债务高企、风险集聚与体制变革——对发展型政府的反思与超越
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摘要
本文通过分析中国债务的形成机制,指出体制性因素是债务高企的根本原因。这一体制性因素可概括为国有企业的优惠政策、地方政府的发展责任与软预算约束、金融机构的体制性偏好以及中央政府的最后兜底。文章通过引入国企与政府补贴的BGG模型,刻画了中国债务形成的体制性原因。计量模型分析也发现:导致宏观杠杆率攀升的因素中,体制因素更为根本;在较低收入阶段,公共部门债务特别是政府债务对增长的不利作用较小,但在高收入阶段,以政府和国企体现的公共部门杠杆率对增长和效率的负面作用明显增强。这表明,随着中国进入高收入发展阶段,通过政府干预实现经济赶超的传统发展模式亟待转型。就本文的主旨而言,这意味着:需要破除政府兜底幻觉,强化国企与地方政府的预算约束,确立信贷资源配置的竞争中立原则,完善退出机制,发挥市场的决定性作用。总之,要超越发展型政府,使之成为"有限的"、服务型政府。
In the 40 years of reform and opening up, the Chinese economy has achieved great transformation and created a growth miracle. At the same time, it has accumulated many institutional and structural problems, which are gradually turning into various types of risk. The overhanging debt is a concentrated manifestation of these risks.This paper investigates the mechanism of China's debt formation and argues that institutional factors are the fundamental cause of the debt overhang. These institutional factors are the typical features of China's developmental state, which can be summarized as the "structural advantage" of state-owned enterprises, the development responsibility and soft budget constraints of local governments, the institutional preference of financial institutions, and the "last resort" of central government. On the one hand, this is the know-how for China's growth catch-up; on the other hand, it has negative impacts, particularly the current debt overhang and risk accumulation.Based on a BGG model(Bernanke et al., 1999), we change the subject of selecting the optimal debt contract to maximize the profit from enterprise to bank, and introduce fiscal subsidies to state-owned enterprises(SOEs) to describe the institutional distortion. The model reveals the following. When fiscal subsidies are introduced, optimal bank behavior allocates more credit to SOEs, increasing the leverage ratio of SOEs and reducing the leverage ratio of privately owned enterprises(POEs) in a steady state. Further simulation results show that(1) the positive shock of fiscal subsidies(i.e., increased subsidies to SOEs) increases the SOE leverage ratio, reduces the POE leverage ratio, and raises the total leverage ratio;(2) the subsidy illusion in the bank results in a higher SOE and total leverage ratio; and(3) a deleveraging policy can reduce the total leverage ratio, but more so for POEs than SOEs, thus exacerbating the credit misallocation.By integrating the newly published Global Debt Database(Mbaye et al., 2018), World Bank database, IMF-IFS(International Financial Statistics database), BIS Credit to the Nonfinancial Sector dataset, etc., we construct an international panel dataset of overall nonfinancial sector debt(i.e., real sector) broken down into the government, private, and SOE sectors, and include other economic indicators such as growth and TFP. The econometric results indicate the following.(1) Although many factors contribute to the macro leverage ratio in the economy, institutional factors measured by the share of government debt to total debt are more fundamental.(2) Cumulative debt generally has a negative effect on growth and TFP, and SOE debt has a more significant adverse effect on efficiency.(3) In the low income stage, public sector debt, especially government debt, has a relatively smaller negative effect on growth, but the high income stage shows a significant increase in the negative effect of public sector debt represented by government and SOE leverage ratios, implying that it benefits the economy to allocate more credit resources to the private sector in the high income stage. This fresh perspective indicates that as China enters the high income stage, the developmental-state featured by government intervention to facilitate growth catch-up requires urgent transformation.In the context of this paper, this transformation means the following.(1) Steadily pushing forward bankruptcy and restructuring mechanisms, especially the exit mechanism of zombie companies, letting the market clearing mechanism play a decisive and mandatory role.(2) Breaking the government bailout illusion, hardening budget constraints on SOEs and local governments, building a normative behavior pattern and incentive-constraint mechanism under a modern enterprise system and modern governance framework, and weakening the expansion or catch-up impulse.(3) Establishing the competitive neutrality rule in credit allocation to eliminate institutional discrimination by financial institutions. In short, we must move beyond the developmental state to establish a "limited" service-oriented government.
