区域贸易协定中的竞争章节研究
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摘要
经济全球化、贸易自由化背景下,市场和竞争愈发国际化,企业的限制性商业做法和违反竞争行为随之增多且出现跨国特征,此时如果缺乏一个有效的国际协调法律框架,这些反竞争行为势必会损害市场效率,不利于全球经济的长远发展。20世纪末21世纪初,关于竞争政策的议题曾进入WTO框架讨论,最终以失败告终。近年来,各国纷纷转而通过区域贸易协定实现区域内的竞争政策合作,并取得了一定成果。通过对区域贸易协定中竞争章节的内容规定、实践运用、现有缺陷的研究不仅有利于加强区域内竞争政策协调机制的构建,同时对我国开展竞争政策的区域合作有较强的现实意义。
With economic globalization and trade liberalization,markets and competition have become increasingly internationalized,restrictive business and violation of competition practices have more transnational features. If there is no effective international coordination legal framework,these anti-competitive behaviors would undermine market efficiency. At the end of 20 thcentury and beginning of the 21 stcentury,competition policy had entered the WTO framework but ended in failure. In recent years,many countries have turned to regional trade agreements to achieve competition policy coordination. The research of content regulations,practical applications,and existing defects in the competition chapters of RTAs will not only help to strengthen the coordination mechanisms of competition policies in regional areas but also has strong reality value for China's regional competition policies cooperation.
With economic globalization and trade liberalization,markets and competition have become increasingly internationalized,restrictive business and violation of competition practices have more transnational features. If there is no effective international coordination legal framework,these anti-competitive behaviors would undermine market efficiency. At the end of 20 thcentury and beginning of the 21 stcentury,competition policy had entered the WTO framework but ended in failure. In recent years,many countries have turned to regional trade agreements to achieve competition policy coordination. The research of content regulations,practical applications,and existing defects in the competition chapters of RTAs will not only help to strengthen the coordination mechanisms of competition policies in regional areas but also has strong reality value for China's regional competition policies cooperation.
引文
(1)参见王晓晔、陶正华:《WTO的竞争政策及其对中国的影响---兼论制定反垄断法的意义》,载《中国社会科学》2003年第5期。
(2)区域贸易协定是指两个或两个以上的国家,或不同关税地区之间,为了消除成员间的各种贸易壁垒,规范彼此之间贸易合作关系而签订的优惠贸易安排。经济学上,按照组织性质与区域经济一体化的发展程度高低,区域贸易协定可以划分为优惠贸易安排、自由贸易区、关税同盟、共同市场、经济同盟,大多数区域一体化协议采用自由贸易协定的形式。
(1)参见殷敏:《新区域主义时代下的美国区域贸易协定---戴维.甘茨<区域贸易协定:法律、政策>介评》,载《政法论坛》2017年第3期。
(2)防守利益主要是指涉特定成员方在市场准入方面敏感议题的利益,主要反映于知识产权政策、农业政策、竞争政策等方面的利益。参见Simon Lester and Bryan Mercurio,“Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements”,Cambridge University Press,2009,p.36.
(3)进攻利益主要是指RTA主导方可直接向缔约方提供市场开放领域的利益,主要为缔约方出口依赖领域的市场准入优惠。参见Simon Lester and Bryan Mercurio,“Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements”,Cambridge University Press,2009,p.36.
(4)Philippe Brusick,Ana Maria Alvarez,Lucian Ceren,t“Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements:How to Assure Development Gains”,United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,2005,p.67.
(5)参见韩立余:《自由贸易协定新议题辨析》,载《国际法研究》2015年第5期。
(6)数据来源:Regional Trade Agreements Information System(RTA-IS),http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicS earchB yC r.aspx最后访问日期2018年7月10日。
(7)同(6)。
(8)Bernark Hoekman,“Competition Policy and Preferential Trade Agreements”,World Bank and Center for Economic Policy Research,NO.37131,1998,p.15.
