地方政府环境偏好与中国环境分权管理体制的环保效应
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摘要
分析了地方政府环境偏好和中国式环境分权对环境保护的作用机理,用地方政府收取的环境相关税费占GDP的比重衡量地方政府环境偏好,用不同层级政府间环境管理人员的配置衡量中国式环境分权度,基于2006—2015年中国省际面板数据,实证检验了地方政府环境偏好和中国式环境分权的环保效应和门槛效应。结果表明:地方政府环境偏好具有环保正效应,中国式环境分权具有环保负效应;两者的环保效应具有显著的门槛效应,且两者在环保效应上相互牵制。在样本期内的300个观测值中,仅有28个观测值同时处于地方政府环境偏好的高门槛区域和中国式环境分权的低门槛区域,占总观测值的9.33%。鉴于此,地方政府环境偏好应进一步提升,同时中央政府应进行适度的环境集权,以显著提升对环境保护的正效应。
Firstly,this paper analyzes the mechanisms of local government environmental preference and Chinese environmental decentralization on environmental protection.Then it measures local government environmental preference by the proportion of environmental related tax and fee collected by local government to GDP,and the degree of Chinese environmental decentralization by the allocation of intergovernmental environmental managers at different levels.And it analyzes empirically environmental protection effect and threshold effect of local government environmental preference and Chinese environmental decentralization by using the panel data during 2006-2015.The results show as follows:local government environmental preference has a positive effect on environmental protection,and Chinese environmental decentralization has a negative effect on it;both of them have significant threshold effects and mutual restraint on environmental effects;in the sample period,only 28 of the 300 observed values are both in the high threshold region of local government environmental preference and low threshold region of Chinese environmental decentralization,accounting for 9.33% of total observed.Therefore,local government environmental preference should be enhanced,and central government should moderate environmental centralization to increase the positive effect on environmental protection significantly.
Firstly,this paper analyzes the mechanisms of local government environmental preference and Chinese environmental decentralization on environmental protection.Then it measures local government environmental preference by the proportion of environmental related tax and fee collected by local government to GDP,and the degree of Chinese environmental decentralization by the allocation of intergovernmental environmental managers at different levels.And it analyzes empirically environmental protection effect and threshold effect of local government environmental preference and Chinese environmental decentralization by using the panel data during 2006-2015.The results show as follows:local government environmental preference has a positive effect on environmental protection,and Chinese environmental decentralization has a negative effect on it;both of them have significant threshold effects and mutual restraint on environmental effects;in the sample period,only 28 of the 300 observed values are both in the high threshold region of local government environmental preference and low threshold region of Chinese environmental decentralization,accounting for 9.33% of total observed.Therefore,local government environmental preference should be enhanced,and central government should moderate environmental centralization to increase the positive effect on environmental protection significantly.
引文
[1]周黎安.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因[J],经济研究,2004(6):33-40.
[2]齐结斌,胡育蓉.环境质量与经济增长——基于异质性偏好和政府视界的分析[J],中国经济问题,2013(5):28-38.
[3]田淑英,董玮.环保财政支出、政府环境偏好与政策效应——基于省际工业污染数据的实证分析[J],经济问题探索,2016(7):14-21.
[4]OATES W A.Reconsideration of environmental federalism[R].Washington D.C.:Resources for the Future,2001.
[5]JACOBSEN G D,KOTCHEN M J,VANDERNBERGH M P.The behavioral response to voluntary provision of an environmental public good:evidence from residential electricity demand[J].European Economic Review,2012,56(5):946-960.
[6]祁毓,卢洪友,徐彦坤.中国环境分权体制改革研究:制度变迁、数量测算与效应评估[J],中国工业经济,2014(1):31-43.
[7]陆远权,张德钢.环境分权、市场分割与碳排放[J],中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(6):107-115.
[8]白俊红,聂亮.环境分权是否真的加剧了雾霾污染?[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017(12):59-69.
[9]GROSSMAN G M,KRUEGER A B.Economic growth and the environment[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1995,8(2):353-377.
[10]WANG H,DI W.The determinants of government environmental performance:an empirical analysis of Chinese townships[Z].Policy Research Working Paper,2010:704-708.
[11]COLE M A.Economic growth and water use[J].Applied Economics Letters,2004,11(1):1-4.