In the 40 years of reform and opening up, the Chinese economy has achieved great transformation and created a growth miracle. At the same time, it has accumulated many institutional and structural problems, which are gradually turning into various types of risk. The overhanging debt is a concentrated manifestation of these risks.This paper investigates the mechanism of China's debt formation and argues that institutional factors are the fundamental cause of the debt overhang. These institutional factors are the typical features of China's developmental state, which can be summarized as the "structural advantage" of state-owned enterprises, the development responsibility and soft budget constraints of local governments, the institutional preference of financial institutions, and the "last resort" of central government. On the one hand, this is the know-how for China's growth catch-up; on the other hand, it has negative impacts, particularly the current debt overhang and risk accumulation.Based on a BGG model(Bernanke et al., 1999), we change the subject of selecting the optimal debt contract to maximize the profit from enterprise to bank, and introduce fiscal subsidies to state-owned enterprises(SOEs) to describe the institutional distortion. The model reveals the following. When fiscal subsidies are introduced, optimal bank behavior allocates more credit to SOEs, increasing the leverage ratio of SOEs and reducing the leverage ratio of privately owned enterprises(POEs) in a steady state. Further simulation results show that(1) the positive shock of fiscal subsidies(i.e., increased subsidies to SOEs) increases the SOE leverage ratio, reduces the POE leverage ratio, and raises the total leverage ratio;(2) the subsidy illusion in the bank results in a higher SOE and total leverage ratio; and(3) a deleveraging policy can reduce the total leverage ratio, but more so for POEs than SOEs, thus exacerbating the credit misallocation.By integrating the newly published Global Debt Database(Mbaye et al., 2018), World Bank database, IMF-IFS(International Financial Statistics database), BIS Credit to the Nonfinancial Sector dataset, etc., we construct an international panel dataset of overall nonfinancial sector debt(i.e., real sector) broken down into the government, private, and SOE sectors, and include other economic indicators such as growth and TFP. The econometric results indicate the following.(1) Although many factors contribute to the macro leverage ratio in the economy, institutional factors measured by the share of government debt to total debt are more fundamental.(2) Cumulative debt generally has a negative effect on growth and TFP, and SOE debt has a more significant adverse effect on efficiency.(3) In the low income stage, public sector debt, especially government debt, has a relatively smaller negative effect on growth, but the high income stage shows a significant increase in the negative effect of public sector debt represented by government and SOE leverage ratios, implying that it benefits the economy to allocate more credit resources to the private sector in the high income stage. This fresh perspective indicates that as China enters the high income stage, the developmental-state featured by government intervention to facilitate growth catch-up requires urgent transformation.In the context of this paper, this transformation means the following.(1) Steadily pushing forward bankruptcy and restructuring mechanisms, especially the exit mechanism of zombie companies, letting the market clearing mechanism play a decisive and mandatory role.(2) Breaking the government bailout illusion, hardening budget constraints on SOEs and local governments, building a normative behavior pattern and incentive-constraint mechanism under a modern enterprise system and modern governance framework, and weakening the expansion or catch-up impulse.(3) Establishing the competitive neutrality rule in credit allocation to eliminate institutional discrimination by financial institutions. In short, we must move beyond the developmental state to establish a "limited" service-oriented government.
引文
纪敏、严宝玉、李宏瑾,2017:《杠杆率结构、水平和金融稳定:理论分析框架和中国经验》,《金融研究》第2期。
纪洋、王旭、谭语嫣、黄益平,2018:《经济政策不确定性、政府隐性担保与企业杠杆率分化》,《经济学(季刊)》第2期。
贾润崧、张四灿,2014:《中国省际资本存量与资本回报率》,《统计研究》2014年第11期。
江曙霞、罗杰、黄君慈,2006:《信贷集中与扩张、软预算约束竞争和银行系统性风险》,《金融研究》第4期。
李建军、张书瑶,2018:《税收负担、财政补贴与企业杠杆率》,《财政研究》第5期。
刘尚希,2004:《中国财政风险的制度特征:“风险大锅饭”》,《管理世界》第5期。
仝冰,2010:《货币、利率与资产价格——基于DSGE模型的分析与预测》,北京大学博士学位论文。
张晓晶、李成、李育,2018:《扭曲、赶超与可持续增长——对政府与市场关系的重新审视》,《经济研究》第1期。
中国金融论坛课题组,2017:《杠杆率结构、水平和金融稳定:理论与经验》,中国人民银行工作论文No.2017/1。
中国人民银行营业管理部课题组,2017:《预算软约束、融资溢价与杠杆率——供给侧结构性改革的微观机理与经济效应研究》,《经济研究》第10期。
朱宁,2016:《刚性泡沫》,中信出版社。
Bardhan,P.,2016,“State and Development:The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature”,Journal of Economic Literature,54(3),862—892.
