硬件木马旁路检测方法的影响因素研究
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摘要
旁路检测方法通过采集电路功耗、延迟、电磁场等物理参数特性筛查硬件木马电路,但其检测性能会受到工艺波动的严重影响,且工艺的不确定性会随着芯片工艺尺寸缩小和亚阈值泄漏电流增大而增加。为此,研究硬件木马旁路检测的影响因素。通过构建旁路检测模型,在中芯国际130 nm和65 nm标准CMOS工艺下对ISCAS’85 c880基准和木马电路进行实验,结果表明,优化测试向量和适当降低电源电压能够降低工艺波动的影响,平均综合灵敏度分别提升5. 60%(130 nm)和0. 40%(65 nm)。同时,利用静/动态测试向量组的绝对差异比作为辅助判别依据,可降低测试向量筛选迭代次数。
The side-channel detection method screens the hardware Trojan circuit by collecting physical parameters such as power consumption,delay,and electromagnetic field,but its detection performance is seriously affected by process fluctuation,and process uncertainty increases as the chip process size shrinks and the subthreshold leakage current increases. Therefore,the influencing factors of hardw are Trojan side-channel detection are studied. The ISCAS '85 c880 reference and Trojan circuits are tested in a SM IC 130 nm and 65 nm standard CM OS process by building a side-channel detection model. The results show that optimizing the test vector and appropriately reducing the pow er supply voltage can reduce the influence of process fluctuation,and the average comprehensive sensitivity is increased by 5. 60%( 130 nm)and 0. 40%( 65 nm),respectively. At the same time,using the absolute difference ratio of the static/dynamic test vector group as the auxiliary discriminant basis,the number of test vector screening iterations can be reduced.
The side-channel detection method screens the hardware Trojan circuit by collecting physical parameters such as power consumption,delay,and electromagnetic field,but its detection performance is seriously affected by process fluctuation,and process uncertainty increases as the chip process size shrinks and the subthreshold leakage current increases. Therefore,the influencing factors of hardw are Trojan side-channel detection are studied. The ISCAS '85 c880 reference and Trojan circuits are tested in a SM IC 130 nm and 65 nm standard CM OS process by building a side-channel detection model. The results show that optimizing the test vector and appropriately reducing the pow er supply voltage can reduce the influence of process fluctuation,and the average comprehensive sensitivity is increased by 5. 60%( 130 nm)and 0. 40%( 65 nm),respectively. At the same time,using the absolute difference ratio of the static/dynamic test vector group as the auxiliary discriminant basis,the number of test vector screening iterations can be reduced.
引文
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[2]赵毅强,何家骥,杨松,等.集成电路中硬件木马防御技术研究[J].计算机工程,2016,42(1):128-132.
[3]BHUNIA S,HSIAO M S,BANGA M,et al.Hardware Trojan attacks:threat analysis and countermeasures[J].Journal Impact Factor and Information,2014,102(8):1229-1247.
[4]ZARRINCHIAN G,ZAMANI M S.Latch-based structure:a high resolution and self-reference technique for hardw are Trojan detection[J].IEEE Transactions on Computers,2017,66(1):100-113.
[5]RATHMAIR M,SCHUPFER F,KRIEG C.Applied formal methods for hardw are Trojan detection[C]//Proceedings of IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems.Washington D.C.,USA:IEEEPress,2014:169-172.
[6]NARASIMHAN S,DU D,CHAKRABORTY R S,et al.Hardw are Trojan detection by multiple-parameter sidechannel analysis[J].IEEE Transactions on Computers,2013,62(11):2183-2195.
[7]李雄伟,王晓晗,张阳,等.基于多旁路综合分析的硬件木马检测方法[J].计算机仿真,2015,32(3):216-219.
[8]AARESTAD J,ACHARYYA D,RAD R,et al.Detecting Trojans through leakage current analysis using multiple supply pad IDDQS[J].IEEE Transactions on Information Forensicsand Security,2010,5(4):893-904.
[9]WEI S,POTKONJAK M.Scalable hardware Trojan diagnosis[J].IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration Systems,2012,20(6):1049-1057.
[10]RAI D,LACH J.Performance of delay-based Trojan detection techniques under parameter variations[C]//Proceedings of IEEE International Workshop on HardwareOriented Security and Trust.Washington D.C.,USA:IEEEPress,2009:58-65.
[11]ISCAS85 test generation benchmark data[EB/OL].[2017-08-15].http://www.cs.ubc.ca/~ajh/courses/cpsc513/assign-cmbcmp-bdd/ISCAS85/.
[12]SAKURAI T,NEWTON A R.Alpha-power law M OSFET model and its applications to CM OS inverter delay and other formulas[J].IEEE Journal of SolidState Circuits,1990,25(2):584-594.
[13]BUTZEN P F,RIBAS R P.Leakage current in submicrometer CM OS gates[EB/OL].[2017-08-15].http://inf.ufrgs.br/logics/docman/book_emicro_butzen.pdf.
[14]Synopsys design compiler[EB/OL].[2017-08-15].http://w w w.synopsys.com/cn/Tools/Implementation/RTLSynthesis/Pages/default.aspx.
[15]Mentor Graphicsv2lvs[EB/OL].[2017-08-15].http://cn.mentor.com/functional-verification.
[16]Synopsys HSPICE[EB/OL].[2017-08-15].http://www.synopsys.com/verification/ams-verification/circuit-simulat ion/hspice.html.
[17]CHA B,GUPTA S.Efficient Trojan detection via calibration of process variations[C]//Proceedings of the21st Asian Test Symposium.Washington D.C.,USA:IEEEPress,2012:355-361.