企业间游说竞争如何影响反倾销裁决
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摘要
反倾销裁决应是政府主管部门实现战略性产业保护的合理抉择,但国内外利益集团通过各种游说竞争方式以影响反倾销裁决结果,反倾销裁决实质上变成各方力量角逐的均衡结果。通过分析反倾销游说下政策博弈参与者的行为抉择,研究发现:进口产品的售价、政府对国家福利的重视程度与反倾销税成反比,而国外企业利益集团的影响则有助于减少反倾销税;国内市场规模越大,政府裁决部门越倾向于提高反倾销保护水平,而有效的游说途径有助于获得理想裁决结果;"搭便车"行为对企业的反倾销申诉积极性存在直接损害,国内企业宁可直接向政府裁决部门提供政治献金,也不愿去搜寻举证信息。
Antidumping decision should be the perfect choice for authorities to implement strategic industrial protection. But the antidumping decision is the equilibrium outcome under the interests' lobbying competition,and antidumping decision actually is the equilibrium result of various delegates' competition.Through analyzing the participator' s utility maximization behavior,the paper proves the price of imported products and the importance the government attaches to the national welfare is inversely proportional with tariff,while the marginal revenue of domestic enterprise from protection is in proportion with tariff. The final tariff will go down with the number of foreign enterprise lobbying for preferred trade policy,and will go up with the volume of domestic market,and an effective way of lobbying helps to win an ideal decision.After analyzing the affection of the information searching and free riding behavior,domestic enterprise would rather directly contribute government offices than collect information,while free riding damage the enterprise' s enthusiasm for antidumping application.
Antidumping decision should be the perfect choice for authorities to implement strategic industrial protection. But the antidumping decision is the equilibrium outcome under the interests' lobbying competition,and antidumping decision actually is the equilibrium result of various delegates' competition.Through analyzing the participator' s utility maximization behavior,the paper proves the price of imported products and the importance the government attaches to the national welfare is inversely proportional with tariff,while the marginal revenue of domestic enterprise from protection is in proportion with tariff. The final tariff will go down with the number of foreign enterprise lobbying for preferred trade policy,and will go up with the volume of domestic market,and an effective way of lobbying helps to win an ideal decision.After analyzing the affection of the information searching and free riding behavior,domestic enterprise would rather directly contribute government offices than collect information,while free riding damage the enterprise' s enthusiasm for antidumping application.
引文
戴亦一,潘越,马舒.2014.中国慈善捐赠是一种“政治献金”吗:来自市委书记更替的证据[J].经济研究(2):74-86.
顾振华,沈瑶.2015.利益集团影响下的中国贸易保护政策:基于产业分工的视角[J].南开经济研究(2):74-93.
刘锦芳.2014.不完全信息下的最优反倾销税率政策分析[J].中央财经大学学报(12):18-28.
刘锦芳.2016.不完全信息下的反倾销游说竞争分析[J].中央财经大学学报(5):80-89.
BENNEDSEN M,FELDMANN S E.2006.Information lobbying and political contributions[J].Journal of Public Economics,90(4-5):631-656.
BOMBARDINI M.2008.Firm heterogeneity and lobby participation[J].Journal of International Economics,75(2):329-348.
CASSING J,TO T.2008.Antidumping,signaling and cheap talk[J].Journal of International Economics,75(2):373-382.
DOBRIN D R,PRUSA T J.1999.Tariff policy for a monopolist in a signaling game[J].Journal of International Economics,49(1):51-76.
EICHER T S,OSANG T.2012.Protection for sale:an empirical investigation:comment[J].American Economic Review,92(5):1702-1710.
EVANS C L,SHERLUND S M.2011.Are antidumping duties for sale?Case-level evidence on the grossman-helpman protection for sale model[J].Southern Economic Journal,78(2):330-357.
GAWANDE K,BANDYOPADHYAY U.2000.Is protection for sale?Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman theory of endogenous protection[J].Review of Economics and Statistics,82(1):139-152.
GAWANDE K,MAGEE C.2012.Free riding and protect for sale[J].International Studies Quarterly,56(4):735-747.
GROSSMAN G E,HELPMAN E.1994.Protect for sale[J].The American Economic Review,84(4):833-850.
KAHNEMAN D,TVERSKY A.1979.Prospect theory:an analysis of decision under risk[J].Econometrica,47(2):263-291.
