银行组织结构、代理成本与农村小银行的普惠金融服务能力:安徽省郎溪县的案例分析
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摘要
乡村振兴离不开银行的贷款支持,银行贷款却需要处理好银行内外部一系列代理关系。文章从代理理论和小微企业贷款的异质性特征出发,构建一个银行内部信息距离影响小微企业贷款代理成本的理论框架,分析不同规模银行小微企业贷款能力,并讨论技术进步与银行监管对代理成本的影响。安徽省郎溪县的案例分析表明,农村小银行信息距离更短,组织不经济程度更小,代理成本更低,具有更强的普惠金融服务能力。
To play an important role in rural development, banks have to deal with a series of agency relationships. Based on the non-standardization of small and mirco business loans, this paper constructs a theoretical framework using agency theory to analyze the agency costs of large and small banks in lending to small and micro businesses. It also discusses the impact of technology improvement and bank regulation on agency costs.The case study of Langxi County, Anhui Province shows that small rural banks have better financial inclusive services abilities due to their shorter informational distance and lower agency costs.
To play an important role in rural development, banks have to deal with a series of agency relationships. Based on the non-standardization of small and mirco business loans, this paper constructs a theoretical framework using agency theory to analyze the agency costs of large and small banks in lending to small and micro businesses. It also discusses the impact of technology improvement and bank regulation on agency costs.The case study of Langxi County, Anhui Province shows that small rural banks have better financial inclusive services abilities due to their shorter informational distance and lower agency costs.
引文
[1] Jensen,Michael C. and Meckling,William H. Theory of the firm:managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976(3):305-360.
[2] Berger Allen N. and Udell,Gregory F. Small business credit availability and relationship lending:the importance of organizational structure[J]. Economic Journal,2002(112):F32-F53.
[3] Stein,Jeremy C. Information Production and Capital Allocation:Decentralized versus Hierarchical Firms[J]. The Journal of Finance,2002,57,5(Oct.):1891-1921.
[4]李克勉,李先军.市场发育、信息供给与商业银行小微金融服务——基于四家商业银行的案例比较分析[J].当代经济管理,2017(6):86-92.
[5] Liberti,JoséM. and Petersen,Mitchell A. Information:Hard and Soft[DB/OL].Kellogg School of Management,Northwestern University.http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/petersen/htm/papers/hard%20and%20soft%20information.pdf,2017.
[6] Williamson,Oliver E. The economics of defense contracting:Incentives and performance[M].in R. McKean,ed.:Issues in Defense Economics(Columbia University Press,New York),1967.
[7] Loutskina,E. and Philip E. Strahan,Informed and Uninformed Investment in Housing:The Downside of Diversification[J]. Review of Financial Studies,2011,24(5):1447-1480.
[8]马九杰,王国达,张剑.中小金融机构与县域中小企业信贷——从需求端对“小银行优势”的实证分析[J].农业技术经济,2012(4):4-13.
[9]张捷.中小企业的关系型借贷与银行组织结构[J].经济研究,2002(6):32-37,94.
[10]粟勤,孟娜娜.县域普惠金融发展的实际操作:由豫省兰考生发[J].改革,2018(1):149-159.
[11] Rajan,U.,Amit Seru and Vikrant Vig. The Failure of Models That Predict Failure:Distance,Incentives and Defaults[J].Journal of Financial Economics[J]. 2015,155(2):237–260.
[12] Saengchote,Kanis.Soft Information in the Subprime Mortgage Market[Z].Working Paper,Kellogg School of Management,Northwestern University,2013.
(1)与此不同的是,信用卡和个人房贷依赖硬信息进行决策,且利率、期限和还款方式基本统一,可以由银行高层(或事业部)集中决策、集中管理。在美国,信用卡透支和个人房贷大都实现了证券化,但小企业贷款却因其合约的异质性而受到限制。
(2)我国部分银行基层员工风险意识淡漠、片面追求业绩,地理距离必然增加银行高管识别基层分支行行为是否合规的难度、提高监督成本。浦发银行成都分行造假案就是最好的证明。来源:“浦发银行成都分行775亿造假案曝光总行高管被调查”,新浪网:http://sc.sina.com.cn/news/b/2018-01-23/detailifyqupt-v8723890.shtml。
(3)数据来源:美联储2016 Small Business Credit Survey。
(4)因篇幅所限不在此展开讨论。
[2] Berger Allen N. and Udell,Gregory F. Small business credit availability and relationship lending:the importance of organizational structure[J]. Economic Journal,2002(112):F32-F53.
[3] Stein,Jeremy C. Information Production and Capital Allocation:Decentralized versus Hierarchical Firms[J]. The Journal of Finance,2002,57,5(Oct.):1891-1921.
[4]李克勉,李先军.市场发育、信息供给与商业银行小微金融服务——基于四家商业银行的案例比较分析[J].当代经济管理,2017(6):86-92.
[5] Liberti,JoséM. and Petersen,Mitchell A. Information:Hard and Soft[DB/OL].Kellogg School of Management,Northwestern University.http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/petersen/htm/papers/hard%20and%20soft%20information.pdf,2017.
[6] Williamson,Oliver E. The economics of defense contracting:Incentives and performance[M].in R. McKean,ed.:Issues in Defense Economics(Columbia University Press,New York),1967.
[7] Loutskina,E. and Philip E. Strahan,Informed and Uninformed Investment in Housing:The Downside of Diversification[J]. Review of Financial Studies,2011,24(5):1447-1480.
[8]马九杰,王国达,张剑.中小金融机构与县域中小企业信贷——从需求端对“小银行优势”的实证分析[J].农业技术经济,2012(4):4-13.
[9]张捷.中小企业的关系型借贷与银行组织结构[J].经济研究,2002(6):32-37,94.
[10]粟勤,孟娜娜.县域普惠金融发展的实际操作:由豫省兰考生发[J].改革,2018(1):149-159.
[11] Rajan,U.,Amit Seru and Vikrant Vig. The Failure of Models That Predict Failure:Distance,Incentives and Defaults[J].Journal of Financial Economics[J]. 2015,155(2):237–260.
[12] Saengchote,Kanis.Soft Information in the Subprime Mortgage Market[Z].Working Paper,Kellogg School of Management,Northwestern University,2013.
(1)与此不同的是,信用卡和个人房贷依赖硬信息进行决策,且利率、期限和还款方式基本统一,可以由银行高层(或事业部)集中决策、集中管理。在美国,信用卡透支和个人房贷大都实现了证券化,但小企业贷款却因其合约的异质性而受到限制。
(2)我国部分银行基层员工风险意识淡漠、片面追求业绩,地理距离必然增加银行高管识别基层分支行行为是否合规的难度、提高监督成本。浦发银行成都分行造假案就是最好的证明。来源:“浦发银行成都分行775亿造假案曝光总行高管被调查”,新浪网:http://sc.sina.com.cn/news/b/2018-01-23/detailifyqupt-v8723890.shtml。
(3)数据来源:美联储2016 Small Business Credit Survey。
(4)因篇幅所限不在此展开讨论。