“懒政”、综合政绩考核与政府机构改革
|
摘要
"懒政"是一种隐性腐败,严重损害政府公信力。"懒政"的制度根源是什么?文章认为,这源于当前针对地方官员的综合政绩考核制度与不同层级政府机构职能不配套。综合政绩考核中最重要的两项指标是经济和社会指标,而两者是冲突任务,经济改革上要"去产能",社会保障上要保就业。"去产能"可能导致结构性失业,失业可能引发群体性事件。面对冲突任务,地方政府官员会顾此失彼,维持现状是最优选择,这就是"懒政"的制度根源。因此,要解决"懒政"问题,必须减少基层政府官员承担任务的冲突程度。要从纵向政府机构改革入手,重新调整各个层级政府间的任务分工,将冲突严重的一类任务由基层市县政府交给中央和省级政府承担。
It is a kind of recessive corruption for local government officials not to fulfill their duties, which tarnishes government credibility. What are the institutional roots of the shirking of government officials? This paper argues that it stems from the incompatibility between the institution of comprehensive performance assessment of local officials and the government agency function. The two most important performance assessment indicators are economic and social indicators, which are contradictory. Economic reform should reduce overcapacity, and social security should ensure employment. The former may lead to structural unemployment which may lead to group disturbance. There are two kinds of contradictory tasks, local government officials will be put in a double squeeze facing two kinds of contradictory tasks. Maintaining the status quo is their best option, which is the institutional origin of the shirking of government officials. To solve the problem, we should reduce the degree of conflict of tasks. We should start with the reform of vertical institutions and redistribute tasks at all levels of government. Conflicting tasks should be handed over from county and municipal governments to central and provincial governments.
It is a kind of recessive corruption for local government officials not to fulfill their duties, which tarnishes government credibility. What are the institutional roots of the shirking of government officials? This paper argues that it stems from the incompatibility between the institution of comprehensive performance assessment of local officials and the government agency function. The two most important performance assessment indicators are economic and social indicators, which are contradictory. Economic reform should reduce overcapacity, and social security should ensure employment. The former may lead to structural unemployment which may lead to group disturbance. There are two kinds of contradictory tasks, local government officials will be put in a double squeeze facing two kinds of contradictory tasks. Maintaining the status quo is their best option, which is the institutional origin of the shirking of government officials. To solve the problem, we should reduce the degree of conflict of tasks. We should start with the reform of vertical institutions and redistribute tasks at all levels of government. Conflicting tasks should be handed over from county and municipal governments to central and provincial governments.
引文
蔡立辉,2017:“从揽政到懒政的政治学分析”,《学术研究》, 2017,5:41—48。
金太军、张健荣,2016:“‘为官不为’现象剖析及其规制”,《学习与探索》,2016,3:42—47。
刘铎,2008:“懒政、政治堰塞与治理——‘瓮安事件’的思考”,《理论视野》,2008,9:58—59。
倪星、王锐,2017:“从邀功到避责:基层政府官员行为变化研究”,《政治学研究》,2017,2:42—51。
聂辉华、蒋敏杰,2011:“政企合谋与矿难:来自中国省级面板数据的证据”,《经济研究》,2011,6:146—156。
文宏、张书,2017:“官员 ‘为官不为’影响因素的实证研究—基于A省垂直系统的数据”,《中国行政管理》,2017,10:100—107。
燕继荣,2015:“官员不作为的深层原因分析”,《人民论坛》,2015,15:22—25。
杨雨莲、张国清,2017:“庸官懒政的博弈分析”,《浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版)》,2017,2:138—147。
郑秉文,2016:《中国养老金发展报告(2016)》,北京:经济管理出版社。
周黎安,2007:“中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究”,《经济研究》,2007,7:36—50。
Bond, P., and A.Gomes, 2009.“Multitask Principal-Agent Problems: Optimal Contracts, Fragility, and Effort Misallocation.”Journal of Economic Theory.144(1):175-211.
Holmstrom,B., and P.Milgrom, 1991. “Multitask Principal-Agent Analysis: Incentive Contracts,Asset Ownership,and Job Design.” Journal of Law,Economics,and Organization.7(9):24-51.
Hood, C., W.Jennings., and P.Copeland, 2016. “Blame Avoidance in Comparative Perspective: Reactivity, Staged Retreat and Efficacy.” Public Administration.94(2):542-562.
Hood, C., 2007. “What Happens When Transparency Meets Blame-Avoidance.” Public Management Review.9(2):191-210.
Mu, R., and De Jong, M., 2018. “The Psychology of Local Officials: Explaining Strategic Behavior in the Chinese Target Responsibility System.” Journal of Chinese Governance. 3(2): 243-260.
Jia, R.X., and Huihua N., 2015. “Decentralization, Collusion and Coalmine Deaths.” Review of Economics and Statistics.99(1):105-118.
