网络外部性条件下差异化双边平台买者参与问题
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摘要
双边平台存在的基础是参与的用户,因此用户的分配是双边市场上各利益主体最关心的问题。为研究用户分配问题,本文在具有差异性的竞争双边市场上,建立了两阶段的双边平台竞争模型。第一阶段使用Rubinstein讨价还价模型对卖者的参与人数进行分配,利用讨价还价顺序描述卖者进入的先后顺序;第二阶段分别在平台利润最大化和社会福利最大化两种情况下,刻画买者对平台的规模偏好,并求均衡的市场份额。通过此模型分析竞争性平台差异化的情况下,网络外部性系数对平台均衡市场份额以及市场利益相关者利得的影响。研究表明:在考虑平台利润最大化的情况下,买者参与人数受卖者规模与网络外部性系数的影响,平台规模并非越大越好;在考虑社会福利最大化的情况下,买者的网络外部性系数与买者参与人数不相关,但与总社会福利正相关。
The main body of the two-sided platform is the platform itself and the users. The existence of the platform is based on the participation of the users. So the distribution of the users is the interest of the two-sided market. In the competitive two-sided market,this paper establishes a two-stage two-sided platform competition model. The paper uses the Rubinstein bargaining model to describe the differences between the sellers and decide the quotient of sellers in the first stage. The paper is divided into the profit maximization and social welfare maximization of the two cases in the second stage. We describe the size of the buyers on the platform preferences,and seek equilibrium. Through this model,the influence of network external coefficient on platform equilibrium market share and market stakeholders' benefit is analyzed under competitive platform. The study shows that the number of buyers is involved by the size of the network and the network externalities. The scale of the platform is not case that the bigger the better. In considering the social welfare maximization,the buyer's participation is not affected by network externality coefficient of buyers. But the total social welfare is positively related to it.
The main body of the two-sided platform is the platform itself and the users. The existence of the platform is based on the participation of the users. So the distribution of the users is the interest of the two-sided market. In the competitive two-sided market,this paper establishes a two-stage two-sided platform competition model. The paper uses the Rubinstein bargaining model to describe the differences between the sellers and decide the quotient of sellers in the first stage. The paper is divided into the profit maximization and social welfare maximization of the two cases in the second stage. We describe the size of the buyers on the platform preferences,and seek equilibrium. Through this model,the influence of network external coefficient on platform equilibrium market share and market stakeholders' benefit is analyzed under competitive platform. The study shows that the number of buyers is involved by the size of the network and the network externalities. The scale of the platform is not case that the bigger the better. In considering the social welfare maximization,the buyer's participation is not affected by network externality coefficient of buyers. But the total social welfare is positively related to it.
引文
[1]中华人民共和国国家发展与改革委员会.2016年“双十一”网购节综合信用评价报告[EB/OL].http://zys.ndrc.gov.cn/xwfb/201612/t20161219_830446.html,2016-12-19/2017-6-25.
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[5]邱甲贤,聂富强,童牧,胡根华.第三方电子交易平台的双边市场特征——基于在线个人借贷市场的实证分析[J].管理科学学报,2016,19(1):47-59.
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[9]纪汉霖.用户部分多归属条件下的双边市场定价策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2011,31(1):75-83.
[10]Poolsombat R,Vernasca G.Partial multihoming in twosided markets[R].Discussion Papers,2006.
[11]Caillaud B,Jullien B.Chicken and egg:competition among intermediation service providers[J].Rand Journal of Economics,2003,34(2):309-328.
[12]Armstrong M,Wright J.Two-sided markets with multihoming and exclusive dealing[R].Idei Working Paper Diw,2004.
[13]Rochet J C,Tirole J.Platform competition in two-sided markets[J].Journal of the European Economic Association,2003,1(4):990-1029.
[14]Armstrong M.Competition in two-sided markets[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,2006,37(3):668-691.
[15]张千帆,于晓娟,张亚军.网络平台企业合作的定价机制研究——基于多归属情形[J].运筹与管理,2016,25(1):231-237.
[16]张凯.存在水平差异化的多寡头双边平台企业竞争研究[J].运筹与管理,2013,22(2):249-255.
[17]Rubinstein A.Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model[J].Econometrica:Journal of the Econometric Society,1982,50(1):97-109.
[18]Anderson E G,Parker G G,Tan B.Platform performance investment in the presence of network externalities[J].Information Systems Research,2014,25(1):152-172.
[19]Rochet J C,Tirole J.Two-sided markets:a progress report[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,2006,37(3):645-667.
[20]Chen J F,Fan M,Li M Z.Advertising versus brokerage model for online trading platforms[J].MIS QUARTERLY,2016,40(3):575-596.
[2]纪汉霖,王小芳.平台差异化且用户部分多归属的双边市场竞争[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,34(6):1398-1406.
[3]Katz M L,Shapiro C.Network externalities,competition,and compatibility[J].The American economic review,1985,75(3):424-440.
[4]叶琼伟,张谦,杜萌,宋光兴.基于双边市场理论的社交网络广告定价分析[J].南开管理评论,2016,19(1):169-178.
[5]邱甲贤,聂富强,童牧,胡根华.第三方电子交易平台的双边市场特征——基于在线个人借贷市场的实证分析[J].管理科学学报,2016,19(1):47-59.
[6]Roger G.Two-sided competition with vertical differentiation[J].Journal of Economics,2017,120(3):193-217.
[7]Lin M,Wu R,Zhou W.Two-sided pricing and endogenous network effects[J/OL].https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2426033,2016-3-21/2017-4-29.
[8]段文奇,柯玲芬.基于用户规模的双边平台适应性动态定价策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(8):79-87.
[9]纪汉霖.用户部分多归属条件下的双边市场定价策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2011,31(1):75-83.
[10]Poolsombat R,Vernasca G.Partial multihoming in twosided markets[R].Discussion Papers,2006.
[11]Caillaud B,Jullien B.Chicken and egg:competition among intermediation service providers[J].Rand Journal of Economics,2003,34(2):309-328.
[12]Armstrong M,Wright J.Two-sided markets with multihoming and exclusive dealing[R].Idei Working Paper Diw,2004.
[13]Rochet J C,Tirole J.Platform competition in two-sided markets[J].Journal of the European Economic Association,2003,1(4):990-1029.
[14]Armstrong M.Competition in two-sided markets[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,2006,37(3):668-691.
[15]张千帆,于晓娟,张亚军.网络平台企业合作的定价机制研究——基于多归属情形[J].运筹与管理,2016,25(1):231-237.
[16]张凯.存在水平差异化的多寡头双边平台企业竞争研究[J].运筹与管理,2013,22(2):249-255.
[17]Rubinstein A.Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model[J].Econometrica:Journal of the Econometric Society,1982,50(1):97-109.
[18]Anderson E G,Parker G G,Tan B.Platform performance investment in the presence of network externalities[J].Information Systems Research,2014,25(1):152-172.
[19]Rochet J C,Tirole J.Two-sided markets:a progress report[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,2006,37(3):645-667.
[20]Chen J F,Fan M,Li M Z.Advertising versus brokerage model for online trading platforms[J].MIS QUARTERLY,2016,40(3):575-596.