草原生态补奖政策能抑制牧户超载过牧行为吗?——基于社会资本调节效应的分析
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摘要
草原生态补奖政策通过政府行政手段干预牧户超载过牧行为,成为减少牧区牲畜养殖数量和保障草原可持续利用的政策之一。在政策执行过程中,牧户通过长期交往形成的社会信任、关系网络等社会资本,不仅可以有效解决草原生态保护中政策监督执行成本高等问题,还能形成减畜的集体行动从而确保政策目标的实现。探讨社会资本与草原生态补奖政策对牧户超载过牧行为的影响效应具有必要性和现实意义。基于此,本文从理论上阐述了草原生态补奖政策对牧户超载过牧行为的影响机理,并基于内蒙古、甘肃两省474户牧户实地调查数据,运用线性回归模型和分组回归模型,检验了草原生态补奖政策对牧户超载过牧行为的影响效应及社会资本对草原生态补奖政策影响牧户超载过牧行为的调节作用。结果表明,草原生态补奖资金对牧户超载过牧行为具有显著的正向影响,而政策监管对牧户超载过牧行为的影响效应为负。社会网络在政策监管影响牧户超载过牧行为中发挥了负向调节作用,社会信任对草原生态补奖资金和政策监管影响牧户超载过牧行为均具有负向调节作用。此外,是否草场流转、非牧业收入占比对牧户超载过牧行为具有正向影响,而家庭收入对牧户超载过牧行为有显著的负向影响。基于以上分析,建议政府优化草原生态补奖资金的发放方式,加强政府对牧户减畜的监管力度,同时发挥社会资本在草原生态补奖政策执行过程中的作用。
Grassland eco-compensation policy is a policy initiative to regulate herders' overgrazing behavior through government administrative measures in order to reduce livestock number and to achieve the sustainable utilization of grassland. During policy implementation,social capital,such as social trust and social network,formed by long-term interaction among herder households,is useful in trimming the high costs related to government supervision and policy implementation in grassland protection and reducing livestock number by collective actions,so as to realize policy objectives. It is necessary to discuss the effect of social capital and grassland eco-compensation policy on herders' overgrazing behavior. This paper analyzes the influence of grassland eco-compensation policy on herders' overgrazing behavior and the role of social capital in moderating this relationship. A linear regression model and a grouping regression model are employed based on survey data of 474 herder households in Inner Mongolia and Gansu. The results show that: the compensation funds and government supervision have the positive and negative influences on herders ' overgrazing,respectively. Moreover,social network plays a negative moderating role in the relationship between government supervision and herders' overgrazing behavior,whereas social trust plays a negative moderating role in the relationship between compensation funds and herders' overgrazing behavior,as well as the relationship between supervision and herders ' overgrazing behavior. Meanwhile,herders' overgrazing behavior is negatively associated with transfer status of grassland and the proportion of non-farm income,and is positively related to household income. Based on the above conclusion,it is suggested that the government should optimize the type of distributed grassland eco-compensation funds,strengthen the government's supervision on herders' livestock reduction,and give full play to the role of social capital in the implementation of grassland eco-compensation policy.
Grassland eco-compensation policy is a policy initiative to regulate herders' overgrazing behavior through government administrative measures in order to reduce livestock number and to achieve the sustainable utilization of grassland. During policy implementation,social capital,such as social trust and social network,formed by long-term interaction among herder households,is useful in trimming the high costs related to government supervision and policy implementation in grassland protection and reducing livestock number by collective actions,so as to realize policy objectives. It is necessary to discuss the effect of social capital and grassland eco-compensation policy on herders' overgrazing behavior. This paper analyzes the influence of grassland eco-compensation policy on herders' overgrazing behavior and the role of social capital in moderating this relationship. A linear regression model and a grouping regression model are employed based on survey data of 474 herder households in Inner Mongolia and Gansu. The results show that: the compensation funds and government supervision have the positive and negative influences on herders ' overgrazing,respectively. Moreover,social network plays a negative moderating role in the relationship between government supervision and herders' overgrazing behavior,whereas social trust plays a negative moderating role in the relationship between compensation funds and herders' overgrazing behavior,as well as the relationship between supervision and herders ' overgrazing behavior. Meanwhile,herders' overgrazing behavior is negatively associated with transfer status of grassland and the proportion of non-farm income,and is positively related to household income. Based on the above conclusion,it is suggested that the government should optimize the type of distributed grassland eco-compensation funds,strengthen the government's supervision on herders' livestock reduction,and give full play to the role of social capital in the implementation of grassland eco-compensation policy.
引文
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[7]田艳丽.建立草原生态补偿机制的探讨——以内蒙古锡林郭勒盟为例[J].农业现代化研究,2010,31(2):171-174.
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[9]常丽霞,沈海涛.草地生态补偿政策与机制研究——基于黄河首曲玛曲县的调查与分析[J].农村经济,2014(3):102-106.
[10]魏琦,侯向阳.建立中国草原生态补偿长效机制的思考[J].中国农业科学,2015,48(18):3719-3726.
