机构投资者持股、高管超额薪酬与公司治理
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摘要
既有文献局限于将机构投资者视为无差异的分析对象,使得关于上市公司外部机构投资者在公司治理中究竟扮演"监督者""合谋者"、抑或"旁观者"的角色至今仍未有明确定论。基于机构投资者的个体异质性视角,选取我国2010年～2017年A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验异质个体机构投资者持股与高管超额薪酬之间的关系,以此考察个体机构投资者在公司治理中的角色。研究结果表明:整体层面上,机构投资者持股的深度和广度都有助于降低高管超额薪酬,并且后者的抑制效应相对较大;个体层面上,证券投资基金持股比例与高管超额薪酬正相关,券商、保险公司、社保基金、信托公司等机构投资者持股比例与高管超额薪酬负相关,未有证据表明QFII、财务公司、银行等机构投资者持股与高管超额薪酬存在明显的相关性。上述结果说明,券商、保险公司、社保基金、信托公司等机构投资者在降低上市公司代理成本方面主要扮演"监督者"角色,证券投资基金更多体现为"合谋者",而QFII、财务公司、银行等机构投资者主要持"旁观者"的态度。
The existing literature is limited to the analysis of institutional investors as indiscriminate subjects,making it still unclear of which role institutional investors play in corporate governance such as a supervisor,collaborator or bystanders. Based on the perspective of individual heterogeneity of institutional investors,this paper takes China's 2010-2017 A-share listed companies as research samples and empirically tests the heterogeneous individual institutional investors' shareholding and executives' excess compensation to investigate the role institutional investors play in corporate governance. The results show tha: On the whole,the depth and breadth of institutional investors' shareholdings can help reduce the executives' excess compensation,and the latter's suppression effect is relatively more significant; on the individual side,the proportion of stockholders in securities investment funds is positively correlated with executives' excess compensation,while the proportion of institutional investors in broker companies,securities firms,social security funds and trust companies is negatively correlated with with executives' excess compensation; there is no evidence suggesting that QFII,financial companies,and banks' shareholdings are related with executives' excess compensation. The above results show that institutional investors in broker companies,insurance companies,social security funds,and entrust companies mainly act as "supervisiors"in reducing the agency costs of listed companies; securities investment funds are more likely to be "collaborators",while investors from QFII,financial institutions,financial companies,and banks mainly play the role of "onlooker".
The existing literature is limited to the analysis of institutional investors as indiscriminate subjects,making it still unclear of which role institutional investors play in corporate governance such as a supervisor,collaborator or bystanders. Based on the perspective of individual heterogeneity of institutional investors,this paper takes China's 2010-2017 A-share listed companies as research samples and empirically tests the heterogeneous individual institutional investors' shareholding and executives' excess compensation to investigate the role institutional investors play in corporate governance. The results show tha: On the whole,the depth and breadth of institutional investors' shareholdings can help reduce the executives' excess compensation,and the latter's suppression effect is relatively more significant; on the individual side,the proportion of stockholders in securities investment funds is positively correlated with executives' excess compensation,while the proportion of institutional investors in broker companies,securities firms,social security funds and trust companies is negatively correlated with with executives' excess compensation; there is no evidence suggesting that QFII,financial companies,and banks' shareholdings are related with executives' excess compensation. The above results show that institutional investors in broker companies,insurance companies,social security funds,and entrust companies mainly act as "supervisiors"in reducing the agency costs of listed companies; securities investment funds are more likely to be "collaborators",while investors from QFII,financial institutions,financial companies,and banks mainly play the role of "onlooker".
引文
[1]HARTZELL J C,STARKS L T. Institutional investors and executive compensation[J]. Journal of Finance,2003,58(6):2351-2374.
[2]ALMAZAN A,HARTZELL J C,STARKS L T. Active institutional shareholders and cost of monitoring:evidence from executive compensation[J]. Financial Management,2005,34(4):5-34.
[3]NING Y,HU X,XAVIER G. An empirical analysis of the impact of large changes in institutional ownership on CEO compensation risk[J].Journal of Economics and Finance,2015,39(1):23-47.
[4]孙光国,刘爽,赵健宇.大股东控制、机构投资者持股与盈余管理[J].南开管理评论,2015(5):75-84.
[5]夏宁,杨硕.异质性机构投资者持股水平与审计收费[J].审计研究,2018(2):72-79.
[6]WOIDTKE T. Agent watching agents:evidence from pension fund ownership and firm value[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2002,63(1):99-131.
[7]CHAO X. Institutional shareholder activism in China:law and practice[J]. International Company and Commercial Law Review,2006,17(9):251-262.
