美国特朗普政府的南海政策:路径、极限与对策思考
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摘要
南海问题现已成为影响中国国家安全、中美关系、地区安全乃至全球地缘政治演进的重要议题之一。美国自20世纪90年代中期直接介入南海问题以来,其南海政策经历了政策宣示、外交介入与军事干涉等阶段。美国南海政策的逻辑原点,是出于所谓"捍卫美国国家利益"、"维护国际规则"、"维持地区军事平衡"乃至"巩固地区主导权"等多重考虑。特朗普就任总统以来,美国的南海政策以"遏制"与"抵消"的混合战略为指导,军事行动与外交手段相互配合并渐次升级,政策实施愈发激进、顽固,成为应对"大国战略竞争"的重要组成部分,对中美两国关系与地区安全影响急剧突出。中国未来的南海战略塑造应注重形势变化,多种手段并重,有效化解该方向日渐突出的战略挑战。
The South China Sea has been one of the most significant issues in Sino-US relations, regional security and even the evolution of global geopolitics. Since directly intervening the given issue in the middle 1990 s, the US's policy on the South China Sea has experienced different stages, from policy declaration, diplomatic involvement to military intervention. The basic logic of the US policy builds on the so-called strategy of "defending the national interest and international norms", "maintaining regional military balance" and "strengthening the US's primacy in the region". After the presidential inauguration, the Trump administration's policy on the South China Sea is shaped by the mixed strategy of containment and offset. Based on radically and stubbornly using military and diplomatic tools, it has become a component to respond to the "strategic competition of great powers", which increasingly influenced Sino-US relations and regional security. China's strategy on the region should focus on the changing circumstance, make full use of various measures, and effectively meet growingly serious challenges in this strategic direction.
The South China Sea has been one of the most significant issues in Sino-US relations, regional security and even the evolution of global geopolitics. Since directly intervening the given issue in the middle 1990 s, the US's policy on the South China Sea has experienced different stages, from policy declaration, diplomatic involvement to military intervention. The basic logic of the US policy builds on the so-called strategy of "defending the national interest and international norms", "maintaining regional military balance" and "strengthening the US's primacy in the region". After the presidential inauguration, the Trump administration's policy on the South China Sea is shaped by the mixed strategy of containment and offset. Based on radically and stubbornly using military and diplomatic tools, it has become a component to respond to the "strategic competition of great powers", which increasingly influenced Sino-US relations and regional security. China's strategy on the region should focus on the changing circumstance, make full use of various measures, and effectively meet growingly serious challenges in this strategic direction.
引文
① Lyle Goldstein,“Chinese Naval Strategy in the South China Sea:An Abundance of Noise and Smoke,but Little Fire”,Contemporary Southeast Asia,Vol.33,No.3,2011,p.320.
(1)Enrico Fels and Truong-Minh Vu,eds.,Power Politics in Asia’s Contested Waters:Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea,New York:Springer International Publishing,2016,p.393.
(2)Nicholas D.Anderson,and Victor D.Cha,“The Case of the Pivot to Asia:System Effects and the Origins of Strategy”,Political Science Quarterly,Vol.132,No.4,2017,p.604.
(3)同①,p.394。
(4)同②。
(5)同①,p.397。
(6)Ashton Carter,“The United States and Challenges to Asia-Pacific Security”,International Institute for Strategic Studies,30 May 2015,https://www.iiss.org/events/shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2015.
(7)分别为:2015年10月美驱逐舰“拉森”号驶入我渚碧礁邻近12海里水域;2016年1月美驱逐舰“威尔伯”号进入我西沙领海;5月美驱逐舰“劳伦斯”号驶入我永暑礁邻近12海里水域;10月美驱逐舰“迪凯特”号进入我西沙领海。Axel Berkofsky,“US Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea—Able to Keep Chinese Territorial Expansionism in Check?” in Marco Clementi,Matteo Dian,and Barbara Pisciotta,eds.,US Foreign Policy in a Challenging World:Building Order on Shifting Foundations,Cham:Springer International Publishing AG,2018,p.341.
(8)Nicholas D.Anderson,and Victor D.Cha,“The Case of the Pivot to Asia:System Effects and the Origins of Strategy”,Political Science Quarterly,Vol.132,No.4,2017,pp.597-598.
(9)Enrico Fels,and Truong-Minh Vu,eds.,Power Politics in Asia’s Contested Waters:Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea,New York:Springer International Publishing,2016,pp.391-392.
(10)同②,pp.389-390.
(11)葛汉文:“‘拒绝衰落’与美国‘要塞化’:特朗普的大战略”,《国际安全研究》,2018年第3期,第92-93页。
(12)James Mattis,“First Plenary Session:The United States and Asia-Pacific Security”,The International Institute for Strategic Studies,June 3,2017,https://www.iiss.org/events/shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2017.
