现金冗余对研发投入的影响研究——股票期权激励及激励阶段的调节效应
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摘要
以我国2012-2015年沪深两市A股企业为样本,主要运用面板Tobit随机效应方法,在研究现金冗余与研发投入关系的基础上,探讨了对高管实施股票期权激励及激励所处阶段对上述关系的影响。结果表明:现金冗余与研发投入正相关;股票期权激励正向调节现金冗余与研发投入的正向关系;相对于处于股票期权激励草案公告前一年的企业,现金冗余对研发投入的促进作用在处于行权等待阶段的企业中会被削弱。在区分企业性质后,以上结论均在非国企中更为明显。
This paper takes China's A-share listed enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen as samples from 2012 to 2015, and uses the Tobit model to explore the relationship between cash slack and R&D investment. On this basis, this paper explores the impact of stock option incentive and its stage on the above relationship. The results show that cash slack is positively related to R&D investment. Stock option incentive positively regulates the positive relationship between cash slack and R&D investment. Compared with enterprises that are in the year before the disclosure of the stock option incentive, the promotion effect of cash slack on R&D investment will be weakened in enterprises in the vesting period. After distinguishing the nature of the ultimate controller, it is found that the above conclusions are all more pronounced in nonSOEs.
This paper takes China's A-share listed enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen as samples from 2012 to 2015, and uses the Tobit model to explore the relationship between cash slack and R&D investment. On this basis, this paper explores the impact of stock option incentive and its stage on the above relationship. The results show that cash slack is positively related to R&D investment. Stock option incentive positively regulates the positive relationship between cash slack and R&D investment. Compared with enterprises that are in the year before the disclosure of the stock option incentive, the promotion effect of cash slack on R&D investment will be weakened in enterprises in the vesting period. After distinguishing the nature of the ultimate controller, it is found that the above conclusions are all more pronounced in nonSOEs.
引文
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[20]张海平,吕长江.上市公司股权激励与会计政策选择:基于资产减值会计的分析[J].财经研究,2011,7:60-70.Zhang H P,Lyu C J.Stock Option Awards and Accounting Policy Choices:Analysis Based on Asset Impairment Accounting[J].Journal of Finance and economics,2011,7:60-70.
[21]杨洋,魏江,罗来军.谁在利用政府补贴进行创新?--所有制和要素市场扭曲的联合调节效应[J].管理世界,2015,1:75-86.Yang Y,Wei J,Luo L J.Who Innovate from Government Subsidies?The Joint Moderation Effects of the Ownership and the Factor Market Distortions[J].Management World,2015,1:75-86.
[22]Zhang,Y.,Li,H.,Li,Y.,et al.FDI Spillovers in an Emerging Market:The Role of Foreign Firms’Country Origin Diversity and Domestic Firms’Absorptive Capacity[J].Strategic Management Journal,2010,31(9):969-989.
[2]Geiger,S.W.,Cashen,L.H.A Multidimensional Examination of Slack and Its Impact on Innovation[J].Journal of Managerial Issues,2002,14(1):68-84.
[3]毕晓方,翟淑萍,何琼枝.财务冗余降低了企业的创新效率吗?--兼议股权制衡的治理作用[J].研究与发展管理,2017,2:82-92.Bi X F,Zhai S P,He Q Z.Does Financial Slack Reduce Enterprises’Innovation Efficiency?Discussing the Governance Effect of Balance of Ownership Structure[J].R&D Management,2017,2:82-92.
[4]Nitin,N.,Ranjay,G.Is Slack Good or Bad for Innovation?[J].Academy of Management Journal,1996,39(5):1245-1264.
[5]王亚妮,程新生.环境不确定性、沉淀性冗余资源与企业创新--基于中国制造业上市公司的经验证据[J].科学学研究,2014,8:1242-1250.Wang Y N,Cheng X S.Environmental Uncertainty,Absorbed Slack and Enterprise Innovation:Evidence from Chinese Listed Enterprises in Manufacture Industry[J].Studies in Science of Science,2014,8:1242-1250.
[6]Terry,M.F.,Chowdhury,J.The Relationship between Organizational Slack and Innovation:Revisited[J].American Journal of Business,2014,29(1):26-42.
