开放经济体系中劳动者的工资议价能力
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摘要
在不完全竞争的劳动力市场中,劳动者工资取决于劳动者的工资议价能力。因而,有效测度劳动者的工资议价能力有助于识别影响劳动者工资的决定因素和理解劳动者的工资决定机制。借助讨价还价模型,从理论上构建一个可以有效刻画单个劳动者与企业进行工资议价的分析框架,在此基础上提出一个可以有效测度劳动者工资议价能力的方法;更进一步,以中国微观企业数据为样本,分析开放经济条件下贸易政策稳定性对劳动者工资议价能力的影响。研究结果表明,更稳定的贸易政策提升了劳动者的工资议价能力,这意味着贸易政策稳定性是影响劳动者工资的重要因素。这一结论有助于深化认识开放经济体系中劳动者的工资决定机制。
In an imperfectly competitive labor market,wages depend on the bargaining power of labor.Accordingly,the effective measurement of this bargaining power will help us identify and understand the factors and mechanisms determining wages.Drawing on bargaining models,we constructed a theoretical analytical framework of wage bargaining between a single worker and the company.On this basis,we put forward a method of measuring labor's wage bargaining power.We further take Chinese Microenterprise Data as a sample to analyze the effect of trade policy stability on labor's wage bargaining power in open economic conditions.Our findings show that a more stable trade policy raises labor's wage bargaining power,which implies that trade policy stability is an important factor influencing wages.This conclusion helps to deepen our understanding of the mechanisms determining wages in an open economic system.
In an imperfectly competitive labor market,wages depend on the bargaining power of labor.Accordingly,the effective measurement of this bargaining power will help us identify and understand the factors and mechanisms determining wages.Drawing on bargaining models,we constructed a theoretical analytical framework of wage bargaining between a single worker and the company.On this basis,we put forward a method of measuring labor's wage bargaining power.We further take Chinese Microenterprise Data as a sample to analyze the effect of trade policy stability on labor's wage bargaining power in open economic conditions.Our findings show that a more stable trade policy raises labor's wage bargaining power,which implies that trade policy stability is an important factor influencing wages.This conclusion helps to deepen our understanding of the mechanisms determining wages in an open economic system.
引文
(1)参见白重恩、钱震杰、武康平:《中国工业部门要素分配份额决定因素分析》,《经济研究》2008年第8 期。
(2)参见罗长远、张军:《劳动收入占比下降的经济学解释》,《管理世界》2009年第5 期。
(3)参见白重恩、钱震杰:《劳动收入份额决定因素:来自中国省际面板数据的证据》,《世界经济》2010年第12 期。
(4)参见伍山林:《劳动收入份额决定机制:一个微观模型》,《经济研究》2011年第9期。
(5)参见魏下海、董志强、黄玖立:《工会是否改善劳动收入份额?》,《经济研究》2013年第8期。
(6)参见陈宇峰、贵斌威、陈启清:《技术偏向与中国劳动收入份额的再考察》,《经济研究》2013年第6期。
(7)参见魏下海、董志强、刘愿:《政治关系、制度环境与劳动收入份额》,《管理世界》2013年第5期。
(8)参见贾珅、申广军:《企业风险与劳动收入份额》,《经济研究》2016年第5期;B.Holmstrom and P.Milgrom,“Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives,” Econometrica,vol.55,no.2,1987,pp.303-328.
(9)参见邵敏、黄玖立:《外资与我国劳动收入份额》,《经济学(季刊)》2010年第4期。
(10)参见唐东波:《全球化与劳动收入占比》,《管理世界》2011年第8期。
(11)参见蒋为、黄玖立:《国际生产分割、要素禀赋与劳动收入份额》,《世界经济》2014年第5期。
(12)参见余淼杰、梁中华:《贸易自由化与中国劳动收入份额》,《管理世界》2014年第7期。
(13)参见赵秋运、张建武:《中国劳动收入份额的变化趋势及其驱动机制新解》,《金融研究》2013年第12期。
(14)参见E.Brock and S.Dobbelaere,“Has International Trade Affected Workers’ Bargaining Power?” Review of World Economics,vol.142,no.2,2006,pp.233-266.