[11]杨振海.努力谱写草原保护建设新篇章[J].中国草地学报,2009,31(2):1-3.
[12]叶晗,朱立志.内蒙山牧区草地生态补偿实践评析[J].草业科学,2014(8):1587-1596.
[13]李静.我国草原生态补偿制度的问题与对策——以甘肃省为例[J].草业科学,2015,32(6):1027-1032. 20.
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[15]GILLSON L,HOFFMAN M T. Rangeland ecology in a changing world[J]. Science,2007,315(5808):53-54.
[16]王晓毅.环境压力下的草原社区:内蒙古六个嘎查村的调查[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2009.
[17]王晓毅.从承包到“再集中”——中国北方草原环境保护政策分析[J].中国农村观察,2009(3):36-46,95.
[18]王海春,高博,祁晓慧,等.草原生态保护补助奖励机制对牧户减畜行为影响的实证分析[J].农业经济问题,2017(12):73-80.
[19]侯向阳.发展草原生态畜牧业是解决草原退化困境的有效途径[J].中国草地学报,2010,32(4):1-9.
[20]刘兴元.草地生态补偿研究进展[J].草业科学,2012,29(2):306-313.
[21]WUNDER S. The efficiency of payments for environmental services in tropical conservation[J]. Conservation biology,2007,21(1):48-58.
[22]WUNDER S. Revisiting the concept of payments for environmental services[J]. Ecological economics,2015,117:234-243.
[23]欧阳志云,郑华,岳平.建立我国生态补偿机制的思路与措施[J].生态学报,2013,33(3):0686-0692.
[24]埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆.公共事物的治理之道[M].余逊达,陈旭东,译.上海:上海三联书店,2000.
[25]杨理.草原治理:如何进一步完善草原家庭承包制[J].中国农村经济,2007(12):62-67.
[26]史雨星,姚柳杨,赵敏娟.社会资本对牧户参与草场社区治理意愿的影响——基于Triple-Hurdle模型的分析[J].中国农村观察,2018(3):35-50.
[27]周立,董小瑜.“三牧”问题的制度逻辑——中国草场管理与产权制度变迁研究[J].中国农业大学学报(社会科学版),2013,30(2):94-107.
[28]BALAND J M,PLATTEAU J P. Halting degradation of natural resources:is there a role for rural communities[J]. Oup catalogue,1996,11(3):251-258.
[29]BOUMA J,BULTE E,SOEST D V. Trust and cooperation:social capital and community resource management[J]. Journal of environmental economics&management,2008,56(2):155-166.
[30]BANKS T. Property rights and the environment in pastoral China:evidence from the Field[J]. Development&change,2010,32(4):717-740.
[31]蔡起华,朱玉春.社会信任、关系网络与农户参与农村公共产品供给[J].中国农村经济,2015(7):57-69.
[32]FAFCHAMPS M. Development and social capital[J]. Journal of development economics,2006,42(7):1180-1198.
[33]COLEMAN S. The foundation of social theory[M]. Cambridge:Belknap Press,2000.
[34]谢先雄,李晓平,赵敏娟,等.资本禀赋如何影响牧民减畜——基于内蒙古372户牧民的实证考察[J].资源科学,2018,40(9):1730-1741.
[35]UZZI B. Social structure and competition in interfirm networks:the paradox of embeddedness[J]. Administrative science quarterly,1997,42(1):35-67.
[36]YANG W,LIU W,VINA A,et al. Nonlinear effects of group size on collective action and resource outcomes[J]. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,2013,110(27):1-6.
[37]路冠军,刘永功.现代国家构建视域下的草场生态治理方式变迁[J].生态经济,2013(2):37-40.
[38]陈秋红.社区主导型草地共管模式:成效与机制——基于社会资本视角的分析[J].中国农村经济,2011(5):61-71.
[39]FREEDMAN M. Lineage organization in southeastern China[M].Oxfordshire:Berg,2004.
[40]贺雪峰.熟人社会的行动逻辑[J].华中师范大学学报(人文社会科学版),2004(1):5-7.
[41]郭云南,姚洋.宗族网络与农村劳动力流动[J].管理世界,2013(3):69-81.
[42]温忠麟,侯杰泰,张雷.调节效应与中介效应的比较和应用[J].心理学报,2005,37(2):268-274.
[2]侯向阳,尹燕亭,运向军,等.北方草原牧户心理载畜率与草畜平衡模式转移研究[J].中国草地学报,2013,35(1):1-11.
[3]张虎,师尚礼,王顺霞.放牧强度对宁夏荒漠草原植物群落结构及草地生产力的影响[J].干旱区资源与环境,2012,26(9):73-76.
[4]赵永珍.肃南县草原生态补奖政策落实及存在问题研究[D].兰州:西北民族大学,2015.
[5]张瑞荣,申向明.牧区草地退化问题的实证分析[J].农业经济问题,2008(S1):183-189.
[6]杨勇,邓祥征,白羽萍,等. 2000—2015年中国典型草原草地动态及其对管理政策的响应[J].资源科学,2017,39(7):1272-1280.