[12]刘修岩,董会敏.出口贸易加重还是缓解中国的空气污染——基于PM2.5和SO2数据的实证检验[J].财贸研究,2017(1):76-84.
[13]RIVERA-BATIZ F L,RIVERA-BATIZ L A.Democracy,participation,and economic development:an introduction[J].Review of Development Economics,2002,6(2):135-150.
[14]谢锐,陈严,韩峰,等.新型城镇化对城市生态环境质量的影响及时空效应[J].管理评论,2018(1):230-241.
[15]熊升银.中国城镇化的生态环境效应——基于工业污染治理投资视角的实证研究[J].技术经济,2017,36(12):86-90.
[16]DEAN J M,LOVELY M E,Wang H.Are foreign investors attracted to weak environmental regulations?evaluating the evidence from China[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2009,90(1):1-13.
[17]韩国高,张超.财政分权和晋升激励对城市环境污染的影响——兼论绿色考核对我国环境治理的重要性[J].城市问题,2018(2):25-35.
[18]HANSEN B E.Threshold effects in non-dynamic panels:estimation,testing and inference[J].Journal of Econometrics,1999,93(2):345-368.
(1)因数据缺失,不包括我国港澳台地区和西藏地区。
(2)环境保护税于2018年1月1日起才正式征求,在此之前中国实行的是“融入型”环境税,环境相关税费主要包括排污费、资源税、土地使用税、城市维护建设税、车船税和耕地占用税。
[2]齐结斌,胡育蓉.环境质量与经济增长——基于异质性偏好和政府视界的分析[J],中国经济问题,2013(5):28-38.
[3]田淑英,董玮.环保财政支出、政府环境偏好与政策效应——基于省际工业污染数据的实证分析[J],经济问题探索,2016(7):14-21.
[4]OATES W A.Reconsideration of environmental federalism[R].Washington D.C.:Resources for the Future,2001.
[5]JACOBSEN G D,KOTCHEN M J,VANDERNBERGH M P.The behavioral response to voluntary provision of an environmental public good:evidence from residential electricity demand[J].European Economic Review,2012,56(5):946-960.
[6]祁毓,卢洪友,徐彦坤.中国环境分权体制改革研究:制度变迁、数量测算与效应评估[J],中国工业经济,2014(1):31-43.
[7]陆远权,张德钢.环境分权、市场分割与碳排放[J],中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(6):107-115.
[8]白俊红,聂亮.环境分权是否真的加剧了雾霾污染?[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017(12):59-69.
[9]GROSSMAN G M,KRUEGER A B.Economic growth and the environment[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1995,8(2):353-377.
[10]WANG H,DI W.The determinants of government environmental performance:an empirical analysis of Chinese townships[Z].Policy Research Working Paper,2010:704-708.
[11]COLE M A.Economic growth and water use[J].Applied Economics Letters,2004,11(1):1-4.
[12]刘修岩,董会敏.出口贸易加重还是缓解中国的空气污染——基于PM2.5和SO2数据的实证检验[J].财贸研究,2017(1):76-84.
[13]RIVERA-BATIZ F L,RIVERA-BATIZ L A.Democracy,participation,and economic development:an introduction[J].Review of Development Economics,2002,6(2):135-150.
[14]谢锐,陈严,韩峰,等.新型城镇化对城市生态环境质量的影响及时空效应[J].管理评论,2018(1):230-241.
[15]熊升银.中国城镇化的生态环境效应——基于工业污染治理投资视角的实证研究[J].技术经济,2017,36(12):86-90.
[16]DEAN J M,LOVELY M E,Wang H.Are foreign investors attracted to weak environmental regulations?evaluating the evidence from China[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2009,90(1):1-13.
[17]韩国高,张超.财政分权和晋升激励对城市环境污染的影响——兼论绿色考核对我国环境治理的重要性[J].城市问题,2018(2):25-35.
[18]HANSEN B E.Threshold effects in non-dynamic panels:estimation,testing and inference[J].Journal of Econometrics,1999,93(2):345-368.
(1)因数据缺失,不包括我国港澳台地区和西藏地区。
(2)环境保护税于2018年1月1日起才正式征求,在此之前中国实行的是“融入型”环境税,环境相关税费主要包括排污费、资源税、土地使用税、城市维护建设税、车船税和耕地占用税。