(1)数据来源:Regional Trade Agreements Information System(RTA-IS),http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicS earch ByC r.aspx最后访问日期2018年7月10日。
(2)同(1)。
(3)Jana Ulrike Hoeffken,“Competition Provisions in EU Regional Trade Agreements:Consequences for Domestic Reform in Developing Countries”,thesis paper to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,April 2016,p.83.
(4)参见US-Australia FTA,Article 14.1.
(5)参见India-Japan FTA,Article 116.
(1)参见US-Australia FTA,Article 14.2.
(2)参见EFTA-Chile FTA,Article 75.
(3)参见US-Australia FTA Article14.2,参见骆旭旭:《区域贸易协定的竞争条款研究》,载《华侨大学学报(社会科学版)》2011年第3期。
(4)参见EFTA-Peru FTA,Article 8.3.
(5)参见刘宁元:《反垄断域外管辖冲突及其国际协调机制研究》,北京大学出版社2013年版,第171页。
(6)参见刘宁元:《反垄断域外管辖冲突及其国际协调机制研究》,北京大学出版社2013年版,第172页。
(7)张瑞萍:《反垄断国际合作中的积极礼让原则分析》,载《环球法律评论》2006年第2期。
(1)参见Canada-Columbia FTA,Article 1302.
(2)参见OECD官方网站:http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/2018年7月10日最后访问。
(3)参见Japan-Switzerland FTA,Article 51.
(4)参见Singapore-Australia FTA,Article 12.1.
(5)参见US-Australia FTA,Article 14.3.
(6)参见US-Australia FTA,Article 14.4.
(7)参见NAFTA Article 1502,1503.
(8)参见US-Chile FTA,Article 16.8.
(9)参见Japan-Singapore FTA,Article 105.
(10)Philippe Brusick,Ana Maria Alvarez,Lucian Ceren,t“Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements:How to Assure Development Gains”,United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,2005,p.45.
(1)D.Daniel Soko,l“Orders without(Enforceable)Law:Why Countries Enter into Non-Enforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade A-greements”.University of Chicago-Kent Law Review,Vol.83,2008,p.241.
(2)Paul J.DiM aggio and Walter W.Powel,l“The Iron Cage Revisited:Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields,”American Sociological Review,48(2),1983,pp.147-160.
(3)Paul J.DiM aggio and Walter W.Powel,l“The Iron Cage Revisited:Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields,”American Sociological Review,48(2),1983,p.149.
(4)Michael T.Hannan&John Freeman,“The Population Ecology of Organizations”,American Journal of Sociology,82(5),1977,p.929.
(5)参见David Levi-Faur,“The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism”,Annals of American Academy of Political&Social Science,598(1),2005,pp12-32.
(6)Richard N.Langlois,“Economics Change and the Boundaries of the Firm”,Institutional&Theoretical Economics,144(4),1989,p.640.
(1)在我国目前签订生效的十六个自由贸易协定中,包含竞争专章的四个自由贸易协定分别是:中国-冰岛自由贸易协定、中国-瑞士自由贸易协定、中国-韩国自由贸易协定、中国-格鲁吉亚自由贸易协定,参见:中国自由贸易区服务网http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn最后访问日期2018年7月10日。
(2)区域贸易协定是指两个或两个以上的国家,或不同关税地区之间,为了消除成员间的各种贸易壁垒,规范彼此之间贸易合作关系而签订的优惠贸易安排。经济学上,按照组织性质与区域经济一体化的发展程度高低,区域贸易协定可以划分为优惠贸易安排、自由贸易区、关税同盟、共同市场、经济同盟,大多数区域一体化协议采用自由贸易协定的形式。
(1)参见殷敏:《新区域主义时代下的美国区域贸易协定---戴维.甘茨<区域贸易协定:法律、政策>介评》,载《政法论坛》2017年第3期。
(2)防守利益主要是指涉特定成员方在市场准入方面敏感议题的利益,主要反映于知识产权政策、农业政策、竞争政策等方面的利益。参见Simon Lester and Bryan Mercurio,“Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements”,Cambridge University Press,2009,p.36.
