我国反垄断宽大制度中的重要信息保护问题研究
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摘要
宽大制度的有效性直接关系到反垄断行政执行是否能有效进行,而宽大制度能维持有效适用的前提之一就是执法机关对于申请人所提供的信息进行全面的保护。然而,对于是否以及如何保护通过宽大程序获得的重要信息,我国《反垄断法》并未明确。目前,《反垄断法》仅规定了商业秘密的保护以及执法机关工作人员泄露商业秘密的法律责任。事实上,宽大程序中的"有关情况的报告"、"重要证据"与"商业秘密"并非完全重合;对于其中非商业秘密的其他重要信息应当进行必要的整体性保护,包括在案件调查过程中以及后继民事诉讼中。在行政调查程序中,对非商业秘密的重要信息进行保护,有利于包括宽大制度在内的行政程序顺利进行;此外,在后继诉讼中,应当在保障宽大制度有效性的前提下,适当缓解原告举证困难这一问题。
The effectiveness of the leniency program is connected directly with the administrative enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law. One of the prerequisites of the effective leniency is the protection of the information submitted by the applicants to the authorities. However, it is not clear in Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law as concerning whether and the measures to protect the important information. Currently, Anti-Monopoly Law only provides the protection of commercial secret and the liabilities of the officials of the authorities to divulge the commercial secret. In fact, "the report" and "important evidence" in Chinese leniency do not always overlap with the "commercial secret"; it is necessary to protect the important information other than the commercial secret as a whole, including during the investigation and the follow-on action. During the administrative investigation, the protection of important information will ensure the investigation effective; furthermore, the onus of proof of the plaintiff shall be alleviated on the basis of effective leniency program in the follow-on action.
The effectiveness of the leniency program is connected directly with the administrative enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law. One of the prerequisites of the effective leniency is the protection of the information submitted by the applicants to the authorities. However, it is not clear in Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law as concerning whether and the measures to protect the important information. Currently, Anti-Monopoly Law only provides the protection of commercial secret and the liabilities of the officials of the authorities to divulge the commercial secret. In fact, "the report" and "important evidence" in Chinese leniency do not always overlap with the "commercial secret"; it is necessary to protect the important information other than the commercial secret as a whole, including during the investigation and the follow-on action. During the administrative investigation, the protection of important information will ensure the investigation effective; furthermore, the onus of proof of the plaintiff shall be alleviated on the basis of effective leniency program in the follow-on action.
引文
(1)为便于讨论,本文将使用“重要信息”指代经营者为获得宽大而向执法机关提供的“有关情况的报告”与“重要证据”中所包含的信息。
(2)参见Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (2006/C 298/11)。
(3)参见Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, Article 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement and Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004(2005/C 325/07)。
(4)文档查阅通告中将“被调查经营者查阅文档”与“第三方查阅文档”采取不同的术语进行表达:被调查经营者查阅文档被称为“access to the file”,第三方查阅文档使用的术语为“access to documents”。“委员会的文件”(Commission file)被定义为在竞争总司的调查程序中获得、制作和/或收集的所有文件。其中,商业秘密以及其他机密信息被界定为不可查阅获得的信息。商业秘密并没有一个很严格的界定,仅仅被列举为“关于企业专有技术、计算成本方法的技术、财务信息,生产秘密以及加工、供应源头,产量和销量,市场份额,客户名单和分销名单,销售计划,成本,价格结构以及销售策略等泄露可能给企业带来严重危害的信息。”其他机密信息是除了商业秘密以外的信息,具有机密性,并且其泄露有可能导致企业或个人的明显损害。信息是否属于商业秘密或其他机密信息,需要经过认定的程序,企业或个人在向委员会提交信息时需要明确提出哪些信息具有机密性,并给出原因,同时提供一份非机密的版本。
(5)Case C-162/15P,Evonik Edgussa v Commission[2017], ECLI:EU:C:2017:205.
(6)参见Directive 2014/4/104/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union (Directive), O J L 349/1, para (6).
(7)参见Sebastian Peyer, Private Antitrust Litigation in Germany from 2005 to 2007: Empirical Evidence, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 8(2), pp. 474, 342.
(8)参见Leniency Notice, recital (6).
(9)Observations of the European Commission pursuant to Article 15(3) of Regulation 1/2003(Observations), para 17.
