养老PPP项目治理机制研究——基于不完全契约理论
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摘要
在人口老龄化愈发严峻的形势下,中国养老产业度过了非理性繁荣期,但问题重重,采用PPP模式支持养老产业发展成为一种有效的政策选择。"PPP不是一场婚礼而是婚姻",后续的治理至关重要,养老PPP项目治理机制是基于契约关系的内部治理机制和基于行政职权的外部治理机制的有机体。项目本质是以契约为纽带的合作,且项目契约具有不完全性。该文从第一代和第二代不完全契约理论出发构建出刚柔相济的缔约机制、产权清晰的激励机制和高效有力的监督机制,来完善养老PPP项目的治理以应对银发浪潮的冲击。
China's pension industry has went through an irrational boom period and there exists problems under the serious situation of the ageing population. Using PPP model to support the development of Pension Industry is becoming an effective policy choice. "PPP is not a wedding but a marriage",and subsequent governance is essential. The governance mechanism of pension PPP project is an organic combination of internal governance mechanism based on contractual relationship and external governance mechanism based on administrative authority. The essence of pension PPP project is a cooperation which is linked by contract and the contract is incomplete. This article establishes the governance mechanism from the first and second generation incomplete contracting theory like this: the contracting mechanism combines hardness with softness; under the incentive mechanism,the property rights are clear and the supervise mechanism is efficient and powerful. Its purpose is to improve the governance of the pension PPP project and then combat the impact of seniors.
China's pension industry has went through an irrational boom period and there exists problems under the serious situation of the ageing population. Using PPP model to support the development of Pension Industry is becoming an effective policy choice. "PPP is not a wedding but a marriage",and subsequent governance is essential. The governance mechanism of pension PPP project is an organic combination of internal governance mechanism based on contractual relationship and external governance mechanism based on administrative authority. The essence of pension PPP project is a cooperation which is linked by contract and the contract is incomplete. This article establishes the governance mechanism from the first and second generation incomplete contracting theory like this: the contracting mechanism combines hardness with softness; under the incentive mechanism,the property rights are clear and the supervise mechanism is efficient and powerful. Its purpose is to improve the governance of the pension PPP project and then combat the impact of seniors.
引文
[1]石莎莎,常志兵.城市基础设施PPP项目治理机制的进化博弈和策略研究[J].建筑经济,2013(1):67-71.
[2]Tirole.J.Incomplete contracts:where do we stand?[J].Econometrica,1999,67(4):741-781.
[3]杨瑞龙,聂辉华.不完全契约理论:一个综述[J].经济研究,2006(2):104-115.
[4]聂辉华.不完全契约理论的转变[J].教学与研究,2011(1):71-78.
[5]刘婷,赵桐,王守清.基于案例的我国PPP项目再谈判情况研究[J].建筑经济,2016(9):31-34.
[6]邱闯.PF2:英国PPP的新模式[J].中国投资,2015:65-66.
[7]张喆,贾明,万迪昉.不完全契约及关系契约视角下的PPP最优控制权配置探讨[J].外国经济与管理,2007(8):24-29.
[8]王守清,伍迪,彭为,崔庆斌.PPP模式下城镇建设项目政企控制权配置研究[J].清华大学学报自然科学版,2017(4):369-375.
[9]明珠.我国PPP立法存在的问题及对策[J].法制与社会,2016:83-84.
[10]长春市养老综合政府与社会资本合作(PPP)项目竞争性磋商文件[EB/OL].http://m.book118.com/html/2017/0313/95262586.shtm,2017.
[2]Tirole.J.Incomplete contracts:where do we stand?[J].Econometrica,1999,67(4):741-781.
[3]杨瑞龙,聂辉华.不完全契约理论:一个综述[J].经济研究,2006(2):104-115.
[4]聂辉华.不完全契约理论的转变[J].教学与研究,2011(1):71-78.
[5]刘婷,赵桐,王守清.基于案例的我国PPP项目再谈判情况研究[J].建筑经济,2016(9):31-34.
[6]邱闯.PF2:英国PPP的新模式[J].中国投资,2015:65-66.
[7]张喆,贾明,万迪昉.不完全契约及关系契约视角下的PPP最优控制权配置探讨[J].外国经济与管理,2007(8):24-29.
[8]王守清,伍迪,彭为,崔庆斌.PPP模式下城镇建设项目政企控制权配置研究[J].清华大学学报自然科学版,2017(4):369-375.
[9]明珠.我国PPP立法存在的问题及对策[J].法制与社会,2016:83-84.
[10]长春市养老综合政府与社会资本合作(PPP)项目竞争性磋商文件[EB/OL].http://m.book118.com/html/2017/0313/95262586.shtm,2017.