(13)The White House,National Security Strategy of United States of America(2017),Washington D.C.:The White House,2017,pp.46-47.
(14)Ryan Browne,“ US Warships Again Challenge Beijing’s Claims in South China Sea”,CNN,February 11,2019,https://edition.cnn.com/2019/02/10/politics/us-ships-south-china-sea/index.htm.
(15)Luis Martinez,“Chinese Warship Came within 45 Yards of USS Decatur in South China Sea:US”,ABC News,1 October 2018,https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/chinese-warship-45-yards-uss-decatur-south-china/story?id=58210760.
(16)“France,UK Announce South China Sea Freedom of Navigation Operations”,Naval Today,6 June 2018,https://navaltoday.com/2018/06/06/france-uk-announce-south-china-sea-freedom-of-navigation-operations/.
(17)“Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s Policy Toward China”,the White House,4 October 2018,https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-administrations-policy-toward-china/.
(18)笔者认为,就概念而言,“政策”意为一国政府已经确定并在执行当中的措施、手段的实践;而“战略”则为就某一宏大问题所进行的总体筹划,观念思想因素占多,当然也有战略实施过程。此处之所以用“战略”一词,主要谈美国战略学界就相关问题所进行的战略筹划,这与前两节论述的政府的具体举措存在不同。
(19)Hal Brands,and Zack Cooper,“Getting Serious about Strategy in the South China Sea”,Naval War College Review,Vol.71,No.1,2018,p.13.
(20)很多美国学者批评道:奥巴马政府的南海政策实际上就是其著名的对朝“战略耐心”(strategic patience)政策的延续。但这个政策不仅无法解决朝鲜问题,类似的思路也导致美国在南海问题上无所作为,最终成为了“战略静默”(strategic silence):“既没有阻止中国填岛,之后又没有阻止中国将之军事化’,‘航行自由行动’开始地既迟缓,数量亦有限,美国政府的重视程度也不够”。Donald K.Emmerson,“South China Sea:US Bargaining Chip or Key Interest?” YaleGlobal Online,1 June 2017,https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/south-china-sea-us-bargaining-chip-or-key-interest.
(21)同②。
(22)Hal Brands,and Zack Cooper,“Getting Serious about Strategy in the South China Sea”,Naval War College Review,Vol.71,No.1,2018,p.14.
(23)特朗普政府前任国务卿雷克斯·蒂勒森(Rex Tillerson)就表达出这种倾向,他曾要求美国不仅需要阻止中国进一步的岛屿建设和将其“军事化”,甚至还要使用美军将这些已建岛礁进行“隔离”或“封锁”,以防止中国“接近这些岛屿”并将之逼退。Nicholas Borroz,“How Trump Can Avoid War with China”,Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies,Vol.4,No.3,2017,p.614.
(24)同①,p.21.
(25)地区很多国家均在担心这种前景,即在南海发生局部武装冲突时被迫要在其最大经济伙伴(中国)与长期的军事盟友(美国)之间“选边站”。见William T.Tow,“President Trump and the Implications for the Australia- US Alliance and Australia’s Role in Southeast Asia”,Contemporary Southeast Asia,Vol.39,No.1,2017,pp.50-51。
(26)同①,pp.22-25.
(27)Hal Brands,and Zack Cooper,“Getting Serious about Strategy in the South China Sea”,Naval War College Review,Vol.71,No.1,2018,pp.25-26.
(28)同①,pp.28-29.
(29)特朗普前首席顾问、普遍被认为是其政治谋主的斯蒂夫·班农(Steve Bannon)在2016年预言:未来十年美中之间必有一战。Nicholas Borroz,“How Trump Can Avoid War with China”,Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies,Vol.4,No.3,2017,p.613.
(30)The White House,National Security Strategy (2015),Washington D.C.:The White House,2015,p.10.
(31)见[美]兹比格纽·布热津斯基著,中国国际问题研究所译:《大棋局:美国的首要地位及其地缘战略》,上海人民出版社,2007年版,第45页。
(32)美国参联会主席约瑟夫·邓福德(Joseph F.Dunford)语。据《纽约时报》报道,2016年在美国国会听证会上,邓福德询问时任太平洋总部司令哈利·哈里斯(Harry Harris):“你是否会为世界另一端的几块无人礁石(指中国黄岩岛)而战?”转引自瓦西里·卡申:“中国南海领土争端”,俄罗斯卫星通讯社,2016年4月6日,http://sputniknews.cn/opinion/201604061018738992/。
(33)Thitinan Pongsudhirak,“Southeast Asia and the Trump Administration:Between a Rock and a Hard Place”,Contemporary Southeast Asia,Vol.16,No.1,2017,p.9.
