碳交易政策下低碳技术异地协同共享策略及减排收益研究
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  • 英文篇名:Research on technology remote synergic sharing strategy of low carbon under the ETS in China
  • 作者:汪明月 ; 刘宇 ; 史文强 ; 李梦明 ; 钟超
  • 英文作者:WANG Mingyue;LIU Yu;SHI Wenqiang;LI Mengming;ZHONG Chao;School of Public Policy and Management,University of Chinese Academy of Sciences;Institutes of Science and Development, Chinese Academy of Sciences;School of Management and Economics,Beijing Institute of Technology;School of Economics and Business Adminisitration, Beijing Normal University;
  • 关键词:碳交易政策 ; 低碳技术创新 ; 技术存量 ; 异地协同共享 ; 减排收益 ; 微分对策
  • 英文关键词:emissions trading strategy;;low-carbon technological innovation;;technology stocks;;remote synergic sharing strategy;;emission reduction benefits;;differential strategy
  • 中文刊名:XTLL
  • 英文刊名:Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
  • 机构:中国科学院大学公共政策与管理学院;中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院;北京理工大学管理与经济学院;北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院;
  • 出版日期:2019-06-25
  • 出版单位:系统工程理论与实践
  • 年:2019
  • 期:v.39
  • 基金:国家重点研发计划“全球变化及应对”重点专项(2016YFA0602500);; 国家自然科学基金面上项目(71473242);; 中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院重大咨询项目(Y02015003)~~
  • 语种:中文;
  • 页:XTLL201906006
  • 页数:16
  • CN:06
  • ISSN:11-2267/N
  • 分类号:59-74
摘要
基于中国碳排放权交易市场背景,文章综合考虑了低碳技术创新(共享)对减排收益的影响,以及本地区域技术创新和外部区域技术共享行为跨期效应特征.采用微分对策方法分析由本地区域低碳技术创新的努力程度和外部区域低碳技术共享努力程度共同决定的区域低碳技术存量动态策略问题.在相关假设的基础上,分别构建了无成本分担的分散式决策、成本分担下的分散式决策及集中式决策三种情形下的动态博弈模型,得到了各自的最优反馈均衡策略、低碳技术存量以及利润函数随时间变化的最优轨迹.通过对比三种情形下的反馈均衡策略、成本分担机制和合作创新机制对主体减排收益帕累托改进程度发现,集中决策情形下,本地区域和外部区域的低碳技术创新(共享)的努力程度较高,整体减排收益也比非合作时高,实现了Pareto最优;成本分担机制能够小范围地提高各主体的努力程度,适度改善减排收益.最后,通过数值仿真分析,验证了模型的有效性,并分析了在低碳技术合作创新情形下相关参数的灵敏性,为推进区域低碳技术异地协同共享长期合作提供了理论依据.
        Based on the background of the carbon emissions trading market in China,the article considers the impact of low-carbon technology innovation(sharing)on emission reduction interests and the characteristics of inter-temporal effects of technology innovation and external technology sharing in local area.By using differential methods,this article also analyses the dynamic strategies of the regional low-carbon technology stock,which is jointly determined by both the efforts of the local low-carbon technology innovation and the external technology sharing.On the basis of the relevant assumptions,we construct the dynamic models under decentralized decision-making without cost-sharing,decentralized decision-making with cost-sharing and centralized decision-making respectively,and respectively obtain their optimal feedback equilibrium strategies,low-carbon technology stock and the optimal trajectory of profit value function over time.By comparing the three feedback equilibrium strategies,through the extent of Pareto improvement of both the cost-sharing mechanism and cooperative innovation mechanism to the main emission reduction interests,it is found that in the case of centralized decision-making,the more the efforts of lowcarbon technological innovation(sharing)in local regions and external regions are endeavored,the higher the overall emission reduction interests than those of non-cooperation to achieve the Pareto optimality.The cost-sharing mechanism can improve the efforts of all subjects and improve the emission reduction interests moderately.Finally,the validity of the model is verified through numerical simulation and the sensitivity of the relevant parameters in the case of cooperative innovation of low-carbon technology is analyzed.And relevant theoretical basis is provided for promoting the long-term cooperation of regional low-carbon technology collaborative sharing in different places.
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