基于联盟博弈的海洋养殖保险运行模式分析
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摘要
我国是世界上遭受海洋灾害最为严重的国家之一。海洋养殖业因资源环境依赖度高,致灾程度也较为严重。目前我国相关损失补偿工作主要依靠政府拨款以及社会捐助进行,保险市场由于收益低等原因参与意愿相对较低。本文将资产管理公司引入联盟博弈模型,比较多主体参与的海洋养殖保险最优模式。Shapely值计算结果显示,保险公司、政府、投保人和资产管理公司四方主体组成联盟中,保险公司可以降低成本,政府能够缓解财政压力,投保人也能得到更加充分的保障,对各方都是最优的选择。
China is one of the countries most affected by marine disasters in the world. Marine aquaculture industry is highly dependent on resources and environment, and the degree of disaster is more serious. At present, the work of compensation for the relevant losses in China mainly relies on government funding and social donations, and the insurance market has relatively low willingness to participate due to low income and other reasons. In this paper, asset management companies are introduced into the alliance game model to compare the optimal model of marine aquaculture insurance with multi-agent participation. The result of Shapely value calculation shows that in the alliance of insurance company, government, policy-holder and asset management company, the insurance company can reduce cost, the government can relieve financial pressure, the policy-holder can get more adequate protection, and so it is the best choice for all parties.
China is one of the countries most affected by marine disasters in the world. Marine aquaculture industry is highly dependent on resources and environment, and the degree of disaster is more serious. At present, the work of compensation for the relevant losses in China mainly relies on government funding and social donations, and the insurance market has relatively low willingness to participate due to low income and other reasons. In this paper, asset management companies are introduced into the alliance game model to compare the optimal model of marine aquaculture insurance with multi-agent participation. The result of Shapely value calculation shows that in the alliance of insurance company, government, policy-holder and asset management company, the insurance company can reduce cost, the government can relieve financial pressure, the policy-holder can get more adequate protection, and so it is the best choice for all parties.
引文
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[14]陈盛伟,王晓丽,牛浩.降雨指数型海水养殖渔业保险产品设计研究[J].经济问题,2017(6):56-59.
[2]Sihem,Ezdini.Agricultural insurance-agricultural productivity nexus:Evidence from international data[J].Journal of Service Science Research,2017,9(2):147-178.
[3]Herrmann M,Greenberg J,Hamel C,et al.Extending Federal Crop Insurance Programs to Commercial Fisheries:The Case of Bristol Bay,Alaska,Sockeye Salmon[J].North American Journal of Fisheries Management,2004,24(2):352-366.
[4]Hui Z,Hairong M,Xin Z.Evaluating the demand for aquaculture insurance:An investigation of fish farmers'willingness to pay in central coastal areas in China[J].Marine Policy,2018,96:152-162.
[5]Da-Rocha,José-María,Prellezo,et al.A dynamic economic equilibrium model for the economic assessment of the fishery stock-rebuilding policies[J].Marine Policy,2017,81:185-195.
[6]Mumford J D,Leach A W,Levontin P,et al.Insurance mechanisms to mediate economic risks in marine fisheries[J].ICES Journal of Marine Science,2009,66(5):950-959.
[7]Mallory T G.Fisheries subsidies in China:Quantitative and qualitative assessment of policy coherence and effectiveness[J].Marine Policy,2016,68:74-82.
[8]Parappurathu S,Ramachandran C,Gopalakrishnan A,et al.What Ails Fisheries Insurance in India?An Assessment of Issues,Challenges and Future Potential[J].Marine Policy,2017,86:144-155.
[9]ZekriS,Mbaga M D,Boughanmi H.Fishermen Willingness to Participate in an Insurance Program in Oman[J].Marine Resource Economics,2008,23(3):379-391.
[10]姜淮,刘长滨.自然灾害恢复重建的联盟博弈分析[J].运筹与管理,2011(2):41-46.
[11]郑慧,王春阳.海洋灾害保险市场道德风险防范策略研究[J].海洋环境科学,2015,4:536-539.
[12]郑慧,俄丽雯.海洋灾害保险参与主体利益分配及合理模式研究[J].海洋经济,2015(4):10-17.
[13]叶晓凌.海洋渔业保险财政补贴及其运行效率分析---基于浙江省渔业互保协会的数据[J].财经论丛,2015,12:41-49.
[14]陈盛伟,王晓丽,牛浩.降雨指数型海水养殖渔业保险产品设计研究[J].经济问题,2017(6):56-59.