(3)进攻利益主要是指RTA主导方可直接向缔约方提供市场开放领域的利益,主要为缔约方出口依赖领域的市场准入优惠。参见Simon Lester and Bryan Mercurio,“Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements”,Cambridge University Press,2009,p.36.
(4)Philippe Brusick,Ana Maria Alvarez,Lucian Ceren,t“Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements:How to Assure Development Gains”,United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,2005,p.67.
(5)参见韩立余:《自由贸易协定新议题辨析》,载《国际法研究》2015年第5期。
(6)数据来源:Regional Trade Agreements Information System(RTA-IS),http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicS earchB yC r.aspx最后访问日期2018年7月10日。
(7)同(6)。
(8)Bernark Hoekman,“Competition Policy and Preferential Trade Agreements”,World Bank and Center for Economic Policy Research,NO.37131,1998,p.15.
(1)数据来源:Regional Trade Agreements Information System(RTA-IS),http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicS earch ByC r.aspx最后访问日期2018年7月10日。
(2)同(1)。
(3)Jana Ulrike Hoeffken,“Competition Provisions in EU Regional Trade Agreements:Consequences for Domestic Reform in Developing Countries”,thesis paper to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,April 2016,p.83.
(4)参见US-Australia FTA,Article 14.1.
(5)参见India-Japan FTA,Article 116.
(1)参见US-Australia FTA,Article 14.2.
(2)参见EFTA-Chile FTA,Article 75.
(3)参见US-Australia FTA Article14.2,参见骆旭旭:《区域贸易协定的竞争条款研究》,载《华侨大学学报(社会科学版)》2011年第3期。
(4)参见EFTA-Peru FTA,Article 8.3.
(5)参见刘宁元:《反垄断域外管辖冲突及其国际协调机制研究》,北京大学出版社2013年版,第171页。
(6)参见刘宁元:《反垄断域外管辖冲突及其国际协调机制研究》,北京大学出版社2013年版,第172页。
(7)张瑞萍:《反垄断国际合作中的积极礼让原则分析》,载《环球法律评论》2006年第2期。
(1)参见Canada-Columbia FTA,Article 1302.
(2)参见OECD官方网站:http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/2018年7月10日最后访问。
(3)参见Japan-Switzerland FTA,Article 51.
(4)参见Singapore-Australia FTA,Article 12.1.
(5)参见US-Australia FTA,Article 14.3.
(6)参见US-Australia FTA,Article 14.4.
(7)参见NAFTA Article 1502,1503.
(8)参见US-Chile FTA,Article 16.8.
(9)参见Japan-Singapore FTA,Article 105.
(10)Philippe Brusick,Ana Maria Alvarez,Lucian Ceren,t“Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements:How to Assure Development Gains”,United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,2005,p.45.
(1)D.Daniel Soko,l“Orders without(Enforceable)Law:Why Countries Enter into Non-Enforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade A-greements”.University of Chicago-Kent Law Review,Vol.83,2008,p.241.
(2)Paul J.DiM aggio and Walter W.Powel,l“The Iron Cage Revisited:Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields,”American Sociological Review,48(2),1983,pp.147-160.
(3)Paul J.DiM aggio and Walter W.Powel,l“The Iron Cage Revisited:Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields,”American Sociological Review,48(2),1983,p.149.
(4)Michael T.Hannan&John Freeman,“The Population Ecology of Organizations”,American Journal of Sociology,82(5),1977,p.929.
(5)参见David Levi-Faur,“The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism”,Annals of American Academy of Political&Social Science,598(1),2005,pp12-32.
(6)Richard N.Langlois,“Economics Change and the Boundaries of the Firm”,Institutional&Theoretical Economics,144(4),1989,p.640.
(1)在我国目前签订生效的十六个自由贸易协定中,包含竞争专章的四个自由贸易协定分别是:中国-冰岛自由贸易协定、中国-瑞士自由贸易协定、中国-韩国自由贸易协定、中国-格鲁吉亚自由贸易协定,参见:中国自由贸易区服务网http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn最后访问日期2018年7月10日。