(34)根据新加坡东南亚研究院一份调查,有56%受访者认为美国未来在东南亚的介入将会减少。在被问及哪个国家或组织在该地区影响力最大时,74%受访者认为中国,18%认为是东盟,仅4%受访者认为是美国。Donald K.Emmerson,“South China Sea:US Bargaining Chip or Key Interest?” YaleGlobal Online,June 1,2017,https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/south-china-sea-us-bargaining-chip-or-key-interest.
(35)不少美国学者判断:随着中美两国发展速度的差距,2030年可能是双方力量平衡的“破界点”。而在此时间点之前,中国南海甚至可能演变成为“21世纪的西柏林”。Hal Brands,and Zack Cooper,“Getting Serious about Strategy in the South China Sea”,Naval War College Review,Vol.71,No.1,2018,p.22.
(36)美国国防部2015年指责,虽然南海权益各声索方均在进行填岛作业,但均无法与中国岛礁建设规模相提并论:“中国填岛2 900英亩,越南80英亩,马来西亚70英亩,菲律宾14英亩,中国台湾8英亩”。Richard Q.Turcsányi,Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea:Power Sources,Domestic Politics,and Reactive Foreign Policy,Cham:Springer International Publishing,2018,p.51.
(37)苏浩:“中国是维护南中国海和平稳定的负责任大国”,《太平洋学报》,2016年第7期,第46页;周士新:“关于‘南海行为准则’磋商前景的分析”,《太平洋学报》2015年第3期。
(1)Enrico Fels and Truong-Minh Vu,eds.,Power Politics in Asia’s Contested Waters:Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea,New York:Springer International Publishing,2016,p.393.
(2)Nicholas D.Anderson,and Victor D.Cha,“The Case of the Pivot to Asia:System Effects and the Origins of Strategy”,Political Science Quarterly,Vol.132,No.4,2017,p.604.
(3)同①,p.394。
(4)同②。
(5)同①,p.397。
(6)Ashton Carter,“The United States and Challenges to Asia-Pacific Security”,International Institute for Strategic Studies,30 May 2015,https://www.iiss.org/events/shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2015.
(7)分别为:2015年10月美驱逐舰“拉森”号驶入我渚碧礁邻近12海里水域;2016年1月美驱逐舰“威尔伯”号进入我西沙领海;5月美驱逐舰“劳伦斯”号驶入我永暑礁邻近12海里水域;10月美驱逐舰“迪凯特”号进入我西沙领海。Axel Berkofsky,“US Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea—Able to Keep Chinese Territorial Expansionism in Check?” in Marco Clementi,Matteo Dian,and Barbara Pisciotta,eds.,US Foreign Policy in a Challenging World:Building Order on Shifting Foundations,Cham:Springer International Publishing AG,2018,p.341.
(8)Nicholas D.Anderson,and Victor D.Cha,“The Case of the Pivot to Asia:System Effects and the Origins of Strategy”,Political Science Quarterly,Vol.132,No.4,2017,pp.597-598.
(9)Enrico Fels,and Truong-Minh Vu,eds.,Power Politics in Asia’s Contested Waters:Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea,New York:Springer International Publishing,2016,pp.391-392.
(10)同②,pp.389-390.
(11)葛汉文:“‘拒绝衰落’与美国‘要塞化’:特朗普的大战略”,《国际安全研究》,2018年第3期,第92-93页。
(12)James Mattis,“First Plenary Session:The United States and Asia-Pacific Security”,The International Institute for Strategic Studies,June 3,2017,https://www.iiss.org/events/shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2017.
(13)The White House,National Security Strategy of United States of America(2017),Washington D.C.:The White House,2017,pp.46-47.
(14)Ryan Browne,“ US Warships Again Challenge Beijing’s Claims in South China Sea”,CNN,February 11,2019,https://edition.cnn.com/2019/02/10/politics/us-ships-south-china-sea/index.htm.
(15)Luis Martinez,“Chinese Warship Came within 45 Yards of USS Decatur in South China Sea:US”,ABC News,1 October 2018,https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/chinese-warship-45-yards-uss-decatur-south-china/story?id=58210760.
(16)“France,UK Announce South China Sea Freedom of Navigation Operations”,Naval Today,6 June 2018,https://navaltoday.com/2018/06/06/france-uk-announce-south-china-sea-freedom-of-navigation-operations/.
(17)“Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s Policy Toward China”,the White House,4 October 2018,https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-administrations-policy-toward-china/.
(18)笔者认为,就概念而言,“政策”意为一国政府已经确定并在执行当中的措施、手段的实践;而“战略”则为就某一宏大问题所进行的总体筹划,观念思想因素占多,当然也有战略实施过程。此处之所以用“战略”一词,主要谈美国战略学界就相关问题所进行的战略筹划,这与前两节论述的政府的具体举措存在不同。
(19)Hal Brands,and Zack Cooper,“Getting Serious about Strategy in the South China Sea”,Naval War College Review,Vol.71,No.1,2018,p.13.