Beckert,S.,2014,Empire of Cotton:A New History of Global Capitalism,Allen Lane (New York).
Bernanke,B.S.,M.Gertler,and S.Gilchrist,1999,“The Financial Accelerator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework”,in:J.B.Taylor & M.Woodford,Handbook of Macroeconomics,Elsevier.
Bordo,M.D.,and C.M.Meissner,2012,“Does Inequality Lead to a Financial Crisis?”,Journal of International Money and Finance,31(8),2147—2161.
Borio,C.,2014,“The Financial Cycle and Macroeconomics:What Have We Learnt?”,Journal of Banking & Finance,45,182—198.
Brandt,L.,and T.G.Rawski,2008,China's Great Economic Transformation,Cambridge University Press,2008.
Dalio,R.,2018,Principles for Navigating Big Debt Crises,Bridgewater Press.
Dudley,W.C.,and R.G.Hubbard,2004,How Capital Markets Enhance Economic Performance and Facilitate Job Creation,Global Markets Institute,Goldman Sachs,1—26.
Eberhardt,M.,and A.F.Presbitero,2015,“Public Debt and Growth:Heterogeneity and Non-linearity”,Journal of International Economics,97(1),45—58.
Faruqee,H.,and M.Mühleisen,2003,“Population Aging in Japan:Demographic Shock and Fiscal Sustainability”,Japan and the World Economy,15(2),185—210.
Holzmann,R.,R.J.Palacios,and A.Zviniene,2004,Implicit Pension Debt:Issues,Measurement and Scope in International Perspective,(Vol.403).Social Protection,Labor Markets,Pensions,Social Assistance,World Bank.
Ichiro,F.,2002,“Financial Accelerator Effects in Japan's Business Cycles”,Research and Statistics Department Bank of Japan,Working Paper 02—6.
Johnson,C.,1982,MITI and the Japanese Miracles:The Growth of Industrial Policy,1925—1975,Stanford University Press.
Krugman,P.,1994,“The Myth of Asia's Miracle”,Foreign Affairs,73(6),62—78.
Lim,J.J.,2019,“Growth in the Shadow of Debt”,Journal of Banking and Finance,103,98—112.
Mbaye,S.,M.Badia,and K.Chae,2018,Global Debt Database:Methodology and Sources.IMF Working Paper,18/111.
Minsky,H.P.,1986,Stabilizing an Unstable Economy,New York:McGraw-Hill.
Pang,Eul-Soo,2000,“The Financial Crisis of 1997—98 and the End of the Asian Developmental State”,Contemporary Southeast Asia,22(3),570—593.
Rajan,R.G.,and L.Zingales,2004,Saving Capitalism From the Capitalists:Unleashing the Power of Financial Markets to Create Wealth and Spread Opportunity,Princeton University Press.
Reinhart,C.M.,and K.S.Rogoff,2010a,“Growth in a Time of Debt”,NBER Working Paper Series,No.15639.
Reinhart,C.M.,and K.S.Rogoff,2010b,“Growth in a Time of Debt”,American Economic Review,100(2),573—578.
Robinson,J.,1952,“The Generalization of the General Theory”,in The Rate of Interest and Other Essays,London,Macmillan,67—142.
Stuwell,J.,2013,How Asia Works:Success and Failure in the World's Most Dynamic Region,Grove Press.
Turner,A.,2015,Between Debt and the Devil:Money,Credit,and Fixing Global Finance,Princeton University Press
Wicksell,K.,1936,Interest and Prices.A Study of the Causes Regulating the Value of Money,London:Macmillan.
Woodford,M.,2003,Interest and Prices.Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy,Princeton and Oxford:Princeton University Press.