[8]付勇,谭松涛.股权分置改革中的机构合谋与内幕交易[J].金融研究,2008(3):88-102.
[9]潘越,戴亦一,魏诗琪.机构投资者与上市公司“合谋”了吗:基于高管非自愿变更与继任选择事件的分析[J].南开管理评论,2011(2):69-81.
[10]GRINSTEIN Y,MICHAELY R. Institutional holdings and payout policy[J]. Journal of Finance,2005,60(3):1389-1426.
[11]BEBCHUK L A,FRIED J M. Executive compensation as an agency problem[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives,2003,17(3):71-92.
[12]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010(11):73-87.
[13]薄仙慧,吴联生.国有控股与机构投资者的治理效应:盈余管理视角[J].经济研究,2009(2):81-91.
[14]韩勇,干胜道,张伊.机构投资者异质性的上市公司股利政策研究[J].统计研究,2013(5):71-75.
[15]许年行,于上尧,伊志宏.机构投资者羊群行为与股价崩盘风险[J].管理世界,2013(7):31-42.
[16]王谨乐,史永东.机构投资者、高管变更与股价波动[J].管理科学学报,2018(7):113-126.
[17]KLAN R,DHARWADKAR R,BRANDES P. Institutional ownership and CEO compensation:a longitudinal examination[J]. Journal of Business Research,2005,58(8):1078-1088.
[18]BRANDES P,GERNOVA M,HALL S. Navigating shareholder influence:compensation plans and the shareholder approval process[J].Academy of Management Perspectives,2008,22(1):41-57.
[19]SHIN J Y,SEO J. Less pay and more sensitivity? institutional investor heterogeneity and CEO pay[J]. Journal of Management,2011,37(6):1719-1746.
[20]MIN D,OZKAN A. Institutional investors and director pay:an empirical study of UK companies[J]. Journal of Multinational Financial Management,2008,18(1):16-29.
[21]张敏,姜付秀.机构投资者、企业产权与薪酬契约[J].世界经济,2010(8):43-58.
[22]伊志宏,李艳丽,高伟.市场化进程、机构投资者与薪酬契约[J].经济理论与经济管理,2011(10):75-84.
[23]刘颖斐,倪源媛.异质机构投资者对企业绩效的影响——基于独立性和稳定性交叉视角下的检验[J].现代财经(天津财经大学学报),2015(8):57-69.
[24]高汉.投资者积极行动主义:能否改善小股东“理性冷漠”[J].河南社会科学,2010(1):108-111.
[25]BRICKLEY J,LEASE R,SMITH C. Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20(1):267-291.
[26]彭利达.大股东与上市公司现金分红:异质机构投资者的调节作用[J].金融经济学研究,2016(3):98-106.
[27]韩亮亮.异质机构投资者、实际控制人性质与银行高管货币薪酬[J].商业经济与管理,2016(10):69-87.
[28]伍伟,刘惠好.机构投资者股权对银行公司治理与绩效的影响[J].金融论坛,2008(10):23-28.
[29]施东晖.证券投资基金的交易行为及其市场影响[J].世界经济,2001(10):26-31.
[30]熊家财,苏冬蔚,刘少波.制度环境、异质机构投资者与股价信息含量[J].江西财经大学学报,2014(7):48-58.
[31]MAXEY D,TEN WOLDE R. CEO pay may be crucial as funds shop[N]. Wall Street Journal,1998-5-26(C25).
[32]毛磊,王宗军,王玲玲.机构投资者与高管薪酬——中国上市公司研究[J].管理科学,2011(5):99-110.
[33]CORE J,GUAY W,LARCKER D. The power of the pen and executive compensation[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(1):1-25.
[34]罗宏,黄敏,周大伟,等.政府补助、超额薪酬与薪酬辩护[J].会计研究,2014(1):42-48.
(1)限于篇幅,未报告解释变量与控制变量相互间的相关性结果。
(1)因篇幅限制,未报告模型(4)的估计结果,备索。
(1)因篇幅限制,未报告2SLS第一阶段的回归结果以及IV-Probit的估计结果。
[2]ALMAZAN A,HARTZELL J C,STARKS L T. Active institutional shareholders and cost of monitoring:evidence from executive compensation[J]. Financial Management,2005,34(4):5-34.
[3]NING Y,HU X,XAVIER G. An empirical analysis of the impact of large changes in institutional ownership on CEO compensation risk[J].Journal of Economics and Finance,2015,39(1):23-47.