(15)参见F.Abraham,J.Konings and S.Vanormelingen,“The Effect of Globalization on Union Bargaining and Price-Cost Margins of Firms,” Review of World Economics,vol.145,no.1,2009,pp.13-36.
(16)参见L.Moreno and D.Rodríguez,“Markups,Bargaining Power and Offshoring:An Empirical Assessment,” The World Economy,vol.34,no.9,2011,pp.1593-1627.
(17)参见盛丹:《外资进入是否提高了劳动者的讨价还价能力》,《世界经济》2013年第10 期;盛丹、陆毅:《出口贸易是否会提高劳动者工资的集体议价能力》,《世界经济》2016年第5 期。
(18)参见M.Macis and F.Schivardi,“Exports and Wages:Rent Sharing,Workforce Composition,or Returns to Skills?” Journal of Labor Economics,vol.34,no.4,2016,pp.945-978.
(19)参见J.De Loecker,“Product Differentiation,Multiproduct Firms,and Estimating the Impact of Trade Liberalization on Productivity,” Econometrica,vol.79,no.5,2011,pp.1407-1451;J.De Loecker,P.K.Goldberg,A.K.Khandelwal and N.Pavcnik,“Prices,Markups,and Trade Reform,” Econometrica,vol.84,no.2,2016,pp.445-510.
(20)参见R.Ke,Y.Lu and L.Zhu,“Trade Reforms and Wage Dispersion:Workforce Composition or Rent Sharing,” Working Paper,2016;J.Montez,“One-to-Many Bargaining When Pairwise Agreements Are Non-Renegotiable,” Journal of Economic Theory,vol.152,2014,pp.249-265.
(21)参见L.Brandt,J.Van Biesebroeck and Y.F.Zhang,“Creative Accounting or Creative Destruction?Firm-Level Productivity Growth in Chinese Manufacturing,” Journal of Development Economics,vol.97,no.2,2012,pp.339-351.
(22)参见D.Ackerberg,K.Caves and G.Frazer,“Identification Properties of Recent Production Function Estimators,” Econometrica,vol.83,no.6,2015,pp.2411-2451;J.De Loecker and F.Warzynski,“Markups and Firm-Level Export Status,” The American Economic Review,vol.102,no.6,2012,pp.2437-2471.
(23)参见E.Brock and S.Dobbelaere,“Has International Trade Affected Workers’Bargaining Power?”
(24)贸易政策稳定性的度量方法和外文文献中度量贸易政策不确定性的方法一样,考虑到政策含义,本文以贸易政策稳定性来刻画一国所面临的国外贸易政策的确定性程度。参见Q.Liu and H.Ma,“Trade Policy Uncertainty and Innovation:Firm Level Evidence from China’s WTO Accession,” Working Paper,2017.
(25)参见R.Feenstra,J.Romalis and P.Schott,“U.S.Imports,Exports,and Tariff Data,1989-2001,” NBER Working Papers,no.9387,2002.
(26)该值越大意味着贸易政策稳定性越弱。
(27)参见K.Handley and N.Lim?o,“Policy Uncertainty,Trade and Welfare:Theory and Evidence for China and the United States,” The American Economic Review,vol.107,no.9,2017,pp.2731-2783.
(28)参见聂辉华、江艇、杨汝岱:《中国工业企业数据库的使用现状和潜在问题》,《世界经济》2012年第5期。
(29)参见谢千里、罗斯基、张轶凡:《中国工业生产率的增长与收敛》,《经济学(季刊)》2008年第3期。
(30)参见R.Feenstra,J.Romalis and P.Schott,“U.S.Imports,Exports,and Tariff Data,1989-2001.”
(31)参见R.Layard,S.Nickell and R.Jackman,Unemployment:Macroeconomic Performance and the Labor Market,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1991.
(32)参见S.Clark,“Inventory Accumulation,Wages and Employment,” Economic Journal,vol.101,no.405,1991,pp.230-238;S.Clark,“The Strategic Use of Inventories in an Infinite Horizon Model of Wage and Employment Bargaining,” Scottish Journal of Political Economy,vol.40,no.2,1993,pp.165-183;J.Dorion,“Bargaining Power and Wage-Employment Contracts in a Unionized Industry,” International Economic Review,vol.33,no.3,1992,pp.583-606.
