独立董事特征与高管薪酬业绩敏感性
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摘要
独立董事制度普遍被认为是对公司高管薪酬激励契约进行监督制约的重要机制。以2016年我国沪深两市A股1981家上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了独立董事特征与高管薪酬业绩敏感性之间的关系。研究发现:独立董事的独立性、声誉越强,越能发挥对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的监督作用;独立董事是否具有会计、金融等知识的教育或工作背景对高管薪酬业绩敏感性没有显著的影响,据此提出完善我国独立董事制度的建议。
The independent director system is generally considered to be an important oversight mechanism of the company's executive compensation contracts. In this paper, we choose 1981 listed companies as the sample from Shanghai and Shenzhen capital markets in 2016, and then we empirically test the relationship between the independent directors' characteristics and the executives' payment performance sensitivity. We find that the more independent and the higher reputation the independent directors, the higher the executives' payment performance sensitivity, whether the independent directors have the education or work background in accounting and finance has nothing to do with the executives' paymnet performance sensitivity. And finally some suggestions are proposed in this paper.
The independent director system is generally considered to be an important oversight mechanism of the company's executive compensation contracts. In this paper, we choose 1981 listed companies as the sample from Shanghai and Shenzhen capital markets in 2016, and then we empirically test the relationship between the independent directors' characteristics and the executives' payment performance sensitivity. We find that the more independent and the higher reputation the independent directors, the higher the executives' payment performance sensitivity, whether the independent directors have the education or work background in accounting and finance has nothing to do with the executives' paymnet performance sensitivity. And finally some suggestions are proposed in this paper.
引文
[1]汪晓波.独立董事何时告别“花瓶”身份.文汇报.2005-7-18(13)
[2]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵.经济研究.2010(11)73-84
[3]方军雄.高管权力与企业薪酬变动的非对称性.经济研究.2011.4:107-120
[4]Benjamin E,Hermalin,Michael S,Weisbach.The Determinants of Board Composition.The RAND Journal of Economics.1988.19(4)589-606
[5]Yermack D.Remuneration,Retention and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors.Journal of Finance.2004.59(5)2281-2308
[6]陈立泰,林川.董事会特征与现金股利分配倾向.管理世界.2011(10)178-179
[7]曾东海.董事会独立性、独立董事身份、任期与现金股利支付关系研究.统计与决策.2013(11)169-172
[8]李维安,徐建.董事会独立性、总经理继任与战略变化幅度---独立董事有效性的实证研究.南开管理评论.2014.17(1)4-13
[9]Bedard J,Chtourou SM,Courteau L.Effect of Audit Committee Expertise,Independence,and Activity on Aggressive Earnings Management.AUDITING:A Journal of Practice&Theory.2004.23(2)13-25
[10]叶康涛,祝继高,陆正飞,等.独立董事的独立性:基于董事会投票的证据.经济研究.2011(1)126-139
[11]郑立东,程小可,姚立杰.独立董事背景特征与企业投资效率---“帮助之手”拟或“拟制之手”?经济与管理研究.2013(8)5-14
[12]Fama MC,Jensen.Separation of Ownership and Control.Journal of Law and Economics.1983.26(2)301-325
[13]Hermalin MS,Weisbach.Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution:a Survey of the Economic Literature.FRBNY Economic Policy Review.2003.9(4)7-26
[2]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵.经济研究.2010(11)73-84
[3]方军雄.高管权力与企业薪酬变动的非对称性.经济研究.2011.4:107-120
[4]Benjamin E,Hermalin,Michael S,Weisbach.The Determinants of Board Composition.The RAND Journal of Economics.1988.19(4)589-606
[5]Yermack D.Remuneration,Retention and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors.Journal of Finance.2004.59(5)2281-2308
[6]陈立泰,林川.董事会特征与现金股利分配倾向.管理世界.2011(10)178-179
[7]曾东海.董事会独立性、独立董事身份、任期与现金股利支付关系研究.统计与决策.2013(11)169-172
[8]李维安,徐建.董事会独立性、总经理继任与战略变化幅度---独立董事有效性的实证研究.南开管理评论.2014.17(1)4-13
[9]Bedard J,Chtourou SM,Courteau L.Effect of Audit Committee Expertise,Independence,and Activity on Aggressive Earnings Management.AUDITING:A Journal of Practice&Theory.2004.23(2)13-25
[10]叶康涛,祝继高,陆正飞,等.独立董事的独立性:基于董事会投票的证据.经济研究.2011(1)126-139
[11]郑立东,程小可,姚立杰.独立董事背景特征与企业投资效率---“帮助之手”拟或“拟制之手”?经济与管理研究.2013(8)5-14
[12]Fama MC,Jensen.Separation of Ownership and Control.Journal of Law and Economics.1983.26(2)301-325
[13]Hermalin MS,Weisbach.Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution:a Survey of the Economic Literature.FRBNY Economic Policy Review.2003.9(4)7-26