(10)参见Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer [2011], I-05161; Case C-536/11, DonauChemie and Others [2013],ECLI:EU:C:2013:366.See Nicholas Hirst, Donau Chemie: National Rules Impeding Access to Antitrust Files Liable to Breach EU law, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2013, Vol. 4, No. 6, 485; See Ingrid Vandenborre and Thorsten Goetz, EU Competition Law Procedural Issues, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2013, Vol. 4, No. 6, 506.
(11)参见Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, the Council and Commission documents. 欧盟的《透明条例》为委员会的文件公开提供了一个基本的框架,据此(欧盟或非欧盟)公民可以在第255条EC之下直接向委员会申请获得有关文件。住所地不在欧盟成员国的公民也可以在欧盟机关(包括欧洲议会,欧盟理事会以及欧盟委员会)的授权下获得相关文件。透明条例意在保证一个最广的文件的公开。
(12)Articles 5 and 6 of the Directive 2014/4/104/EU, O J L 349/1 指令目前明确指出哪些证据完全禁止披露,哪些暂时禁止披露是基于对法律确定性的考虑。欧盟法院在Pfleiderer案和Donau Chemie案中提出的个案审查无法保证不同成员国内法院一致适用,大陆法系与英美法系成员国法院通常对于证据开示采取截然不同的态度。例如在英美法系的英国,民事诉讼中本来就存在诉前和诉讼中的证据开示制度(part 31 of English Civil Procedure Rules)。在德国民事诉讼中没有诉前的证据开示,对于当事人唯一的路径是依据德国《民事诉讼法》第421和428条向法院申请要求对方提供记录和文件。此外,德国联邦卡特尔局可以依据德国《刑事诉讼法典》第406e条第一款以及《秩序违反法》(Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten)第46条被要求提供其所持有的证据。对于证据开示的申请时,大陆法系的成员国法院可能趋向于更严格的审查。但是在文献中也存在认为目前指令的设计在于为保护宽大政策申请人而牺牲受害人的利益的观点。
(13)Article 11(4) of the Directive2014/4/104/EU.
(14)参见Case T-437/08, CDC Hydrogene Peroxide v Commission [2011], II-08251, ECLI:EU:T:2011:752, para 6 and 9.
(15)参见Paolo Buccirossi, Catarina Marv?o, and Giancarlo Spagnolo, Leniency and Damages, No.32 Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, 2015.
(16)参见Case T-437/08, CDC Hydrogene Peroxide v Commission [2011], II-08251, ECLI:EU:T:2011:752, para 6 and 9.
(17)参见Peter Gussone, Tilmann M. Schreiber, Private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung: Rückenwindaus Europa Zum Richtlinienentwurf der KommissionfürkartellrechtlicheSchadensersatzklagen, WuW 11/2013, pp.1055; see Carsten Krüger, Der Gesamtschuldnerausgleich im System der privaten Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung, WuW 01/2012, pp.12; see Raphael Koch, Rechtsdurchsetzung im Kartellrecht: Public vs. private enforcement: Auf dem Wegzueinem level playing field?, JZ 8/2013, pp.394
(18)对于这一问题,有观点建议美国的judgment-sharing agreement可以作为一种可能的解决方式。协议成员之间可以签订judgment-sharing agreement以确定彼此之间应承担的责任,并减少连带责任免除带来的不确定风险。其中的责任大多依据市场份额通过协议成员之间的和解或者诉讼来确定。See Carsten Krüger, Der Gesamtschuldnerausgleich im System der privaten Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung,WuW 01/2012, pp.12
(2)参见Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (2006/C 298/11)。
(3)参见Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, Article 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement and Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004(2005/C 325/07)。
(4)文档查阅通告中将“被调查经营者查阅文档”与“第三方查阅文档”采取不同的术语进行表达:被调查经营者查阅文档被称为“access to the file”,第三方查阅文档使用的术语为“access to documents”。“委员会的文件”(Commission file)被定义为在竞争总司的调查程序中获得、制作和/或收集的所有文件。其中,商业秘密以及其他机密信息被界定为不可查阅获得的信息。商业秘密并没有一个很严格的界定,仅仅被列举为“关于企业专有技术、计算成本方法的技术、财务信息,生产秘密以及加工、供应源头,产量和销量,市场份额,客户名单和分销名单,销售计划,成本,价格结构以及销售策略等泄露可能给企业带来严重危害的信息。”其他机密信息是除了商业秘密以外的信息,具有机密性,并且其泄露有可能导致企业或个人的明显损害。信息是否属于商业秘密或其他机密信息,需要经过认定的程序,企业或个人在向委员会提交信息时需要明确提出哪些信息具有机密性,并给出原因,同时提供一份非机密的版本。
(5)Case C-162/15P,Evonik Edgussa v Commission[2017], ECLI:EU:C:2017:205.