(33)我们还做了涉及样本选择偏误、模型设定等方面的稳健性检验,限于篇幅,文中没有一一列举,感兴趣的读者可向作者索取。下文列表中的其他控制变量主要包括基本回归中的企业销售规模、企业要素密集度、企业存货、企业流动资产、企业负债和外资比例。
(34)参见P.Topalova,“Factor Immobility and Regional Impacts of Trade Liberalization:Evidence on Poverty from India,” American Economic Journal:Applied Economics,vol.2,no.4,2010,pp.1-41.
(35)参见E.Duflo,“Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of School Construction in Indonesia:Evidence from an Unusual Policy Experiment,”The American Economic Review,vol.91,2001,pp.795-813.
(36)参见J.Wooldridge,“Inverse Probability Weighted M-Estimators for Sample Selection,Attrition,and Stratification,” Portuguese Economic Journal,vol.1,2002,pp.117-139;J.Wooldridge,“Inverse Probability Weighted M-Estimation for General Missing Data Problems,” Journal of Econometrics,vol.141,2007,pp.1281-1301.
(37)参见J.E.Rauch,“Networks Versus Markets in International Trade,”Journal of International Economics,vol.48,no.1,1999,pp.7-35.
(2)参见罗长远、张军:《劳动收入占比下降的经济学解释》,《管理世界》2009年第5 期。
(3)参见白重恩、钱震杰:《劳动收入份额决定因素:来自中国省际面板数据的证据》,《世界经济》2010年第12 期。
(4)参见伍山林:《劳动收入份额决定机制:一个微观模型》,《经济研究》2011年第9期。
(5)参见魏下海、董志强、黄玖立:《工会是否改善劳动收入份额?》,《经济研究》2013年第8期。
(6)参见陈宇峰、贵斌威、陈启清:《技术偏向与中国劳动收入份额的再考察》,《经济研究》2013年第6期。
(7)参见魏下海、董志强、刘愿:《政治关系、制度环境与劳动收入份额》,《管理世界》2013年第5期。
(8)参见贾珅、申广军:《企业风险与劳动收入份额》,《经济研究》2016年第5期;B.Holmstrom and P.Milgrom,“Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives,” Econometrica,vol.55,no.2,1987,pp.303-328.
(9)参见邵敏、黄玖立:《外资与我国劳动收入份额》,《经济学(季刊)》2010年第4期。
(10)参见唐东波:《全球化与劳动收入占比》,《管理世界》2011年第8期。
(11)参见蒋为、黄玖立:《国际生产分割、要素禀赋与劳动收入份额》,《世界经济》2014年第5期。
(12)参见余淼杰、梁中华:《贸易自由化与中国劳动收入份额》,《管理世界》2014年第7期。
(13)参见赵秋运、张建武:《中国劳动收入份额的变化趋势及其驱动机制新解》,《金融研究》2013年第12期。
(14)参见E.Brock and S.Dobbelaere,“Has International Trade Affected Workers’ Bargaining Power?” Review of World Economics,vol.142,no.2,2006,pp.233-266.
(15)参见F.Abraham,J.Konings and S.Vanormelingen,“The Effect of Globalization on Union Bargaining and Price-Cost Margins of Firms,” Review of World Economics,vol.145,no.1,2009,pp.13-36.
(16)参见L.Moreno and D.Rodríguez,“Markups,Bargaining Power and Offshoring:An Empirical Assessment,” The World Economy,vol.34,no.9,2011,pp.1593-1627.
(17)参见盛丹:《外资进入是否提高了劳动者的讨价还价能力》,《世界经济》2013年第10 期;盛丹、陆毅:《出口贸易是否会提高劳动者工资的集体议价能力》,《世界经济》2016年第5 期。
(18)参见M.Macis and F.Schivardi,“Exports and Wages:Rent Sharing,Workforce Composition,or Returns to Skills?” Journal of Labor Economics,vol.34,no.4,2016,pp.945-978.
(19)参见J.De Loecker,“Product Differentiation,Multiproduct Firms,and Estimating the Impact of Trade Liberalization on Productivity,” Econometrica,vol.79,no.5,2011,pp.1407-1451;J.De Loecker,P.K.Goldberg,A.K.Khandelwal and N.Pavcnik,“Prices,Markups,and Trade Reform,” Econometrica,vol.84,no.2,2016,pp.445-510.