(1)关于杠杆率的影响及其风险一般论及较多,这里不再赘述。另外,本文的杠杆率均指宏观杠杆率,即债务/GDP。
(2)本文所有中国杠杆率数据均来自中国社会科学院国家资产负债表研究中心(CNBS)。
(3)存在补贴幻觉是由于银行(或金融机构)相信国企(或政府支持的企业)即便亏损,最终也会由财政买单(即财政补贴)。但政府买单并非正式制度,只是一种隐性的、或有的担保。而银行未能拿到其所预期的补贴(即补贴幻觉),恰恰表明这种担保是隐性的、或有的。
(4)地方政府没有进入模型,但其行为与国企具有较大的相似性。
(5)限于篇幅,描述模型经济系统动态运行规律的方程对数线性化结果不再列出,感兴趣的读者可向作者索取。
(6)用(私人部门债务总额+中央政府债务)/GDP得到。本文的私人部门其实是非政府部门,但在许多国家私人部门中会包括国有企业,所以读者须清楚私人部门的含义,它是相对于政府(公共)部门而言的。
(7)我们也做了Hausman随机效应和固定效应检验,结果均支持使用固定效应模型。
(8)其中,政府本币债务几乎不存在违约问题,因国家掌握铸币权,可以不断采取展期的方式延后债务。
(9)800美元约为美国1970年人均GDP的15%,而2015年美国人均GDP的15%则为8466美元。我们亦尝试了700美元、500美元等多个档次,结果基本一致。
(10)我们也对杠杆率与各国全要素生产率进行回归,结果与GDP增速的回归基本一致。略有差异的地方在于:国企债务对于经济的全要素生产率的不利影响主要体现在高收入经济体,而在低收入经济体不显著。
纪洋、王旭、谭语嫣、黄益平,2018:《经济政策不确定性、政府隐性担保与企业杠杆率分化》,《经济学(季刊)》第2期。
贾润崧、张四灿,2014:《中国省际资本存量与资本回报率》,《统计研究》2014年第11期。
江曙霞、罗杰、黄君慈,2006:《信贷集中与扩张、软预算约束竞争和银行系统性风险》,《金融研究》第4期。
李建军、张书瑶,2018:《税收负担、财政补贴与企业杠杆率》,《财政研究》第5期。
刘尚希,2004:《中国财政风险的制度特征:“风险大锅饭”》,《管理世界》第5期。
仝冰,2010:《货币、利率与资产价格——基于DSGE模型的分析与预测》,北京大学博士学位论文。
张晓晶、李成、李育,2018:《扭曲、赶超与可持续增长——对政府与市场关系的重新审视》,《经济研究》第1期。
中国金融论坛课题组,2017:《杠杆率结构、水平和金融稳定:理论与经验》,中国人民银行工作论文No.2017/1。
中国人民银行营业管理部课题组,2017:《预算软约束、融资溢价与杠杆率——供给侧结构性改革的微观机理与经济效应研究》,《经济研究》第10期。
朱宁,2016:《刚性泡沫》,中信出版社。
Bardhan,P.,2016,“State and Development:The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature”,Journal of Economic Literature,54(3),862—892.
Beckert,S.,2014,Empire of Cotton:A New History of Global Capitalism,Allen Lane (New York).
Bernanke,B.S.,M.Gertler,and S.Gilchrist,1999,“The Financial Accelerator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework”,in:J.B.Taylor & M.Woodford,Handbook of Macroeconomics,Elsevier.
Bordo,M.D.,and C.M.Meissner,2012,“Does Inequality Lead to a Financial Crisis?”,Journal of International Money and Finance,31(8),2147—2161.
Borio,C.,2014,“The Financial Cycle and Macroeconomics:What Have We Learnt?”,Journal of Banking & Finance,45,182—198.
Brandt,L.,and T.G.Rawski,2008,China's Great Economic Transformation,Cambridge University Press,2008.
Dalio,R.,2018,Principles for Navigating Big Debt Crises,Bridgewater Press.
Dudley,W.C.,and R.G.Hubbard,2004,How Capital Markets Enhance Economic Performance and Facilitate Job Creation,Global Markets Institute,Goldman Sachs,1—26.