[7]姚晓林,李井林,梁雯.技术内部董事、财务冗余与研发投资--来自中国高新技术企业的经验证据[J].科学决策,2018,6:21-40.Yao X L,Li J L,Liang W.Technical Internal Directors,Financial Redundancy and R&DInvestment:An Empirical Research Based on Hi-Tech Enterprises[J].Scientific Decision Making,2018,6:21-40.
[8]Zhang,Y.Are Debt and Incentive Compensation Substitutes in Controlling the Free Cash Flow Agency Problem?[J].Financial Management,2009,38(3):507-541.
[9]肖淑芳,张晨宇,张超,等.股权激励计划公告前的盈余管理--来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2009,4:113-119.Xiao S F,Zhang C Y,Zhang C,et al.Earnings Management Prior to the Public Disclosure of An Equity Incentive Plan:Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies in China[J].Nankai Business Review,2009,4:113-119.
[10]陈林荣,裘益政,王克敏.股票期权激励计划实施中的研发支出行为研究[J].科研管理,2018,2:86-93.Chen L R,Qiu Y Z,Wang K M.A Research on the R&D Expenditure Behaviors during Implementation of the Stock Option Incentive Scheme[J].Science Research Management,2018,2:86-93.
[11]杨慧辉,潘飞,奚玉芹.国外期权激励诱发高管择时行为研究述评及对中国的启示[J].外国经济与管理,2015,5:75-84.Yang H H,Pan F,Xi Y Q.A Foreign Literature Review of Executive Timing Behavior Caused by Stock Option Incentives and Implication for China[J].Foreign Economies and Management,2015,5:75-84.
[12]Wiersma,E.How and When Do Firms Translate Slack into Better Performance?[J].British Accounting Review,2017,49(5):445-459.
[13]Sharfman,M.P.,Wolf,G.,Chase,R.B.,et al.Antecedents of Organizational Slack[J].Academy of Management Review,1988,13(4):601-614.
[14]Jensen,M.C.The Modern Industrial Revolution,Exit,and the Failure of Internal Control Systems[J].Journal of Finance,1993,48(3):831-880.
[15]吕长江,张海平.股权激励计划对公司投资行为的影响[J].管理世界,2011,11:118-126.Lyu C J,Zhang H P.The Effect of the Stock Option Plans on Corporate Investment Behaviors[J].Management World,2011,11:118-126.
[16]田轩,孟清扬.股权激励计划能促进企业创新吗[J].南开管理评论,2018,3:176-190.Tian X,Meng Q Y.Do Stock Incentive Schemes Spur Corporate Innovation[J].Nankai Business Review,2018,3:176-190.
[17]Aboody,D.,Kasznik,R.CEO Stock Option Awards and the Timing of Corporate Voluntary Disclosures[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,2000,29(1):73-100.
[18]吴德胜,王栋.中国业绩型股权激励公告前的盈余操纵[J].审计与经济研究,2015,5:66-75.Wu D S,Wang D.Earnings Manipulation of China’s Performance:Vested Equity Incentives before the Announcement[J].Audit&Economy Research,2015,5:66-75.
[19]王艳.中小上市企业财务冗余影响因素及其经济后果的实证研究[D].中南大学,2013.Wang Y.The Empirical Research on the Affecting Factors and Economics Consequences of Financial Slack of Listed SMEs[D].Central South University,2013.
[20]张海平,吕长江.上市公司股权激励与会计政策选择:基于资产减值会计的分析[J].财经研究,2011,7:60-70.Zhang H P,Lyu C J.Stock Option Awards and Accounting Policy Choices:Analysis Based on Asset Impairment Accounting[J].Journal of Finance and economics,2011,7:60-70.
[21]杨洋,魏江,罗来军.谁在利用政府补贴进行创新?--所有制和要素市场扭曲的联合调节效应[J].管理世界,2015,1:75-86.Yang Y,Wei J,Luo L J.Who Innovate from Government Subsidies?The Joint Moderation Effects of the Ownership and the Factor Market Distortions[J].Management World,2015,1:75-86.
[22]Zhang,Y.,Li,H.,Li,Y.,et al.FDI Spillovers in an Emerging Market:The Role of Foreign Firms’Country Origin Diversity and Domestic Firms’Absorptive Capacity[J].Strategic Management Journal,2010,31(9):969-989.