LAGERLOF J.1997.Lobbying,information,and private and social welfare[J].European Journal of Political Economy,13(3):615-637.
MAGEE C.2002.Endogenous trade policy and lobby formation:an application to the free-rider problem[J].Journal of International Economics,57(2):449-471.
(1)本文分析的企业游说活动主要包括:企业提供举证材料;参加听证会;依托人大代表、政协委员在两会或其他场合发表意见;进行公关宣传等。本文的企业游说活动指的是企业通过种种方式影响公共权力机构的过程。使用这一概念乃是为了构建研究分析框架,以进一步研究该问题。
(1)因为国内企业和国外企业的信息报告可以相互验证,具有对照审查的效果,因此,为避免被查出谎报而遭受处罚,企业有很大可能提供自己所能搜集到的举证信息,在此企业将会直接提供政府裁决部门自己搜集到的举证信息,而这对政府裁决部门产生何种影响,则取决于政府裁决部门对举证材料的认可程度。
(2)出于保护本国进口竞争性产业、引进适度竞争、促进产业发展等目的,一般政府裁决部门会对低成本国外企业征收高反倾销税,对高成本类型国外企业征低反倾销税,甚至不征税(刘锦芳,2014)。
顾振华,沈瑶.2015.利益集团影响下的中国贸易保护政策:基于产业分工的视角[J].南开经济研究(2):74-93.
刘锦芳.2014.不完全信息下的最优反倾销税率政策分析[J].中央财经大学学报(12):18-28.
刘锦芳.2016.不完全信息下的反倾销游说竞争分析[J].中央财经大学学报(5):80-89.
BENNEDSEN M,FELDMANN S E.2006.Information lobbying and political contributions[J].Journal of Public Economics,90(4-5):631-656.
BOMBARDINI M.2008.Firm heterogeneity and lobby participation[J].Journal of International Economics,75(2):329-348.
CASSING J,TO T.2008.Antidumping,signaling and cheap talk[J].Journal of International Economics,75(2):373-382.
DOBRIN D R,PRUSA T J.1999.Tariff policy for a monopolist in a signaling game[J].Journal of International Economics,49(1):51-76.
EICHER T S,OSANG T.2012.Protection for sale:an empirical investigation:comment[J].American Economic Review,92(5):1702-1710.
EVANS C L,SHERLUND S M.2011.Are antidumping duties for sale?Case-level evidence on the grossman-helpman protection for sale model[J].Southern Economic Journal,78(2):330-357.
GAWANDE K,BANDYOPADHYAY U.2000.Is protection for sale?Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman theory of endogenous protection[J].Review of Economics and Statistics,82(1):139-152.
GAWANDE K,MAGEE C.2012.Free riding and protect for sale[J].International Studies Quarterly,56(4):735-747.
GROSSMAN G E,HELPMAN E.1994.Protect for sale[J].The American Economic Review,84(4):833-850.
KAHNEMAN D,TVERSKY A.1979.Prospect theory:an analysis of decision under risk[J].Econometrica,47(2):263-291.
LAGERLOF J.1997.Lobbying,information,and private and social welfare[J].European Journal of Political Economy,13(3):615-637.
MAGEE C.2002.Endogenous trade policy and lobby formation:an application to the free-rider problem[J].Journal of International Economics,57(2):449-471.
(1)本文分析的企业游说活动主要包括:企业提供举证材料;参加听证会;依托人大代表、政协委员在两会或其他场合发表意见;进行公关宣传等。本文的企业游说活动指的是企业通过种种方式影响公共权力机构的过程。使用这一概念乃是为了构建研究分析框架,以进一步研究该问题。
(1)因为国内企业和国外企业的信息报告可以相互验证,具有对照审查的效果,因此,为避免被查出谎报而遭受处罚,企业有很大可能提供自己所能搜集到的举证信息,在此企业将会直接提供政府裁决部门自己搜集到的举证信息,而这对政府裁决部门产生何种影响,则取决于政府裁决部门对举证材料的认可程度。
(2)出于保护本国进口竞争性产业、引进适度竞争、促进产业发展等目的,一般政府裁决部门会对低成本国外企业征收高反倾销税,对高成本类型国外企业征低反倾销税,甚至不征税(刘锦芳,2014)。