[4]孙光国,刘爽,赵健宇.大股东控制、机构投资者持股与盈余管理[J].南开管理评论,2015(5):75-84.
[5]夏宁,杨硕.异质性机构投资者持股水平与审计收费[J].审计研究,2018(2):72-79.
[6]WOIDTKE T. Agent watching agents:evidence from pension fund ownership and firm value[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2002,63(1):99-131.
[7]CHAO X. Institutional shareholder activism in China:law and practice[J]. International Company and Commercial Law Review,2006,17(9):251-262.
[8]付勇,谭松涛.股权分置改革中的机构合谋与内幕交易[J].金融研究,2008(3):88-102.
[9]潘越,戴亦一,魏诗琪.机构投资者与上市公司“合谋”了吗:基于高管非自愿变更与继任选择事件的分析[J].南开管理评论,2011(2):69-81.
[10]GRINSTEIN Y,MICHAELY R. Institutional holdings and payout policy[J]. Journal of Finance,2005,60(3):1389-1426.
[11]BEBCHUK L A,FRIED J M. Executive compensation as an agency problem[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives,2003,17(3):71-92.
[12]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010(11):73-87.
[13]薄仙慧,吴联生.国有控股与机构投资者的治理效应:盈余管理视角[J].经济研究,2009(2):81-91.
[14]韩勇,干胜道,张伊.机构投资者异质性的上市公司股利政策研究[J].统计研究,2013(5):71-75.
[15]许年行,于上尧,伊志宏.机构投资者羊群行为与股价崩盘风险[J].管理世界,2013(7):31-42.
[16]王谨乐,史永东.机构投资者、高管变更与股价波动[J].管理科学学报,2018(7):113-126.
[17]KLAN R,DHARWADKAR R,BRANDES P. Institutional ownership and CEO compensation:a longitudinal examination[J]. Journal of Business Research,2005,58(8):1078-1088.
[18]BRANDES P,GERNOVA M,HALL S. Navigating shareholder influence:compensation plans and the shareholder approval process[J].Academy of Management Perspectives,2008,22(1):41-57.
[19]SHIN J Y,SEO J. Less pay and more sensitivity? institutional investor heterogeneity and CEO pay[J]. Journal of Management,2011,37(6):1719-1746.
[20]MIN D,OZKAN A. Institutional investors and director pay:an empirical study of UK companies[J]. Journal of Multinational Financial Management,2008,18(1):16-29.
[21]张敏,姜付秀.机构投资者、企业产权与薪酬契约[J].世界经济,2010(8):43-58.
[22]伊志宏,李艳丽,高伟.市场化进程、机构投资者与薪酬契约[J].经济理论与经济管理,2011(10):75-84.
[23]刘颖斐,倪源媛.异质机构投资者对企业绩效的影响——基于独立性和稳定性交叉视角下的检验[J].现代财经(天津财经大学学报),2015(8):57-69.
[24]高汉.投资者积极行动主义:能否改善小股东“理性冷漠”[J].河南社会科学,2010(1):108-111.
[25]BRICKLEY J,LEASE R,SMITH C. Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20(1):267-291.
[26]彭利达.大股东与上市公司现金分红:异质机构投资者的调节作用[J].金融经济学研究,2016(3):98-106.
[27]韩亮亮.异质机构投资者、实际控制人性质与银行高管货币薪酬[J].商业经济与管理,2016(10):69-87.
[28]伍伟,刘惠好.机构投资者股权对银行公司治理与绩效的影响[J].金融论坛,2008(10):23-28.
[29]施东晖.证券投资基金的交易行为及其市场影响[J].世界经济,2001(10):26-31.
[30]熊家财,苏冬蔚,刘少波.制度环境、异质机构投资者与股价信息含量[J].江西财经大学学报,2014(7):48-58.
[31]MAXEY D,TEN WOLDE R. CEO pay may be crucial as funds shop[N]. Wall Street Journal,1998-5-26(C25).
[32]毛磊,王宗军,王玲玲.机构投资者与高管薪酬——中国上市公司研究[J].管理科学,2011(5):99-110.
[33]CORE J,GUAY W,LARCKER D. The power of the pen and executive compensation[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(1):1-25.
[34]罗宏,黄敏,周大伟,等.政府补助、超额薪酬与薪酬辩护[J].会计研究,2014(1):42-48.
(1)限于篇幅,未报告解释变量与控制变量相互间的相关性结果。
(1)因篇幅限制,未报告模型(4)的估计结果,备索。
(1)因篇幅限制,未报告2SLS第一阶段的回归结果以及IV-Probit的估计结果。