零售商回收与制造商处理过期食品模式下三方演化博弈
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摘要
针对零售商回收与制造商处理过期食品模式,本文构建零售商、制造商与政府部门的三方演化博弈模型,得到不同参数取值条件下的稳定均衡策略组合,并利用数值仿真直观分析了三方博弈的不同稳定点。主要结论表明:零售商、制造商与政府部门相关过期食品回收处理和监管的"成本"和"收益"比较而导致零售商和政府部门四种不同的演化稳定策略组合,即(不回收,不监管)、(不回收,监管)、(回收,不监管)与(回收,监管),制造商和政府部门三种不同的演化稳定策略组合,即(非正规处理,不监管)、(非正规处理,监管)、与(正规处理,监管)。据此,应增加零售商与制造商正规回收处理过期食品的综合收益等"机会收益",减少其正规回收处理过期食品的各类"机会成本",政府部门还需重视过期食品等废弃食品正规回收处理的管控,将其作为考核政府部门食品安全监管工作的主要内容之一。
This paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of retailers, manufacturers and government departments for retailers to recycle and manufacturers to deal with expired foods, and the combination of the stable equilibrium strategies under different parameter values is obtained, and the numerical simulation is used to visually analyze the different stable points of the three-party game. The result shows that the comparison of ′cost′ and ′revenue′ related to expired food recycling and regulation among retailers, manufacturers and government departments lead to four different evolutionary stability strategies combinations for retailers and government departments, i.e.(no recycling, no regulation),(no recycling, regulation),(recycling, no regulation) and(recycling, regulation), and three different evolutionary stability strategies combinations between manufacturers and government departments, i.e.(informal processing, no regulation),(informal processing, regulation) and(formal processing, regulation). According to this, "opportunity gains" such as the comprehensive income of retailers and manufacturers for regular recycling of expired foods should be increased, and various "opportunity costs" for regular recycling of expired foods should be reduced, and government departments also need to pay attention to the control of the formal recycling of discarded foods such as expired foods, and use it as one of the main contents of the food safety supervision work of government departments.
This paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of retailers, manufacturers and government departments for retailers to recycle and manufacturers to deal with expired foods, and the combination of the stable equilibrium strategies under different parameter values is obtained, and the numerical simulation is used to visually analyze the different stable points of the three-party game. The result shows that the comparison of ′cost′ and ′revenue′ related to expired food recycling and regulation among retailers, manufacturers and government departments lead to four different evolutionary stability strategies combinations for retailers and government departments, i.e.(no recycling, no regulation),(no recycling, regulation),(recycling, no regulation) and(recycling, regulation), and three different evolutionary stability strategies combinations between manufacturers and government departments, i.e.(informal processing, no regulation),(informal processing, regulation) and(formal processing, regulation). According to this, "opportunity gains" such as the comprehensive income of retailers and manufacturers for regular recycling of expired foods should be increased, and various "opportunity costs" for regular recycling of expired foods should be reduced, and government departments also need to pay attention to the control of the formal recycling of discarded foods such as expired foods, and use it as one of the main contents of the food safety supervision work of government departments.
引文
[1] 李朝伟,陈青川.澳大利亚的食品回收管理[J].中国检验检疫,2000(9):42-43.
[2] 王宇卓,聂永丰,任连海.我国食品废物处理概况及管理对策探讨[J].环境科学动态,2004(3):34-35.
[3] 尹世久,陈默,徐迎军.食品安全认证标识如何影响消费者偏好?——以有机番茄为例[J].华中农业大学学报(社会科学版),2015(2):118-125.
[4] Mashayehi A N. Transition in the New York State Solid Waste System: a Dynamic Analysis[J].System Dynamics Review,1993,9(1):23-47.
[5] 钟永光,钱颖,尹凤福,等.激励居民参与环保化回收废弃家电及电子产品的系统动力学模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2010,30(4):709-722.
