“绿水青山”建设时代退耕还湿问题博弈分析
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摘要
以博弈论为分析工具,以信息的完备性为分断点,基于退耕还湿政策的有效性趋势,分别从委托-代理与讨价还价两种模型对"绿水青山"建设时代退耕还湿主体的策略选择进行讨论,并从无限重复博弈分析中归纳合作的可能性。研究表明:无论从何种机制进行探讨,农户和政府的合作是必然和有效的;从主体角度分析,推进退耕还湿能促进参与主体互利。因此,建议加大补偿弹性与优化惩罚机制并重、工作透明化与补偿多元化相结合、普及湿地潜在价值以让农户更注重长远利益,为退耕还湿推广和实施、湿地恢复和保护提供理论借鉴。
⑴ Background——Due to population growth,climate change,land reclamation,urban expansion,etc.,the wetland area in China has decreased drastically,and its ecosystem diversity and function have been weakened. Based on this,the implementation of counter measures is extremely important for wetland conservation and restoration.⑵ Methods——Under the policy of returning farmland to wetland to restore wetland and using game theory as a tool,the two models of "trust-agent" and "bargaining" are used as mechanisms to explore the choices of farmers and governments under the policy. Meanwhile, the time factor is introduced to analyze the optimal choice of the subject under the infinite repeated game.⑶ Results——The results show that for the trust-agent model,according to the formula of( V1-V2) + R+ F1> 2 P( t),the cooperation of returning farmland between government and farmers can be realized under certain conditions. That is,increasing the compensation R can increase the participation of cooperation,and increasing the penalty F1 will encourage cooperation for a long time. For the bargaining model,due to incomplete information and the existence of transaction and time costs,the optimal choice for farmers is to choose early cooperation. However,the government has certain advantages in the bargaining game,aims to maximize social welfare and pays more attention to cooperation. For infinite repeated game,the two parties consider the current interests while taking into account the future benefits. The cooperation makes the benefits of the final stage far greater than the initial returns. The government and the farmers will take long-term cooperation with the future interests as the starting point. In short,from the mechanism analysis,whether it is complete information or incomplete information,farmers' acceptance of returning farmland and government compensation are the best strategic combination to promote the inevitability and effectiveness of returning farmland to wetland; from the perspective of the main body,the promotion of returning farmland to wetland makes mutual benefit. If the future benefits of wetlands are considered and the infinite repeated game is carried out,the cooperation between the two will be more stable.⑷ Conclusions and Discussions——At the trust-agent level,it is recommended to increase the flexibility of compensation and set up a penalty-assisted mechanism. Compensation and incentive mechanisms should be set up,and "strong compensation" and "weak compensation" methods should be introduced to mobilize farmers to compensate for internal competition and form a competitive atmosphere; punishment as an indirect aid,once farmers and the government reach a cooperation contract,default or midway waiver will be accompanied by a big price which will punish their behavior of re-cultivation or isolate their choices or increase their cost of recultivation. At the bargaining level,it is recommended to increase the transparency of the work of returning farmland to wetland and realize diversification of incentives. At the level of infinite repeated game,it is recommended to interpret the potential value of wetlands so that farmers can focus on long-term benefits.
⑴ Background——Due to population growth,climate change,land reclamation,urban expansion,etc.,the wetland area in China has decreased drastically,and its ecosystem diversity and function have been weakened. Based on this,the implementation of counter measures is extremely important for wetland conservation and restoration.⑵ Methods——Under the policy of returning farmland to wetland to restore wetland and using game theory as a tool,the two models of "trust-agent" and "bargaining" are used as mechanisms to explore the choices of farmers and governments under the policy. Meanwhile, the time factor is introduced to analyze the optimal choice of the subject under the infinite repeated game.⑶ Results——The results show that for the trust-agent model,according to the formula of( V1-V2) + R+ F1> 2 P( t),the cooperation of returning farmland between government and farmers can be realized under certain conditions. That is,increasing the compensation R can increase the participation of cooperation,and increasing the penalty F1 will encourage cooperation for a long time. For the bargaining model,due to incomplete information and the existence of transaction and time costs,the optimal choice for farmers is to choose early cooperation. However,the government has certain advantages in the bargaining game,aims to maximize social welfare and pays more attention to cooperation. For infinite repeated game,the two parties consider the current interests while taking into account the future benefits. The cooperation makes the benefits of the final stage far greater than the initial returns. The government and the farmers will take long-term cooperation with the future interests as the starting point. In short,from the mechanism analysis,whether it is complete information or incomplete information,farmers' acceptance of returning farmland and government compensation are the best strategic combination to promote the inevitability and effectiveness of returning farmland to wetland; from the perspective of the main body,the promotion of returning farmland to wetland makes mutual benefit. If the future benefits of wetlands are considered and the infinite repeated game is carried out,the cooperation between the two will be more stable.⑷ Conclusions and Discussions——At the trust-agent level,it is recommended to increase the flexibility of compensation and set up a penalty-assisted mechanism. Compensation and incentive mechanisms should be set up,and "strong compensation" and "weak compensation" methods should be introduced to mobilize farmers to compensate for internal competition and form a competitive atmosphere; punishment as an indirect aid,once farmers and the government reach a cooperation contract,default or midway waiver will be accompanied by a big price which will punish their behavior of re-cultivation or isolate their choices or increase their cost of recultivation. At the bargaining level,it is recommended to increase the transparency of the work of returning farmland to wetland and realize diversification of incentives. At the level of infinite repeated game,it is recommended to interpret the potential value of wetlands so that farmers can focus on long-term benefits.