[7]田艳丽.建立草原生态补偿机制的探讨——以内蒙古锡林郭勒盟为例[J].农业现代化研究,2010,31(2):171-174.
[8]胡振通.中国草原生态补偿机制[D].北京:中国农业大学,2016.
[9]常丽霞,沈海涛.草地生态补偿政策与机制研究——基于黄河首曲玛曲县的调查与分析[J].农村经济,2014(3):102-106.
[10]魏琦,侯向阳.建立中国草原生态补偿长效机制的思考[J].中国农业科学,2015,48(18):3719-3726.
[11]杨振海.努力谱写草原保护建设新篇章[J].中国草地学报,2009,31(2):1-3.
[12]叶晗,朱立志.内蒙山牧区草地生态补偿实践评析[J].草业科学,2014(8):1587-1596.
[13]李静.我国草原生态补偿制度的问题与对策——以甘肃省为例[J].草业科学,2015,32(6):1027-1032. 20.
[14]胡振通,柳荻,靳乐山.草原生态补偿:生态绩效、收入影响和政策满意度[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(1):165-176.
[15]GILLSON L,HOFFMAN M T. Rangeland ecology in a changing world[J]. Science,2007,315(5808):53-54.
[16]王晓毅.环境压力下的草原社区:内蒙古六个嘎查村的调查[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2009.
[17]王晓毅.从承包到“再集中”——中国北方草原环境保护政策分析[J].中国农村观察,2009(3):36-46,95.
[18]王海春,高博,祁晓慧,等.草原生态保护补助奖励机制对牧户减畜行为影响的实证分析[J].农业经济问题,2017(12):73-80.
[19]侯向阳.发展草原生态畜牧业是解决草原退化困境的有效途径[J].中国草地学报,2010,32(4):1-9.
[20]刘兴元.草地生态补偿研究进展[J].草业科学,2012,29(2):306-313.
[21]WUNDER S. The efficiency of payments for environmental services in tropical conservation[J]. Conservation biology,2007,21(1):48-58.
[22]WUNDER S. Revisiting the concept of payments for environmental services[J]. Ecological economics,2015,117:234-243.
[23]欧阳志云,郑华,岳平.建立我国生态补偿机制的思路与措施[J].生态学报,2013,33(3):0686-0692.
[24]埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆.公共事物的治理之道[M].余逊达,陈旭东,译.上海:上海三联书店,2000.
[25]杨理.草原治理:如何进一步完善草原家庭承包制[J].中国农村经济,2007(12):62-67.
[26]史雨星,姚柳杨,赵敏娟.社会资本对牧户参与草场社区治理意愿的影响——基于Triple-Hurdle模型的分析[J].中国农村观察,2018(3):35-50.
[27]周立,董小瑜.“三牧”问题的制度逻辑——中国草场管理与产权制度变迁研究[J].中国农业大学学报(社会科学版),2013,30(2):94-107.
[28]BALAND J M,PLATTEAU J P. Halting degradation of natural resources:is there a role for rural communities[J]. Oup catalogue,1996,11(3):251-258.
[29]BOUMA J,BULTE E,SOEST D V. Trust and cooperation:social capital and community resource management[J]. Journal of environmental economics&management,2008,56(2):155-166.
[30]BANKS T. Property rights and the environment in pastoral China:evidence from the Field[J]. Development&change,2010,32(4):717-740.
[31]蔡起华,朱玉春.社会信任、关系网络与农户参与农村公共产品供给[J].中国农村经济,2015(7):57-69.
[32]FAFCHAMPS M. Development and social capital[J]. Journal of development economics,2006,42(7):1180-1198.
[33]COLEMAN S. The foundation of social theory[M]. Cambridge:Belknap Press,2000.
[34]谢先雄,李晓平,赵敏娟,等.资本禀赋如何影响牧民减畜——基于内蒙古372户牧民的实证考察[J].资源科学,2018,40(9):1730-1741.
[35]UZZI B. Social structure and competition in interfirm networks:the paradox of embeddedness[J]. Administrative science quarterly,1997,42(1):35-67.
[36]YANG W,LIU W,VINA A,et al. Nonlinear effects of group size on collective action and resource outcomes[J]. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,2013,110(27):1-6.
[37]路冠军,刘永功.现代国家构建视域下的草场生态治理方式变迁[J].生态经济,2013(2):37-40.
[38]陈秋红.社区主导型草地共管模式:成效与机制——基于社会资本视角的分析[J].中国农村经济,2011(5):61-71.
[39]FREEDMAN M. Lineage organization in southeastern China[M].Oxfordshire:Berg,2004.
[40]贺雪峰.熟人社会的行动逻辑[J].华中师范大学学报(人文社会科学版),2004(1):5-7.
[41]郭云南,姚洋.宗族网络与农村劳动力流动[J].管理世界,2013(3):69-81.
[42]温忠麟,侯杰泰,张雷.调节效应与中介效应的比较和应用[J].心理学报,2005,37(2):268-274.