(20)参见R.Ke,Y.Lu and L.Zhu,“Trade Reforms and Wage Dispersion:Workforce Composition or Rent Sharing,” Working Paper,2016;J.Montez,“One-to-Many Bargaining When Pairwise Agreements Are Non-Renegotiable,” Journal of Economic Theory,vol.152,2014,pp.249-265.
(21)参见L.Brandt,J.Van Biesebroeck and Y.F.Zhang,“Creative Accounting or Creative Destruction?Firm-Level Productivity Growth in Chinese Manufacturing,” Journal of Development Economics,vol.97,no.2,2012,pp.339-351.
(22)参见D.Ackerberg,K.Caves and G.Frazer,“Identification Properties of Recent Production Function Estimators,” Econometrica,vol.83,no.6,2015,pp.2411-2451;J.De Loecker and F.Warzynski,“Markups and Firm-Level Export Status,” The American Economic Review,vol.102,no.6,2012,pp.2437-2471.
(23)参见E.Brock and S.Dobbelaere,“Has International Trade Affected Workers’Bargaining Power?”
(24)贸易政策稳定性的度量方法和外文文献中度量贸易政策不确定性的方法一样,考虑到政策含义,本文以贸易政策稳定性来刻画一国所面临的国外贸易政策的确定性程度。参见Q.Liu and H.Ma,“Trade Policy Uncertainty and Innovation:Firm Level Evidence from China’s WTO Accession,” Working Paper,2017.
(25)参见R.Feenstra,J.Romalis and P.Schott,“U.S.Imports,Exports,and Tariff Data,1989-2001,” NBER Working Papers,no.9387,2002.
(26)该值越大意味着贸易政策稳定性越弱。
(27)参见K.Handley and N.Lim?o,“Policy Uncertainty,Trade and Welfare:Theory and Evidence for China and the United States,” The American Economic Review,vol.107,no.9,2017,pp.2731-2783.
(28)参见聂辉华、江艇、杨汝岱:《中国工业企业数据库的使用现状和潜在问题》,《世界经济》2012年第5期。
(29)参见谢千里、罗斯基、张轶凡:《中国工业生产率的增长与收敛》,《经济学(季刊)》2008年第3期。
(30)参见R.Feenstra,J.Romalis and P.Schott,“U.S.Imports,Exports,and Tariff Data,1989-2001.”
(31)参见R.Layard,S.Nickell and R.Jackman,Unemployment:Macroeconomic Performance and the Labor Market,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1991.
(32)参见S.Clark,“Inventory Accumulation,Wages and Employment,” Economic Journal,vol.101,no.405,1991,pp.230-238;S.Clark,“The Strategic Use of Inventories in an Infinite Horizon Model of Wage and Employment Bargaining,” Scottish Journal of Political Economy,vol.40,no.2,1993,pp.165-183;J.Dorion,“Bargaining Power and Wage-Employment Contracts in a Unionized Industry,” International Economic Review,vol.33,no.3,1992,pp.583-606.
(33)我们还做了涉及样本选择偏误、模型设定等方面的稳健性检验,限于篇幅,文中没有一一列举,感兴趣的读者可向作者索取。下文列表中的其他控制变量主要包括基本回归中的企业销售规模、企业要素密集度、企业存货、企业流动资产、企业负债和外资比例。
(34)参见P.Topalova,“Factor Immobility and Regional Impacts of Trade Liberalization:Evidence on Poverty from India,” American Economic Journal:Applied Economics,vol.2,no.4,2010,pp.1-41.
(35)参见E.Duflo,“Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of School Construction in Indonesia:Evidence from an Unusual Policy Experiment,”The American Economic Review,vol.91,2001,pp.795-813.
(36)参见J.Wooldridge,“Inverse Probability Weighted M-Estimators for Sample Selection,Attrition,and Stratification,” Portuguese Economic Journal,vol.1,2002,pp.117-139;J.Wooldridge,“Inverse Probability Weighted M-Estimation for General Missing Data Problems,” Journal of Econometrics,vol.141,2007,pp.1281-1301.
(37)参见J.E.Rauch,“Networks Versus Markets in International Trade,”Journal of International Economics,vol.48,no.1,1999,pp.7-35.