(1)2015年李克强总理在十二届全国人大三次会议上的《政府工作报告》。
(2)中国新闻网,李克强总理答记者问。http://www. chinanews. com/gn/2015/03-15/7129773. shtml。
(3)详细案例见《国务院办公厅关于督查问责典型案例的通报》(国办发[2017]53号)。
(4)十九大报告。
(5)《关于改进地方党政领导班子和领导干部政绩考核工作的通知》。
(1)十八届三中全会公报明确指出“完善发展成果考核评价体系,纠正单纯以经济增长速度评定政绩的偏向”。
(2)具体见文章第三部分的制度背景。
(3)新华网http://www. xinhuanet. com/politics/2013-06/29/c_116339948. htm。
(4)河南省发改委官网http://www. hndrc. gov. cn/ar/20150917000034. htm。
(1)亳州市政府官网http://xxgk. bozhou. gov. cn/openness/detail/content/59e41dd7da3293564603cd94. html。
(2)人民网http://politics. people. com. cn/n1/2016/0303/c1001-28167086. html。
(3)新华网,http://news. xinhuanet. com/fortune/2016-05/08/c_128967388. htm。
(1)财政部网站,“2017年财政收支情况”。
(2)中国政府网http://www. gov. cn/zhengce/content/2014-10/02/content_9111. htm。
金太军、张健荣,2016:“‘为官不为’现象剖析及其规制”,《学习与探索》,2016,3:42—47。
刘铎,2008:“懒政、政治堰塞与治理——‘瓮安事件’的思考”,《理论视野》,2008,9:58—59。
倪星、王锐,2017:“从邀功到避责:基层政府官员行为变化研究”,《政治学研究》,2017,2:42—51。
聂辉华、蒋敏杰,2011:“政企合谋与矿难:来自中国省级面板数据的证据”,《经济研究》,2011,6:146—156。
文宏、张书,2017:“官员 ‘为官不为’影响因素的实证研究—基于A省垂直系统的数据”,《中国行政管理》,2017,10:100—107。
燕继荣,2015:“官员不作为的深层原因分析”,《人民论坛》,2015,15:22—25。
杨雨莲、张国清,2017:“庸官懒政的博弈分析”,《浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版)》,2017,2:138—147。
郑秉文,2016:《中国养老金发展报告(2016)》,北京:经济管理出版社。
周黎安,2007:“中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究”,《经济研究》,2007,7:36—50。
Bond, P., and A.Gomes, 2009.“Multitask Principal-Agent Problems: Optimal Contracts, Fragility, and Effort Misallocation.”Journal of Economic Theory.144(1):175-211.
Holmstrom,B., and P.Milgrom, 1991. “Multitask Principal-Agent Analysis: Incentive Contracts,Asset Ownership,and Job Design.” Journal of Law,Economics,and Organization.7(9):24-51.
Hood, C., W.Jennings., and P.Copeland, 2016. “Blame Avoidance in Comparative Perspective: Reactivity, Staged Retreat and Efficacy.” Public Administration.94(2):542-562.
Hood, C., 2007. “What Happens When Transparency Meets Blame-Avoidance.” Public Management Review.9(2):191-210.
Mu, R., and De Jong, M., 2018. “The Psychology of Local Officials: Explaining Strategic Behavior in the Chinese Target Responsibility System.” Journal of Chinese Governance. 3(2): 243-260.
Jia, R.X., and Huihua N., 2015. “Decentralization, Collusion and Coalmine Deaths.” Review of Economics and Statistics.99(1):105-118.
(1)2015年李克强总理在十二届全国人大三次会议上的《政府工作报告》。
(2)中国新闻网,李克强总理答记者问。http://www. chinanews. com/gn/2015/03-15/7129773. shtml。
(3)详细案例见《国务院办公厅关于督查问责典型案例的通报》(国办发[2017]53号)。
(4)十九大报告。
(5)《关于改进地方党政领导班子和领导干部政绩考核工作的通知》。
(1)十八届三中全会公报明确指出“完善发展成果考核评价体系,纠正单纯以经济增长速度评定政绩的偏向”。
(2)具体见文章第三部分的制度背景。
(3)新华网http://www. xinhuanet. com/politics/2013-06/29/c_116339948. htm。
(4)河南省发改委官网http://www. hndrc. gov. cn/ar/20150917000034. htm。
(1)亳州市政府官网http://xxgk. bozhou. gov. cn/openness/detail/content/59e41dd7da3293564603cd94. html。
(2)人民网http://politics. people. com. cn/n1/2016/0303/c1001-28167086. html。
(3)新华网,http://news. xinhuanet. com/fortune/2016-05/08/c_128967388. htm。
(1)财政部网站,“2017年财政收支情况”。
(2)中国政府网http://www. gov. cn/zhengce/content/2014-10/02/content_9111. htm。