(20)很多美国学者批评道:奥巴马政府的南海政策实际上就是其著名的对朝“战略耐心”(strategic patience)政策的延续。但这个政策不仅无法解决朝鲜问题,类似的思路也导致美国在南海问题上无所作为,最终成为了“战略静默”(strategic silence):“既没有阻止中国填岛,之后又没有阻止中国将之军事化’,‘航行自由行动’开始地既迟缓,数量亦有限,美国政府的重视程度也不够”。Donald K.Emmerson,“South China Sea:US Bargaining Chip or Key Interest?” YaleGlobal Online,1 June 2017,https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/south-china-sea-us-bargaining-chip-or-key-interest.
(21)同②。
(22)Hal Brands,and Zack Cooper,“Getting Serious about Strategy in the South China Sea”,Naval War College Review,Vol.71,No.1,2018,p.14.
(23)特朗普政府前任国务卿雷克斯·蒂勒森(Rex Tillerson)就表达出这种倾向,他曾要求美国不仅需要阻止中国进一步的岛屿建设和将其“军事化”,甚至还要使用美军将这些已建岛礁进行“隔离”或“封锁”,以防止中国“接近这些岛屿”并将之逼退。Nicholas Borroz,“How Trump Can Avoid War with China”,Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies,Vol.4,No.3,2017,p.614.
(24)同①,p.21.
(25)地区很多国家均在担心这种前景,即在南海发生局部武装冲突时被迫要在其最大经济伙伴(中国)与长期的军事盟友(美国)之间“选边站”。见William T.Tow,“President Trump and the Implications for the Australia- US Alliance and Australia’s Role in Southeast Asia”,Contemporary Southeast Asia,Vol.39,No.1,2017,pp.50-51。
(26)同①,pp.22-25.
(27)Hal Brands,and Zack Cooper,“Getting Serious about Strategy in the South China Sea”,Naval War College Review,Vol.71,No.1,2018,pp.25-26.
(28)同①,pp.28-29.
(29)特朗普前首席顾问、普遍被认为是其政治谋主的斯蒂夫·班农(Steve Bannon)在2016年预言:未来十年美中之间必有一战。Nicholas Borroz,“How Trump Can Avoid War with China”,Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies,Vol.4,No.3,2017,p.613.
(30)The White House,National Security Strategy (2015),Washington D.C.:The White House,2015,p.10.
(31)见[美]兹比格纽·布热津斯基著,中国国际问题研究所译:《大棋局:美国的首要地位及其地缘战略》,上海人民出版社,2007年版,第45页。
(32)美国参联会主席约瑟夫·邓福德(Joseph F.Dunford)语。据《纽约时报》报道,2016年在美国国会听证会上,邓福德询问时任太平洋总部司令哈利·哈里斯(Harry Harris):“你是否会为世界另一端的几块无人礁石(指中国黄岩岛)而战?”转引自瓦西里·卡申:“中国南海领土争端”,俄罗斯卫星通讯社,2016年4月6日,http://sputniknews.cn/opinion/201604061018738992/。
(33)Thitinan Pongsudhirak,“Southeast Asia and the Trump Administration:Between a Rock and a Hard Place”,Contemporary Southeast Asia,Vol.16,No.1,2017,p.9.
(34)根据新加坡东南亚研究院一份调查,有56%受访者认为美国未来在东南亚的介入将会减少。在被问及哪个国家或组织在该地区影响力最大时,74%受访者认为中国,18%认为是东盟,仅4%受访者认为是美国。Donald K.Emmerson,“South China Sea:US Bargaining Chip or Key Interest?” YaleGlobal Online,June 1,2017,https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/south-china-sea-us-bargaining-chip-or-key-interest.
(35)不少美国学者判断:随着中美两国发展速度的差距,2030年可能是双方力量平衡的“破界点”。而在此时间点之前,中国南海甚至可能演变成为“21世纪的西柏林”。Hal Brands,and Zack Cooper,“Getting Serious about Strategy in the South China Sea”,Naval War College Review,Vol.71,No.1,2018,p.22.
(36)美国国防部2015年指责,虽然南海权益各声索方均在进行填岛作业,但均无法与中国岛礁建设规模相提并论:“中国填岛2 900英亩,越南80英亩,马来西亚70英亩,菲律宾14英亩,中国台湾8英亩”。Richard Q.Turcsányi,Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea:Power Sources,Domestic Politics,and Reactive Foreign Policy,Cham:Springer International Publishing,2018,p.51.
(37)苏浩:“中国是维护南中国海和平稳定的负责任大国”,《太平洋学报》,2016年第7期,第46页;周士新:“关于‘南海行为准则’磋商前景的分析”,《太平洋学报》2015年第3期。