引文
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[14]张兴,张炜,赵敏娟.退耕还林生态补偿机制的激励有效性:基于异质性农户视角[J].林业经济问题,2017,37(1):31-36,102.
[15]张路路,佟光霁.模糊模型分析下退耕还湿效益评价:以黑龙江三江平原湿地为例[J].林业经济,2018,40(7):39-44.
[16]吕一河,陈利顶,傅伯杰,等.自然保护区管理的博弈分析[J].生物多样性. 2004,12(5):546-552.
[17]王慧琴,张彩虹,邹家红.我国湿地资源保护的博弈分析[J].生态环境,2011(2):174-178.
[18]王君,李锦宏.中国自然保护区生态补偿机制构建与反思:基于各方利益主体的博弈视角[J].林业经济问题,2017,37(2):39-44,103.
[19]齐力.政府与农户博弈视角下退耕还湿生态补偿研究:以黑龙江三江湿地自然保护区为例[J].求索,2016(8):100-103.
[20]谢识予.经济博弈论[M],上海:复旦大学出版社,2001:19-27.
[21]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M],上海:上海人民出版社,2012:33-46.
[2] ANDERSON B C,WATT W E,MARSALEK J. Critical issues for storm-water ponds:learning from a decade of research[J]. Water Science and Technology,2002,45(9):277-283.
[3] HARTIG E K,GROZEV O,ROSENZWEIG C. Climate change,agriculture and wetlands in Eastern Europe:Vulnerability,adaptation and policy[J]. Climatic Change,1997,36(1-2):107-121.
[4] JUNK W J,AN S,FINLAYSON C M,et al. Current state of knowledge regarding the world's wetlands and their future under global climate change:a synthesis[J]. Aquatic Sciences,2013,75(1):151-167.
[5] GEDAN K B,KIRWAN M L,WOLANSKI E,et al. The present and future role of coastal wetland vegetation in protecting shorelines:answering recent challenges to the paradigm[J]. Climatic Change,2011,106(1):7-29.
[6] VYMAZAL J. Constructed wetlands for wastewater treatment[J]. Ecological Engineering,2005,5(25):475-477.
[7] NASIRU I M. Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation[M]. Berlin:Springer,2015:1-10.
[8] PETRESCU A M R,LOHILA A,TUOVINEN J P,et al. The uncertain climate footprint of wetlands under human pressure[J]. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America,2015,112(15):4594-4599.
[9] WHITE L,BRISCO B,DABBOOR M,et al. A collection of SAR methodologies for monitoring wetlands[J]. Remote Sensing,2015,7(6):7615-7645.
[10] TINCH R,MATHIEU L. Marine and coastal ecosystem services:valuation methods and their practical application[G]//UNEP-WCMC Biodiversity Series:No33. London:Cambridge UNEP-WCMC,2011:1-46.
[11]牛振国,张海英,王显威,等. 1978—2008中国湿地类型变化[J].中国科学,2012,57(16):1400-1411.
[12]蒋本超,戚秀云.哈尔滨市松江湿地保护现状及生态修复策略研究[J].环境科学与管理,2016,41(2):146-149.
[13]刘晓曼,蒋卫国,王文杰,等.东北地区湿地资源动态分析[J].资源科学,2004(5):105-110.
[14]张兴,张炜,赵敏娟.退耕还林生态补偿机制的激励有效性:基于异质性农户视角[J].林业经济问题,2017,37(1):31-36,102.
[15]张路路,佟光霁.模糊模型分析下退耕还湿效益评价:以黑龙江三江平原湿地为例[J].林业经济,2018,40(7):39-44.
[16]吕一河,陈利顶,傅伯杰,等.自然保护区管理的博弈分析[J].生物多样性. 2004,12(5):546-552.
[17]王慧琴,张彩虹,邹家红.我国湿地资源保护的博弈分析[J].生态环境,2011(2):174-178.
[18]王君,李锦宏.中国自然保护区生态补偿机制构建与反思:基于各方利益主体的博弈视角[J].林业经济问题,2017,37(2):39-44,103.
[19]齐力.政府与农户博弈视角下退耕还湿生态补偿研究:以黑龙江三江湿地自然保护区为例[J].求索,2016(8):100-103.
[20]谢识予.经济博弈论[M],上海:复旦大学出版社,2001:19-27.
[21]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M],上海:上海人民出版社,2012:33-46.