[6] Ma P, Shang J, Wang H. Enhancing Corporate Social Responsibility: Contract Design Under Information Asymmetry [J]. Omega,2017,67:19-30.
[7] Yenipazarli A. To Collaborate or not to Collaborate: Prompting Upstream Eco-efficient Innovation in a Supply Chain [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2017, 260: 571-587.
[8] 沈一平.食品生产环节召回及过期食品处置的调查报告及政策建议[J].中国食品药品监管,2015(11): 57-59.
[9] 莫鸣,李亚婷.超市食品消费者赔偿投诉及其制度改进——基于 208 个超市食品安全事件的分析[J].湖南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2016,17(3):84-89.
[10] 周海荣.监管经营过期食品的法律困境——以深圳为例[J].法制与社会,2018(4):139-141.
[11] 费威.食品供应链回收处理环节安全问题博弈分析——以“弃猪”事件为例[J].农业经济问题,2015(4):94-101.
[12] 费威.不同主体负责回收的废弃产品回收决策分析[J].软科学,2018(6):113-118.
[13] 赵佩华,张柳钦,胡赛强.基于演化博弈的造假者与监管方行为研究[J].经济与管理,2018(4):76-82.
[14] 刘伟,夏立秋.网络借贷市场参与主体行为策略的演化博弈均衡分析——基于三方博弈的视角[J].中国管理科学,2018(5):169-177.
① 为便于分析和说明,本文将处理过期食品的主体制造商或者供应商统称为“制造商”。
② 某类食品零售商通常有多个,导致政府部门监管困境,因此本文假设政府部门处罚过期食品非正规回收处理行为对负责处理的制造商主体进行。
[2] 王宇卓,聂永丰,任连海.我国食品废物处理概况及管理对策探讨[J].环境科学动态,2004(3):34-35.
[3] 尹世久,陈默,徐迎军.食品安全认证标识如何影响消费者偏好?——以有机番茄为例[J].华中农业大学学报(社会科学版),2015(2):118-125.
[4] Mashayehi A N. Transition in the New York State Solid Waste System: a Dynamic Analysis[J].System Dynamics Review,1993,9(1):23-47.
[5] 钟永光,钱颖,尹凤福,等.激励居民参与环保化回收废弃家电及电子产品的系统动力学模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2010,30(4):709-722.
[6] Ma P, Shang J, Wang H. Enhancing Corporate Social Responsibility: Contract Design Under Information Asymmetry [J]. Omega,2017,67:19-30.
[7] Yenipazarli A. To Collaborate or not to Collaborate: Prompting Upstream Eco-efficient Innovation in a Supply Chain [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2017, 260: 571-587.
[8] 沈一平.食品生产环节召回及过期食品处置的调查报告及政策建议[J].中国食品药品监管,2015(11): 57-59.
[9] 莫鸣,李亚婷.超市食品消费者赔偿投诉及其制度改进——基于 208 个超市食品安全事件的分析[J].湖南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2016,17(3):84-89.
[10] 周海荣.监管经营过期食品的法律困境——以深圳为例[J].法制与社会,2018(4):139-141.
[11] 费威.食品供应链回收处理环节安全问题博弈分析——以“弃猪”事件为例[J].农业经济问题,2015(4):94-101.
[12] 费威.不同主体负责回收的废弃产品回收决策分析[J].软科学,2018(6):113-118.
[13] 赵佩华,张柳钦,胡赛强.基于演化博弈的造假者与监管方行为研究[J].经济与管理,2018(4):76-82.
[14] 刘伟,夏立秋.网络借贷市场参与主体行为策略的演化博弈均衡分析——基于三方博弈的视角[J].中国管理科学,2018(5):169-177.
① 为便于分析和说明,本文将处理过期食品的主体制造商或者供应商统称为“制造商”。
② 某类食品零售商通常有多个,导致政府部门监管困境,因此本文假设政府部门处罚过期食品非正规回收处理行为对负责处理的制造商主体进行。