(6)参见Directive 2014/4/104/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union (Directive), O J L 349/1, para (6).
(7)参见Sebastian Peyer, Private Antitrust Litigation in Germany from 2005 to 2007: Empirical Evidence, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 8(2), pp. 474, 342.
(8)参见Leniency Notice, recital (6).
(9)Observations of the European Commission pursuant to Article 15(3) of Regulation 1/2003(Observations), para 17.
(10)参见Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer [2011], I-05161; Case C-536/11, DonauChemie and Others [2013],ECLI:EU:C:2013:366.See Nicholas Hirst, Donau Chemie: National Rules Impeding Access to Antitrust Files Liable to Breach EU law, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2013, Vol. 4, No. 6, 485; See Ingrid Vandenborre and Thorsten Goetz, EU Competition Law Procedural Issues, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2013, Vol. 4, No. 6, 506.
(11)参见Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, the Council and Commission documents. 欧盟的《透明条例》为委员会的文件公开提供了一个基本的框架,据此(欧盟或非欧盟)公民可以在第255条EC之下直接向委员会申请获得有关文件。住所地不在欧盟成员国的公民也可以在欧盟机关(包括欧洲议会,欧盟理事会以及欧盟委员会)的授权下获得相关文件。透明条例意在保证一个最广的文件的公开。
(12)Articles 5 and 6 of the Directive 2014/4/104/EU, O J L 349/1 指令目前明确指出哪些证据完全禁止披露,哪些暂时禁止披露是基于对法律确定性的考虑。欧盟法院在Pfleiderer案和Donau Chemie案中提出的个案审查无法保证不同成员国内法院一致适用,大陆法系与英美法系成员国法院通常对于证据开示采取截然不同的态度。例如在英美法系的英国,民事诉讼中本来就存在诉前和诉讼中的证据开示制度(part 31 of English Civil Procedure Rules)。在德国民事诉讼中没有诉前的证据开示,对于当事人唯一的路径是依据德国《民事诉讼法》第421和428条向法院申请要求对方提供记录和文件。此外,德国联邦卡特尔局可以依据德国《刑事诉讼法典》第406e条第一款以及《秩序违反法》(Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten)第46条被要求提供其所持有的证据。对于证据开示的申请时,大陆法系的成员国法院可能趋向于更严格的审查。但是在文献中也存在认为目前指令的设计在于为保护宽大政策申请人而牺牲受害人的利益的观点。
(13)Article 11(4) of the Directive2014/4/104/EU.
(14)参见Case T-437/08, CDC Hydrogene Peroxide v Commission [2011], II-08251, ECLI:EU:T:2011:752, para 6 and 9.
(15)参见Paolo Buccirossi, Catarina Marv?o, and Giancarlo Spagnolo, Leniency and Damages, No.32 Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, 2015.
(16)参见Case T-437/08, CDC Hydrogene Peroxide v Commission [2011], II-08251, ECLI:EU:T:2011:752, para 6 and 9.
(17)参见Peter Gussone, Tilmann M. Schreiber, Private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung: Rückenwindaus Europa Zum Richtlinienentwurf der KommissionfürkartellrechtlicheSchadensersatzklagen, WuW 11/2013, pp.1055; see Carsten Krüger, Der Gesamtschuldnerausgleich im System der privaten Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung, WuW 01/2012, pp.12; see Raphael Koch, Rechtsdurchsetzung im Kartellrecht: Public vs. private enforcement: Auf dem Wegzueinem level playing field?, JZ 8/2013, pp.394
(18)对于这一问题,有观点建议美国的judgment-sharing agreement可以作为一种可能的解决方式。协议成员之间可以签订judgment-sharing agreement以确定彼此之间应承担的责任,并减少连带责任免除带来的不确定风险。其中的责任大多依据市场份额通过协议成员之间的和解或者诉讼来确定。See Carsten Krüger, Der Gesamtschuldnerausgleich im System der privaten Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung,WuW 01/2012, pp.12