个生活中的实例,如小张平时就喜好、也了解汽车,一日受同事之邀到销售汽车的4S店观看一部他早已了解、名声甚好的汽车,经由对样车的驾驶体验和销售员对该车的各种性能指标的详细讲解,发生了下述情况:1.小张知道了这是一部好车;2.小张从内心也喜欢这部车;3.小张也不缺钱购买这部车。但最后小张并没有购买这部车。类似这样的例子可以从一个侧面把它了解为情感在行为动机方面的失效。
(18)David B.Wong,“Is There a Distinction between Reason and Emotion in Mencius?”,Philosophy East & West 41.1 (1991):33.
(19)此一对话结构的特色亦可见于第五章。
(20)有关孟子思想或其道德劝说是否具有效果论性质的问题,西方学者间或有所提出,可参阅顾立雅 (G.H.Creel,Chinese Thought:From Confucius to Mao Tze-tung,Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1953,pp.86-87);倪德卫 (David S.Nivison,The Way of Confucianism:Investigations in Chinese Philosophy,ed.& Intro.Bryan W.Van Norden,Chicago and La Salle,Illinois:1996,p.106);信广来(Kwong-loi Shun,“Moral Reasons in Confucian Ethics,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 16,1989,p.341.)等。中文学界较有代表性的是蔡信安,参阅氏著:《道德抉择理论》,台北:时英出版社,1993年,第150～154页。
(21)此处所谓“并不那么协调一致”乃基于两个假设的前提:一是假定对《孟子》一书可以有整体理论的把握和章节对话脉络的分析这两种不同的读法;二是假定孟子的相关对话章节可以作为独立的文本加以分析。某一段落或章节是否可以作为独立文本加以分析,而不至于被认为断章取义,当满足以下两个条件:1.该段落或章节论述的目的、宗旨清楚且确定;2.该段落或章节论证的过程完整而清晰。
(22)朱子云:“七篇之书,莫非体验、扩充之端……孟子大概是要人探索力讨,反己自求。”(《语类》卷第十九《论语一·论孟纲领》)
(23)对话、劝说如要获得成功,一个重要的特点就是要在现场情境下切实“打动”对方;而面对满眼都是功利的诸侯而言,若不在“效果”上着手,则很难真正“打动”他们。这是从常识着眼的理解,却十分符合战国时期众多士人游说诸侯的策略。
② 在英语学界,较有代表性的学者如倪德卫(David S.Nivison)、信广来(Kwong-loi Shun)、黄百锐(David B.Wong)、艾文贺(P.J.Ivanhoe)、万百安(Bryan W.Van Norden)、任满说(Manyul Im)、田中孝治(Koji Tanaka)、井原敬(Craig Ihara)等皆对此有专门的论述。笔者在给研究生上课时,曾专门就西方汉学家(指英文世界而言,其余则由于语言能力所限,不能论及)对此的相关论述给予了梳理。由于该部分与本文相涉不是很大,故而我们在稍后只作为背景资料加以必要的说明。
(1)冯友兰先生认为,依孟子,若齐宣王“因己之好货好色,即推而与百姓同之,即‘举斯心加诸彼’也。若实现此心于政事,则其政事即仁政矣。‘善推其所为’即仁也,即忠恕也。孔子讲仁及忠恕,多限于个人之修养方面。孟子则应用之于政治及社会哲学。孔子讲仁及忠恕,只及于‘内圣’;孟子则更及于‘外王’”。参阅氏著:《中国哲学史》(上),上海:华东师范大学出版社,2000年,第95页。
(2)杨伯峻将“恩”理解为“好心好意”或“恩惠”。参阅氏著:《孟子译注》,北京:中华书局,2010年,第18、19页。
(3)倪德卫:《儒家之道——中国哲学之探讨》,南京:江苏人民出版社,2006年,第129页。
(4)倪德卫:《儒家之道——中国哲学之探讨》,第173页。参阅原文David S.Nivison,“Two Roots or One?” The Ways of Confucianism:Investigations in Chinese Philosophy,ed.Bryan Van Norden (Chicago:Open Court,1996) 137.