Eberhardt,M.,and A.F.Presbitero,2015,“Public Debt and Growth:Heterogeneity and Non-linearity”,Journal of International Economics,97(1),45—58.
Faruqee,H.,and M.Mühleisen,2003,“Population Aging in Japan:Demographic Shock and Fiscal Sustainability”,Japan and the World Economy,15(2),185—210.
Holzmann,R.,R.J.Palacios,and A.Zviniene,2004,Implicit Pension Debt:Issues,Measurement and Scope in International Perspective,(Vol.403).Social Protection,Labor Markets,Pensions,Social Assistance,World Bank.
Ichiro,F.,2002,“Financial Accelerator Effects in Japan's Business Cycles”,Research and Statistics Department Bank of Japan,Working Paper 02—6.
Johnson,C.,1982,MITI and the Japanese Miracles:The Growth of Industrial Policy,1925—1975,Stanford University Press.
Krugman,P.,1994,“The Myth of Asia's Miracle”,Foreign Affairs,73(6),62—78.
Lim,J.J.,2019,“Growth in the Shadow of Debt”,Journal of Banking and Finance,103,98—112.
Mbaye,S.,M.Badia,and K.Chae,2018,Global Debt Database:Methodology and Sources.IMF Working Paper,18/111.
Minsky,H.P.,1986,Stabilizing an Unstable Economy,New York:McGraw-Hill.
Pang,Eul-Soo,2000,“The Financial Crisis of 1997—98 and the End of the Asian Developmental State”,Contemporary Southeast Asia,22(3),570—593.
Rajan,R.G.,and L.Zingales,2004,Saving Capitalism From the Capitalists:Unleashing the Power of Financial Markets to Create Wealth and Spread Opportunity,Princeton University Press.
Reinhart,C.M.,and K.S.Rogoff,2010a,“Growth in a Time of Debt”,NBER Working Paper Series,No.15639.
Reinhart,C.M.,and K.S.Rogoff,2010b,“Growth in a Time of Debt”,American Economic Review,100(2),573—578.
Robinson,J.,1952,“The Generalization of the General Theory”,in The Rate of Interest and Other Essays,London,Macmillan,67—142.
Stuwell,J.,2013,How Asia Works:Success and Failure in the World's Most Dynamic Region,Grove Press.
Turner,A.,2015,Between Debt and the Devil:Money,Credit,and Fixing Global Finance,Princeton University Press
Wicksell,K.,1936,Interest and Prices.A Study of the Causes Regulating the Value of Money,London:Macmillan.
Woodford,M.,2003,Interest and Prices.Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy,Princeton and Oxford:Princeton University Press.
(1)关于杠杆率的影响及其风险一般论及较多,这里不再赘述。另外,本文的杠杆率均指宏观杠杆率,即债务/GDP。
(2)本文所有中国杠杆率数据均来自中国社会科学院国家资产负债表研究中心(CNBS)。
(3)存在补贴幻觉是由于银行(或金融机构)相信国企(或政府支持的企业)即便亏损,最终也会由财政买单(即财政补贴)。但政府买单并非正式制度,只是一种隐性的、或有的担保。而银行未能拿到其所预期的补贴(即补贴幻觉),恰恰表明这种担保是隐性的、或有的。
(4)地方政府没有进入模型,但其行为与国企具有较大的相似性。
(5)限于篇幅,描述模型经济系统动态运行规律的方程对数线性化结果不再列出,感兴趣的读者可向作者索取。
(6)用(私人部门债务总额+中央政府债务)/GDP得到。本文的私人部门其实是非政府部门,但在许多国家私人部门中会包括国有企业,所以读者须清楚私人部门的含义,它是相对于政府(公共)部门而言的。
(7)我们也做了Hausman随机效应和固定效应检验,结果均支持使用固定效应模型。
(8)其中,政府本币债务几乎不存在违约问题,因国家掌握铸币权,可以不断采取展期的方式延后债务。
(9)800美元约为美国1970年人均GDP的15%,而2015年美国人均GDP的15%则为8466美元。我们亦尝试了700美元、500美元等多个档次,结果基本一致。
(10)我们也对杠杆率与各国全要素生产率进行回归,结果与GDP增速的回归基本一致。略有差异的地方在于:国企债务对于经济的全要素生产率的不利影响主要体现在高收入经济体,而在低收入经济体不显著。