(5)任满说对此认为,倪氏所理解的“推”在某种意义上是一种“修辞性的说服模式”(a rhetorical mode of persuasion),或者说是一种“理性压力的策略”(rational pressure tactic)。Manyul Im,“Action,Emotion,and Inference in Mencius,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 29.2 (2002):235.
(6)Kwong-loi Shun,“Moral Reasons in Confucian Ethics,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 16.3-4 (1989):322.
(7)Manyul Im,“Action,Emotion,and Inference in Mencius,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 29.2 (2002):221,242.
(8)David B.Wong,“Reasons and Analogical Reasoning in Mengzi,” Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi,eds.Xiusheng Liu,and Philip J.Ivanhoe (Indianapolis:Hackett Publishing Company,Inc.,2002) 190-191.
(9)Philip J.Ivanhoe,“Confucian Self Cultivation and Mengzi's Notion of Extension,” Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi,eds.Xiusheng Liu,and Philip J.Ivanhoe (Indianapolis:Hackett Publishing Company,Inc.,2002) 234.
(10)Ibid.David B.Wong (2002) 198-199.
(11)Ibid.David B.Wong (2002) 191.
(12)David B.Wong,“Is There a Distinction between Reason and Emotion in Mencius?”,Philosophy East & West 41.1 (1991):32.
(13)Cf.Craig K.Ihara,“David Wong on Emotions in Mencius,” Philosophy East and West 41.1 (1991):45-54.
(14)万百安文请参阅“Kwong-loi Shun on Moral Reason in Mencius,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 18.4 (1991):353-370.
(15)主张“情感扩充”的学者虽然在主要方面有其相似的看法,但他们之间在具体观点上也各不相同。
(16)David B.Wong,“Reasons and Analogical Reasoning in Mengzi,” Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi,eds.Xiusheng Liu,and Philip J.Ivanhoe (Indianapolis:Hackett Publishing Company,Inc.,2002)191.
(17)我们举一个生活中的实例,如小张平时就喜好、也了解汽车,一日受同事之邀到销售汽车的4S店观看一部他早已了解、名声甚好的汽车,经由对样车的驾驶体验和销售员对该车的各种性能指标的详细讲解,发生了下述情况:1.小张知道了这是一部好车;2.小张从内心也喜欢这部车;3.小张也不缺钱购买这部车。但最后小张并没有购买这部车。类似这样的例子可以从一个侧面把它了解为情感在行为动机方面的失效。
(18)David B.Wong,“Is There a Distinction between Reason and Emotion in Mencius?”,Philosophy East & West 41.1 (1991):33.
(19)此一对话结构的特色亦可见于第五章。
(20)有关孟子思想或其道德劝说是否具有效果论性质的问题,西方学者间或有所提出,可参阅顾立雅 (G.H.Creel,Chinese Thought:From Confucius to Mao Tze-tung,Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1953,pp.86-87);倪德卫 (David S.Nivison,The Way of Confucianism:Investigations in Chinese Philosophy,ed.& Intro.Bryan W.Van Norden,Chicago and La Salle,Illinois:1996,p.106);信广来(Kwong-loi Shun,“Moral Reasons in Confucian Ethics,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 16,1989,p.341.)等。中文学界较有代表性的是蔡信安,参阅氏著:《道德抉择理论》,台北:时英出版社,1993年,第150～154页。
(21)此处所谓“并不那么协调一致”乃基于两个假设的前提:一是假定对《孟子》一书可以有整体理论的把握和章节对话脉络的分析这两种不同的读法;二是假定孟子的相关对话章节可以作为独立的文本加以分析。某一段落或章节是否可以作为独立文本加以分析,而不至于被认为断章取义,当满足以下两个条件:1.该段落或章节论述的目的、宗旨清楚且确定;2.该段落或章节论证的过程完整而清晰。
(22)朱子云:“七篇之书,莫非体验、扩充之端……孟子大概是要人探索力讨,反己自求。”(《语类》卷第十九《论语一·论孟纲领》)
(23)对话、劝说如要获得成功,一个重要的特点就是要在现场情境下切实“打动”对方;而面对满眼都是功利的诸侯而言,若不在“效果”上着手,则很难真正“打动”他们。这是从常识着眼的理解,却十分符合战国时期众多士人游说诸侯的策略。